The house at the corner was Battalion Headquarters. The ground
attacked over was beyond the village.
]
The village had been considerably knocked about by the shelling, and the
enemy continued to add to the damage by his counter-shelling during the
rest of the day. The 73rd Brigade passed through us in the afternoon and
took over the advanced guard work. On the following morning the 17th
Brigade followed the 73rd, and we became brigade in Divisional Reserve.
During the day, October 10, we moved from Awoingt to Cagnoncles, where
we were very comfortably billeted for the night.
The advance continued on the 11th, and we moved forward in the early
morning to positions south of Rieux, where we dug in in artillery
formation and remained for the night. It was during this digging in that
Lieut. Dean was wounded. He was loudly cheered by the Battalion, and
particularly by No. 16 Platoon, as he was carried away on a stretcher.
This ended Dean’s active service with the Battalion, as after a critical
time in hospital in England he did not become convalescent until long
after hostilities had ceased, and he was not sent out again. After the
charmed existence he had had during the past weeks, it was the irony of
fate which decided that he should be the only casualty in the Battalion
on the day when he was wounded.
On October 12 the enemy was reported to have retired across the River
Selle, and the 17th Brigade were following. The enemy had, however, left
strong rearguards behind, and the 17th Brigade had very heavy casualties
during the advance on St. Aubert.
At night we moved forward into billets in Avesnes.
In the early morning of the 13th we relieved the Rifle Brigade on the
Selle river in front of Haussy. The 1st North Staffordshire Regiment
were holding similar positions on our left, and the 9th East Surrey
Regiment were in reserve in St. Aubert. Our forward positions were on
high ground just short of the ravine through which the Selle flowed. The
enemy shelled us persistently in these positions, and the North
Staffordshire Regiment had heavy casualties from gas in Montrecourt
Wood.
During the night of the 13th/14th our patrols were very active along the
line of the river. They found all bridges had been demolished, and the
enemy was holding the line of the railway beyond with machine guns in
considerable strength. During the early morning of the 14th small
patrols from A Company succeeded in penetrating into the village of
Haussy. The village was strongly held by the enemy, and the civilians
were still there. Our patrols were immediately reinforced by two
platoons, the men crawling two at a time behind a low hedge into the
village. Capt. Selfe and a few men succeeded in crossing the river at
one of the broken bridges, and brought back three prisoners as a result
of some hand-to-hand fighting in the streets. The civilians were very
much on our side. They gave us information as to the whereabouts of the
enemy, they concealed our men in their houses, and fed them on coffee
and eggs.
In the afternoon the enemy realised what we had done, and attacked our
new positions in the village, but we succeeded in holding on. Lieut.
Piggott and Sergt. Ashdown were killed.
At a brigade conference held later in the day, plans for an attack on
the river line were discussed. The attack was to be carried out by
ourselves and the North Staffordshire Regiment, and was to have as its
objective the high ground from the chapel in the northern outskirts of
the village northwards to the railway opposite Montrecourt. The village
itself was not to be attacked. Our attack on the right was complicated
by several sunken roads and a sand pit, and we decided to try a new
experiment in the nature of the artillery barrage to be used, in order
to avoid a frontal attack on the sunken roads. The attack was to take
place in the early morning of October 16.
We spent the 15th in the same positions. The ground leading to the
assembly positions was thoroughly reconnoitred by officers and N.C.O.s,
and all arrangements for the attack were completed by midnight. 2nd
Lieut. Thomas, who spoke French like a native, went into the village at
night, and 150 civilians were escorted back behind our lines.
It was decided to make an effort to assemble for the attack on the far
side of the river. To do this it was necessary to ensure that there were
no enemy outposts remaining between the river and the railway. During
the early part of the night of the 15th/16th, therefore, harassing fire
by our artillery was brought down on the railway and on the ground
between the railway and the river. From 3 a.m. on the 16th this fire
continued on the railway only, and a strong patrol from C Company (under
2nd Lieut. Wallis) advanced across the river and cleared the ground as
far as the railway, and took up a line as close to it as the shelling
would permit. There was only one temporary bridge available, and all our
assembling troops had to cross at this point. From about 3.30 a.m. the
enemy commenced a counter-preparation on a wide front. All roads and
approaches to the village and river were shelled with gas. In spite of
this, and largely on account of the thoroughness with which the
reconnoitring had been done, and thanks also to the work of 2nd Lieut.
Wallis and his covering party, the two companies, D on the right and B
on the left, were successfully assembled across the river by 5 a.m.
Owing to the lack of bridges, and the winding nature of the river, the
assembly positions were on the left flank of our attack, but the special
barrages which had been arranged assisted us in launching the attack
from these positions.
The barrage opened at 5.10, and our men advanced to the railway without
difficulty. It was then discovered that the battalion who were to have
attacked on our left had failed to assemble on account of the enemy’s
shelling, and the left flank of our attack was therefore in the air. The
enemy had several machine guns mounted on the railway north of us, and B
Company suffered heavy casualties in crossing the railway. A large
number of prisoners were captured in the shelters behind the railway
embankment and in the sunken roads and the sand pit.
The enemy was obviously surprised by the novelty of the barrage,
combined with an attack from the flank. In spite of the opposition from
the left flank the attack progressed, and by 7 a.m. all objectives had
been taken, together with over 200 prisoners, many machine guns, and a
few trench mortars.
Our successful penetration into the village two days before, and our
capture of one bridgehead, had led the Corps to include the village
itself in the objectives of the attack, and the 9th East Surrey Regiment
were detailed for this work. The greater part of the village was
successfully taken, and we were in touch with their posts at the chapel.
We had a very long exposed northern flank, and it was necessary to put
the greater part of our strength to protect it. A protective barrage was
arranged to assist in this, and by 10 a.m. a defensive position had been
made which seemed satisfactory. Had we had the men, and had the attack
on our left been carried out, we could have exploited our success across
the open country east of us, and could probably have got among the
enemy’s battery positions. As it was, with greatly depleted numbers and
with the necessity of guarding our left flank, we had to adopt a
defensive attitude on our final objectives.
All the B Company officers had become casualties, and the
sergeant-majors of both B and D Companies. Capt. J. C. Orchardson,
commanding D Company, took command of the whole garrison, and he made
the dispositions for defence, which successfully held the positions
during the day.
As a result of their advance the East Surrey Regiment had an exposed
southern flank. A company of the Guards were to come up to protect this
flank, but until they came this was obviously a danger point, and there
was no certainty that the Guards would be able to get through. From
about 10 a.m. the enemy commenced to shell the village. The fury of his
concentrated bombardment from then onwards beat almost anything we could
remember in the way of shelling, with the possible exception of the
attack on Delville Wood in 1916. Eight-inch and 5·9-inch shells were
falling in the village at the rate of from six to ten a minute, and it
became impossible to move troops anywhere in the streets. We had no
troops ourselves in the village, except Battalion Headquarters and the
Dressing Station, both of which had a most unpleasant day. The Guards’
Company on their way up shortly after 1 p.m. got caught in the shelling,
suffered very heavy casualties, and were unable to get to their
positions. There was thus an unprotected flank on the right of the East
Surrey positions.
A lot of gas shell was mixed with the other shelling, and this, in spite
of the fact that there were still several hundred civilians in the
village—a fact well known to the enemy. Months afterwards we visited
Haussy, and were told on all sides of scores of civilians who had died
from the effects of the gas on October 16. In the early afternoon, after
the continuous shelling for over four hours, the enemy counter-attacked.
He succeeded in penetrating the exposed flank south of the village, and
he advanced as far as the river, some 300 yards south of the church.
From this point, under the cover of an intense barrage, he worked
through the village on the eastern bank of the river, and large numbers
of the 9th East Surrey Regiment, holding positions on the eastern
outskirts of the village, were thus cut off, and our situation north of
the village became critical. Capt. Orchardson was ordered to take up the
line of the sunken road from the chapel to the railway, and to form a
strong post at the chapel facing south, to deny the enemy the northern
exits from the village. All this was done promptly, and just in time,
and the enemy made no further progress. In the midst of all this inferno
we were informed that two companies of the 7th Northamptonshire Regiment
were on their way up to relieve us. It was a precarious position to hand
over to them. We were the only troops left holding positions on the east
of the river, but it was still a fact that we were able to hand over to
them at the close of the day the whole 600 yards of river and
bridge-heads captured by us in the early morning. During the day also we
had added one or two improvised bridges, and the position we left was a
very valuable one.
[Illustration:
THE MEMORIAL BOARD AT HAUSSY.
]
We feel that the Battalion can be justly proud of its share in the
Battle of Haussy. The very daring and successful work of A Company, in
cutting out part of the village two days before the attack and holding
it, had a most important bearing on the operations. On the day of the
attack the work of the attacking companies was beyond praise. In spite
of very heavy casualties at the outset, all ranks displayed the greatest
determination. The fact that all objectives were taken, together with a
large number of prisoners and a great deal of material, reflects the
very greatest credit on Capt. Orchardson and the other officers,
N.C.O.s, and men. Throughout the very trying day which followed they
held their ground with the greatest tenacity, in spite of repeated enemy
attempts to dislodge them, and the crossings of the river were handed
over intact at the close of the day.
[Illustration:
THE RIVER SELLE AND THE MILL FROM WHICH MANY PRISONERS WERE TAKEN.
]
At the chapel is a cross erected to the memory of our men who were
killed in the Battle of Haussy. 2nd Lieuts. Laskey, Bain, Holman, and
twelve other ranks were killed, 2nd Lieut. Wallis and Coy.-Sergt.-Maj.
Gutteridge died of wounds, and Capt. Porter, Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. Dyer, and
seventy-five other ranks were wounded.
The following decorations were awarded to the Battalion for the Battle
of Haussy and the period preceding it: