Battalion Headquarters was near the two trees on the right.
]
On the whole all the positions except one or two of the foremost were
comfortable, the weather was fine; and when we first had a good look at
the delightful countryside, it was almost impossible to think of
anything but a peaceful life there. Very soon, however, it was to become
an inferno of every kind of beastliness in the way of shot and shell. We
knew we were brought back into the line for a reason, and work on the
improvement of defences at all possible times, the constant instructions
of all ranks as to the exact importance of the various positions, and
constant intelligence reports of activity extraordinary behind the enemy
lines made us feel in our bones that the charm of our present outlook
might not last for ever. We started then on this evening of March 11 for
a long tour in this position. Two companies were in the outpost zone in
front; two companies and Battalion Headquarters in the Vadencourt
defences. Inter-company reliefs were carried out every four days, and we
began to settle down to routine work.
In spite of the seeming uncertainty of things, leave was never better in
the whole war. When the great enemy offensive commenced on March 21,
about 200 officers and other ranks of the Battalion were on leave to
England. On March 19 B Company were holding the outpost zone on the
right, D Company on the left. A and C Companies were at Vadencourt
Château with Battalion Headquarters. On our right the 1st North
Staffordshire Regiment were in the front line with Headquarters at
Maissemy.
On our left were the 3rd Rifle Brigade (17th Brigade).
On March 20, which was very quiet, the adjutant, Capt. Baker, went on
leave. In the evening report was received at Battalion Headquarters that
according to information given by a German prisoner, an enemy attack
might take place on March 20 or 21. The usual patrolling was carried out
on the night of the 20th/21st, and no abnormal enemy activity was
reported. The night was clear and fine, but just before dawn a thick
mist began to develop which shortly became so dense that it was
impossible to see more than fifteen yards. It was in this famous mist
that the Germans commenced their grand offensive against the British 3rd
and 5th Armies, which was designed to cut between the British and French
Forces and win the war in a few weeks.
At 4.30 a.m. on March 21 a general bombardment by the enemy commenced,
and we were in the thick of it.
Vadencourt Château was very heavily shelled for six hours, largely with
gas shells. The outpost zone and trenches on the ridge were being
knocked to pieces.
A very gallant young officer of C Company, 2nd Lieut. C. C. Baring,
unfortunately got badly gassed by almost the first gas shell thrown
over, and later died of the effects. Apart from this there was no known
case of a gas casualty in the Battalion. About 7 o’clock Lieut. G. S.
Bowen, the Intelligence Officer, set out to visit the forward companies.
He got safely through a perilous journey, and returned to Battalion
Headquarters about 9 o’clock. The trenches in which were the Company
Headquarters on the ridge in front had been badly knocked in in parts,
but no attack had developed in this area.
The enemy gunnery had certainly been marvellous. In the previous weeks
there had been practically no registration by their artillery, and
almost all shooting on March 21 must have been by map or by sound
ranging. Yet there was scarcely a battery behind our front which did not
lose half its guns, and trenches and redoubts were shot up with
wonderful precision. Just behind Vadencourt were two 4·5-inch howitzers,
which had been in position two days, and fired a few rounds only.
Both these guns were knocked out by direct hits very early.
About 10.30 a.m. the order was given for gas masks to be removed, and a
few minutes later the first report of the enemy advance came in. It was
still too misty to see more than a few yards, and scouts had therefore
been sent out on the flanks. One of these from the road to Maissemy
reported that the enemy had attacked the North Staffordshire Regiment
from the right flank and rear, and had overwhelmed them and was now
advancing on us straight up the Maissemy road. How much of this was true
it was impossible to say, but it was soon obvious that something serious
was wrong, for machine-gun and rifle bullets began to whistle among us
from the direction of Maissemy on our right, and slightly from the rear.
The bridge over the Omignon was demolished at once, and just in time, by
Lieut. Christison, R.E., of the 103rd Field Company, in the face of the
enemy. This bridge was the only crossing of the river anywhere near our
position, and we now had a fair protection on our right flank against
direct assault, but not against enfilade fire, which was very
troublesome all day long.
About 11.30 a.m. the fog began to clear and the sun came out.
At this point it may be well to mention the officers and warrant
officers who held the commands within the Battalion:
Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Col. H. J. Wenyon.
Adjutant, 2nd Lieut. J. B. Cryer.
Intelligence Officer, Lieut. G. S. Bowen.
Medical Officer, Capt. W. A. Kellogg (U.S. Army).
Company Officers:
B Company (Right Forward Company), Capt. C. R. H. Allworth.
D Company (Left Forward Company), Capt. F. C. Needham.
A Company (at Vadencourt), Capt. W. J. Ewen.
C Company (at Vadencourt), Capt. S. G. Thompson.
Regimental-Sergeant-Major, Regt.-Sergt.-Maj. R. Rankin.
Transport Officer, Capt. J. N. Arnaud. A/Quartermaster, Lieut. H. E.
Outram. Regimental-Quartermaster Sergeant,
Regt.-Quartermaster-Sergt. R. Ifould.
[Illustration:
WATLING STREET, COOKER QUARRY, THE SUPPORT POSITIONS, AND IN THE
DISTANCE THE TUMULUS.
]
[Illustration:
THE BRIDGE OVER THE OMIGNON RIVER.
]
A number of officers, including the Adjutant, Capt. Baker, the
Quartermaster, Capt. J. R. Wood, and the Officer Commanding D Company,
Capt. F. Proctor, were on leave.
As visibility became better at 11.30 a.m., it was possible to discover
at last something of what had happened.
The enemy were seen to be occupying Mareval and Pontru Trenches on the
ridge in front of Vadencourt. Capt. Needham, Officer Commanding D
Company, got back wounded to Battalion Headquarters. He reported that
after very heavy shelling, his company had been attacked from the right
flank and from the rear, and very few could have escaped. Shortly after
this two prisoners were brought back by one of B Company’s runners, and
a few men of B Company (mostly wounded) came to the dressing station.
The following account of the fate of B Company is given by Capt. C. R.
H. Allworth:
“At 4.30 a.m. on March 21 the enemy opened a very heavy bombardment on
our positions, chiefly on the village of Pontru and on the forward
outpost positions; a great number of gas shells were used, together with
the high explosive. By 5 o’clock the telephone wires between Company
Headquarters and the forward platoons and Battalion Headquarters had
been cut by shell-fire. During the bombardment the Battalion
Intelligence Officer and a runner visited me; they stayed for about ten
minutes, and then returned. I then decided to go up to visit the forward
platoons; my runner accompanied me. We had left the trench, and had
proceeded about 200 yards, when two Germans appeared out of the mist,
one was a wounded man and the other a medical orderly or a
stretcher-bearer; the latter escaped in the mist, but we captured the
man and brought him back to Company Headquarters. He could speak neither
French nor English, and since I could not speak German, he was not of
much use to us. This was our first indication that the enemy had
attacked.
“The enemy had occupied Pontru village and all the foremost positions.
About 8.30 a.m. they attacked our line (Pontru Trench and Mareval
Trench). The wire in front of the trench had been untouched by the
bombardment, and owing to our Lewis-gun and rifle fire they failed to
get through it. The enemy then brought up a machine gun on the flank
bridge across the Omignon River on the right of our sector; this was put
out of action at once by our right Lewis gun. They then brought up
another gun, and, owing to a jam in our Lewis gun, put our team out of
action. A number of the enemy came down the banks of the stream and
rushed the post and occupied the right of Pontru Trench. We attempted to
bomb them out, but they got round in the rear of the trench, and we had
a rather exciting retreat down the trench to Company Headquarters, where
we established a block.
“By this time the enemy had broken through on the left, and were coming
down the Bellenglise-Vermand road. I ordered a few men to hold the
“block,” and the remainder I sent up the trench to convenient positions
to fire at the enemy on the road. The Germans suffered very heavy
casualties on the road; a machine gun from Cooker Quarry did some
splendid shooting. After about three-quarters of an hour of this, which
under different conditions would have been very good sport, we ran out
of ammunition. The enemy had been rifle grenading us and sniping us very
heavily, and only very few men remained. We could see the Germans
digging our support line, and there were great numbers attacking our
rear positions. We then, with fixed bayonet, got out of the trench and
attempted to get back to the Battalion’s main positions, but we ran into
large numbers of Germans and were overpowered.
“The men of my company behaved splendidly. Though several of them were
wounded, they carried on firing, and the enemy suffered very heavily.”
Had we not known it from the weight and length of the bombardment, it
was obvious, as soon as we could see, that this was no ordinary attack.
The effrontery of the enemy was astounding. He was marking out the line
of his advance with white flags, and far in the rear the forward
movement of battalions with full transport could be seen in all
directions. Message after message was sent down asking for artillery
fire to be brought to bear on these wonderful targets, but our guns were
practically all silenced, and not till late in the day did any begin to
speak at all, and these were shooting very short into our own positions.
The general advance of the enemy in large numbers towards Vadencourt and
Cooker Quarry (held by the Rifle Brigade on our left) began about 12
noon. Vadencourt was subjected to very heavy machine-gun fire from three
directions. Finding the obstacle of the river and swamp on our right
front too difficult, the enemy attempted to advance across our front
towards Cooker Quarry. He was in close formation about a battalion
strong. Our Vickers guns, Lewis guns, and rifles did tremendous
execution, and very few of the enemy got back. This success braced us up
considerably, and we felt there was yet a chance of holding on to our
position if only our flanks could hold. No information came through to
us as to the general position, even on our own divisional front.
In the afternoon the Rifle Brigade were still holding a line level with
ours, but on the right the enemy was established in Maissemy and had
advanced about a mile beyond it, and was trying to get machine-gun posts
on the river bank.
The scene on our front during the afternoon was most exasperating.
Several frontal attacks by the enemy were frustrated by our rifle fire,
but the steady movement of enemy forces from the rear could not be
checked. All we could do was to engage them with Vickers guns at 2,000
yards’ range. Enemy aeroplanes swarmed overhead and bombed us at
intervals. An observation post had been established on The Tumulus, and
a group of mounted men remained there all the afternoon.
In the early evening the enemy commenced to shell Vadencourt and its
surroundings heavily again; trench mortars had been brought up, and
things began to get very unpleasant. In spite of the precarious nature
of our line, it appeared that we could hold on if the troops on our left
in Cooker Quarry held. We had plenty of ammunition, and although we were
reduced in numbers and several machine guns had been knocked out, we
could still bring a very withering fire to bear on anything like a
frontal attack.
At 7.15 p.m. the enemy commenced to advance towards Cooker Quarry, and
unfortunately both quarry and trench were captured, the garrison, some
200 strong, retiring in the direction of Vermand. The enemy immediately
commenced to advance in large numbers up Watling Street, and towards the
high ground on our left flank. This left us with both flanks hopelessly
in the air. We engaged the enemy with every available rifle, Lewis gun,
and machine gun, and considerably delayed his advance. About this time
we received the only written message of the day from Brigade
Headquarters, sent off about five hours before. This informed us that a
counter-attack to retake Maissemy under an artillery barrage would take
place at 7.30. In view of this we decided to hold on. This message, as
we learned afterwards, was cancelled by another one which we never
received, and the counter-attack did not take place. We were now truly
in “Queer Street.” Every minute we were expecting the bombardment and
attack on Maissemy to commence, every minute also we were expecting an
overwhelming attack from our left flank. The outposts of A Company on
this flank did splendidly during these tense minutes. They harassed the
enemy furiously, and undoubtedly deceived him as to our actual strength
at this particular spot. It was barely a platoon, but it might well have
been half a battalion. However, it was obvious this could not go on for
long. We were badly placed to meet an attack from this flank, and as
soon as the enemy discovered the real position he could overwhelm us by
probably twenty to one. Still there was the hope of the Maissemy attack,
and we held on.
The next move by the enemy was a bombardment by howitzers and trench
mortars, added to a rattling and continuous machine-gun fire on this
unfortunate left flank of ours. Tyler and Malby, two young officers of A
Company, were in charge up there, and they and their men stuck it
splendidly. But they were losing men steadily, and something had to be
done at once.
At 8.30 p.m. it was decided that we would make an attempt to withdraw
under cover of darkness to the Brown Line at Bihecourt some 600 yards
behind. This was no easy matter, and it was essential that we got away
unknown to the enemy. A strong rearguard was organised, and took up
positions on the threatened flank.
Lieut. Goulden, 2nd Lieut. Pfeuffar, and 2nd Lieut. Tiley, with a number
of men with four Lewis guns formed the guard, and they set up a powerful
demonstration of fire for nearly an hour. There was no panic in the
Battalion whatever. A definite order of march was laid down, and a
section at a time the whole garrison withdrew to Bihecourt.
The rearguard got back about 10 p.m., and, thanks to their work, we had
achieved almost a miracle in getting back without a single casualty. Two
companies of the 13th Middlesex reinforced us in this line, and the
whole force was properly organised from the river northwards, and into
touch with the 17th Brigade by 12 midnight.
So ended March 21, 1918, one of the most memorable days in the whole
history of the Battalion. The brief sketch of the main events of the day
gives a very feeble picture of the actual fight. Countless acts of
heroism could be recorded if space allowed. The whole Battalion fought
splendidly. Vadencourt could well have been described as hell during
almost the whole of that day, yet no one ever thought of wavering, and
again and again the enemy was thrown back with heavy losses. It was not
till afterwards that we learnt with pride that the holding of the ridge
north of the Omignon River had such an important tactical bearing on the
general situation, and that the 24th Division was the first division in
the British Army to be mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief in his first
dispatch on the great fight against the German offensive.
Congratulations were showered on the Commanding Officer for the work of
the Battalion. A message had been sent to us ordering us to withdraw to
Bihecourt in the early afternoon. The message had never arrived, but the
Brigade Staff, seeing that we did not come back, had given us all up for
lost. A council of war took place in an old cellar in Vermand at
midnight. Everything was fairly quiet now, but it was obvious that by
the morning the enemy would be ready for another great smash. So far he
had achieved very little success on our front, but our numbers were
sadly depleted, and we had seen almost countless numbers of men, horses,
guns, and trench mortars being hurried into the forward positions
obviously for the next day’s work. It was decided that a stand should be
made on the Brown Line, and the 72nd Brigade was hastily reorganised.
Col. Le Fleming of the 9th East Surreys had been killed in the
afternoon; Col. Pope of the 1st North Staffordshire Regiment severely
wounded in the morning.
Col. Anderson, who came up to reinforce with dismounted cavalry, joined
the East Surreys, and took command of the force south of the Omignon.
Col. Wenyon was given command north of the river.
A certain amount of fitful sleep came to most of us during the night,
and food was taken very early in the morning. There was another very
dense fog at dawn, and the enemy did not begin his advance so early.
About 9 o’clock he commenced a hurricane bombardment of Vermand and the
Brown Line area, and immediately launched his attack on Bihecourt.
Possibly the cases of excellent port wine which we had been compelled to
leave behind at Vadencourt had made him reckless, and in spite of
casualties the enemy advanced almost right up to our trenches.
Fortunately there was some wire in front of this line, and most of the
attacking force that had got so far died a few yards only in front of
the muzzles of our rifles. Here and there over the 300 yards of open
country in front of us small pockets of the enemy established themselves
in shell-holes and old trenches. A supply of rifle grenades which were
found in the Brown Line were used with great effect by C Company in
driving away these enemy posts. The enemy’s trench mortaring was again
very unpleasant. The manner in which he had moved up these great engines
was almost uncanny.
Constantly during the morning the attacks were renewed, but he met the
same steady front he had tasted the day before. The two companies of the
13th Middlesex took up the fight splendidly, and we can really be said
to have taken tea with the Hun on this morning. Several times he reached
our wire in small numbers, but he never got into our trenches. From the
noise on our left we were under the strong impression, however, that all
was not well there. It was pretty clear that the enemy had fairly
penetrated, but it was not until much later in the day that we knew that
during the morning he was fighting through Bernes, some five miles
behind us.
About 1 p.m. the enemy succeeded in driving in our troops at
Villecholles, south of the river, and reached the outskirts of Vermand.
So suddenly did this happen, that it seemed that the only way back for
our men was going to be closed before we could move. An immediate order
to withdraw was given, but it was not until 2 p.m. that we actually left
the Brown Line. By all the rules of warfare, none of us should have got
back alive. Our only way back was along a dead straight road (our own
wire made it impossible to go across country). This road was being shot
along and across by a murderous fire from well-placed machine guns. We
certainly had many casualties on the Vermand road, but the miracle was
that so many did get safely back.
We got on to the road from Vermand to Monchy Lagache, and it was a case
of a straight march in small parties. The enemy was through a long way
on our left, and too close to our flank to be pleasant. He was through
even further on our right, but beyond the river, and not so close. We
were peppered with machine guns along the road, but we got through, and
we were ready for a rest and some food when the Brigade concentrated in
some old trenches at Monchy at 8 o’clock in the evening. After these two
days of battle we realised the tactics, now so well known, which the
enemy was using for his great offensive. The battling all along the line
was calculated by him to discover some weak spots in our resistance.
Immediately he had penetrated anywhere, he sent reserve mobile troops
with motor machine-gun sections if possible through the gap, and very
often succeeded in cutting off troops which had resisted. This is what
happened to part of our front companies on the first day. The enemy had
penetrated right through on their right, and, crossing the river between
Vadencourt and their trenches under cover of fog, he had attacked them
simultaneously from the flank and the rear. So it was all the way back
on this sustained rearguard fight. Every day we were fighting the Hun
very hard, and at close quarters; at the end of the day we found our
positions intact, and were ready to take up the fight with him again at
dawn. Then, just as we were hoping to snatch an hour’s rest, we were
ordered back to conform with a new line for the next day’s battle, the
enemy having succeeded in getting through some miles on one of our
flanks.
We passed through the Green Line, held on this front by the 50th
Division, who had been hurried up from rest in motor-buses. The position
did not inspire us with much confidence as we passed through it. On most
of the front the trenches were only a few inches deep, and the front
held by the 50th Division must have been a wide one, for the troops were
very scattered. However, the trenches were well sited and the wire was
quite good. One party of our men, under the Regimental-Sergeant-Major,
stayed and held a post in the Green Line until nightfall, when they
joined us at Monchy Lagache.
We found the transport under Capt. Arnaud at Monchy, and heard the first
news of their experiences. The transport lines had been fairly blown up
at Vermand on the 21st. Cpl. Verrall and one or two men, directly the
bombardment started, got the animals out and stampeded them on the road
behind Vermand. Here they were all collected, and it was a miracle that
we did not lose a single horse. Had they remained in their lines for
half an hour, most of them must have been killed. The Brigade Transport
Officer had taken the transport right back to Monchy straight away, and
in consequence there were no vehicles available forward to remove our
Quartermasters’ stores from Vermand, most of which had to be abandoned.
The cookers were going strong at Monchy, and we had a very welcome hot
meal before getting our first rest for forty-eight hours.
All night the hangars at the great aerodrome at Monchy were burning, and
lit up the country for miles. The enemy shelled the village in a random
way, and the night was bitterly cold.
At dawn breakfast and as fine a tot of rum as was ever drunk was issued.
The Commanding Officer was called to a council of war at Brigade
Headquarters in the village.
Col. Wyatt, who was commanding the Brigade in the absence of Gen.
Morgan, set out the plan for the day. The Green Line had apparently been
fairly easily forced by the enemy, and our Division was ordered to
withdraw across the Somme at Falvy. The 24th Divisional Reinforcement
Camp had been formed into a battalion, and were attached to the 72nd
Brigade for the day. Our brigade was detailed to form the rearguard on
the eastern bank of the Somme for the rest of the Division to pass
through. The other brigades were in the trenches on our right, and we
were to stop at Monchy till they had all moved off. It was the third
foggy morning, and this seemed all to the good for our particular job.
However, it seemed the orders had not reached the other brigades so
soon, and we had to wait for them to move. All orders were issued and
the order and manner of march laid down, but it was after 10 o’clock
before we started.
Then, just as we were leaving Monchy to take the track across the three
miles of plain to Falvy, our Commanding Officer, who was in command of
the rearguard, found the Rifle Brigade digging themselves in behind the
village. Gen. Stone, commanding 17th Infantry Brigade, was in
attendance, and he was of opinion that one battalion ought to be left
there for a time to prevent the enemy if he took the village from
debouching on to the plain. The fog was just beginning to disappear, and
it appeared that this plan was unwise in the circumstances. However,
Gen. Stone wished the Rifle Brigade to fight this position, and he asked
for one company of the East Surreys to scout through the wood as a flank
guard on his left. The company was accordingly detached, and worked its
way through the wood. Later in the day this company got to the Somme,
when it was a perfect inferno, and at a place where there was no bridge.
Many of the men were lost, and the remnants had to swim the river.
The remainder of the Brigade got to a position on the east bank of the
Somme, as ordered, and by this time the whole of the Division could have
been safely over the river. About 11 o’clock the sun came out, and every
blade of grass on this wide plain was visible. The whole Division,
including attached troops, were there. When the Rifle Brigade began to
come back at about 11.30 they were shelled unmercifully, so were the
Reinforcement Camp Battalion just behind them, and so were the rest of
the Division on the bank of or crossing the river.
Our cheery little friend, the Brigade Signalling Officer, Lieut. G. F.
Hopkinson, did marvellous work during the terrible time that followed.
Again and again he went up on his motor-bicycle across the plain and
brought back wounded men to the dressing station across the river.
After every other unit of the Division had crossed the river the 72nd
Brigade crossed at about 3.30. It had been a horrible day, and we are
firmly convinced that had the whole division marched away from Monchy in
the fog, the retirement would have been completed without a casualty.
Just before we crossed the Somme a squadron of cavalry rode over the
bridge eastwards. They could do very little at this stage, but they
seemed to be spoiling for a fight, and were acting under orders given
several hours earlier. With the greatest gallantry they attempted to
round up the machine-gun nests which the Germans had now pushed forward,
but they suffered very heavy casualties both to horses and men, and had
to return. A battalion of the 8th Division passed us as we crossed the
river. They were to act as an outpost to the main line on the west side
of the river. The division had been sent up from a rest area to hold the
line of the Somme, and the men were in splendid fettle as they swung
across the bridge.
So with wishes of good luck on both sides we passed through the 8th
Division to the village of Licourt, some four miles off. We could not
have gone to a more unfortunate place. It was peaceful enough, and our
Battalion was got together and camped under the sky in a big field. But
in the village was the headquarters of an Infantry Brigade of the 8th
Division.
The Brigadier-General commanding this brigade was in doubt about his
positions on the river. He found Col. Wyatt, who was commanding our
Brigade, and our Commanding Officer was summoned to the Brigade
Headquarters. The General stated that he had not received information of
the arrival of one of his battalions. Our Commanding Officer pointed out
that this battalion had passed through in the direction of the river in
buses some time before. This would not do for the General. He ordered
_us_ to go.
Our men had been at it fighting or footing it for twelve hours, after
two days of hell. They were very nearly dead beat, and now they were
ordered back to the crossing of the river they had just passed, almost
certainly on a wild goose chase. The Colonel decided to go down to the
place himself first, and orders were left with the Adjutant that the
Battalion should move off half an hour later.
Arrived at the river, he left his horse and groom at an old church and
went on. He found, as expected, the Battalion was in position, and had
been on the spot for some hours. It was now getting dusk and he could
not find the horses, so he came back on foot, but unfortunately by a
road parallel to the one down which the Battalion was marching. The
Battalion had to proceed right to the river, and were then sent back.
They arrived back at Licourt about midnight, and shortly afterwards
Capt. Arnaud brought up the cookers and a wonderful hot meal. The night
was again very cold indeed, and it was a case of lying down in the open.
This meal was the finest thing we had seen for a long time. In spite of
the cold and soreness of limb, we slept like logs.
On the next day, Sunday, March 24, the 72nd Brigade was ordered back
early in the morning to Chaulnes, some six miles back. There were
welcome signs of our own artillery on this march back. Big guns were in
position, and speaking to some purpose on all sides, and more were
lumbering up as we marched. At this time we were supposed to be marching
out to be relieved by French troops, but we did not really believe it.
We had heard that there had been some hitch about demolishing some of
the Somme bridges, and the river positions did not seem to be altogether
secure.
We arrived at Chaulnes about 9 a.m., and as we were now some miles at
any rate from the enemy, we had a few hours’ relaxation. The feet of
every man in the Battalion were attended to first, and much-needed water
and soap were brought into use. Kellogg, the Medical Officer, had a busy
morning.
At noon a council of war was summoned hastily at Brigade Headquarters.
The enemy was reported to have forced a crossing of the Somme at
Béthencourt, and a gap had been formed between the 8th and 20th
Divisions. The 72nd Brigade was ordered to march to Fonches to take up a
position there. The American officer in command of a big dump, which had
been set on fire, met us just before we left Chaulnes with the
comforting news that the enemy was in sight and that we would never
reach Fonches. As we marched across the railway, some excited French
Engineers were trying to blow up the permanent way, and were doing their
best to bring it off as we were crossing. In view of the news we marched
to Fonches by companies, with strong flank guards and advanced guards
thrown well out. We arrived there without incident at 3 p.m., and found
Fonches was a place of perfect peace. The Brigade was disposed in
trenches defending the Hattencourt-Fonches-Fonchette road, the 9th East
Surrey Regiment on the right, the 8th Royal West Kent Regiment on the
left. The 73rd Brigade were on our left in front of Punchy, and the 17th
Brigade on their left in front of Omiécourt. The Battalion’s
dispositions were quickly made, and close liaison established with the
battalions on our right and left. Battalion Headquarters were
established at Fonches Church. Very soon it was clear that the enemy was
not within miles of us yet, and the cookers, which had been kept a
little behind, were ordered up. Fonches was a pretty little village,
with an old village green; the weather was delightful, and we wonder if
anyone who was there will ever forget the wonderful picnic on the green
which we had on the arrival of the cookers.
We felt much fitter after this, and every man was given a task in
strengthening our trench positions. The work went on right through the
night, while joint patrols of our men and the 7th Battalion
Northamptonshire Regiment were out under 2nd Lieut. Pfeuffar, through
the dense wood and along the valley east of Fonches as far as Curchy. By
daybreak we had greatly strengthened our positions along the road.
About 7 a.m. it was reported that the 8th Division were to make an
attack in the direction of Morchain and Béthencourt, in conjunction with
French troops. The 24th Division was ordered to move up in support of
the attack, and the 17th and 73rd Brigades took up a position on the
line Dreslincourt to Pertain. The 72nd Brigade took up a position in
support, astride the railway west of Hyencourt-le-Petit. This meant a
march of about two miles north from Fonches. The Royal West Kent
Regiment deployed north of the railway in three lines, D and C Companies
and the North Staffordshire Regiment (the remnants of whom were now
attached to us) in front, A and B Companies in support, Headquarters in
reserve. The enemy shelling became very unpleasant—the 17th and 73rd
Brigades were driven in, and at about 1 p.m. the 72nd Brigade was
ordered to return to Fonches and hold the line Hattencourt-Fonchette to
the main cross-roads 800 yards north-east of Fonchette. After some
difficulty—the main road being now the mark for enemy guns—we took up
the new positions, and the Commanding Officer inspected the left flank
of our position. It was found that the 73rd Brigade front was at right
angles to ours, and running back towards Hallu. We had a telephone line
to Brigade from Fonches Church, and the position was immediately
explained to General Morgan, who had just got back from leave full of
martial ardour.
Our Colonel was ordered to do all he could to re-establish this flank.
_In any case we were to hold out at Fonches to the last._ The 9th East
Surreys were in position on our right, and, leaving Maj. Clark in
charge, Col. Wenyon went with his servant (Pte. Smith) to see what could
be done on the left. The enemy had advanced considerably opposite the
73rd Brigade front, and appeared to be occupying Hyencourt-le-Petit, and
positions south of that village. Heavy machine-gun fire was being
directed on the area north and west of the cross-roads which formed our
left flank. After about two hours, two battalions of the 73rd Brigade
were got forward to the belt of wire running north and south just west
of the Fonchette-Omiécourt road. Our position being now secure, Col.
Wenyon returned to Fonches.
The Battalion had been having a bad time. The Fonches cross-roads was,
and had been for some time, the mark for most things the enemy could
throw over. The spot was under particularly heavy machine-gun fire, and
we had our first experience of being shot up by field guns at
point-blank range. Capt. Ewen, commanding A Company, had been killed,
the Adjutant, 2nd Lieut. J. B. Cryer, had been wounded, and we had had
many other casualties.
Kellogg and the medical officer of the East Surreys had their dressing
station in the village road by the green, where we had picnicked so
peacefully the day before, and they were attending to wounded without
ceasing all the afternoon. The enemy was desperately close to this
horrible cross-roads, and once again we could see hordes of men coming
up from the rear, ready to reinforce his forward battalions. Still our
garrison was well disposed to meet attack, thanks largely to the hard
work of the night before, and the officers and men were ready to fight
the position to the last. We had an exciting evening, and thrust back
attack after attack. All the afternoon the enemy had been collecting in
large numbers in the wood just south of this valley. After many messages
had been sent down, at last some real heavies of ours got on to this
wood and did excellent work for some hours.
Shortly after 8 p.m. determined efforts were made by the enemy to break
through our lines. A party succeeded in getting into a disused trench
about twenty yards in front of A Company. A cutting-out movement was at
once organised, and after a stiff fight, in which 2nd Lieut. Stevens was
wounded, the enemy retired, leaving behind a store of bombs and
ammunition. We then put a post in this disused trench and established a
block there.
The night was clear and moonlight, and, apart from isolated sallies by
the enemy, which were met by our fire and dispersed, nothing of note
occurred. In one of these sallies we secured a hefty Prussian prisoner.
The action of our Padre, Rev. G. D. Barlow-Poole, might be mentioned
here. Having heard at Brigade Headquarters the orders that we were to
fight Fonches to the last, he deliberately came up and spent the whole
time with us.
Knowing what our orders were, 2nd Lieut. Cryer, though shot through the
arm and in considerable pain, had refused to go to the Field Ambulance,
and behaved with the greatest gallantry.
Numberless acts of splendid heroism could be mentioned, but space does
not permit. To mention one would be to mention every man. Throughout the
companies the word had passed, “When it comes to it, three Huns for each
of us,” and every man was determined to carry this out. Men were not
recklessly throwing away their lives, but wherever the fight became
hottest, or when any point was gravely threatened, there was a
spontaneity about the measures to put things right which made our
attacks irresistible. In the midst of all this noise and fury Capt.
Arnaud succeeded in getting a cooker up near enough after dark for us to
carry hot soup and stew, if you please, to every man in the Battalion.
The cross-roads at Fonches will surely always live in the minds of the
little garrison who hung on by the teeth there through that awful day.
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