On the Ypres-Dickebusch Road.
]
About this date also the Germans attacked and captured The Bluff from
the division which occupied the trenches on the right of the 24th
Division.
This success of the Germans caused considerable uneasiness at 2nd Army
Headquarters, and it was thought probable that the 24th Division would
be ordered to retake the Bluff; this operation was, however, carried out
by the 3rd Division, who had just moved into rest as Corps Reserve. The
taking of the Bluff by the Germans caused “a certain liveliness,”
however, in the 24th Division, and the system of reliefs had to be
altered, owing to a whole brigade being kept in Divisional Reserve
complete, instead of one battalion of each brigade.
On the night of February 27 the Battalion moved up again, and took over
the Sanctuary Wood Trenches from the 8th Queens, the sector taken over
being the right of the Right Sector and Maple Copse.
On February 29 orders were received to move back to Belgian Château, and
the 8th Queens took over the Sanctuary Wood Trenches.
It was thought at first that the Battalion was going to take part in
retaking the Bluff, but nothing transpired, and the Battalion remained
at Belgian Château Dug-outs till March 3, when they moved up and took
over the sector occupied by the 8th Queens. Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. Acland was
wounded during the stay at Belgian Château.
This proved a quiet tour from March 3–7, though a considerable amount of
work was put in building up the trenches, orders having been received
that everything possible was to be done to strengthen the system, as it
was believed that the Germans meditated an attack in the spring.
During this period the Battalion lost a valued officer in 2nd Lieut.
Hamilton of C Company, an original officer of the Battalion from its
inception. He was sniped while going down a communication trench to
Company Headquarters.
A few casualties occurred during this tour, chiefly from rifle grenades,
which the Boche had now begun to use extensively.
On March 8 the Battalion moved back into rest and took over A Camp at
Ouderdon from the 13th Battalion Middlesex Regiment.
Here the Battalion was strengthened by the arrival of a fresh batch of
officers, among whom was Sir Henry Hawley, an original member of the
Battalion and afterwards Officer Commanding C Company.
During the period spent at A Camp, March 9–15, the Battalion had to find
working parties, two companies strong, every night for work in the
Salient, building machine-gun emplacements, and wiring and repairing
trenches. These parties proceeded by train to Ypres, and then marched to
their rendezvous. A number of casualties by shell-fire were caused on
these working parties, the Germans showing the most uncanny knowledge of
the whereabouts of the sites of proposed machine-gun emplacements.
On the night of March 15 the Battalion moved forward and took over the
dug-outs at Belgian Château. Rumours of relief by the 3rd Canadian
Division were now rife.
Working parties on the support defences south of the Lille Gate
continued unceasingly; much of this work was observed by the Germans
daily, by the aid of their Fokker aeroplane, which at this time was
superior to any British machine in use, and it was no rare sight to see
two or more of our machines crashed daily by Fokkers.
The night March 20/21 saw the relief of the Battalion by the 4th
Canadian Mounted Rifles, and the Battalion moved back to Camp F. It may
safely be said that all ranks were glad to leave the Ypres Salient after
nearly three months of monotonous trench warfare. Moreover, the Boche
was undoubtedly meditating mischief, which culminated in his lightning
attack on the Canadian Corps, an attack which the Canadians heroically
withstood, though it cost them enormous casualties.
On March 22 the Battalion moved to Berthen, near Bailleul. Excellent
billets were found for all, and the contrast of unshelled fields, spring
weather, and peaceful nights soon put all ranks on good terms with
themselves.
Training was carried out for three days, the usual reconnoitring party
proceeding to the Wulverghem Sector on the 24th to reconnoitre the new
area to be taken over from the Canadians.
The new sector was found to be extraordinarily quiet, and the lack of
shelling amazing, whole houses and farms being untouched by shell-fire
within 1,400 yards of the front line.
On the 26th the Battalion moved to Dranoutre and took over the rest area
for the night, the men being well pleased with the hutments and the look
of Dranoutre, which at this time was absolutely untouched and full of
its original inhabitants, plying a thriving trade with “Tommy.”
On the 27th the Battalion moved up to Wulverghem and took over trenches
C3 and C4, B1 and B2, facing Messines, from the 1st Canadians, moving in
by sections in daylight about 4 p.m., the relief being accomplished
without loss.
Headquarters took over St. Quentin Cabaret, a small inn within 1,000
yards of the front line, absolutely intact and undoubtedly the best
headquarters in the whole of the British front at that time. The support
company lived even nearer to the line in Souvenir Farm, also intact.
During the months previous to our taking over there had been something
like an understanding between our artillery and the enemy’s: “If you
don’t shell, we won’t.” So estaminets and small shops were open in and
around Wulverghem, less than three-quarters of a mile from the front
line, and farmers were working in the fields just as close.
There was only one line of trenches on our front, and, as was the custom
in those days, every firebay had a section of men in it. About 400 yards
behind the line were absurd Strong Points built overground of sandbags.
Each was held by a platoon. The two on our front were known as S.P.4 and
S.P.5. The chief incident during our first five-day tour in the front
line was the destruction of S.P.5 by enemy artillery fire. He shelled it
very accurately for over an hour with 5·9s. The garrison stuck it out
under Sergt. “Miffy” Mills, who, though badly shaken, was merry and
bright when it was over. Cpl. Hogg was wounded.
After five days we moved into support, not very far back, all living in
farm buildings. Battalion Headquarters and A Company went to Tea Farm, B
and C Companies to Aircraft Farm, and D Company to Kandahar Farm.
Trouble began during this tour in support. Our artillery had given up
the policy of peace, and had been steadily strafing the Hun during the
previous days. So _he_ started. First of all on Tea Farm. At 5.30 a.m.,
on April 6, he put a 5·9 shell into the loft of one of the barns where
the Battalion bombers were sleeping. It was real bad luck that he hit
the place first shot, because we had trenches a short way off to go to;
and before the next shell came over a few minutes after, everyone not
actually employed on attending to casualties was safely away. That first
shell accounted for thirteen casualties, eight killed and five wounded.
He shelled the farm then for two hours, and off and on all day for three
days, until it was a wreck. Cpl. Bates greatly distinguished himself
evacuating the wounded under heavy fire. Battalion Headquarters moved up
to Kandahar Farm with D Company, and we had peace for the rest of the
five days out.
Our next tour in the trenches was uneventful. We had a few casualties,
including 2nd Lieut. Eldridge, who was wounded in the knee. On April 10
we were relieved by the 8th Queens, and moved back into reserve at
Dranoutre, where everyone was fairly comfortable.
So things went on for a time—five days in the line, five days in
support; five days in the line, five days in reserve.
At the end of April the enemy released gas against us. The 8th Queens
and 1st North Staffordshire Regiment were in the line. We were in
support and the 9th East Surreys were in reserve. We had to take up our
battle positions, and assist in the work of getting up new gas-masks and
rations after the attack was over. We escaped lightly, but the
battalions in the line had fairly heavy casualties. Shortly after this
it was decided to organise a big raid in retaliation for the gas attack,
and our Battalion was ordered to carry it out. Maj. N. I. Whitty
organised the raid, Capt. W. Wood was in command, and other officers
were Lieut. N. B. Green, 2nd Lieuts. S. E. Dove, S. B. Smith, and T.
Bowling. During the greater part of May the party were out of the line,
training at Dranoutre. The sector had become decidedly “lively” by this
time, and the Boche had “set about” most of the open farms in the
district. The civilians had given it best and left.
On May 6, Capt. W. K. Tillie left to command the 72nd M.G.C., and Lieut.
S. J. F. Mills became adjutant.
On May 31 occurred one of the tragedies in the history of the Battalion.
Capt. W. Wood was killed by a German sniper when out in No Man’s Land
patrolling with some of his raiding party.
It is impossible to exaggerate the worth of Capt. Wood’s work while he
was with the Battalion, or the sense of personal loss felt by all ranks
when the news of his death reached us. Brave as a lion himself, he was a
strict disciplinarian. His work and influence as Officer Commanding A
Company had been marvellous, and the effect of his example upon the
whole Battalion was seen at every turn. Perhaps one can sum up his
record with the Battalion by saying that at first most of us were afraid
of him, then we came to respect him, and last we came to love him. He
was buried at Dranoutre on June 1. Gen. Mitford and his staff were
present, and practically all the Battalion. Gen. Capper, the Divisional
Commander, in a letter to Col. Parker, spoke of the personal loss he had
sustained by Wood’s death, and alluded to him as the finest company
commander in the Division. “Quo fas et gloria ducunt.”
On the night of June 4/5 the raid was attempted. 2nd Lieut. S. B. Smith
behaved with great gallantry in trying to cut the enemy’s wire, but it
was found impossible to get through. We had a number of casualties, and
2nd Lieut. Bowling was killed. 2nd Lieut. Smith, although he had been
working hard nearly all night and was dead beat, went out just after
dawn and got in Bowling’s body.
June 1916 will be remembered long by all who were with the Battalion. We
were out of the line, in support again, for the enemy’s second gas
attack on June 17. The Queens and the North Staffords had the misfortune
to be again in the line. This time the enemy used phosgene for the first
time, and the Brigade suffered severely. Most of our Battalion were in
the front line or in the communication trenches as working parties, and
they behaved magnificently. All night and long into the next day they
helped with casualties. Gas discipline among our men was then, as it
always has been, very good, and we had comparatively few casualties.
Apart from these few days in support, which were far from a rest, we
were in the front line the whole month, and after the enemy gas attack
it was no picnic.
It was arranged that we should release gas in retaliation, and all
labour was devoted to installing the cylinders in our trenches. Work was
carried on at feverish speed, and at the same time the enemy had brought
up his well-known “travelling circus” of trench mortars opposite us, and
he made a practice of blowing us up every evening. The trenches came to
be known humorously as the “Wulverghem Empire”—Two Houses Nightly.
On the 28th we released our gas, and the Queens followed it up and
raided the enemy’s trenches. The wire had been previously cut by
artillery, the raiding party got in successfully and captured about six
prisoners. In this raid one of our officers, 2nd Lieut. Reynolds, who
had been transferred to the Queens, did splendidly. This night’s work
annoyed the Hun no end, and he made our positions a positive inferno.
The next evening he set about us with trench mortars of the heaviest
type, and fairly wrecked the trenches. All ranks behaved with the
greatest gallantry, and were ready to repel an enemy attack at any
moment. We had forty casualties, and 2nd Lieut. E. F. Vinicombe, of D
Company, was killed.
On the next day, June 30, we were relieved by the 7th Australian
Battalion, and moved out to Kortipyp Huts, very tired but greatly
exhilarated by the experiences of the past weeks. We knew very little
about the coming Somme offensive, but we had rumours, and we assumed,
correctly, that we were “for it” there sooner or later. It was with
surprise, therefore, that we received orders after a few days out at
Meteren to go into the line again at Ploegsteert. Here some of us were
served out with Australian hats, which we were to wear, and show
ourselves in order to give the enemy the idea that the Australians were
still in the line. Our stay in these trenches only lasted two days, when
we were relieved by a battalion of the 20th Division, and moved out to
Berthen. Here we remained for a few days until orders were received to
move by train to Amiens, behind the Somme Battle. Then we knew.
The end of June 1916 saw the Battalion in good spirits, united and keen.
We had had real hard trench experience, and the Battalion had proved
itself worthy of the trusts which had been put upon it. All ranks looked
forward with confidence, even with eagerness, to the Somme, and all the
possibilities of getting at the Hun in the open and really finishing the
war which it promised. How things actually turned out on the Somme are
well known, and the next phase of the Battalion’s history will give
details of our part in that great struggle.
PHASE III
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
_August–September 1916_
After a few days at Berthen the Battalion entrained at Bailleul and
detrained at Longeau, near Amiens.
By this time we had all formed a pretty clear idea of what was happening
in the Somme Battle. News of the terrific fighting had been digested. We
had read with pride of the work of our 7th Battalion in Trones Wood,
where we were ourselves very soon destined to be, and we knew we were in
for serious business.
During July 25 we marched seventeen miles to the village of Saisseval.
It was intensely hot and very dusty, but we arrived at Saisseval about
noon. This village was without exception the dirtiest and nastiest the
Battalion had ever been quartered in. However, there was some excellent
country round the village, and for a week we trained strenuously in the
new methods of following a barrage and attacking in waves.
On July 31 and August 1 we moved to the Sandpits, near Meaulte, just
outside Albert. We were here for ten days continuing the training. On
August 8 A and B Companies were suddenly ordered up into Montauban. An
enemy counter-attack was expected at Delville Wood, and it was
apparently not certain whether the troops detailed for the Montauban
defences would be able to get there. The two companies got into position
in the afternoon, took over the dispositions, and arranged to continue
work on the trenches at dawn the next day. However, during the evening
the troops for Montauban arrived, and our companies marched back again
to the Sandpits.
On August 9 orders were received to take over the front-line positions
between Trones Wood and Guillemont the next day.
Early in the morning of August 10 our advance parties went up and
thoroughly reconnoitred the positions. The rest of the Battalion
followed in the afternoon. We were treated to quite a healthy
bombardment on the way in, but the Battalion was finally settled in
position before dusk. In front D Company were on the right, A Company on
the left, in Edward Trench, B Company were in support just outside
Trones Wood, and C Company and Battalion Headquarters in positions round
the Sunken Road at the south-east corner of Trones Wood.
Such trenches as there were had only just been scratched out, and were
mostly not more than a foot deep. From dusk till dawn work by the front
companies was continuous. It was a case of digging for our lives, and at
stand to in the morning every man had trench room nearly six feet deep.
The positions were heavily shelled by the enemy in the morning, and our
casualties would have been very heavy had it not been for the strenuous
digging of the night before. As it was, very few were hit, and the
experience was a very healthy object-lesson to all of us.
The unfortunate village of Guillemont in front of us was practically
gone. Our shelling was continuous. During the day the place was usually
obscured from view by clouds of red brick-dust from bursting shells, and
at night the crashing of shells was continuous. The Hun did no
persistent shelling, but he gave us hurricane bombardments at intervals,
which were most unpleasant.
During the afternoon of August 12 a partial attack by the French on our
right took place. We had a good view of the creeping barrage, and a very
considerable amount of retaliation by the enemy on our trenches. Capt.
Penton, Officer Commanding D Company, was wounded during the afternoon.
In the evening things quietened somewhat, and we were relieved by the
1st North Staffordshire Regiment. We were out for forty-eight hours,
just in front of the Briqueterie, during which time the whole Battalion
was up at night digging a new trench, Nott Trench, some 400 yards in
advance of our front line. On the 15th we went up again, D Company into
Nott Trench, C Company into Edward Trench, B Company into the Trones
Wood position, and A Company to Carnoy Craters. The enemy set about our
new trench that night, and we had a bad time. 2nd Lieut. S. E. Dove, who
was commanding D Company, was killed. There was no enemy attack,
however. After two days we were relieved again, and the Battalion
concentrated at Carnoy Craters.
It had been a stiff week. We had casualties to six officers and 146
other ranks. While in the line the Reserve Company had been working
continuously in salving. As a consequence, huge dumps were made at
Battalion Headquarters, which were used as forward dumps in future for
all troops coming into the area.
An outstanding feature of this week’s fighting was the magnificent work
of Capt. McLarty, the Medical Officer. He was working almost
continuously in the open in the Sunken Road by Battalion Headquarters,
and he must have dressed hundreds of cases during the week. An abortive
attack on Guillemont had taken place just before we took over, and
wounded were coming down and being brought in by our stretcher-bearers
continuously. Practically every shell-hole in front of us had a corpse
or a wounded man in it. All night cries for “water” were heard. We had
large parties out every night, and every soldier in front of us who was
not past human assistance was got back.
On August 18 the 24th Division attacked Guillemont.
The 72nd Brigade was in support, concentrated at Carnoy Craters. The
whole attack was on a frontage of fourteen miles. On our Division’s
front Guillemont Station and a post in the village near the famous
Quarries were captured. In the evening we moved up, and as a first step
we occupied our old positions in Nott and Edward Trenches. Battalion
Headquarters were now in a dug-out in Edward Trench. A Company held Nott
Trench, C and D Company Edward Trench, and B Company the Trones Wood
positions.
On August 19 A Company was ordered up into the village to take over the
post captured there and held by elements of the 73rd Brigade. From Nott
Trench the Company marched in three sections into the village on a
compass bearing after dark. The relief was completed before midnight, B
Company having taken over Nott Trench. The Company in Guillemont was in
a peculiar position. Our new line ran from the post in the village
northwards to the Station. There were trenches of sorts here, and touch
was established with the 3rd Rifle Brigade, who were holding the
Station. But southwards and eastwards our post in the village was in
touch with the enemy only, and that at very close quarters. The post
itself consisted of shell-holes in a very early stage of consolidation.
The quarries which faced our positions from the south at about 40 yards’
distance were strongly held by the enemy, and he made the work of
consolidation exceedingly difficult for our men by constantly harassing
them with machine-gun and rifle-grenade fire.
By daylight on the 20th we had succeeded in getting a continuous trench
facing south to the quarry, and two enormous shell-holes were
consolidated as a defensive position facing east. The enemy seemed to
have no settled position in the village, and he was evidently occupying
shell-holes in a very irregular fashion. During the day he showed
himself a great deal, and we did a lot of very successful shooting. In
view of the enemy’s unsettled position in the village, it was decided to
make an attempt to continue our trench which faced south in an easterly
direction, to form a jumping-off position for another attack on the
village.
A large party of the 12th Sherwood Foresters (Pioneers) was to come up
at night to do the digging, and the area where they were to work was to
be previously cleared of and held from the enemy. At dusk, therefore,
2nd Lieut. A. Roscoe took out a big fighting patrol of a platoon in
strength. He first worked eastwards from our shell-hole position to the
eastern extremities of the village, then southwards towards the low
ground in the centre of the village. It was a very difficult operation
indeed, but his work was splendidly successful. The patrol had several
encounters with isolated posts in shell-holes. One of these fights
developed into a wrestling match in which one Hun was killed and one
wounded. We had a few casualties, but succeeded in establishing two
positions south of the site of the new trench. The garrisons of these
posts remained out all night, frustrated all attempts by the Boche to
filter northwards again, and covered the party digging the new trench.
In the small hours of the morning of August 21 A Company was relieved by
two companies of the 8th Queens, and moved back to Dublin Trench, near
the Briqueterie. It had been a highly exciting thirty hours up in the
village, and the memory of it will live long in the minds of all who
were there. The relieving feature had been the absence of shelling; our
positions in the village were too near the enemy’s, and the Boche
positions east of ours were too indefinite for the enemy to shell us
with safety to his own men. The other companies had been holding the old
trenches, and had been subjected to the same old hurricane bombardments
several times a day. We moved back to Citadel Camp, near Fricourt, on
August 22, and on the 25th to camps near Ville-sur-Ancre.
On the 27th the Battalion was inspected by Maj.-Gen. J. E. Capper, C.B.,
the Divisional Commander, who in a short speech thanked us for what had
been done, and gave us his well-known doctrine of hatred of the Hun, as
displayed by blood on the bayonet. He also spoke of our forthcoming work
in Delville Wood. On this day company commanders had paid their first
visit to Delville Wood, and Inner Trench, which had just been taken from
the enemy in his final ejection from the wood, was reconnoitred. As a
result of the reconnaissance it was clear to all of us that the enemy
would never allow us to hold the trench without desperate efforts to
retake it. The Battalion went into billets at Ribemont on the evening of
the 27th, and stayed there till the morning of the 30th, when we marched
to Fricourt. In the evening we went up to Delville Wood. Will anyone who
was with the Battalion ever forget that night? At Bernafay Wood we were
to be met by guides, and from there to Inner Trench the distance was
about a mile “as the crow flies.” The men were excessively heavily
laden. Each company carried three days’ rations, 25 petrol tins of
water, 25 boxes of bombs, 12 boxes of flares, 12 boxes of Very lights,
and some boxes of S.A.A. It had rained hard all day, and showed no signs
of abating at night. The guides were picked up successfully at 9.30
p.m., and the crawl across Caterpillar Valley and through the wood
began. Nominally there was a communication trench leading all the way,
but there was little or nothing of it left, and the guides could
scarcely be expected to keep direction. Delville Wood was notorious for
changing its shape and appearance every hour. Details of that terrible
night’s march are innumerable, and cannot be dwelt on here. Most of them
can be recalled by those who were there, and they can be imagined when
it is stated that the rain was continuous, the shelling of the wood
heavy and incessant, and the mud knee-deep at least. Added to this it
should be remembered that the Battalion had already marched ten miles
during the day, and the men were loaded up like desert camels. The
leading company began to get into its position at 5 a.m. on August 31,
but it was nearly 8 o’clock before the trenches were really taken
over—eleven hours after we had picked up our guides a mile away!
[Illustration:
DELVILLE WOOD.
]
[Illustration:
THE MEMORIAL BOARD TO THOSE WHO FELL ON THE SOMME, 1916, PLACED IN
GUILLEMONT CEMETERY.
]
A Company occupied Inner Trench and a new trench forward of the wood
facing north-east. B Company occupied Edge Trench in touch with the left
flank of A Company. C Company were in support in the wood, and D Company
in reserve behind the wood. Battalion Headquarters were in a dug-out at
Longueval Church. Col. Parker had gone down sick with malaria and trench
fever, and Maj. N. I. Whitty took over command of the Battalion. The
Company Commanders were: A Company, Capt. H. J. Wenyon; B Company, 2nd
Lieut. H. Flowers; C Company, Capt. Sir Henry Hawley, Bt.; D Company,
2nd Lieut. W. G. Lock.
We were allowed very little respite after the position had been taken
over. If the night’s march had been deadly, the day which followed was
far worse. It was the day of the enemy’s last and biggest attempt to
retake the high ground from High Wood to Guillemont. We just had time to
have our breakfast of sodden biscuits and cold bacon, when the shelling
began, shortly after 8 a.m. It is not intended to paint lurid details of
this shelling. Suffice it to say that Delville Wood went up in fire and
smoke for five and a half hours. In Inner Trench was one deep dug-out.
In this we kept five machine guns and crews of the 72nd M.G.C., also
some of our Lewis guns and teams. The shelling round the dug-out was
particularly heavy, but by the grace of God the enemy failed to demolish
it. In Edge Trench cover was scanty and the shelling terrific. Most of
the forward platoons of A Company were casualties before 10 a.m., and B
Company on the left suffered very severely too. The garrison of the two
front companies became very thin, and two platoons of D Company from
reserve were sent up to hold the centre.
At 1.30 p.m. the shelling suddenly and very obviously lifted on to the
south edge of the wood. Shelters and dug-outs were immediately cleared,
machine guns and Lewis guns were got into position, and our depleted
garrison disposed to meet an attack.
Scouts crawled out in front to beyond the edge of the wood to watch a
piece of dead ground there. On the right we were in fair order for
meeting an attack. We had our machine guns and most of our Lewis guns
intact, and quite a fair supply of ammunition. The enemy was some 600
yards away, and was bound to show himself clearly at 500 yards’ range.
On the left our position was more difficult, the enemy was much closer,
and there was a covered way of approach opposite the front of the
Battalion on our left. The men were tremendously eager. After terrific
shelling which numbs the senses while it lasts, the reaction often took
this form. As the first of the attacking troops began to trickle into
view it was difficult to hold our rifle fire down. We kept perfectly
silent, however, and, encouraged by this, the enemy came forward in
considerable numbers till he arrived at an intermediate jumping-off
trench some 500 yards away. Here he collected for half an hour, and word
was passed down our line that as soon as he debouched from these
positions in force, every rifle, machine gun, and Lewis gun was to open
fire. At about 2.30 p.m. the enemy came forward all along the front, at
a slow trot. Immediately all along our line machine guns, Lewis guns,
and rifles let fly at him. He was stopped dead within 50 yards of his
trenches, while his men fell right and left. For a moment his line
wavered, and the next his troops were running back in a mad rush to
their original positions, followed all the way by our fire.
Baulked of his desire, the enemy shelled us again for an hour and an
half, and then in the early evening he repeated his attempt. This time
we knew exactly what to do, and we carried out the same programme as
before with the same result. Inner Trench and Edge Trench were still
entirely held by us at the end of the day. On the left of Edge Trench,
however, the enemy had gained a footing in Orchard Trench, held by the
battalion on our left, and B Company had a very nasty time in the
evening. The Company Commander, 2nd Lieut. Flowers, was killed, and 2nd
Lieut. E. G. Brown took over command. He and his Sergeant-Major,
Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. R. Rankin, did splendid work, and organised their
exposed flank for defence. Away on our right, too, the enemy gained a
footing in the trenches of a battalion of the 7th Division, but he was
ejected. A counter-attack the next day expelled the enemy from Orchard
Trench and re-established the position all along the front. The enemy’s
great bid for the high ground had failed, and the night of August
31/September 1 was comparatively quiet.
Everyone was absolutely dead beat. In turns most of us managed to snatch
some sleep that night, and the next morning we heard we were to be
relieved during the day. The Queens relieved us in the afternoon, and we
moved back into Check Trench in Caterpillar Valley, between Bernafay
Wood and Delville Wood. The valley was stiff with our guns, and Check
Trench was about thirty yards in front of their muzzles. At about 9
p.m., just when we were all hoping to get a bit of sleep, the enemy
commenced a concentrated counter-battery bombardment with gas shell of
the guns in Caterpillar Valley. We got the full benefit of this.
Everyone was ordered to put on gas helmets (the old P.H.) at once. We
spent a most uncomfortable night: the bombardment was kept up for five
hours, and many of us had our first experience of sleeping in a gas
helmet—quite possible, but most unpleasant. We had practically no
casualties from that night’s gas shelling.
We remained in Caterpillar Valley till September 5. The batteries were
constantly shelled, and we usually got the benefit of it. On the first
afternoon we had ten signallers buried in one firebay by an 8-inch
shell. 2nd Lieut. Roscoe organised a digging party at once, and after
two hours he succeeded in clearing the whole firebay; only one man was
killed. A similar fate overtook another bay shortly after, and again all
except one man were dug out alive. On the next day 2nd Lieut. Roscoe
took up a party at daybreak to get rations up to the Queens, who were
now in a new trench in front of Inner Trench. The party ran into very
heavy shelling in Inner Trench, and had several casualties, including
2nd Lieut. Roscoe, who was severely wounded in the leg. He died of
wounds at Corbie the next day. Throughout the fortnight at Guillemont
and Delville Wood he had done magnificently. His cheerfulness was
wonderful, and he was ready at all times for any job there was going.
After 2nd Lieut. Roscoe was hit in Inner Trench, Sergt. Greenaway took
the remains of the party on, though it was now broad daylight. They
crawled across the open to the new trench, and delivered the rations and
water successfully to the officers in command there.
On September 3 a big attack on Ginchy and Guillemont on our right took
place, and on the evening of the 5th the 24th Division was relieved, and
moved back to a camp near Fricourt. On September 7 the Battalion arrived
at Vauchelles-les-Quesnoy, a delightful little village close to
Abbeville, where we were very comfortable. A large draft of new officers
joined us on our way, and the Battalion settled down to refit and train
for what was to follow. As things turned out, we had finished with the
Somme, and we were soon hurried off north to the 1st Army.
Our sojourn in the historic battlefields of the Somme had been crammed
with incident. It coincided with the period in which the enemy was
making his most strenuous efforts to drive us from the high ground,
which gave the British their first sight of Bapaume. We had learnt what
shelling meant at Ypres and Messines, and during the terrific
bombardments at Guillemont and Delville Wood the Battalion was always
steady. Apart from the holding and exploiting of the forward positions,
the Battalion did a tremendous amount of work in their brief spells out
of the front posts. As examples, one may mention Nott Trench, 800 yards
long, dug in two nights right in front of our front line and under
constant fire from the enemy, and the work of salvage done by the
Reserve Companies in the Trones Wood area.
Of fighting the enemy we had had it at close quarters in Guillemont
Village, and we had had it after a shattering bombardment in Delville
Wood, where the enemy was not allowed to get within 400 yards of us. In
both cases he had been beaten.
It is difficult to pick out any isolated cases of brave deeds among the
countless acts of heroism of those weeks. 2nd Lieut. Roscoe’s work has
already been mentioned. 2nd Lieut. E. G. Brown and Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. R.
Rankin in Edge Trench did wonderful work in an awful position in keeping
the enemy at bay. The Battalion stretcher-bearers one and all did
magnificently all through. They worked seemingly without sleep or food,
and without ceasing, as also did Capt. McLarty, the Medical Officer. An
act of two private soldiers may be mentioned as indicating very truly
the spirit of the Battalion during the day of the enemy’s counter-attack
at Delville Wood. Towards the end of the bombardment, when one front
company had lost over a third of its men, the Company Commander
considered it imperative to send back a report to Battalion
Headquarters. He hesitated to do so for a time, because it seemed
certain death to the men taking the message. Finally volunteers were
called for, and two wounded men, Pte. Skerry and Pte. Tyrrell, came
forward. The message was given to them, and they were told to deliver it
at Battalion Headquarters, and then to go down to the field ambulance.
The wood was a perfect inferno at the time, but they started off with
the greatest bravery, although one of them could scarcely walk.
Something more than an hour later the Company Commander was astounded to
see them back in Inner Trench, and assumed they had not been able to get
through the barrage. The fact was, however, that they had not only got
back to Battalion Headquarters with the message, but they had insisted
on bringing an answer back to their Company Commander rather than go
straight back to the safety of the field ambulance. As the result of
this message the reinforcements from D Company already mentioned came up
to fill the gaps in the two front companies.
One other case may be mentioned. At the end of a long night’s work in
front of Guillemont, dawn broke with a slight mist. Cries for “water”
could still be heard in front, so under cover of the mist a large party
went out and brought back many wounded men. While they were out, a cry
was heard from a long way in front. An officer who was with the party
went forward as far as possible and discovered that the wounded man was
in the enemy wire. The stretcher-bearer party was following up, but the
officer ordered them not to go forward, as it seemed obviously hopeless
to get the man back. The whole party therefore returned to Edward
Trench. It was then discovered that one man, Pte. Allchin, was missing.
A few men went out again to find him, and after about an hour he was
seen coming back from the enemy wire carrying the wounded man on his
back. That he had got there and back was nothing short of a miracle,
because the enemy was exceedingly vigilant at this time, and he was
sniping incessantly.
The fighting on the Somme had taken a heavy toll of the Battalion. The
Battalion memorial erected in Guillemont Cemetery gives the names of 3
officers and 91 N.C.O.s and men who were killed or who died of wounds.
Our total casualties were 13 officers and about 300 N.C.O.s and men.
The impression left in the minds of most people who fought on the Somme
was that the enemy was being taught there once for all that the British
Army was going to beat the Germans at all cost.
The 8th Battalion of the Royal West Kent Regiment can justly claim to
have done much to drive home that lesson to the enemy at Guillemont and
Delville Wood.
PHASE IV
TRENCH WARFARE AT VIMY RIDGE, HULLUCH, AND MAROC—THE ADVANCE ON LENS
_September 1916–April 1917_
Our stay at Vauchelles was pleasant, but short. The billets were all
quite good, and Battalion Headquarters occupied sumptuous quarters at
the château of the Baron de Rocquigny. Reorganisation was taken in hand.
The commands were as follows:
Commanding Officer, Maj. N. I. Whitty; A/Adjutant, Lieut. H. S. Brown,
vice Lieut. and Adjutant S. J. F. Mills, who broke his ankle as the
result of a fall from his horse.
Company Commanders: A Company, Capt. H. J. Wenyon; B Company, 2nd Lieut.
E. G. Brown; C Company, Lieut. Sir H. C. W. Hawley; D Company, 2nd
Lieut. W. G. Lock.
On September 19 we entrained at Abbeville under orders to move to the
1st Army Area. After a four days’ halt at Sains-les-Pernes, where
training and reorganisation were continued strenuously, a further move
was made to Haillicourt, near Bruay, for a couple of days before the
Battalion arrived in the new area behind the Vimy Ridge and went into
Divisional Reserve at Gouy-Servins on the 26th. The civilians were
inclined to be hostile here, and we were not very comfortable. The
Battalion was billeted in the château, which was in a very dilapidated
condition. On October 2 we moved up to the front line in the right
subsection (Berthonval Section), and spent an uneventful spell of eight
days there. The Hun did a certain amount of trench mortaring, but after
the Somme these trenches were really a peaceful home from home. The
communication trenches were in very fair condition, but the front line
was not so good. A, C, and D Companies were in the front line, with B in
support.
On October 10 the Battalion went back into support in Zouave Valley,
Coliseum, and Alhambra Trenches and Cabaret Rouge. Here the chief sports
were working parties of all sorts, and rat-hunting. On the 18th we moved
to Gouy-Servins again, and while there the officers gave the sergeants a
good trouncing at football, and later played a very even game with the
whole of the rest of the Battalion.
Orders were soon received for us to move up to the Hulluch Sector. On
the 24th the Battalion marched to Mazingarbe, and on the 25th moved into
the line opposite Hulluch, relieving the 14th Highland Light Infantry, a
bantam battalion of the 40th Division.
Many tragic memories were here revived, for we were holding the very
trenches over which the attack on Hulluch had been launched on September
26, 1915.
[Illustration:
_Photo by_] [_Swaine, London._