Shortly after General Lee passed down the steps he was followed by

an erect, slightly built, soldierly looking officer, in a neat but

somewhat worn gray uniform, a man with an anxious and thoughtful

face, wearing spectacles, who glanced neither to the right nor left,

keeping his eyes straight before him. Notwithstanding this, I doubt

if he missed anything within the range of his vision. This officer,

I was afterward told, was Colonel Marshall, one of the Confederate

adjutants-general, the member of General Lee’s staff whom he had

selected to accompany him.

As soon as the colonel had mounted, General Lee drew up his reins, and,

with the colonel riding on his left and followed by the orderly, moved

at a slow walk across the yard toward the gate.

[Illustration: DEPARTURE OF GENERAL LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER]

Just as they started, General Grant came out of the house, crossed the

porch, and passed down the steps into the yard. At this time he was

nearly forty-two years of age, of middle height, not over-weighted

with flesh, but, nevertheless, stockily and sturdily built, with light

complexion, mild, gray-blue eyes, finely formed Grecian nose, an

iron-willed mouth, brown hair, full brown beard with a tendency toward

red rather than black, and in his manner and all his movements there

was a strength of purpose, a personal poise, and a cool, quiet air of

dignity, decision, and soldierly confidence that were very good to see.

On this occasion he wore a plain blue army blouse, with shoulder-straps

set with three silver stars equidistant, designating his rank as

lieutenant-general commanding the armies of the United States; it was

unbuttoned, showing a blue military vest, over which and under his

blouse was buckled a belt, but he was without a sword. His trousers

were dark blue and tucked into top-boots, which were without spurs,

but heavily splashed with mud, for, once he knew that General Lee

was waiting for him at Appomattox Court-house, he had ridden rapidly

across the country, over road and field and through woods, to meet him.

He wore a peculiar, stiff-brimmed, sugar-loaf-crowned, campaign hat

of black felt, and his uniform was partly covered by a light-weight,

dark-blue, waterproof, semi-military cloak, with a full cape,

unbuttoned and thrown back, showing the front of his uniform, for while

the day had developed into warm, bright, and beautifully sunny weather,

the early morning had been damp, slightly foggy, and presaged rain.

As he reached the foot of the steps and started across the yard to the

fence where, inside the gate, the orderlies were holding his horse and

those of several of his staff-officers, General Lee, on his way to the

gate, rode across his path. Stopping suddenly, General Grant looked up,

and both generals simultaneously raised their hands in military salute.

After General Lee had passed, General Grant crossed the yard and sprang

lightly and quickly into his saddle. He was riding his splendid bay

horse Cincinnati, and it would have been difficult to find a firmer

seat, a lighter hand, or a better rider in either army.

As he was about to go out of the gate he halted, turned his horse,

and rode at a walk toward the porch of the house, where, among others,

stood General Sheridan and myself. Stopping in front of the general, he

said, “Sheridan, where will you make your headquarters to-night?”

“Here, or near here; right here in this yard, probably,” was the reply.

“Very well, then; I’ll know where to find you in case I wish to

communicate. Good-day.”

“Good-day, General,” was the response, and with a military salute

General Grant turned and rode away.

As he rode forward and halted at the porch to make this inquiry, I

had my wished-for opportunity, but my eyes sought his face in vain

for any indication of what was passing in his mind. Whatever may have

been there, as Colonel Newhall has well written, “not a muscle of his

face told tales on his thoughts”; and if he felt any elation, neither

his voice, features, nor his eyes betrayed it. Once out of the gate,

General Grant, followed by his staff, turned to the left and moved off

at a rapid trot.

General Lee continued on his way toward his army at a walk, to be

received by his devoted troops with cheers and tears, and to sit down

and pen a farewell order that, to this day, no old soldier of the Army

of Northern Virginia can read without moistening eyes and swelling

throat.

General Grant, on his way to his field headquarters on this eventful

Sunday evening, dismounted, sat quietly down by the roadside, and wrote

a short and simple despatch, which a galloping aide bore at full speed

to the nearest telegraph station. On its reception in the nation’s

capital this despatch was flashed over the wires to every hamlet in the

country, causing every steeple in the North to rock to its foundation,

and sending one tall, gaunt, sad-eyed, weary-hearted man in Washington

to his knees, thanking God that he had lived to see the beginning of

the end, and that he had at last been vouchsafed the assurance that he

had led his people aright.

SYNOPSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS, CHIEFLY MILITARY, BETWEEN APPOMATTOX,

1865, AND THE BATTLES OF MANILA BAY AND SANTIAGO DE CUBA, 1898

1866. The Civil Rights Bill is passed over President Johnson’s veto.

Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment granting political rights to the

negro. (This amendment was proclaimed part of the Constitution in

1868.) Successful establishment of ocean telegraphy between Europe and

America. Fenian raid into Canada.

1867. Admission of Nebraska into the Union. Passage of the

Reconstruction Act. Purchase of Alaska from Russia. Dominion of Canada

constituted. Maximilian, abandoned by the French in Mexico, is captured

and shot.

1868. Impeachment and trial of President Johnson. The impeachment

fails. Ulysses S. Grant elected President. Outbreak of Cuban

insurrection.

1869. Adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment prohibiting the States from

denying the right to vote to any citizen of the United States on

account of race or color. (This amendment was proclaimed a part of the

Constitution in 1870.) Completion of the Pacific Railway.

1870. Completion of reconstruction in the Southern States. Death of Lee

and Farragut.

1871. Treaty of Washington for the settlement of the “Alabama” Claims.

Great Fire in Chicago. Hall’s Arctic Expedition reaches lat. 82° 16´.

1872. The Geneva Tribunal makes an award to the United States on

account of the “Alabama” Claims. The Emperor of Germany decides San

Juan boundary question. Ulysses S. Grant re-elected President. Outbreak

of the Modoc War.

1873. Surrender of the Modocs. Capture of the American steamer

_Virginius_ by a Spanish gunboat. Surrender of the _Virginius_.

Financial Panic.

1874. President Grant vetoes Inflation Bill. Race riots in the Southern

States.

1875. Supplementary Civil Rights Bill passed.

1876. The Custer Massacre by the Sioux Indians. Admission of Colorado

into the Union. Disputed Presidential Election (Hayes, Republican, and

Tilden, Democrat). The Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia. Invention

of the Telephone.

1877. The Electoral Commission awards the Presidency to Rutherford

B. Hayes. Great Labor Strike throughout the United States. Campaign

against the Nez Percé Indians.

1878. End of the Ten Years’ War in Cuba. China sends a minister to

Washington for the first time.

1879. Resumption of Specie Payment in the United States.

1880. James A. Garfield elected President. Treaty with China relative

to the restriction of Chinese Immigration.

1881. Assassination of James A. Garfield. Chester A. Arthur succeeds to

the Presidency. Construction of the Panama Canal begun by the French.

1882. Verdict in the Star Route case.

1883. Passage of the Civil Service Bill. Northern Pacific Railroad

opened.

1884. Grover Cleveland elected President.

1885. United States government guarantees transit across Isthmus of

Panama threatened by insurgents, and enforces this with troops.

1886. Extensive Labor Strikes in the United States. The “Haymarket”

Anarchists’ riot at Chicago. Earthquake at Charleston. Anti-Chinese

riots in Seattle. Railroad riots in the West. United States troops

ordered to St. Louis. Act passed to increase navy.

1887. Interstate Commerce Bill passed. Centennial Celebration of the

Constitution. Execution of the Chicago “Haymarket” Anarchists. Blizzard

throughout the northwestern section of the United States.

1888. Blizzard in the East. Benjamin Harrison elected President. Dakota

divided into North and South Dakota.

1889. Wreck of the U. S. steamers _Trenton_, _Vandalia_, and

_Nipsic_ at the Samoan Islands. The territory of Oklahoma opened for

settlement. Flood at Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Centennial celebration

of Washington’s inauguration. Admission of North and South Dakota into

the Union; also of Montana and Washington. Department of Agriculture

created.

1890. The McKinley Tariff Bill passed. Admission of Wyoming into the

Union. The Mormon Church formally abandons Polygamy.

1891. The Pine Ridge Indian outbreak. Seizure of the Chilian insurgent

steamer _Itata_. Assault upon sailors of the U. S. Cruiser _Baltimore_

at Valparaiso.

1892. An Ultimatum submitted to Chili; the latter country makes

an apology and pays an indemnity. The Homestead Labor Riots in

Pennsylvania. Railroad riots at Buffalo. National Guard ordered out.

Grover Cleveland elected President.

1893. Opening of the World’s Columbian Exposition at Chicago. Admission

of Utah and Arizona into the Union.

1894. Great Railway Strike at Chicago. President Cleveland recognizes

the new Republic of Hawaii. _Kearsarge_ lost on Roncador Reef.

1895. Steamship _Alliance_ fired upon by a Spanish Cruiser. Spain

apologizes. Spain declares martial law in Cuba. Cuban revolutionists

proclaim independence, adopt a constitution, establish a republican

government, and unfurl the flag of the revolution of 1868–78. Message

of President Cleveland regarding the boundary dispute between Great

Britain and Venezuela.

1896. William McKinley elected President. President Cleveland issues a

proclamation against the Cuban Filibusters. International Arbitration

Congress meets at Washington.

1897. The United States recognizes the belligerency of the Cuban

insurgents. Venezuela boundary treaty ratified. Hawaii annexed to the

United States.

1898. The U. S. battle-ship _Maine_ is blown up in Havana Harbor,

with great loss of life, on the night of February 15th. On April 20th

Congress directs the President to intervene between Spain and Cuba. On

April 23d the President issues a call for one hundred and twenty-five

thousand volunteers, and on April 26th Congress authorizes an increase

of the regular army to 61,919 officers and men. On April 25th Congress

declares war between Spain and the United States as existing since

April 21st.

XXI

THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY, 1898

For more than a century the island of Cuba had been an object of

peculiar interest and concern to the United States.[272] During the

first part of the nineteenth century the fear was that Cuba might

be acquired by Great Britain or France, and thus a strong European

power would be established at the very gate of the American republic.

Manifestly, it was then the policy of the United States to guarantee

the possession of the island to Spain. But after the Mexican War the

idea of exterritorial expansion entered more and more largely into

American statesmanship. The South looked upon Cuba as a desirable

addition to slave-holding territory, and it was apparent to every

eye that the island occupied an all-important strategic position in

relation to the proposed canal routes across the Isthmus of Panama.

In 1822 propositions for annexation came from Cuba to the United

States, and Monroe sent an agent to investigate. Later, annexation

was a recurrent subject favored by the South, which saw a field for

the extension of slavery. In 1848 the American minister at Madrid was

instructed by President Polk to sound the Spanish government upon the

question of sale or cession. But Spain declined even to consider such

a proposition. In 1854 the so-called “Ostend Manifesto,” drawn up by

James Buchanan, John Y. Mason, and Pierre Soulé (respectively United

States ministers to England, France, and Spain), declared in plain

language that the “Union can never enjoy repose nor possess reliable

security as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries.” It

went on to advise the seizing of the coveted territory in case Spain

refused to sell. The administration of President Pierce never directly

sanctioned the proposition advanced in such extraordinary terms,

and Marcy, the Secretary of State, repudiated it unqualifiedly. So

the matter fell again into abeyance until in 1873 the _Virginius_,

an American schooner suspected of conveying arms and ammunition to

the Cuban insurgents, was captured by a Spanish gunboat and taken to

Havana. As a result of the trial, many insurgents, together with six

British subjects and thirty American citizens, were executed. For a

time international complications seemed certain, but finally Spain made

proper apologies and surrendered the _Virginius_ and the survivors of

her crew.

The Cuban “Ten Years’ War,” from 1868 to 1878, was characterized by

great cruelty and destructive losses of life and property in which

American interests were now deeply involved. President Grant seriously

considered and even threatened intervention, which would have meant

annexation; but Spain promised definite reforms, and the old conditions

were continued.

When the insurrection of 1895 began, American citizens owned at least

fifty millions of property in the island, and American commerce

amounted to a hundred millions annually. Both on the Spanish and Cuban

side outrages were of daily occurrence, and the situation quickly

became intolerable. The McKinley administration ventured upon a mild

remonstrance against the inhumanities of Captain-General Weyler, and

the Spanish authorities replied evasively. Finally the United States

formally offered its good offices for the adjustment of Cuban affairs,

presumably on a basis of independence. Spain declared that it was her

intention to grant autonomy to the island, and the decree was actually

published on November 27, 1897. But it was now too late, and the

unhappy conditions grew worse day by day.

There had been riots at Havana itself, and it was thought advisable

to send the United States cruiser _Maine_ on a friendly visit to that

port. The _Maine_ arrived at Havana on January 25, 1898. On the night

of February 15th the _Maine_ was blown up while lying at her harbor

moorings, with a ghastly loss of life. The American Court of Inquiry

found that the ship was destroyed from the outside; the Spanish inquiry

resulted in a verdict that the ship was destroyed from causes within

herself. At the time there was an outburst of passion throughout the

United States, and Spain was held guilty of an atrocious crime. While

the exact cause of the disaster has never been finally determined, it

is the verdict of calmer and more distant consideration that official

Spain must be acquitted, although the belief remains on the part of

the American naval authorities that the _Maine_ was blown up from

outside. At the time, however, this tragedy powerfully reinforced the

efforts of Cubans and the pressure of financial interests to secure

American support. When Senator Redfield Proctor, of Vermont, a man

of peculiarly dispassionate temperament, made public his account

of the suffering which he had witnessed among the _reconcentrados_

(collections of native Cubans, particularly women and children, herded

together by Spanish troops), the sympathies of Americans were stirred

even more deeply. Ministers preached intervention from their pulpits.

Many newspapers demanded intervention. Yellow journals clamored for

an ultimatum backed by arms. Congress was carried away by the wave of

intense feeling, although President McKinley thought that a solution

could be reached without an appeal to arms--a belief in which the final

verdict of history will probably agree, although it was inevitable that

Spain should resign control of Cuba. But the President was powerless

against the popular sentiment.

On April 25th war with Spain was formally declared, and for the first

time in over three-quarters of a century the republic of the West found

itself arrayed in arms against a European nation.

The situation had its peculiar features. It had been assumed that

the principal theatre of conflict would be the island of Cuba, and

consequently the American campaign must be one of invasion. But the

Spaniards, owing to the civil war in the colony, were in virtually the

same position--fighting at a distance from their base of supplies.

In material resources the United States ranked immeasurably superior.

True, the numerical strength of the regular army was small, but behind

it stood thousands of State militia and millions of available reserves.

Moreover, the United States was classed among the richest of nations

and Spain among the poorest. So far as the land operations were

concerned, the final issue could not be doubtful.

In naval strength, however, there was less disparity. On paper the

United States ranked sixth among the world powers, while Spain

occupied eighth place. But the United States, with its thousands of

miles of coast on both the Atlantic and the Pacific seaboards, was

unquestionably vulnerable. Coast defences were admittedly inadequate,

and it was conceivable that one swift dash by a Spanish squadron might

endanger millions of property at Boston, New York, and Baltimore; at

San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle.

The situation on the Pacific coast seemed even more delicate than that

on the Eastern seaboard. There was a formidable Spanish squadron at

Manila in the Philippine Islands, and all depended upon the fighting

ability of the American Pacific fleet; if Dewey failed, the Western

States of America were absolutely at the mercy of the enemy.

For more than a month Commodore Dewey had lain with his fleet in the

harbor of Hong-Kong, waiting for events to shape themselves. In

anticipation of the coming strife, and the consequent declaration of

neutrality on the part of Great Britain, the American commander had

purchased two transport steamers, together with ten thousand tons of

coal. He was thus prepared for prompt and decisive action.

War had been declared on April 25th, and the American squadron

immediately left Hong-Kong for Mirs Bay, some thirty miles away. On

April 26th Commodore Dewey received the following despatch:

“WASHINGTON, _April 26_.

“DEWEY, ASIATIC SQUADRON,--Commence operations at once,

particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture or destroy

them.

MCKINLEY.”

On April 27th the American fleet sailed for Manila, six hundred and

twenty-eight miles away, and on the morning of Saturday, April 30th,

Luzon was sighted, and the ships were ordered to clear for action.

Under Commodore George Dewey were the _Olympia_, the _Boston_, the

_Petrel_, the _Concord_, the _Raleigh_, and the _Baltimore_. The only

armored vessel in the squadron was the _Olympia_, the protecting

belting, four inches thick, being around the turret guns. The auxiliary

force was made up of the revenue-cutter _McCulloch_ and two transports,

the _Vaughan_ and the _Zafiro_. Altogether, the American fighting force

included four cruisers, two gunboats, fifty-seven classified big guns,

seventy-four rapid-fire and machine guns, and 1808 men. On the other

side, Rear-Admiral Montojo commanded seven cruisers, five gunboats, two

torpedo-boats, fifty-two classified big guns, eighty-three rapid-fire

and machine guns, and 1948 men. It will thus be seen that the Americans

mounted a few more heavy guns, but the Spanish had several more ships

and over a hundred more men. Moreover, the Spanish ships were assisted

by the fort and land batteries at Manila, and they also possessed

the great advantage of range-marks. Finally, the ship-channels were

supposed to be amply protected by mines and submarine batteries. After

satisfying himself that the ships of the enemy were not in Subig Bay,

Commodore Dewey resolved to enter Manila Bay the same night. It was

known that the channel had been mined, but that risk must be taken.

With all lights except the stern ones extinguished, the American

vessels steamed steadily onward; finally, Corregidor Island, with its

lofty light-house, came into view, and the fleet swept into the main

ship-channel known as the Boca Grande.

Up to this point no sign had been made by the enemy that the approach

of the American ships had been discovered, although the night was

moonlit and it was only a little after eleven o’clock. Then a fireman

on the _McCulloch_ threw some soft coal in the furnace and a shower of

sparks flew from the cutter’s funnel. A solitary rocket ascended from

Corregidor, and there was an answering light from the mainland. At a

quarter-past eleven a bugle sounded, and from the shore batteries came

a blinding glare, followed by the boom of a heavy gun--the first shot

of the Spanish-American War.

The _Raleigh_ had the honor of replying for the American side, and

the _Boston_ followed quickly. A well-aimed six-inch shell from the

_Concord_ plumped into the Spanish fort; there was a crash and a cry,

and all was still. The forts had been silenced.

At slow speed the squadron moved onward, for Commodore Dewey did not

wish to arrive at Manila before dawn. Some of the men managed to get

a little sleep, but the ever-present danger of torpedoes and the

excitement of the approaching battle were not conducive to peaceful

slumbers.

The morning of Sunday, May 1st, dawned clear and beautiful, although

the day promised to be hot. The squadron found itself directly across

the bay from the city of Manila; and there, under the guns of Cavité,

lay the Spanish fleet.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF MANILA BAY]

According to Commodore Dewey’s report, the shore batteries began

firing at a quarter-past five. The _Olympia_, flying the signal

“Remember the Maine,” led the American column, followed closely by

the _Baltimore_, _Raleigh_, _Petrel_, _Concord_, and _Boston_ in the

order named. The ships came on in a line approximately parallel to

that of the enemy, reserving their fire until within effective range.

As the fleet advanced two submarine mines were exploded, but neither

did any damage. At twenty minutes to six Commodore Dewey shouted to

Captain Gridley in the conning-tower of the flag-ship: “Fire as soon

as you get ready, Gridley.” Instantly the _Olympia_ discharged her

broadside, the _Baltimore_ followed the lead, and each successive ship

in turn discharged every gun that could be brought to bear. The Spanish

returned the fire with great energy, but with inconclusive results.

Several of the American ships were struck, but no casualties followed.

Lieutenant Brumby, of the flag-ship, had the signal halliards shot out

of his hands; a shot passed clean through the _Baltimore_, and another

smashed into the foremast of the _Boston_. Incessantly firing, the

battle-line steamed past the whole length of the stationary Spanish

fleet, then swung slowly around and began the countermarch. Once

Montojo’s flag-ship, the _Reina Cristina_, made a desperate attempt to

leave the line and engage at close quarters, but she was quickly driven

back.

A little after half-past seven the American commander ordered the

firing to be stopped, and the fleet headed for the eastern side of the

bay for breakfast and a redistribution of ammunition for the big guns.

The Spaniards, seeing the withdrawal of the American vessels, rashly

concluded that the enemy had been repulsed and raised a feeble cheer.

In reality they were hopelessly beaten: several of their ships were

on fire, the decks of all were covered with dead and dying men, and

ammunition was running low.

At a quarter-past eleven the battle was renewed. Several of the Spanish

ships were now disabled and on fire, and Admiral Montojo had been

forced to transfer his flag to the _Isla de Cuba_.

A few minutes later the _Reina Cristina_, his former flag-ship, was

blazing from end to end, and the explosion of her magazine completed

the destruction of the vessel. One after another the Spanish ships

succumbed under the storm of shot and shell, and either surrendered

or were cut to pieces. The _Don Antonio de Ulloa_, riddled like a

sieve and on fire in a dozen places, refused to acknowledge defeat,

and went down with colors flying. Finally, Admiral Montojo hauled down

his flag, and, leaving the _Isla de Cuba_, escaped to the shore. The

arsenal building at Cavité ran up the white flag, and at half-past

one Commodore Dewey signalled to his ships that they might anchor at

discretion.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF MANILA BAY]

Never was victory more decisive. Not a man had been killed on

the American side, and but four men were wounded--this through the

explosion of a Spanish shell on the _Baltimore_. None of the American

ships received any material damage. On the other hand, the following

Spanish ships were completely destroyed: _Reina Cristina_ (flag-ship),

_Castilla_, _Don Antonio de Ulloa_, _Don Juan de Austria_, _Isla de

Luzon_, _Isla de Cuba_, _Marquiz del Duero_, _General Lezo_, _Correo_,

_Velasco_, and _Isla de Mandanao_. The casualties on the Spanish side

amounted to about four hundred men. Moreover, the water-batteries of

Cavité had been demolished, the arsenal had been captured, and the city

of Manila lay defenceless under the guns of the American fleet.

But Commodore Dewey’s difficulties were by no means at an end. He had

immediately proclaimed a blockade of the port. The German Pacific

squadron, under Vice-Admiral von Diederich, had arrived at Manila

shortly after the battle, and were, of course, in the position

of neutrals, having access to the harbor merely on the ground of

international courtesy. This privilege the Germans quickly began

to abuse, disregarding Commodore Dewey’s regulations at will, and

committing various acts inconsistent with the neutrality laws. Their

attitude was both annoying and insolent, and it was evident that it

must be promptly and effectually checked if the American supremacy were

to be maintained.

At last the opportunity came. Commodore Dewey learned, on

unquestionable authority, that one of the German vessels had been

landing provisions at Manila, thereby violating neutrality. He

immediately sent a vigorous protest to Admiral von Diederich--a message

that ended with these significant words: “And, Brumby, tell Admiral von

Diederich that if he wants a fight he can have it right now.”

That was enough. The German admiral was not quite ready to involve his

country in a war with the United States; he made an apology, and the

incident was closed.

On June 30th the first army expedition from the United States arrived

at Manila, and Commodore Dewey’s long vigil was at an end, the

succeeding operations in the Philippines being almost exclusively

military, and consisting of the capture of the city of Manila by the

Americans and subsequent warfare with Aguinaldo and insurgent Filipinos.

Such, in large outline, was the battle of Manila Bay. Foreign critics

have derided American enthusiasm on the ground that the American fleet

was far superior, that the Spanish vessels, many of them mere gunboats,

lacked armor and adequate guns, and that they were imperfectly manned.

Yet the same critics ranked the naval forces of Spain as quite equal

to the American at the outset of the war. Furthermore, the action of

Dewey, without a single battle-ship or torpedo-boat under his command,

in entering a mined harbor without waiting to countermine, and in

attacking a fleet whose strength was not accurately known, under

the guns of land batteries, must be classed among the distinctive

achievements of naval history. The battle was decisive in its immediate

outcome, far-reaching in its ultimate consequences. Dewey’s victory but

presaged the final triumph of American arms. The Battle of Manila Bay

meant the expulsion of Spain from the Pacific and the succession of

the United States to Spain’s heritage of Asiatic power. Politically,

therefore, in its establishment of the United States as a power in

the Orient, Manila Bay is to be placed among the decisive battles of

history.[273]

XXII

THE BATTLES OF SANTIAGO, 1898

I

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR IN THE WEST INDIES

Ex-President Roosevelt once said that the most striking thing about the

war with Spain was the preparedness of the navy and the unpreparedness

of the army. For fifteen years the United States had been building up a

navy, and for months preceding the war every effort was made, with the

resources at the command of the Navy Department, to put it in a state

of first-class efficiency. As early as January 11, 1898, instructions

were sent to the commanders of the several squadrons to retain in the

service men whose terms of enlistment were about to expire. As the

Cuban situation grew more threatening, the North Atlantic Squadron

and a torpedo-boat flotilla were rapidly assembled in Florida waters;

and immediately after the destruction of the _Maine_ the ships on the

European and South Atlantic stations were ordered to Key West....

Both from a political and a military point of view the blockade of

Cuba was the first step for the American government to take, and the

surest and quickest means of bringing things to an issue. Cuba was the

point in dispute between the United States and Spain, and a blockade

would result in one of two things--the surrender of the island or the

despatch of a Spanish naval force to its relief. The Navy Department

had very little apprehension of an attack on our coast, as no squadron

could hope to be in condition after crossing the Atlantic for offensive

operations without coaling, and the only places where Spain could coal

were in the West Indies. The public, however, took a different view

of the situation, and no little alarm was felt in the Eastern cities.

A few coast-defence guns of modern pattern would have relieved the

department of the necessity of protecting the coast, and enabled it

to concentrate the whole fighting force around Cuba. To meet popular

demands, however, a Northern Patrol Squadron was organized April 20th,

under command of Commodore Howell, to cover the New England coast;

and a more formidable Flying Squadron, under Commodore Schley, was

assembled at Hampton Roads, and kept there until the appearance of

the Spanish fleet in the West Indies. The main squadron was stationed

at Key West under Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, who had just been

promoted to that grade, and given command of the entire naval force in

North Atlantic waters. His appointment over the heads of Schley and

other officers of superior rank and longer service created a great deal

of criticism, although he was everywhere conceded to be one of the most

efficient and progressive officers of the new navy.[274]

One hundred and twenty-eight ships [steam merchantmen, revenue-cutters,

light-house tenders, yachts, and ocean liners] were added to the navy,

and the government yards were kept busy transforming them. To man these

ships the number of enlisted men was raised from 12,500 to 24,123,

and a number of new officers appointed.[275] The heavy fighting force

consisted of four first-class battle-ships, the _Indiana_, _Iowa_,

_Massachusetts_, and _Oregon_; one second-class battle-ship, the

_Texas_; and two armored cruisers, the _Brooklyn_ and the _New York_.

As against these seven armored ships Spain had five armored cruisers

of modern construction and of greater reputed speed than any of ours

except the _Brooklyn_ and the _New York_, and one battle-ship of the

_Indiana_ type. Spain had further a type of vessel unknown to our navy

and greatly feared by us--namely, torpedo-boat destroyers, such as the

_Furor_, _Pluton_, and _Terror_. It was popularly supposed that the

Spanish navy was somewhat superior to the American.

As soon as the Spanish minister withdrew from Washington, a despatch

was sent to Sampson at Key West directing him to blockade the coast

of Cuba immediately from Cardenas to Bahia Honda, and to blockade

Cienfuegos if it was considered advisable. On April 29th, Admiral

Cervera’s division of the Spanish fleet left the Cape de Verde Islands

for an unknown destination, and disappeared for two weeks from the

knowledge of the American authorities. This fleet was composed of

four armored cruisers, the _Infanta Maria Teresa_, _Cristobal Colon_,

_Oquendo_, and _Vizcaya_, and three torpedo-boat destroyers. Its

appearance in American waters was eagerly looked for, and interest in

the war became intense....

[In the next two weeks Sampson’s patrol of the Windward Islands and

adjacent waters, and his visit to San Juan, Porto Rico, produced no

discoveries, and he started to return to the blockade of Havana. At

midnight, May 12th–13th, thirty-six hours after the event, the Navy

Department learned that Cervera had appeared off Martinique. Sampson,

with his fleet, and Schley, with the Flying Squadron, were ordered to

Key West, which they reached on May 18th.]

The department had heard that Cervera had munitions of war essential

to the defence of Havana, and that his orders were to reach Havana,

Cienfuegos, or a port connected with Havana by rail. As Cienfuegos

seemed the only place he would be likely to choose, Schley was ordered

there with the _Brooklyn_, _Massachusetts_, and _Texas_, May 19th. He

was joined later by the _Iowa_, under Captain Evans, and by several

cruisers. The Spanish squadron slipped into Santiago, unobserved by the

cruisers on scouting duty, May 19th, two days before Schley arrived at

Cienfuegos, so that had Cervera known the conditions he could easily

have made the latter port. On the same day the department received from

spies in Havana probable information, conveyed by the cable which had

been allowed to remain in operation, that Cervera had entered Santiago.

As we now know, he had entered early that morning. Several auxiliary

cruisers were immediately ordered to assemble before Santiago in order

to watch Cervera and follow him in case he should leave.

At the same time the department “strongly advised” Sampson to send

Schley to Santiago at once with his whole command. Sampson replied that

he had decided to hold Schley at Cienfuegos until it was certain that

the Spanish fleet was in Santiago. Later he sent a despatch to Schley,

received May 23d, ordering him to proceed to Santiago if satisfied

that the enemy were not at Cienfuegos.[276] The next day[277] Schley

started, encountering on the run much rain and rough weather, which

seriously delayed the squadron. At 5.30 P.M., May 26th, he reached

a point twenty-two miles south of Santiago, where he was joined by

several of the auxiliary cruisers on scouting duty. Captain Sigsbee, of

the _St. Paul_, informed him that the scouts knew nothing positively

about the Spanish fleet. The collier _Merrimac_ had been disabled,

which increased the difficulty of coaling. At 7.45 P.M., a little over

two hours after his arrival, Schley without explanation signalled to

the squadron: “Destination, Key West, _via_ south side of Cuba and

Yucatan Channel, as soon as collier is ready; speed, nine knots.”

Thus began the much-discussed retrograde movement which occupied two

days. Admiral Schley states in his book that. Sigsbee’s report and

other evidence led him to conclude that the Spanish squadron was not

in Santiago; hence the retrograde movement to protect the passage west

of Cuba.[278] But he has never yet given any satisfactory explanation

why he did not definitely ascertain the facts before turning back.

Fortunately the squadron did not proceed very far; the lines towing

the collier parted and other delays occurred. The next morning

Schley received a despatch from the department stating that all the

information at hand indicated that Cervera was in Santiago, but he

continued on his westward course slowly and at times drifting while

some of the ships coaled. The next day, May 28th, Schley returned to

Santiago, arriving before that port about dusk, and established a

blockade.[279]

Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago June 1st, and assumed direct

command of the squadron. The blockade, which lasted for over a month,

was eagerly watched by the whole American people. The most thrilling

incident was the daring but unsuccessful attempt made by Lieutenant

Richmond Pearson Hobson to sink the collier Merrimac across the

entrance to Santiago harbor, undertaken by direction of Admiral

Sampson. Electric torpedoes were attached to the hull of the ship,

sea-valves were cut, and anchor chains arranged on deck so that she

could be brought to a sudden stop. Early on the morning of June 3d,

Hobson, assisted by a crew of seven seamen, took the collier into the

entrance of the harbor under heavy fire and sunk her. The unfortunate

shooting away of her steering-gear and the failure of some of the

torpedoes to explode kept the ship from sinking at the place selected,

so that the plan miscarried. Hobson and his men escaped death as by a

miracle, but fell into the hands of the Spaniards.[280]

II

THE LAND CAMPAIGN

As soon as Cervera was blockaded in Santiago and the government was

satisfied that all his ships were with him, it was decided to send an

army to co-operate with the navy. Hitherto the war had been a naval war

exclusively, and the two hundred thousand volunteers who had responded

to the calls of the President in May had been kept in camp in different

parts of the country. Most of the regular infantry and cavalry,

together with several volunteer regiments, had been assembled at Tampa

and organized as the Fifth Army Corps, in readiness to land in Cuba as

soon as the navy had cleared the way. Conspicuous among these troops

was the First Volunteer Cavalry, popularly known as Roosevelt’s Rough

Riders, a regiment which through the energetic efforts of Dr. Leonard

Wood, an army surgeon, who became its colonel, and Theodore Roosevelt,

who resigned the position of assistant secretary of the navy to become

its lieutenant-colonel, had been enlisted, officered, and equipped in

fifty days. It was recruited largely from Arizona, New Mexico, and

Oklahoma, and had in its ranks cowboys, hunters, ranchmen, and more

than one hundred and sixty full-blooded Indians, together with a few

graduates of Harvard, Yale, and other Eastern colleges.

Tampa was ill-suited for an instruction camp, and the preparations made

by the department for the accommodation and provisioning of such large

bodies of men were wholly inadequate. One of the main difficulties was

the inability of the Commissary and Quartermaster departments, hampered

by red tape, senseless regulations, and political appointees, to

distribute the train-loads of supplies which blocked the tracks leading

to Tampa; so great was the congestion that the soldiers could not even

get their mail. This condition continued for weeks. The great majority

of the troops were finally sent to Santiago to fight under a tropical

sun in heavy woollen clothes; lighter clothing was not supplied to them

until they were ready to return to Montauk Point, where they needed

the woollen. The sanitation of the camp was poor and the water-supply

bad; dysentery, malaria, and typhoid soon made their appearance.

Similar conditions prevailed at the other camps. The administrative

inefficiency of the War Department was everywhere revealed in striking

contrast with the fine record of the Navy Department. Secretary Alger

had been too much occupied with questions of patronage to look after

the real needs of the service. Although war had been regarded for

months as inevitable, when it finally came the department was found

to be utterly unprepared to equip troops for service in Cuba. As the

result of this neglect, for which it should be said Congress was partly

responsible, it was necessary to improvise an army--a rather serious

undertaking!

It had been the original intention to land the Fifth Army Corps at

Mariel, near Havana, and begin operations against the capital city

under the direct supervision of General Miles; but the bottling-up of

Cervera at Santiago caused a change of plan, and General Miles, who

still expected the heavy fighting to take place at Havana, selected

Major-General William R. Shafter for the movement against Santiago. By

June 1st the battle-ship _Indiana_, under Captain Henry C. Taylor, with

a dozen smaller vessels, was ready to convoy the expedition. The army

was very slow in embarking, and it was not until June 8th that the

force was ready to depart. Further delay was caused by the unfounded

rumor that a Spanish cruiser and two torpedo-boat destroyers had been

sighted off the north coast of Cuba.[281] In order to ascertain whether

all the Spanish ships were at Santiago, Lieutenant Victor Blue, of the

navy, landed, and by personal observation from the hills back of the

city located Cervera’s entire division in the harbor. On June 14th

the transports, about thirty in number, sailed from Tampa with their

convoy. They were crowded and ill-provided with supplies, the whole

movement showing lack of experience in handling large bodies of men.

The expedition consisted of 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men,

regulars except the Seventy-first New York, Second Massachusetts, and

the First Volunteer Cavalry.[282]

The expedition under Shafter began disembarking at Daiquiri on the

morning of June 22d, and by night six thousand men had with great

difficulty been put ashore. No lighters or launches had been provided,

and the only wharf, a small wooden one, had been stripped of its

flooring: the War Department expected the navy to look after these

matters. In addition, the troops had been crowded into the transports

without any reference to order, officers separated from their commands,

artillery-pieces on one transport, horses on another, harness on a

third, and no means of finding out where any of them were. By the aid

of a few launches borrowed from the battle-ships, the men were put

ashore, or near enough to wade through the surf, but the animals had

to be thrown into the sea, where many of them perished, some in their

bewilderment swimming out to sea instead of to shore.

General Lawton advanced and seized Siboney next day, and Kent’s

division landed here, eight miles nearer Santiago. General Wheeler

pushed on with part of Young’s brigade, and on the morning of the 24th

defeated the Spanish force at Las Guasimas, with a loss of one officer

and fifteen men killed, six officers and forty-six men wounded.[283]

During the next week the army, including Garcia’s Cuban command, was

concentrated at Sevilla. These were trying days. The troops suffered

from the heavy rains, poor rations, and bad camp accommodations.

No adequate provision had been made for landing supplies or for

transporting them to the camps, so that with an abundance, such as they

were, aboard the transports, the soldiers were in actual want.

On June 30th it was decided to advance. San Juan Hill, a strategic

point on the direct road to Santiago, could not be taken or held while

the Spaniards occupied El Caney, on the right of the American advance.

The country was a jungle, and the roads from the coast little more than

bridle-paths. Lawton moved out to a position south of El Caney that

afternoon, so as to begin the attack early next morning. Wheeler’s

division of dismounted cavalry and Kent’s division of infantry advanced

toward El Poso, accompanied by Grimes’ battery, which was to take

position early in the morning and open the way for the advance toward

San Juan. The attack at this point was to be delayed until Lawton’s

infantry fire was heard at El Caney. After forcing the enemy from this

position, Lawton was to move toward Santiago and take position on

Wheeler’s right. Little was known of the ground over which the troops

were to move or the position and strength of the forces they were to

meet, consequently they went into battle without knowing what they

were about and fought without any generalship being displayed. General

Shafter was too ill to leave his headquarters in the rear.

At El Caney, which was surrounded by trenches and block-houses, the

Spaniards developed unexpected strength, and held Lawton in check

until late in the afternoon, when he finally carried the position. In

this fight about thirty-five hundred Americans were engaged, and not

more than six hundred or one thousand Spaniards. The American loss was

four officers and seventy-seven men killed, and twenty-five officers

and three hundred and thirty-five men wounded. About one hundred and

fifty Spaniards were captured, and between three hundred and four

hundred killed and wounded.[284]

[Illustration: THE CAPTURE OF THE BLOCK-HOUSE AT SAN JUAN]

Meanwhile there had been a desperate fight at San Juan Hill. As soon as

Lawton’s musket-fire was heard at El Caney, Grimes’ battery opened fire

from El Poso on the San Juan block-house. This fire was immediately

returned by the enemy’s artillery, who had the range, and a number

of men were killed. The Spaniards used smokeless powder, which made

it difficult to locate them, while some of the Americans had black

powder, which quickly indicated their position. The road along which

the troops had to advance was so narrow and rough that at times they

had to proceed in column of twos. The progress made was very slow, and

the long-range guns of the enemy killed numbers of men before they

could get into position to return the fire. By the middle of the day

the advance had crossed the river, the cavalry division under Sumner

deploying to the right in front of Kettle Hill, and Kent’s division

of infantry deploying to the left directly in front of San Juan Hill.

During this movement the troops were exposed to a galling artillery

and rifle fire and suffered greatly, especially the third brigade

of Kent’s division, which lost three commanders in fifteen minutes,

General Wikoff being killed and Colonels Worth and Liscum disabled. The

suffering of the wounded, many of whom lay in the brush for hours

without succor, was the most terrible feature of the situation.

Finally the long-expected order to advance was given. The First Regular

Cavalry, the Rough Riders, and the Negro troopers of the Ninth and

a part of the Tenth advanced up Kettle Hill and drove the Spaniards

from the ranch-house, while the infantry division with the Sixth and

Sixteenth regiments under Hawkins in the lead charged up San Juan Hill

in the face of a destructive fire and captured the block-house. Then

the cavalry under Sumner and Roosevelt advanced from Kettle Hill and

occupied the trenches on San Juan Hill north of the block-house. The

Spaniards fled to their second line of trenches, six or eight hundred

yards in the rear.

[Illustration: PLAN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AROUND SANTIAGO]

After occupying San Juan Hill, the cavalry were still exposed to a

constant fire, and many were discouraged and wanted to retire, but

General Wheeler, who, though ill, had come to the front early in the

afternoon, put a stop to this and set the men to work fortifying

themselves. The next day Lawton came up and advanced to a strong

position on Wheeler’s right. The fighting was resumed on the two

following days, but about noon, July 3d, the Spaniards ceased firing.

The losses in the three days’ fight were eighteen officers and one

hundred and twenty-seven men killed, sixty-five officers and eight

hundred and forty-nine men wounded, and seventy-two men missing.[285]

The condition of the troops after the battle was very bad; many of them

were down with fever, and all were suffering from lack of suitable

equipment and supplies. General Shafter cabled to the secretary of

war, July 3d, that it would be impossible to take Santiago by storm

with the forces he then had, and that he was “seriously considering

withdrawing about five miles and taking up a new position on the high

ground between the San Juan River and Siboney.”[286] The destruction

of Cervera’s fleet the same day materially changed the situation.

III

THE DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA’s FLEET

The advance made by the American troops around Santiago on July 1st

and 2d forced the Spanish authorities to come to a decision in regard

to Cervera’s fleet. Captain-General Blanco insisted that the fleet

should not be captured or destroyed without a fight. Cervera refused

to assume the responsibility of leaving the harbor, and when ordered

to do so went out with consummate bravery, knowing that he was leading

a forlorn-hope. Sampson seems to have been under the impression all

along that the Spanish squadron would attempt to escape at night,

but the American ships kept in so close to the shore, with dazzling

search-lights directed against the entrance of the harbor, as to render

it almost impossible to steer a ship out. On the morning of July 3d,

at 8.55, Sampson started east to meet General Shafter in conference

at Siboney, signalling to the fleet as he left: “Disregard movements

commander-in-chief.” The _Massachusetts_ had also left her place in

the blockade to go to Guantanamo for coal. The remaining ships formed

a semicircle around the entrance of the harbor, the _Brooklyn_ to the

west, holding the left of the line, then the _Texas_, next the _Iowa_

in the centre and at the south of the curve, then, as the line curved

in to the coast on the right, the _Oregon_ and the _Indiana_. The

_Brooklyn_ and the _Indiana_, holding the left and the right of the

line, were about two miles and one and a half miles respectively from

the shore, and near them, closer in, lay the converted gunboats _Vixen_

and _Gloucester_.

At 9.35 A.M., while most of the men were at Sunday inspection, the

enemy’s ships were discovered slowly steaming down the narrow channel

of the harbor. In the lead was the _Maria Teresa_, followed by the

_Vizcaya_, the _Colon_, the _Oquendo_, and the two torpedo-boat

destroyers. The _Iowa_ was the first to signal that the enemy were

escaping, though the fact was noted on several ships at almost the same

moment, and no orders were necessary. The American ships at once closed

in and directed their fire against the _Teresa_. For a moment there was

doubt as to whether the Spanish ships would separate and try to scatter

the fire of our fleet or whether they would stick together. This was

quickly settled when Cervera turned west, followed by the remainder

of his command. At this point Commodore Schley’s flag-ship, the

_Brooklyn_, which was farthest west, turned to the eastward, away from

the hostile fleet, making a loop, at the end of which she again steamed

westward farther out to sea but still ahead of any of the American

vessels. The sudden and unexpected turn of the _Brooklyn_ caused the

_Texas_, which was behind her, to reverse her engines in order to avoid

a collision and to come to a standstill, thus losing position, the

_Oregon_ and the _Iowa_ both passing her. The two destroyers, which

came out last, were attacked by the _Indiana_ and the _Gloucester_,

the commander of the latter, Wainwright, dashing toward them in utter

disregard of the fragile character of his vessel. The _Furor_ was

sunk and the _Pluton_ was run ashore. The _Teresa_, struck by several

shells which exploded and set her on fire, turned to the shore at 10.15

and was beached about six miles west of the Morro. The _Oquendo_ was

riddled by shell and likewise soon on fire. She was beached about half

a mile west of the _Teresa_ at 10.20. The _Vizcaya_ and _Colon_ were

now left to bear the fire of the pursuing American ships, which were

practically uninjured. In this running fight the _Indiana_ dropped

behind, owing to the defective condition of her machinery, but kept up

her fire. At 11.05 the _Vizcaya_ turned to run ashore about fifteen

miles west of the Morro. The _Brooklyn_ and the _Oregon_, followed at

some distance by the _Texas_, continued the chase of the _Colon_. The

_Indiana_ and the _Iowa_, at the order of Sampson, who had come up,

went back to guard the transports. At 1.15 P.M. the _Colon_ turned to

shore thirty miles west of the _Vizcaya_ and surrendered.[287]

[Illustration: THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE SHIPS IN THE BATTLE OF

JULY 3, 1898, OFF SANTIAGO

ABBREVIATIONS:--N. Y., _New York_; B., _Brooklyn_; Tx., _Texas_; A.,

_Iowa_; I., _Indiana_; O., _Oregon_; G., _Gloucester_; Vx., _Vixen_;

H., _Hist._; E., _Ericsson_; T., _Teresa_; V., _Vizcaya_; C., _Colon_;

Oq., _Oquendo_; P., _Pluton_; F., _Furor_.]

The fight was over, one of the most remarkable naval battles on record.

On the American side, though the ships were struck many times, only

one man was killed and one wounded. These casualties both occurred on

Commodore Schley’s flag-ship, the _Brooklyn_. The Spaniards lost about

six hundred in killed and wounded. The American sailors took an active

part in the rescue of the officers and crews of the burning Spanish

ships.

Only one hundred and twenty-three out of about eight thousand American

projectiles hit the Spanish ships.

IV

THE SPANISH SURRENDER

On July 3d, General Shafter demanded the surrender of the Spanish

forces in Santiago. This being refused, he notified General Toral that

the bombardment of Santiago would begin at noon of the 5th, thus giving

two days for the women and children to leave the city. Nearly twenty

thousand people came out and filled the villages and roads around. They

were in an utterly destitute condition, and had to be taken care of

largely by the American army--a great drain on their supplies. On the

10th and 11th the city was bombarded by the squadron. At this point

General Miles arrived off Santiago with additional troops intended for

Porto Rico. He and Shafter met General Toral under a flag of truce

and arranged terms for the surrender, which took place on the 17th.

Shafter’s command was by this time in a serious state of health and

anxious to return home. Malarial fevers had so weakened the men that an

epidemic of yellow-fever, which had appeared sporadically throughout

the command, was greatly feared. The situation was desperate, and the

War Department apparently deaf to all representations of the case.

Under these circumstances the division and brigade commanders and the

surgeons met at General Shafter’s headquarters early in August and

signed a round-robin addressed to the secretary of war urging the

immediate removal of the corps to the United States. This action was

much criticised at the time, but it had the desired effect, and on

August 4th orders were given to remove the command to Montauk Point,

Long Island. The movement was begun at once and completed before the

end of the month.

[Illustration: THE LAST OF CERVERA’S FLEET

(The _Colon’s_ final effort)]

The surrender of Santiago left General Miles free to carry out plans

already matured for the invasion of Porto Rico. He left Guantanamo,

July 21st, with 3415 men, mostly volunteers, convoyed by a fleet

under the command of Captain Higginson, and landed at Guanica on the

25th. Early next morning General Garretson pushed forward with part

of his brigade and drove the Spanish forces from Yauco, thus getting

possession of the railroad to Ponce. General Miles was reinforced in

a few days by the commands of Generals Wilson, Brooke, and Schwan,

raising his entire force to 16,973 officers and men. In about two weeks

they had gained control of all the southern and western portions of the

island, but hostilities were suspended by the peace protocol before

the conquest of Porto Rico was completed. The American losses in this

campaign were three killed and forty wounded.[288]

The last engagement of the war was the assault on Manila, which was

captured August 13, 1898, by the forces under General Merritt, assisted

by Admiral Dewey’s squadron. This occurred the day after the signing

of the peace protocol, the news of which did not reach the Philippines

until several days later.

V

CONTROVERSIES CAUSED BY THE WAR

Two controversies growing out of the war with Spain assumed such

importance that they cannot be passed by. The first related to the

conduct of the War Department, which was charged with inefficiency

resulting from political appointments and corruption in the purchase

of supplies. The most serious charge was that made by Major-General

Miles, commanding the army, who declared that much of the refrigerated

beef furnished the troops was “embalmed beef,” preserved with secret

chemicals of an injurious character. In September, 1898, President

McKinley appointed a commission to investigate these charges, and the

hearings held were sensational in the extreme. Commissary-General

Eagan read a statement before the commission which was so violent in

its abuse of the commanding general that he was later court-martialled

and sentenced to dismissal for conduct unbecoming an officer and a

gentleman, though this sentence was commuted by the President to

suspension from rank and duty, but without loss of pay. The report of

the commission[289] failed to substantiate General Miles’ charges,

but it was not satisfactory or convincing. In spite of its efforts

to whitewash things, the commission had to report that the secretary

of war had failed to “grasp the situation.” Many leading newspapers

demanded Alger’s resignation, but President McKinley feared to

discredit the administration by dismissing him. Nevertheless, a

coolness sprang up between them; and several months later, when Alger

became a candidate for the Michigan senatorship, with the open support

of elements distinctly hostile to the administration, the President

asked for his resignation, which was tendered July 19, 1899.[290]

The other controversy, which waged in the papers for months, was as to

whether Sampson or Schley was in command at the battle of Santiago. As

a reward for their work on that day, the President advanced Sampson

eight numbers, Schley six, Captain Clark of the Oregon six, and the

other captains five. These promotions were all confirmed by the Senate

save those of Sampson and Schley, a number of senators holding that

Schley should have received at least equal recognition with Sampson.

The controversy was waged inside and outside of Congress for three

years. The officials of the Navy Department were for the most part

stanch supporters of Sampson, while a large part of the public, under

the impression that the department was trying to discredit Schley,

eagerly championed his cause. Finally, at the request of Admiral

Schley, who was charged in certain publications with inefficiency

and even cowardice, a court of inquiry was appointed July 26, 1901,

with Admiral Dewey as president, for the purpose of inquiring into

the conduct of Schley during the war with Spain. The opinion of the

court was that his service prior to June 1st was “characterized by

vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise.” Admiral Dewey

differed from the opinions of his colleagues on certain points, and

delivered a separate opinion, in the course of which he took up the

question as to who was in command at Santiago, a point which had not

been considered by the court. His conclusion was that Schley “was in

absolute command and is entitled to the credit due to such commanding

officer for the glorious victory which resulted in the total

destruction of the Spanish ships.” This made matters worse than ever.

Secretary Long approved the findings of the majority of the court,

and disapproved Dewey’s separate opinion. Schley appealed from the

findings of the court to the President. February 18, 1902, President

Roosevelt’s memorandum, in which he reviewed the whole controversy, was

made public. He declared that the court had done substantial justice

to Schley. As regards the question of command at Santiago, he said

that technically Sampson commanded the fleet, and Schley the western

division, but that after the battle began not a ship took orders from

either Sampson or Schley, except their own two vessels. “It was a

captains’ fight.”[291]

The Spanish war revealed many serious defects in the American military

system, some of which have been remedied by the reorganization of the

army and the creation of a general staff.[292] It demonstrated the

necessity of military evolutions on a large scale in time of peace,

so as to give the general officers experience in handling and the

Quartermaster and Commissary departments experience in equipping and

supplying large bodies of troops; it showed the folly and danger of

appointing men from civil life through political influence to positions

of responsibility in any branch of the military or naval service;

it showed the value of field-artillery, of smokeless powder, and of

high-power rifles of the latest model; it also showed the necessity of

having on hand a large supply of the best war material ready for use.

While every American is proud of the magnificent record of the navy,

it must not be imagined that the war with Spain was a conclusive test

of its invincibility, for, however formidable the Spanish cruisers

appeared at the time, later information revealed the fact that through

the neglect of the Spanish government they were very far from being in

a state of first-class efficiency.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Bourne, _Spain in America_ (_Am. Nation_, III), 31; Hart,

_Contemporaries_, I, 40.

[2] Andrews, _Colonial Self-Government_ (_Am. Nation_, V), chap. v.

[3] Mahan, _Influence of Sea Power upon History_, chaps. iv–viii.

[4] Cf. Howard, _Preliminaries of the Revolution_ (_Am. Nation_,

VIII), chap. i.

[5] _Ibid._, 229.

[6] _Cf._ Hart, _Foundations of Am. Foreign Policy_, 18.

[7] McLaughlin, _Confederation and Constitution_ (_Am. Nation_, X).

chaps. vii, viii.

[8] Texts in _Am. Hist. Leaflets_, No. 32.

[9] _Federalist_ (Lodge ed.), No. 14.

[10] Cf. Channing, _Jeffersonian System_ (_Am. Nation_, XII), chap. v.

[11] Garrison, _Westward Extension_ (_Am. Nation_, XVII), chap. v.

[12] _Ibid._, chap. xi.

[13] _Ibid._, chap. vii.

[14] Turner, _New West_ (_Am. Nation_, XIV), 114–122.

[15] _See_ chap. iii, below.

[16] Bourne, _Essays in Historical Criticism_, No. 9.

[17] Dunning, _Reconstruction_ (_Am. Nation_, XXII), chap. x.

[18] _Ibid._

[19] Dewey, _National Problems_ (_Am. Nation_, XXIV), chap. xviii.

[20] Official order addressed to Spanish commanders authorizing the

conversion, enslavement, or slaughter of the natives.

[21] “The shot from Champlain’s arquebus had determined the part

that was to be played in the approaching conflict by the most

powerful military force among the Indians of North America. It

had made the confederacy of the Iroquois and all its nations

and dependencies the implacable enemies of the French and the

fast friends of the English for all the long struggle that was

to come.” [This quotation is from Senator Elihu Root’s eloquent

address at the Champlain tercentenary celebration in 1909.

Influential as Champlain’s act proved to be, it is well to

remember that it was the Dutch treatment of the Iroquois that

gained the latter’s friendship for the English, the successors

of the Dutch, and also that the Iroquois, as Doctor Thwaites

points out in his _France in America_, did in subsequent

years negotiate with the French. But the historic consequence

of Champlain’s act is of course obvious, although it is not

necessary to accept unreservedly one tercentenary dictum to the

effect that “Few decisive battles from Marathon to Waterloo had

larger consequences.” Cartier’s first voyage to the St. Lawrence

decided the immediate association of the French with their

Algonquian neighbors. It would have been impossible for them to

be friends of both Algonquians and Iroquois. The consequences of

immediate and prolonged hostility on the part of the Algonquians

invite curious speculation.--EDITOR.]

[22] Clowes, _Royal Navy_, III, 186–189.

[23] _Ibid_., 210–214, on Boscawen’s victory; 216–222, on Hawke’s.

[24] Clowes, _Royal Navy_, III, 196–201.

[25] _Ibid._, 201–203.

[26] Parkman, _Montcalm and Wolfe_, II, 80.

[27] For biographical details of Wolfe’s early career, see Wright,

_Life_, and Doughty and Parmelee, _Siege of Quebec_, I, 1–128;

in _ibid._, II, 16, is a portrait of Wolfe’s fiancée.

[28] Text in Doughty and Parmelee, _Siege of Quebec_, VI, 87–90.

[29] Lists in Doughty and Parmelee, _Siege of Quebec_, II, 22, 23.

[30] Wood, _Fight for Canada_, 166, 167, 173.

[31] “Journal of the Expedition up the River St. Lawrence,” by a

sergeant-major of grenadiers, in Doughty and Parmelee, _Siege of

Quebec_, V, 1–11.

[32] Doughty and Parmelee, _Siege of Quebec_, II, 51–53.

[33] Wood, _Fight for Canada_, 152.

[34] Authorities cited in Parkman, _Montcalm and Wolfe_, II, 233,

234. For details, consult Doughty and Parmelee, _Siege of

Quebec_, II, chap. vi.

[35] See Bougainville’s correspondence, in Doughty and Parmelee

_Siege of Quebec_, IV, 1–141.

[36] September 22, 1759, quoted in Parkman, _Montcalm and Wolfe_, II,

249.

[37] Official journal of Amherst, in London _Magazine_, XXVII,

379–383.

[38] Stanwix to Pitt, November 20, 1759, MS. in Public Record Office.

[39] [There was one regular regiment of American origin with Wolfe,

the “Royal Americans,” represented by their second and third

battalions. One battalion was left to guard the landing. The

superior officers of this regiment were English. There seem to

have been also some provincial rangers, although the famous

Robert Rogers was not present.--EDITOR.]

[40] Doughty and Parmelee, _Siege of Quebec_, II, 237.

[41] _Ibid._, II, 332, with detailed British returns; Wood, _Fight

for Canada_, 262.

[42] Greene, _The Provincial Governor_, passim.

[43] Barry, _Hist. of Mass._, I, 288–295.

[44] For a detailed study of this subject, see Howard, _Preliminaries

of the Revolution_ (_American Nation_, VIII).

[45] 5 George III., chap. xii, given in Macdonald, _Select Charters_,

281.

[46] Beer, _Commercial Policy of England_, 10–13.

[47] For details and exact references to laws, see Channing, _The

Navigation Laws_, in Amer. Antiq. Soc., _Proceedings_,

new series, VI. For discussion, see Andrews, _Colonial

Self-Government_, chap. i; Greene, _Colonial Commonwealths_

(_American Nation_, V, VI).

[48] Beer, _Commercial Policy of England_, chap. vii.

[49] 6 George II., chap. xiii.

[50] Macdonald, _Select Charters_, 259.

[51] Lecky, _American Revolution_ (Woodburn’s ed.), 48.

[52] J. Adams, _Works_, II, 523–525.

[53] 4 George III., chap. xv.

[54] Osgood, in _Political Science Quarterly_, XIII, 45.

[55] Lecky, _American Revolution_ (Woodburn’s ed.), 64.

[56] Dulany, in Tyler, _Lit. Hist. of Amer. Rev._, I, 104–105.

[57] _Life, Correspondence, and Speeches of Patrick Henry_, I, 84–89.

[58] Hart, _Contemporaries_, II, 402.

[59] _Walpole’s Letters_, February 12, 1765.

[60] Franklin, _Works_ (Sparks’ ed.), IV, 161–198.

[61] 6 George III, chap. xii.

[62] Morley, _Burke_, 146.

[63] Franklin, _Works_ (Sparks’ ed.), IV, 169.

[64] Walpole, _Memoirs of George III._, II, 275, III, 23–27.

[65] 7 George III., chaps. xli, xlvi, lvi. See Macdonald, _Select

Charters_, 320–330.

[66] Samuel Adams, _Writings_ (Cushing’s ed.), I, 184.

[67] Hutchinson, _Hist. of Massachusetts Bay_, III, 494.

[68] Junius (ed. of 1799), II, 31.

[69] Collins, _Committees of Correspondence_ (Amer. Hist. Assoc.,

_Report_, 1901), I, 247.

[70] _Va. Cal. of State Pap._, VIII, 1–2.

[71] _R. I. Col. Records_, VII, 81, 108.

[72] Farrand, “Taxation of Tea,” in _Amer. Hist. Review_, III, 269.

[73] Macdonald, _Select Charters_, 337–356; Force, _Am. Archives_,

4th series, I, 216.

[74] “Quebec Act and the American Revolution,” in _Yale Review_,

August, 1895.

[75] Force, _Am. Archives_, 4th series, I, 421.

[76] Macdonald, _Select Charters_, 356, 362.

[77] Wells, _Samuel Adams_, I.

[78] Franklin, _Works_ (Sparks’ ed.), IV, 41.

[79] Franklin’s Plan, in _Works_ (Sparks’ ed.), III, 26, 36–55.

[80] Van Tyne, _Loyalists_, 5.

[81] Van Tyne, _Loyalists_, chap. i.

[82] Force, _Am. Archives_, 4th series, II, 365–368.

[83] Hatch, _Administration of the Revolutionary Army_, 1.

[84] Frothingham, _Siege of Boston_, 100–102.

[85] _Ibid._, 99–101.

[86] Bolton, _The Private Soldier Under Washington_, 90; Force, _Am.

Archives_, 4th series, III, 2.

[87] Hatch, _Administration of the Revolutionary Army_, 13, 14.

[88] Frothingham, _Siege of Boston_, 105, 106.

[89] “Bunker Hill Monument celebrates a fact more important than most

victories--namely, that the raw provincials faced the British

army for two hours, they themselves being under so little

organization that it is impossible to tell even at this day who

was their commander; that they did this with only the protection

of an unfinished earthwork and a rail fence, retreating only

when their powder was out.... The newspapers of England, instead

of being exultant, were indignant or apologetic.”--THOMAS

WENTWORTH HIGGINSON.

[90] Later Bemis.

[91] “The surrender of Burgoyne turned the scale in favor of the

Americans so far as the judgment of Europe was concerned.... The

first treaty with France--which was also the first treaty of the

United States with any foreign government--was signed February

6, 1778, two months after the news of Burgoyne’s surrender had

reached Paris.”--Higginson’s _History of the United States_.

[92] For the text of the articles of capitulation, and the general

return of the officers and privates surrendered, see _Harper’s

Encyclopædia of United States History_, X.

[93] A detailed description of the topography and events of the

Yorktown campaign is afforded in Lossing’s _Pictorial

Field-Book of the Revolution_, II, chap. xii. An elaborate and

authoritative study from a military point of view is provided in

_The Yorktown Campaign_, by Henry P. Johnston. Both histories

are published by Harper & Brothers.

[94] _Annual Register_, XXV, 252–257.

[95] _Two Centuries of Irish History_, 91.

[96] _Treaties and Conventions_, 370, 375.

[97] _Journals of Congress_, January 13, 14, 1784.

[98] For the complete history of the American struggle for

independence, see Professor Van Tyne’s _The American

Revolution_, IX, in _The American Nation_. Harper & Brothers.

[99] “The destruction of the British fleet gave the United States

supremacy on Lake Erie and compelled the abandonment of Malden

and Detroit; it recovered Michigan, and made a real invasion of

Canada once more a possibility, for by means of the control of

the lakes thus given Harrison was enabled to enter at once upon

an aggressive campaign on the Canadian side of Lake Erie. His

men were easily transported to the north side, and his line of

communication was no longer threatened by a British fleet. Its

effect, too, upon the American people was decidedly important;

for the first time an American fleet had met a British fleet

and defeated it. Nor was it fair to discount the significance

of the victory by saying that the vessels were small and of

hasty construction. The charm of British invincibility had been

broken in the great ship duels which made the names of Decatur,

Bainbridge, and Hull household words. To this list was now

added the name of Perry, who was looked upon by the Americans

as a hero of the same class as Nelson.”--Prof. Kendric Charles

Babcock in _The Rise of American Nationality_.

[100] “The decisiveness of this battle was evident at once to the

British. Hardly was the result known, when measures were

taken for the retreat of Prevost’s army into Canada. At best,

Prevost’s assault upon the land forces had been so poor as to

give little aid to the fleet; and for this failure and his

prompt retreat Prevost was ordered to trial by court-martial,

but died before the trial could take place. The war was

practically ended by this retreat of the British army from

Plattsburg into Canada. It would seem as though the persistent

mismanagement of the American forces in northern New York, the

incompetency of Dearborn and Wilkinson, the strange interference

of Secretary Armstrong, the diversion of the forces of Izard

from the front of Prevost’s army, were all atoned for by the

brilliancy of the accomplishment of Commodore Macdonough and

his handful of sailors and soldiers on Lake Champlain.”--Prof.

Kendric Charles Babcock in _The Rise of American Nationality_.

[101] For the whole correspondence beginning with this letter, see

_Senate Docs._, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, pp. 25–48.

[102] _Senate Docs._, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, p. 28.

[103] _Senate Docs._, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, pp. 38, 41.

[104] _Ibid._, pp. 42–48.

[105] _Niles’ Register_, LXVIII, 84.

[106] _Ibid._, 135; Von Holst, _United States_, III, 80, _nn._ 3, 4.

[107] Dublán y Lozano, _Legislatión Mexicana_, V, 19–22.

[108] Taylor’s successive orders, in _House Exec. Docs._, 30 Cong., 1

Sess., VII, No. 60, pp. 7, 79–82.

[109] _House Exec. Docs._, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, p. 99.

[110] _Ibid._, pp. 102–109.

[111] _House Exec. Docs._, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, p. 90.

[112] _House Exec. Docs._, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, p. 140.

[113] _Ibid._, p. 141.

[114] See Polk, _MS. Diary_, entry for May 9, 1846.

[115] Richardson, _Messages and Papers_, IV, 442.

[116] _Cong. Globe_, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 795.

[117] [John Slidell, of New Orleans, appointed a commissioner

to Mexico in 1845 to endeavor to adjust the boundary and

re-establish relations.]

[118] Polk, _MS. Diary_, February 17, 1846.

[119] _Senate Docs._, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, p. 39.

[120] Ripley, _War with Mexico_, I, 149; Polk, _MS. Diary_, May 14,

16, 1846.

[121] Hittell, _California_, II, bk. vi., chaps. ii–v, passim.

[122] _Niles’ Register_, LXX, 310; _Cong. Globe_, 29 Cong., 2 Sess.,

298; Polk, _MS. Diary_, August 18, 19, 1847.

[123] _House Exec. Docs._, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, pp. 324,

353, especially Taylor to Adjutant-General, July 2, 1846,

_ibid._, pp. 329–332; cf. Polk, _MS. Diary_, September 15, 1846.

[124] Taylor to Adjutant-General, October 15, 1846, in _House Exec.

Docs._, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, pp. 351–354.

[125] Polk, _MS. Diary_, November 14, 1846.

[126] Taylor to Adjutant-General, January 27, 1847, in _House Exec.

Docs._, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 60, pp. 1100–1102.

[127] Taylor to Adjutant-General, March 6, 1847, in _Senate Docs._, 30

Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, pp. 132–141.

[128] Scott to Marcy, March 29, 1847, _ibid._, 229.

[129] Ripley, _War with Mexico_, II, 153–155; Polk, _MS. Diary_,

December 28, 1847.

[130] _Senate Docs._, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII, No. 52, p. 345.

[131] Buchanan to Trist, October 6, 1847, _ibid._, pp. 91–93; Polk,

_MS. Diary_, October 5, 1847.

[132] See official reports of these operations, in _Senate Docs._, 30

Cong., 1 Sess., I, No. 1, pp. 354–471.

[133] _U. S. Treaties and Conventions_, 683.

[134] Gen. Lew Wallace, who reached Buena Vista two days after the

battle, furnishes a vigorous defence of the Indiana volunteers

in his _Autobiography_, vol. I, chaps. xviii and xix.--[EDITOR.]

[135] Cf. _Am. Nation_, XIV; XVI-XVIII, passim.

[136] Stephens, _War between the States_, II, 32.

[137] Davis, _Confederate Government_, I, 80.

[138] Adams, _New England Federalism_, 144–146.

[139] Buchanan, _Administration on Eve of Rebellion_, chap. v;

_National Intelligencer_, January 18, 1861.

[140] Secretary of War, _Report_, 1860, _Senate Exec. Docs._, 36

Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pp. 214, 216.

[141] Secretary of Navy, _Report_, 1860, _ibid._, 383.

[142] Secretary of War, _Report_, 1860, _ibid._, 209, 213.

[143] Buchanan, _Administration on Eve of Rebellion_, 104.

[144] _National Intelligencer_, January 11, 1861.

[145] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 68.

[146] _Ibid._, p. 69; Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 57, 58.

[147] Trescot MS., quoted by Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 58, 59.

[148] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 70.

[149] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, pp. 74, 75.

[150] _Ibid._, 76.

[151] _Ibid._, 80.

[152] Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 64.

[153] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, pp. 79–82.

[154] _Ibid._, p. 82.

[155] Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 67.

[156] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 89.

[157] _Ibid._, 103.

[158] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, pp. 96–100; Crawford, _Fort

Sumter_, 77.

[159] _Trescot MS._, quoted by Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 78.

[160] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 101.

[161] Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 81–83.

[162] _Ibid._, 85, 86.

[163] Curtis, _Buchanan_, II, 385. The emphasis is Buchanan’s.

[164] Governor’s message to legislature, quoted by Crawford, _Fort

Sumter_, 87.

[165] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 111.

[166] Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 91.

[167] Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, chap. x.

[168] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 2.

[169] Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 112.

[170] Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 110, 111.

[171] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 3.

[172] Ward H. Lamon, a former law partner of President Lincoln,

who visited Charleston at this time and assumed to be a

representative of the President.--[EDITOR.]

[173] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 222.

[174] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 230.

[175] _Ibid._, 228.

[176] _Ibid._, 284, 285.

[177] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 285.

[178] Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 377.

[179] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 283.

[180] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 241.

[181] Doubleday, _Sumter and Moultrie_, 98.

[182] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 235.

[183] Nicolay and Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, IV, 31, 32.

[184] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 294.

[185] _Ibid._, 249–251.

[186] Talbot’s report, in _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 251.

[187] Roman, _Beauregard_, I, 33.

[188] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, pp. 12–25, 213–216.

[189] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, pp. 25–58.

[190] Statement of Ex-Confederate Secretary of War to writer;

Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 421.

[191] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 297.

[192] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 297.

[193] Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 422.

[194] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 13.

[195] _Ibid._, 59; Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 424.

[196] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 301.

[197] Crawford, _Fort Sumter_, 425, 426.

[198] _Naval War Records_, IV, 248.

[199] Fox’s report, in _Naval War Records_, IV, 245–251.

[200] Doubleday, _Sumter and Moultrie_, 142.

[201] Doubleday, _Sumter and Moultrie_, 147.

[202] _Ibid._

[203] Foster’s report, in _War Records_, Serial No. 1, pp. 20, 21.

[204] _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 293.

[205] _Ibid._, 22.

[206] Doubleday, _Sumter and Moultrie_, 158.

[207] Foster’s report, in _War Records_, Serial No. 1, p. 24.

[208] Foster’s report, in _War Records_, Serial No. 1, pp. 23, 24.

[209] Doubleday, _Sumter and Moultrie_, App., where the names appear.

[210] _Naval War Records_, IV, 251.

[211] J. E. Johnston, _Narrative_, 84.

[212] Commander J. M. Brooke, in _Battles and Leaders_, I, 715;

Scharf, _Navy of the Confederate States_, 145 et seq.

[213] _Battles and Leaders_, I, 692 et seq.

[214] Nicolay and Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, V, 226.

[215] Soley, _Blockade and Cruisers_, 54.

[216] See _The Appeal to Arms_, by Dr. J. K. Hosmer, p. 74.

[217] Poore, _Burnside_, 132.

[218] _War Records_, Serial No. 6, pp. 133–167.

[219] Soley, _Blockade and Cruisers_, 82 et seq.

[220] Farragut, _Farragut_, chaps. i, ii.

[221] _Naval War Records_, XVIII, pp. xv, xvi.

[222] Farragut, _Farragut_, 207.

[223] _Naval War Records_, XVIII (West Gulf Blockading Squadron);

Mahan, _Gulf and Inland Waters_, 52.

[224] Beverly Kennon, a Southern officer, in _Battles and Leaders_,

II, 76, criticises severely the management of the Confederate

ships.

[225] _Naval War Records_, XVIII, 134 et seq.; Mahan, _Gulf and Inland

Waters_, 52 et seq.

[226] Parton, _Butler in New Orleans_, chap. xii.

[227] _War Records_, Serial No. 24, p. 511.

[228] Grant, _Personal Memoirs_, I, 411.

[229] Sherman, _Memoirs_, I, 319.

[230] Nicolay and Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, VII, 135.

[231] Sherman, _Memoirs_, I, 324.

[232] Cullum, _Register of Mil. Acad._, art., “McPherson.”

[233] _War Records_, Serial No. 36, pp. 371–467.

[234] Mahan, _Gulf and Inland Waters_, 110 et seq.

[235] Johnston, _Narrative_, 152.

[236] _War Records_, Serial No. 36, pp. 565 et seq.

[237] _War Records_, Serial No. 36, p. 32.

[238] Johnston, _Narrative_, 153.

[239] Admiral Porter’s fleet kept up a continuous bombardment for

forty days. Seven thousand mortar shells and forty-five hundred

shells from the gunboats were discharged at the city. As Grant

drew his lines closer, his cannonade was kept up day and night.

The people of Vicksburg had taken shelter in caves dug in the

clay hills on which the city stands. In these caves families

lived day and night, and children were born. Famine attacked the

city, and mule-meat made a savory dish. Grant mined under some

of the Confederate works, and one of them, Fort Hill Bastion,

was blown up on June 25th with terrible effect.--_Harper’s

Encyclopædia of United States History_.

[240] _War Records_, Serial No. 37, pp. 146–424.

[241] _War Records_, Serial No. 41, pp. 41–181 (Port Hudson).

[242] Greene, _The Mississippi_.

[243] _War Records_, Serial Nos. 43 and 44, pp. 1–775 (all on

Gettysburg campaign).

[244] Longstreet, _Manassas to Appomattox_, 331.

[245] _War Records_, Serial No. 45, p. 31.

[246] F. H. Lee, _Robert E. Lee_, 265. For R. E. Lee’s report of

Gettysburg, see _War Records_, Serial No. 44, pp. 293 et seq.;

Long, _Lee_, 280.

[247] But see controversy between Mosby and Robertson as to management

of the Confederate cavalry, _Battles and Leaders_, III, 251.

[248] Cullum, _Register of Mil. Acad._, art. “Meade.”

[249] Hunt, in _Battles and Leaders_, III, 258.

[250] Livermore, _Numbers and Losses_, 102.

[251] _War Records_, Serial No. 43, pp. 104–119 (Report of Meade).

[252] F. H. Lee, _Robert E. Lee_, 270.

[253] Doubleday, _Chancellorsville and Gettysburg_, 132.

[254] Cullum, _Register of Mil. Acad._, art. “Hancock.”

[255] Walker, _Hancock_, in _Mass. Mil. Hist. Soc. Papers_, “Some

Federal and Confederate Commanders,” 49.

[256] Doubleday, _Chancellorsville and Gettysburg_, 156.

[257] A tradition at Gettysburg.

[258] Mrs. Longstreet, _Lee and Longstreet at High Tide_, 83, 84.

[259] For criticisms by the friends of Lee, see Davis, _Rise and Fall

of the Confederate Government_, II, 447; F. H. Lee, _Robert E.

Lee_, 299; William Allan, in _Battles and Leaders_, III, 355.

Able and impartial is G. F. R. Henderson, _Science of War_, 280

et seq.

[260] Hood, _Advance and Retreat_, 57 et seq.

[261] For Meade’s good judgment and activity, see Walker, in _Battles

and Leaders_, III, 406.

[262] Gibbon, in _Battles and Leaders_, III, 313.

[263] Mrs. Longstreet, _Lee and Longstreet at High Tide_, 48.

[264] Pennypacker, _Meade_, 194.

[265] Longstreet, _Manassas to Appomattox_, 385 et seq.

[266] Fremantle, _Three Months in the Southern States_, 274 et seq.

Confirmed to the writer by General E. P. Alexander, who heard

the rebuke.

[267] _Battles and Leaders_, III, 349.

[268] Committee on Conduct of the War, _Report_, pt. i (1864–1865),

408 et seq.

[269] Nicolay and Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, VII, 278.

[270] For a minute discussion of Meade’s management, and much

testimony, see Committee on Conduct of the War, _Report_, pt. i

(1864–1865), 295–524.

[271] Livermore, _Numbers and Losses_, 102.

[272] See the chapter on the Monroe Doctrine in _The Rise of the

New West_, by Prof. F. J. Turner, and also chaps. i and xi

of _America as a World Power_, by Prof. G. H. Latané. (_The

American Nation_, Harper & Brothers.)--[EDITOR.]

[273] _The War with Spain_, by Henry Cabot Lodge, and _The Spanish

War_, by General Russell A. Alger, may be consulted with

advantage. Both are published by Harper & Brothers. Harper’s

_Encyclopædia of United States History_, VI, affords a

picturesque account of the battle of Manila Bay, by Ramon

Reyes Lala, a Filipino author and lecturer. Professor Latané’s

account of the war, in his _America as a World Power_ (Harper &

Brothers), offers an excellent example of judicial historical

treatment.--EDITOR.

[274] Long, _New American Navy_, I, 209.

[275] _Messages and Docs._, Abridgment, 1898–1899, II, 921.

[276] Sec. of the Navy, _Annual Report_, 1898, App., pp. 465, 466.

[277] It was on this date, May 24th, that the _Oregon_, Captain Clark,

appeared off Jupiter Inlet, Florida, ready for action, after a

voyage of fourteen thousand miles from San Francisco.--[EDITOR.]

[278] Schley, _Forty-five Years Under the Flag_, 276.

[279] Sec. of the Navy, _Annual Report_, 1898, App., p. 402; Long,

_New Am. Navy_, I, 258–287.

[280] Sec. of the Navy, _Annual Report_, 1898, App., p. 437.

[281] Sec. of the Navy, _Annual Report_, 1898, App., p. 667.

[282] Major-General commanding the army, _Report_, 1898, p. 149.

[283] Major-General commanding the army, _Report_, 1898, p. 162.

[284] Major-General commanding the army, _Report_, 1898, pp. 152, 169,

171, 319, 366, 381. [General Vara el Rey, one of the bravest

of the Spanish officers, was the leader in this desperate

resistance, and was killed while rallying his men in the

village.--EDITOR.]

[285] Major-General commanding the army, _Report_, pp. 167, 173.

[286] _Messages and Docs._, Abridgment, 1898–1899, I, 270.

[287] Sec. of the Navy, _Annual Report_, 1898, App., pp. 505–602;

Long, _New Am. Navy_, II, 28–42.

[288] Major-General commanding the army, _Report_, 1898, pp. 138–147,

226–243, 246–266.

[289] _Senate Docs._, 56 Cong., I Sess., No. 221, 8 vols.

[290] _Nation_, LXIX, 61.

[291] Proceedings of the Schley Court of Inquiry, _House Docs._, 57

Cong., I Sess., No. 485.

[292] Act of February 14, 1903, _U. S. Statutes at Large_, XXXII, pt.

i, p. 830.

INDEX

Abercrombie, James, killed at Bunker Hill, 115.

Adams, John, elected President, 154.

Adams, John Quincy, interested in western exploration, 9;

elected President, 180;

Texas, 184.

Adams, Samuel, circular letter, 90;

“committees of correspondence,” 92;

on independence, 96;

outlawed, 102.

Aguinaldo, Emilio, insurrection, 356.

Alabama, admitted into the Union, 180;

secession, 231.

_Alabama_ and the _Kearsarge_, 327;

Claims, 343.

Alaska, purchase, 11, 343.

Alger, R. A., Spanish War, 363;

resignation, 374, 375.

Alien acts, passage, 154.

_Alliance_ fired upon, 345.

Almonte, J. N., annexation of Texas, 184, 185;

demands his passports, 185.

Alston, Charles, at surrender of Sumter, 271.

Amendment, Thirteenth, 328;

Fourteenth, 343;

Fifteenth, 343.

America, territorial history, 1–12.

American, flag adopted, 143;

victory at Cowpens, 144;

Embargo Act, 155;

Anti-Slavery Society, 181.

Americans, at Bunker Hill, 102–108;

at battle of Long Island, 119;

at White Plains, 119;

at Bennington, 119;

at Saratoga, 120;

at Valley Forge, 143;

storm Stony Point, 144;

at Yorktown, 145;

invade Canada, 155;

at Chippewa, 156;

occupy California, 182;

New Mexico, 182.

Amherst, Jeffrey, commander-in-chief in America, 66;

advance down Lake Champlain, 73.

Ampudia, Pedro de, at Buena Vista, 200, 203, 205.

Anderson, Robert, commands Charleston forts, 243;

fitness, 243;

urges reinforcements and occupation of Pinckney and Sumter,

243, 244;

state enrollment of fort laborers, 245;

instructions, 246–247;

removal to Sumter, 251–253;

refuses to return, 254, 255;

Lamon’s statements, 256;

Beauregard, 256;

defensive instructions repeated, 253;

scarcity of provisions, 258;

fears he has been abandoned, 260;

informed of Fox expedition, 260;

isolated, 260;

refuses to evacuate, 264;

offer on evacuation refused, 265;

bombardment, 267;

surrenders, 271.

André, John, capture and execution, 144.

Andros, Sir Edward, Governor of New England, 59.

Anne, Fort, 126, 127.

Anti-Slavery Society, formation, 181.

_Ariel_ at Lake Erie, 163, 170.

Arizona, admission into the Union, 345.

Arkansas, admission into the Union, 181;

secession, 273.

Arnold, Benedict, to the relief of Fort Schuyler, 129, 132;

at Behmus’ Heights, 132;

deprived of command, 135;

wounded, 137;

treason, 144.

Arthur, C. A., succeeds to the Presidency, 344.

Appleton, Major, in King Philip’s War, 52.

Appomattox campaign, 329–342;

map, 331;

meeting between Grant and Lee, 336;

Lee’s surrender, 337;

Lincoln, 342.

Appomattox Court-House, Lee’s surrender, 328.

Ashburton treaty, on northeastern boundary, 181.

Babcock, Colonel, at Appomattox, 336, 337.

Babcock, Prof. Kendric Charles quoted, 172, 180.

Badeau, Adam, at Appomattox, 337.

_Baltimore_ in Spanish War, 351.

Balboa, Vasco Nunez de, discovers Pacific Ocean, 12.

Banks, N. P., expedition against Port Hudson, 305.

Barclay, Commodore, at Lake Erie, 160.

Baum, Colonel, at Bennington, 130.

Beauregard, P. G. T., pledge from Anderson, 256;

reports readiness to attack Fort Sumter, 258;

order to attack, 263;

demands evacuation, 264;

Anderson’s offer, 265;

bombardment, 267;

terms of surrender, 271.

Behmus’ Heights, battle, 133;

map, 136.

Behring’s Strait, discovery, 61.

Bennington, battle, 130.

Bissell, Colonel, at Buena Vista, 201.

Blue, Victor, at Santiago, 364.