PURCHASE OF THE SUEZ CANAL SHARES: AN OPPOSITION VIEW (1875).

=Source.=--_Annual Register, 1875_; _English History_, pp. 123–125.

“You will expect,” said Sir William Harcourt at Oxford, on December

30, “that I should say something to you on the subject of the Suez

Canal shares. Well, that is a matter on which no prudent politician

in our present state of information will hazard a competent opinion.

At the same time, after all that has been said on the matter, to be

wholly silent would be an affectation of reserve. For my part, if the

matter had been allowed to remain in the regions of high policy, I

should have been content to abstain from criticising it altogether.

I am not unfavourable to a far-seeing and a bold policy in the

conduct of great affairs. We have had somewhat too little of that

spirit of late. But all reticence upon that score is at an end. The

most contradictory and, in some respects, the most absurd surmises

with respect to this transaction were afloat some weeks ago. Lord

Hartington, at the beginning of this month, invited a declaration from

the Government of the real meaning and object of their policy, and Lord

Derby accepted the challenge with perfect frankness. Since the speech

of the Foreign Secretary the whole aspect of the question has been

completely changed both at home and abroad. Up to that time a sort of

glamour had invested a very plain business with the unnatural haze that

distorts the true proportion of things. There was something Asiatic in

this mysterious melodrama. It was like ‘The Thousand and One Nights,’

when, in the midst of the fumes of incense, a shadowy Genie astonished

the bewildered spectators. The public mind was dazzled, fascinated,

mystified. We had done we did not know exactly what--we were not

told precisely why--_omne ignotum pro magnifico_. The Government

maintained an imposing and perplexing silence. But our daily and

weekly instructors gave free rein to their imagination. We were told

by those who assumed the patronage of the grand arcanum that a great

blow had been struck, that a new policy had been inaugurated, and that

England had at length resumed her lead among the nations. The Eastern

Question had been settled by a _coup d’état_ on the Stock Exchange,

and Turkey was abandoned to her fate. Egypt was annexed. The Bulls of

England had vanquished the Bears of Russia. Moab was to be our washpot

and over Edom we had cast our shoe. France and M. de Lesseps were

confounded. We were a very great people; we had done a very big thing,

and, to consummate the achievement, a Satrap from Shoreham, attended

by a plump of financial Janissaries, was despatched to administer the

subject provinces of the English protectorate on the Nile. All this,

if somewhat nebulous, was in the grand manner, and if any inquisitive

person, like the troublesome little boy on the field of Blenheim,

was disposed to ask ‘what good came of it at last,’ we could always

answer, like the judicious Kasper--

“‘Why, that I cannot tell,’ said he,

‘But ’twas a glorious victory.’

“We all of us felt some six inches taller than before. We spread our

tails like peacocks to the sun, and were as pleased as children at our

soap-bubble, iridescent with many hues. But, all of a sudden, this

beautiful vision melted away; the Egyptian mirage evaporated; the

great political phantasmagoria faded like a dissolving view. There

is nothing so delightful as magic, until, in an unhappy moment, the

conjuror consents to reveal the apparatus to us by which our senses

have been deluded, and shows us how it is done. Lord Derby is a great

master of prose, and he has translated the Eastern romance into

most pedestrian English. But the Foreign Secretary is a responsible

statesman. He has widely warned us against ‘cant’ and against ‘rant,’

and he cannot afford to indulge in the exaggerated visions in which

journalists may, with impunity, amuse themselves and their readers.

It was not his affair to mystify England, but to reassure Europe; and

therefore with that straightforwardness and common sense for which he

is eminent, he told us at Edinburgh that the affair which had created

so much sensation at home and abroad was not at all the sort of thing

it had been represented to be; that, if it had been capable of the

construction which had been put upon it, it would have been neither a

wise nor a honest transaction. He repudiated with scorn the idea that

England aspired to an Egyptian protectorate; they had not reversed

their Eastern policy; still less had they contemplated to appropriate

the territories of the Khedive as our share in a scramble for general

plunder. What had really been accomplished was a very ordinary affair.

The Khedive had certain shares in the Suez Canal. So far from being

ambitious to get hold of them, Lord Derby would have much preferred

that the ruler of Egypt should have kept them in his own hands; but,

as he found himself obliged to part with them, the English Government

thought it better to purchase them than to let them go elsewhere. They

have acquired them, not to give England any special or predominant

foreign influence, nor to secure any exclusive advantage, but to

keep open a communication for the benefit of all, which to England

is of supreme importance. And with these explanations, tendered on

the good faith of an English Minister, upon the credit of which Lord

Derby justly relies, he tells us that the European Powers are amply

satisfied. And so the nine days’ wonder is over, the enchantment is at

an end, the chariot of Cinderella relapses into its original pumpkins

and mice. Since Lord Derby has so pitilessly dowsed with cold water the

heated enthusiasm of visionary journalists, they have never ceased to

weep and to wail over the ruins of their pet toy, which has collapsed

like a pricked bladder or a broken drum. They beg us to believe that

the Foreign Minister does not understand the meaning of his own acts,

or the scope of his own policy; that, in spite of all his protestations

to the contrary, we are the veritable _perfide Albion_.

“For my own part I cannot refuse to respond to the appeal of Lord

Derby, when he says, ‘We have told Europe what we want, and why we

want it, and Europe is in the habit of believing what we say.’ I hope

the day will never come when an English Government will be justly

charged with saying one thing and meaning another. I therefore gladly

take Lord Derby at his word. But now that this grand affair is reduced

to the moderate dimensions of a sort of post-office subsidy, we may

criticise it in a manner and upon grounds which might in another

aspect of the question have been inappropriate. Of course, if this

transaction had been really of the magnitude which was represented,

the Government would have been deeply responsible for not inviting at

once the judgment of Parliament upon a policy which vitally involved

the interests and the future of the country, but being what it is, we

may well wait a few weeks for fuller explanations of some points which

still remain very obscure. There will be no disposition, I imagine,

in any quarter to approach the discussion in a spirit of carping or

of captious criticism. Upon the main ground by which this purchase is

justified--namely, the determination to secure a free passage between

the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, there will be no conflict of

opinion. That is a policy in which England is profoundly interested;

and for that, statesmen of all parties will be prepared to make common

efforts, and, if necessary, great sacrifices. No one, I think, will

contend that even 4,000,000 pounds of money is too large a sum for the

accomplishment of such an end. But that which has not hitherto been

explained, and what remains to be shown, is in what manner and to what

extent this investment really does conduce to that desirable object.”

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