I felt so little satisfied with the decision of the Cabinet on
Saturday, that I determined to make a notch off my own bat, and
accordingly I wrote this morning to Apponyi, asking him to come here
and give me half an hour’s conversation. He came accordingly. I said I
wished to have some friendly and unreserved conversation with him, not
as between an English Minister, and the Austrian Ambassador, but as
between Palmerston and Apponyi, that what I was going to say related to
serious matters; but I begged that nothing I might say should be looked
upon as a threat, but only as a frank explanation between friends on
matters which might lead to disagreements, and with regard to which,
unless timely explanation were given as to possible consequences
of certain things, a reproach might afterwards be made that timely
explanation might have averted disagreeable results. I said that we
have from the beginning taken a deep interest in favour of Denmark--not
from family ties, which have little influence on English policy, and
sometimes act unfavourably--but, first, that we have thought from the
beginning that Denmark has been harshly and unjustly treated; and,
secondly, we deem the integrity and independence of the State, which
commands the entrance to the Baltic, objects of interest to England.
That we abstained from taking the field in defence of Denmark for many
reasons--from the season of the year; from the smallness of our army,
and the great risk of failure in a struggle with all Germany by land.
That with regard to operations by sea, the positions would be reversed:
we are strong, Germany is weak; and the German ports in the Baltic,
North Sea, and Adriatic would be greatly at our command. Speaking for
myself personally, and for nobody else, I must frankly tell him that,
if an Austrian squadron were to pass along our coasts and ports, and
go into the Baltic to help in any way the German operations against
Denmark, I should look upon it as an affront and insult to England.
That I could not, and would not stand such a thing; and that, unless
in such case a superior British squadron were to follow, with such
orders for acting as the case might require, I would not continue
to hold my present position; and such a case would probably lead to
collision--that is, war; and in my opinion Germany, and especially
Austria, would be the sufferer in such a war. I should deeply regret
such a result, because it is the wish of England to be well with
Austria; but I am confident that I should be borne out by public
opinion. I again begged that he would not consider this communication
as a threat, but simply as a friendly reminder of consequences which
might follow a possible course of action.
Apponyi having listened with great attention to what I said, replied
that the considerations which I had pointed out were not new to his
mind; that they had been forcibly dwelt upon, among other persons, by
the King of the Belgians. That he was quite aware that, if the Austrian
ships entered the Baltic, an English squadron would follow them; that
in all probability one of two things would happen--either that the
Austrian squadron would be destroyed, or that it would be compelled by
orders from the English Admiral, to leave the Baltic. Thus they would
run the risk of a catastrophe or a humiliation, and they did not wish
for either. That, therefore, whatever may have been said by Rechberg in
his note, we might be sure that the Austrian squadron will not enter
the Baltic. This is satisfactory as far as Apponyi may be considered
the organ of the Austrian Government; but I think we ought to have
something more positive in writing than we have got.
I shall state to the Cabinet to-morrow the substance of my conversation
with Apponyi.
Yours sincerely,
PALMERSTON.