CHAPTER XV.

THE PROPÆDEUTIC OFFICE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY _(continued)_.

"If we regard this sublime philosophy as a preparation for

Christianity instead of seeking in it a substitute for the

Gospel, we shall not need to overstate its grandeur in order

to estimate its real value."--Pressensé.

"Plato made me to know the true God. Jesus Christ showed me

the way to Him."--St. Augustine.

The preparatory office of Grecian philosophy is also seen in _the

department of morals_.

I. _In the awakening and enthronement of Conscience as a law of duty,

and the elevation and purification of the Moral Idea_.

The same law of evolution, which we have seen governing the history of

speculative thought, may also be traced as determining the progress of

ethical inquiry. In this department there are successive stages marked,

both in the individual and the national mind. There is, first, the

simplicity and trust of childhood, submitting with unquestioning faith

to prescribed and arbitrary laws; then the unsettled and ill-directed

force of youth, questioning the authority of laws, and asking reasons

why this or that is obligatory; then the philosophic wisdom of riper

years, recognizing an inherent law of duty, which has an absolute

rightness and an imperative obligation. There is first a dim and shadowy

apprehension of some lines of moral distinction, and some consciousness

of obligation, but these rest mainly upon an outward law--the observed

practice of others, or the command of the parent as, in some sense, the

command of God. Then, to attain to personal convictions, man passes

through a stage of doubt; he asks for a ground of obligation, for an

authority that shall approve itself to his own judgment and reason. At

last he arrives at some ultimate principles of right, some immutable

standard of duty; he recognizes an inward law of conscience, and it

becomes to him as the voice of God. He extends his analysis to history,

and he finds that the universal conscience of the race has, in all ages,

uttered the same behest. Should he live in Christian times, he discovers

a wondrous harmony between the voice of God within the heart, and the

voice of God within the pages of inspiration. And now the convention of

public opinion, and the laws of the state, are revered and upheld by

him, just so far as they bear the imprimatur of reason and of

conscience--that is, of God.

This history of the normal development of the individual mind has its

counterpart in the history of humanity. There is (1.) _The age of

popular and unconscious morality_; (2.) _The transitional, skeptical, or

sophistical age_; and (3.) _The philosophic or conscious age of

morality_.[899] In the "Republic" of Plato, we have these three eras

represented by different persons, through the course of the dialogue.

The question is started--what is Justice? and an answer is given from

the stand-point of popular morality, by Polemarchus, who quotes the

words of the poet Simonides,

"To give to each his due is just;"[900]

that is, justice is paying your debts. This doctrine being proved

inadequate, an answer is given from the Sophistical point of view by

Thrasymachus, who defines justice as "the advantage of the

strongest"--that is, might is right, and right is might.[901] This

answer being sharply refuted, the way is opened for a more philosophic

account, which is gradually evolved in book iv., Glaucon and Adimantus

personifying the practical understanding, which is gradually brought

into harmony with philosophy, and Socrates the higher reason, as the

purely philosophic conception. Justice is found to be the right

proportion and harmonious development of all the elements of the soul,

and the equal balance of all the interests of society, so as to secure a

well-regulated and harmonious whole.

[Footnote 899: Grant's "Aristotle's Ethics," vol. i. p. 46.]

[Footnote 900: "Republic," bk. i. § 6.]

[Footnote 901: Ibid., bk. i. § 12.]

The era of _popular and unconscious morality_ is represented by the

times of Homer, Hesiod, the Gnomic poets, and "the Seven Wise Men of

Greece."

This was an age of instinctive action, rather than reflection--of poetry

and feeling, rather than analytic thought. The rules of life were

presented in maxims and proverbs, which do not rise above prudential

counsels or empirical deductions. Morality was immediately associated

with the religion of the state, and the will of the gods was the highest

law for men. "Homer and Hesiod, and the Gnomic poets, constituted the

educational course," to which may be added the saws and aphorisms of the

Seven Wise Men, and we have before us the main sources of Greek views of

duty. When the question was asked--"What is right?" the answer was given

by a quotation from Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, and the like. The morality

of Homer "is concrete, not abstract; it expresses the conception of a

heroic life, rather than a philosophic theory. It is mixed up with a

religion which really consists in a celebration of the beauty of nature,

and in a deification of the strong and brilliant qualities of human

nature. It is a morality uninfluenced by a regard for a future life. It

clings with intense enjoyment and love to the present world, and the

state after death looms up in the distance as a cold and repugnant

shadow. And yet it would often hold death preferable to disgrace. The

distinction between a noble and ignoble life is strongly marked in

Homer, and yet a sense of right and wrong about particular actions seems

fluctuating" and confused.[902] A sensuous conception of happiness is

the chief good, and mere temporal advantage the principal reward of

virtue. We hear nothing of the approving smile of conscience, of inward

self-satisfaction, and peace, and harmony, resulting from the practice

of virtue. Justice, energy, temperance, chastity, are enjoined, because

they secure temporal good. And yet, with all this imperfection, the

poets present "a remarkable picture of primitive simplicity, chastity,

justice, and practical piety, under the three-fold influence of right

moral feeling, mutual and fear of the divine displeasure."[903]

[Footnote 902: Grant's "Aristotle's Ethics," vol. i. p. 51.]

[Footnote 903: Tyler, "Theology of the Greek Poets," p. 167.]

The _transitional, skeptical_, or _sophistical era_ begins with

Protagoras. Poetry and proverbs had ceased to satisfy the reason of man.

The awakening intellect had begun to call in question the old maxims and

"wise saws," to dispute the arbitrary authority of the poets, and even

to arraign the institutions of society. It had already begun to seek for

some reasonable foundation of authority for the opinions, customs, laws,

and institutions which had descended to them from the past, and to ask

why men were obliged to do this or that? The question whether there is

at bottom any real difference between truth and error, right and wrong,

was now fairly before the human mind. The ultimate standard of all truth

and all right, was now the grand object of pursuit. These inquiries were

not, however, conducted by the Sophists with the best motives. They were

not always prompted by an earnest desire to know the truth, and an

earnest purpose to embrace and do the right. They talked and argued for

mere effect--to display their dialectic subtilty, or their rhetorical

power. They taught virtue for mere emolument and pay. They delighted, as

Cicero tells us, to plead the opposite sides of a cause with equal

effect. And they found exquisite pleasure in raising difficulties,

maintaining paradoxes, and passing off mere tricks of oratory for solid

proofs. This is the uniform representation of the sophistical spirit

which is given by all the best writers who lived nearest to their times,

and who are, therefore, to be presumed to have known them best.

Grote[904] has made an elaborate defense of the Sophists; he charges

Plato with gross misrepresentation. His portraits of them are denounced

as mere caricatures, prompted by a spirit of antagonism; all antiquity

is presumed to have been misled by him. No one, however, can read

Grant's "Essay on the History of Moral Philosophy in Greece"[905]

without feeling that his vindication of Plato is complete and

unanswerable: "Plato never represents the Sophists as teaching a lax

morality to their disciples. He does not make sophistry to consist in

holding wicked opinions; he represents them as only too orthodox in

general,[906] but capable of giving utterance to immoral paradoxes for

the sake of vanity. Sophistry rather tampers and trifles with the moral

convictions than directly attacks them." The Sophists were wanting in

deep conviction, in moral earnestness, in sincere love of truth, in

reverence for goodness and purity, and therefore their trifling,

insincere, and paradoxical teaching was unfavorable to goodness of life.

The tendency of their method is forcibly depicted in the words of Plato:

"There are certain dogmas relating to what is _just_ and _good_ in which

we have been brought up from childhood--obeying and reverencing them.

Other opinions recommending pleasure and license we resist, out of

respect for the old hereditary maxims. Well, then, a question comes up

concerning what is right? He gives some answer such as he has been

taught, and straightway is refuted. He tries again, and is again

refuted. And, when this has happened pretty often, he is reduced to the

opinion that _nothing is either right or wrong_; and in the same way it

happens about the just and the good, and all that before we have held in

reverence. On this, he naturally abandons his allegiance to the old

principles and takes up with those he before resisted, and so, from

being a good citizen, he becomes lawless."[907] And, in point of fact,

this was the theoretical landing-place of the Sophists. We do not say

they became practically "lawless" and antinomian, but they did arrive at

the settled opinion that right and wrong, truth and error, are solely

matter of private opinion and conventional usage. Man's own fluctuating

opinion is the measure and standard of all things.[908] They who "make

the laws, make them for their own advantage."[909] There is no such

thing as Eternal Right. "That which _appears_ just and honorable to each

city is so for that city, as long as the opinion prevails."[910]

[Footnote 904: "History of Greece."]

[Footnote 905: Aristotle's "Ethics," vol. i. ch. ii.]

[Footnote 906: "His teachings will be good counsels about a man's own

affairs, how best to govern his family; and also about the affairs of

the state, how most ably to administer and speak of state

affairs."--"Protag.," § 26.]

[Footnote 907: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xvii.]

[Footnote 908: "Theætetus," § 23.]

[Footnote 909: "Gorgias," §§ 85-89.]

[Footnote 910: "Theætetus," §§ 65-75.]

The age of the Sophists was a transitional period--a necessary, though,

in itself considered, an unhappy stage in the progress of the human

mind; but it opened the way for, _The Socratic, philosophic_, or

_conscious age of morals_. It has been said that "before Socrates there

was no morality in Greece, but only propriety of conduct." If by this is

meant that prior to Socrates men simply followed the maxims of "the

Theologians,"[911] and obeyed the laws of the state, without reflection

and inquiry as to the intrinsic character of the acts, and without any

analysis and exact definition, so as to attain to principles of ultimate

and absolute right, it must be accepted as true--there was no philosophy

of morals. Socrates is therefore justly regarded as "the father of moral

philosophy." Aristotle says that he confined himself chiefly to ethical

inquiries. He sought a determinate conception and an exact definition of

virtue. As Xenophon has said of him, "he never ceased asking, What is

piety? what is impiety? what is noble? what is base? what is just? what

is unjust? what is temperance? what is madness?"[912] And these

questions were not asked in the Sophistic spirit, as a dialectic

exercise, or from idle curiosity. He was a perfect contrast to the

Sophists. They had slighted Truth, he made her the mistress of his soul.

They had turned away from her, he longed for more perfect communion with

her. They had deserted her for money and renown, he was faithful to her

in poverty.[913] He wanted to know what piety was, that he might be

pious. He desired to know what justice, temperance, nobility, courage

were, that he might cultivate and practise them. He wrote no books,

delivered no lectures; he instituted no school; he simply conversed in

the shop, the market-place, the banquet-hall, and the prison. This

philosophy was not so much a _doctrine_ as a _life_. "What is remarkable

in him is not the _system_ but the _man_. The memory he left behind him

amongst his disciples, though idealized--the affection, blended with

reverence, which they never ceased to feel for his person, bear

testimony to the elevation of his character and his moral purity. We

recognize in him a Greek of Athens--one who had imbibed many dangerous

errors, and on whom the yoke of pagan custom still weighed; but his life

was nevertheless a noble life; and it is to calumny we must have

recourse if we are to tarnish its beauty by odious insinuations, as

Lucian did, and as has been too frequently done, after him, by

unskillful defenders of Christianity,[914] who imagine it is the gainer

by all that degrades human nature. Born in a humble position, destitute

of all the temporal advantages which the Greeks so passionately loved,

Socrates exerted a kingship over minds. His dominion was the more real

for being less apparent.... His power consisted of three things: his

devoted affection for his disciples, his disinterested love of truth,

and the perfect harmony of his life and doctrine.... If he recommended

temperance and sobriety, he also set the example; poorly clad, satisfied

with little, he disdained all the delicacies of life. He possessed every

species of courage. On the field of battle he was intrepid, and still

more intrepid when he resisted the caprices of the multitude who

demanded of him, when he was a senator, to commit the injustice of

summoning ten generals before the tribunals. He also infringed the

iniquitous orders of the thirty tyrants of Athens. The satires of

Aristophanes neither moved nor irritated him. The same dauntless

firmness he displayed when brought before his judges, charged with

impiety. 'If it is your wish to absolve me on condition that I

henceforth be silent, I reply I love and honor you, but I ought rather

to obey the gods than you. Neither in the presence of judges nor of the

enemy is it permitted me, or any other man, to use every sort of means

to escape death. It is not death but crime that it is difficult to

avoid; crime moves faster than death. So I, old and heavy as I am, have

allowed myself to be overtaken by death, while my accusers, light and

vigorous, have allowed themselves to be overtaken by the light-footed

crime. I go, then, to suffer death; they to suffer shame and iniquity. I

abide by my punishment, as they by theirs. All is according to order.'

It was the same fidelity to duty that made Socrates refuse to escape

from prison, in order not to violate the laws of his country, to which,

even though irritated, more respect is due than to a father. 'Let us

walk in the path,' he says 'that God has traced for us.' These last

words show the profound religious sentiment which animated Socrates....

It is impossible not to feel that there was something divine in such a

life crowned with such a death."[914]

[Footnote 911: Homer, Hesiod, etc.]

[Footnote 912: "Memorabilia," bk. i. ch. i. p. 16.]

[Footnote 913: Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 122.]

[Footnote 914: Watson's "Institutes of Theology," vol. i. p. 374.]

[Footnote 915: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," pp. 109-111.]

Socrates laid the foundation for conscious morality by placing the

ground of right and wrong in an eternal and unchangeable reason which

illuminates the reason and conscience of every man. He often asserted

that morality is a science which can not be taught. It depends mainly

upon principles which are discovered by an inward light. Accordingly he

regarded it as the main business of education to "draw out" into the

light of consciousness the principles of right and justice which are

infolded within the conscience of man--to deliver the mind of the secret

truth which was striving towards the light of day. Therefore he called

his method the "maieutic" or "obstetric" art. He felt there was

something divine in all men (answering to his _to daimonion_ or

_daimonion ti_--a divine and supernatural something--a warning

"voice"--a gnomic "sign"--a "law of God written on the heart"), which by

a system of skillful interrogations he sought to elicit, so that each

might hear for himself the voice of God, and, hearing, might obey. Thus

was he the "great prophet of the human conscience," and a messenger of

God to the heathen world, to prepare the way of the Lord.

The morality of conscience was carried to its highest point by Plato.

From the moment he became the disciple of Socrates he sympathized deeply

with the spirit and the method of his master. He had the same deep

seriousness of spirit, that same earnestness of purpose, that same

inward reverence for justice, and purity, and goodness, which dwelt in

the heart of Socrates. A naturally noble nature, he loved truth with all

the glow and fervor of his young heart. He felt that if any thing gave

meaning and value to life, it must be the contemplation of absolute

truth, absolute beauty, and absolute Good. This absolute Good is God,

who is the first principle of all ideas, the fountain of all the order

and proportion and beauty of the universe, the source of all the good

which exists in nature and in man. To practise goodness--to conform the

character to the eternal models of order, proportion, and excellence, is

to resemble God. To aspire after perfection of moral being, to secure

assimilation to God ([Greek: omoiosis Theô]) is the noble aspiration of

Plato's soul.

When we read the "Gorgias," the "Philebus," and especially the

"Republic," with what noble joy are we filled on hearing the voice of

conscience, like a harp swept by a seraph's hand, uttering such

deep-toned melodies! How does he drown the clamors of passion, the

calculations of mere expediency, the sophism of mere personal interest

and utility. If he calls us to witness the triumph of the wicked in the

first part of the "Republic," it is in order that we may at the end of

the book see the deceitfulness of their triumph. "As to the wicked," he

says, "I maintain that even if they succeed at first in concealing what

they are, most of them betray themselves at the end of their career.

They are covered with opprobrium, and present evils are nothing compared

with those that _await them in the other life_. As to the just man,

whether in sickness or in poverty, these imaginary evils will turn to

his advantage in this life, _and after his death_; because the

providence of the gods is necessarily attentive to the interests of him

who labors to become just, and to attain, by the practice of virtue, to

the most perfect resemblance to God which is possible to man."[916] He

rises above all "greatest happiness principles," and asserts distinctly

in the "Gorgias" that it is better to suffer wrong than to do

wrong.[917] "I maintain," says he, "that what is most shameful is not to

be struck unjustly on the cheek, or to be wounded in the body; but that

to strike and wound me unjustly, to rob me, or reduce me to slavery--to

commit, in a word, any kind of injustice towards me, or what is mine--is

a thing far worse and more odious for him who commits the injustice,

than for me who suffer it."[918] It is a great combat, he says, greater

than we think, that wherein the issue is whether we shall be virtuous or

wicked. Neither glory, nor riches, nor dignities, nor poetry, deserves

that we should neglect justice for them. The moral idea in Plato has

such intense truth and force, that it has at times a striking analogy

with the language of the Holy Scriptures.[919]

[Footnote 916: "Republic," bk. x. ch. xii.]

[Footnote 917: "Gorgias," §§ 59-80.]

[Footnote 918: Ibid., § 137.]

[Footnote 919: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," p. 129.]

The obligation of moral rectitude is, by Plato, derived from the

authoritative utterances of conscience as the voice of God. We must do

right because reason and conscience say it is right. In the "Euthyphron"

he maintains that the moral quality of actions is not dependent on the

arbitrary will of a Supreme Governor;--"an act is not holy because the

gods love it, but the gods love it because it is holy." The eternal law

of right dwells in the Eternal Reason of God, the idea of right in all

human minds is a ray of that Eternal Reason; and the requirement of the

divine law that we shall do right is, and must be, in harmony with both.

The present life is regarded by Plato as a state of probation and

discipline, the future life as one of reward and punishment.[920]

[Footnote 920: "Republic," bk. x. ch. xv., xvi.; "Laws," bk. x. ch.

xiii.]

Plato was thus to the heathen world "the great apostle of the moral

idea;" he followed up and completed the work of Socrates. "The voice of

God, that still found a profound echo in man's heart, possessed in him

an organ to which all Greece gave ear; and the austere revelation of

conscience this time embodied in language too harmonious not to entice

by the beauty of form, a nation of artists, they received it. The tables

of the eternal law, carved in purest marble and marvellously sculptured,

were read by them."

In Plato both the theistic conception and the moral idea seem to have

touched the zenith. The philosophy of Aristotle, considered as a whole,

appears on one side to have passed the line of the great Hellenic

period. If it did not inaugurate, it at least prepared the way for the

decline. It perfected logic, as the instrument of ratiocination, and

gave it exactness and precision, Yet taken all in all, it was greatly

inferior to its predecessor. From the moral point of view it is a

decided retrogression. The god of Aristotle is indifferent to virtue. He

is pure thought rather than moral perfection. He takes no cognizance of

man. Morality has no eternal basis, no divine type, and no future

reward. Therefore Aristotle's philosophy had little power over the

conscience and heart.

During the grand Platonic period human reason made its loftiest flight,

it rose aloft and soared towards heaven, but alas! its wings, like those

of Icarus, melted in the sun and it fell to earth again. Instead of wax

it needed the strong "eagle pinions of faith" which revelation only can

supply. The decadence is strongly marked both in the Epicurean and Stoic

schools. They both express the feeling of exhaustion, disappointment,

and despair. The popular theology had lost its hold upon the public

mind. The gods no longer visited the earth. "The mysterious voice which,

according to the poetic legend related by Plutarch, was heard out at

sea--'Great Pan is dead'--rose up from every heart; the voice of an

incredulous age proclaimed the coming end of paganism. The oracles were

dumb." There was no vision in the land. All faith in a beneficent

overruling Providence was lost, and the hope of immortality was

well-nigh gone. The doctrines of a resurrection and a judgment to come,

were objects of derisive mockery.[921] Philosophy directed her attention

solely to the problem of individual well-being on earth; it became

simply a philosophy of life, and not, as with Plato, "a preparation for

death." The grosser minds sought refuge in the doctrines of Epicurus.

They said, "Pleasure is the chief good, the end of life is to enjoy

yourself;" to this end "dismiss the fear of gods, and, above all, the

fear of death." The nobler souls found an asylum with the Stoics. They

said, "Fata nos ducunt--The Fates lead us! Live conformable to reason.

Endure and abstain!" Notwithstanding numerous and serious errors, the

ethical system of the Stoics was wonderfully pure. This must be

confessed by any one who reads the "Enchiridion" of Epictetus, and the

"Meditations" of Aurelius. "The highest end of life is to contemplate

truth and to obey the Eternal Reason. God is to be reverenced above all

things, and universally submitted to. The noblest office of reason is to

subjugate passion and conduct to virtue. Virtue is the supreme good,

which is to be pursued for its own sake, and not from fear or hope. That

is sufficient for happiness which is seated only in the mind, and

therefore independent of external things. The consciousness of

well-doing is reward enough without the applause of others. And no fear

of loss, or pain, or even death, must be suffered to turn us aside from

truth and virtue."[922]

[Footnote 921: Acts xvii. 32.]

[Footnote 922: Marcus Aurelius.]

The preparatory office of Christianity in the field of ethics is further

seen,

II. _In the fact that, by an experiment conducted on the largest scale,

it demonstrated the insufficiency of reason to elaborate a perfect ideal

of moral excellence, and develop the moral forces necessary to secure

its realization_.

We have seen that the moral idea in Socrates, Plato, Epictetus, Marcus

Aurelius, and Seneca rose to a sublime height, and that, under its

influence, they developed a noble and heroic character. At the same time

it must be conceded that their ethical system was marked by signal

blemishes and radical defects. After all its excellence, it did not give

roundness, completeness, and symmetry to moral life. The elements which

really purify and ennoble man, and lend grace and beauty to life, were

utterly wanting. Their systems were rather a discipline of the reason

than a culture of the heart. The reason held in check the lower passions

and propensities of the nature but it did not evoke the softer, gentler,

purer emotions of the soul. The cardinal virtues of the ancient ethical

systems are Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Courage, all which are in

the last analysis reduced to Wisdom. Humility, Meekness, Forgiveness of

injuries, Love of even enemies, Universal Benevolence, Real

Philanthropy, the graces which give beauty to character and bless

society, are scarcely known. It is true that in Epictetus and Seneca we

have some counsels to humility, to forbearance, and forgiveness; but it

must be borne in mind that Christianity was now in the air, exerting an

indirect influence beyond the limits of the labors of the indefatigable

missionaries of the Cross.[923] By their predecessors, these qualities

were disparaged rather than upheld. Resentment of injuries was applauded

as a virtue, and meekness was proclaimed a defect and a weakness. They

knew nothing of a forgiving spirit, and were strangers to the charity

"which endureth all things, hopeth all things, and never fails." The

enlarged philanthrophy which overleaps the bounds of kindred and

nationality, and embraces a common humanity in its compassionate regards

and benevolent efforts, was unknown. Socrates, the noblest of all the

Grecians, was in no sense cosmopolitan in his feeling. His whole nature

and character wore a Greek impress. He could scarce be tempted to go

beyond the gates of Athens, and his care was all for the Athenian

people. He could not conceive an universal philanthropy. Plato, in his

solicitude to reduce his ideal state to a harmonious whole, answering to

his idea of Justice, sacrificed the individual. He superseded private

property, broke up the sacred relations of family and home, degraded

woman, and tolerated slavery. Selfishness was to be overcome, and

political order maintained, by a rigid communism. To harmonize

individual rights and national interests, was the wisdom reserved for

the fishermen of Galilee. The whole method of Plato's "Politeia,"

breathes the spirit of legalism in all its severity, untempered by the

spirit of Love. This was the living force which was wanting to give

energy to the ideals of the reason and conscience, to furnish high

motive to virtue, to prompt to deeds of heroic sacrifice and suffering

for the good of others; and this could not be inspired by philosophy,

nor constrained by legislation. This love must descend from above. "The

Platonic love" was a mere intellectual appreciation of beauty, and

order, and proportion, and excellence. It was not the love of man as the

offspring and image of God, as the partaker of a common nature, and the

heir of a common immortality. Such love was first revealed on earth by

the incarnate Son of God, and can only be attained by human hearts under

the inspiration of his teaching and life, and the renewing influence of

the Holy Spirit. "Love is of God, and every one that loveth is born of

God and knoweth God." To "love our neighbor as ourself" is the golden

precept of the Son of God, who is incarnate Love. The equality of all

men as "the offspring of God" had been nominally recognized by the Stoic

philosophers; its realization had been rendered possible to the popular

thought by Roman conquest, law, and jurisprudence; these had prepared

the way for its fullest announcement and practical recognition by the

world. At this providential juncture St. Paul appears on Mars' Hill, and

in the presence of the assembled philosophers proclaims, "_God hath made

of one blood all nations of men_." A lofty ideal of moral excellence had

been attained by Plato--the conception of a high and inflexible

morality, which contrasted most vividly with the depravity which

prevailed in Athenian society. The education "of the public assemblies,

the courts, the theatres, or wherever the multitude gathered" was

unfavorable to virtue. And the inadequacy of all mere human teaching to

resist this current of evil, and save the young men of the age from

ruin, is touchingly and mournfully confessed by Plato. "There is not,

there never was, there never will be a moral education possible that can

countervail the education of which these are the dispensers; that is,

_human_ education: I except, with the proverb, that which is Divine.

And, truly, any soul that in such governments escapes the common wreck,

can only escape _by the special favor of heaven."_[924] He affirms again

and again that man can not by himself rise to purity and goodness.

"Virtue is not natural to man, neither is it to be learned, but it comes

to us by a divine influence. Virtue is the gift of God in those who

possess it."[925] That "gift of God" was about to be bestowed, in all

its fullness of power and blessing, "_through Jesus Christ our Lord_."

[Footnote 923: Seneca lived in the second century; Epictetus, in the

latter part of the first century.]

[Footnote 924: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. vi., vii.]

[Footnote 925: "Meno;" see conclusion.]

In the department of _religious feeling_ and _sentiment_, the

propædeutic office of Greek philosophy is seen, in general, in the

revealing of the immediate spiritual wants of the soul, and the distinct

presentation of the problem which Christianity alone can solve.

I. _It awakened in man the sense of distance and estrangement from God,

and the need of a Mediator--"a daysman betwixt us, that might lay his

hand upon us both_"[926]

[Footnote 926: Job ix. 33.]

During the period of unconscious and unreflective theism, the sentiment

of the Divine was one of objective nearness and personal intimacy. The

gods interposed directly in the affairs of men, and held frequent and

familiar intercourse with our race. They descend to the battle-field of

Troy, and mingle in the bloody strife. They grace the wedding-feast by

their presence, and heighten the gladness with celestial music. They

visit the poor and the stranger, and sometimes clothe the old and

shrivelled beggar with celestial beauty. They inspire their favorites

with strength and courage, and fill their mouths with wisdom and

eloquence. They manifest their presence by signs and wonders, by visions

and dreams, by auguries and prophetic voices. But more frequently than

all, they are seen in the ordinary phenomena of nature, the sunshine and

storm, the winds and tempests, the hail and rain. The natural is, in

fact, the supernatural, and all the changes of nature are the movement

and action of the Divine. The feeling of dependence is immediate and

universal, and worship is the natural and spontaneous act of man.

But the period of reflection is inevitable. Man turns his inquiring gaze

towards nature and desires, by an imperfect effort of physical

induction, to reach "the first principle and cause of things." Soon he

discovers the prevalence of uniformity in nature, the actions of

physical properties and agencies, and he catches some glimpses of the

reign of universal law. The natural tendency of this discovery is

obvious in the weakening of his sense of dependence on the immediate

agency of God. The Egyptians told Herodotus that, as their fields were

regularly irrigated by the waters of the Nile, they were less dependent

on God than the Greeks, whose lands were watered by rains, and who must

perish if Jupiter did not send them showers.[927] As man advances in the

field of mere physical inquiry, God recedes; from the region of

explained phenomena, he retires into the region of unexplained

phenomena--the border-land of mystery. The gods are driven from the

woods and streams, the winds and waves. Neptune does not absolutely

control the seas, nor Æolus the winds. The Divine becomes, no more a

physical archê--a nature-power, but a Supreme Mind, an ineffable Spirit,

an invisible God, the Supreme Essence of Essences, the Supreme Idea of

Ideas (eidos auto kath auto) apprehended by human reason alone, but

having an independent, eternal, substantial, personal being. Through the

instrumentality of Platonism, the idea of God becomes clearer and purer.

Man had learned that communion with the Divinity was something more than

an apotheosis of humanity, or a pantheistic absorption. He caught

glimpses of a higher and holier union. He had surrendered the ideal of a

national communion with God, and of personal protection through a

federal religion, and now was thrown back upon himself to find some

channel of personal approach to God. But alas! he could not find it. A

God so vastly elevated beyond human comprehension, who could only be

apprehended by the most painful effort of abstract thought; a God so

infinitely removed from man by the purity and rectitude of his

character; a God who was all pure reason, seemed alien to all the

yearnings and sympathies of the human heart; and such a God, dwelling in

pure light, seemed inapproachable and inacessible to man.[928] The

purifying of the religious idea had evoked a new ideal, and this ideal

was painfully remote. By the energy of abstract thought man had striven

to pierce the veil, and press into "the Holy of Holies," to come into

the presence of God, and he had failed. And he had sought by moral

discipline, by self-mortification, by inward purification, to raise

himself to that lofty plane of purity, where he might catch some

glimpses of the vision of a holy God, and still he failed. Nay, more, he

had tried the power of prayer. Socrates, and Plato, and Cleanthes had

bowed the knee and moved the lips in prayer. The emperor Aurelius, and

the slave Epictetus had prayed, and prayer, no doubt, intensified their

longing, and sharpened and agonized their desire, but it did not raise

them to a satisfying and holy _koinonia_ in the divine life. "It seems

to me"--said Plato--as Homer says of Minerva, that she removed the mist

from before the eyes of Diomede,

'That he might clearly see 'twixt Gods and men.'

so must he, in the first place, remove from your soul the mist that now

dwells there, and then apply those things through which you will be able

to know[929] and rightly pray to God.

[Footnote 927: Herodotus, vol. ii. bk. ii. ch. xiii. p. 14 (Rawlinson's

edition).]

[Footnote 928: "To discover the Maker and Father of the universe is a

hard task;.... to make him known to all is impossible."--"Timæus," ch.

ix.]

[Footnote 929: "Second Alcibiades," § 23.]

To develop this innate desire and "feeling after God" was the grand

design of providence in "fixing the times" of the Greek nation, and "the

boundaries of their habitation."[930] Man was brought, through a period

of discipline, to feel his need of a personal relation to God. He was

made to long for a realizing sense of his presence--to desire above all

things a Father, a Counsellor, and a Friend--a living ear into which he

might groan his anguish, or hymn his joy; and a living heart that could

beat towards him in compassion, and prompt immediate succor and aid. The

idea of a pure Spiritual Essence without form, and without emotion,

pervading all, and transcending all, is too vague and abstract to yield

us comfort, and to exert over us any persuasive power. "Our moral

weakness shrinks from it in trembling awe. The heart can not feed on

sublimities. We can not make a home of cold magnificence; we can not

take immensity by the hand."[931] Hence the need and the desire that God

shall condescendingly approach to man, and by some manifestation of

himself in human form, and through the sensibilities of the human heart,

commend himself to the heart of man--in other words, the need of an

_Incarnation_. Thus did the education of our race, by the dispensation

of philosophy, prepare the way for him who was consciously or

unconsciously "_the Desire of Nations_," and the deepening earnestness

and spiritual solicitude of the heathen world heralded the near approach

of Him who was not only "the Hope of Israel" but "the Saviour of the

world."

[Footnote 930: Acts xvii. 26, 27.]

[Footnote 931: Caird.]

The idea of an _Incarnation_ was not unfamiliar to human thought, it was

no new or strange idea to the heathen mind. The numberless metamorphoses

of Grecian mythology, the incarnations of Brahm, the avatars of Vishnu,

and the human form of Krishna had naturalized the thought.[932] So that

when the people of Lystra saw the apostles Paul and Barnabas exercising

supernatural powers of healing, they said, "The gods have come down to

us in the likeness of men!" and they called Barnabas Jupiter, and Paul,

Mercurius. The idea in its more definite form may have been, and indeed

was, communicated to the world through the agency of the dispersed Jews.

So that Virgil, the Roman poet, who was contemporary with Christ, seems

to re-echo the prophecy of Isaiah--

The last age decreëd by the Fates is come,

And a new frame of all things does begin;

A holy progeny from heaven descends

Auspicious in his birth, which puts an end

To the iron age, and from which shall arise

A golden age, most glorious to behold.

[Footnote 932: Young's "Christ of History," p. 248.]

II. _Finally, Greek philosophy prepared the way for Christianity by

awakening and deepening the consciousness of guilt, and the desire for

Redemption_.

The consciousness of sin, and the consequent need of expiation for sin,

were gradually unfolded in the Greek mind. The idea of sin was at first

revealed in a confused and indefinite feeling of some external,

supernatural, and bewildering influence which man can not successfully

resist; but yet so in harmony with the sinner's inclination, that he can

not divest himself of all responsibility. "Homer has no word answering

in comprehensiveness or depth of meaning to the word _sin_, as it is

used in the Bible..... The noun _amartia_ which is appropriated to

express this idea in the Greek of the New Testament, does not occur in

the Homeric poems..... The word which is most frequently employed to

express wrong-doing of every kind is _atê_, with its corresponding

verb..... The radical signification of the word seems to be a

befooling--a depriving one of his senses and his reason, as by

unseasonable sleep, and excess of wine, joined with the influence of

evil companions, and the power of destiny, or the deity. Hence, the

Greek imagination, which impersonated every great power, very naturally

conceived of Atê as a person, a sort of omnipresent and universal cause

of folly and sin, of mischief and misery, who, though the daughter of

Jupiter, yet once fooled or misled Jupiter himself, and thenceforth,

cast down from heaven to earth, walks with light feet over the heads of

men, and makes all things go wrong. Hence, too, when men come to their

senses, and see what folly and wrong they have perpetrated, they cast

the blame on Atê, and so, ultimately, on Jupiter and the gods."[933]

[Footnote 933: Tyler, "Theology of the Greek Poets," pp. 174, 175.]

"Oft hath this matter been by Greeks discussed,

And I their frequent censure have incurred:

Yet was not I the cause; but Jove, and Fate,

And gloomy Erinnys, who combined to throw

A strong delusion o'er my mind, that day

I robb'd Achilles of his lawful prize.

What could I do? a Goddess all o'erruled,

Daughter of Jove, dread Até, baleful power

Misleading all; with light step she moves,

Not on the earth, but o'er the heads of men.

With blighting touch, and many hath caused to err."[934]

And yet, though Agamemnon here attempts to shuffle off the guilt of his

transgression upon Até, Jove, and Fate, yet at other times he confesses

his folly and wrong, and makes no attempt to cast the responsibility on

the gods.[935] Though misled by a "baleful power," he was not compelled.

Though tempted by an evil goddess, he yet followed his own sinful

passions, and therefore he owns himself responsible.

To satisfy the demands of divine justice, to show its hatred of sin, and

to deter others from transgression, sin is punished. Punishment is the

penalty due to sin; in the language of Homer, it is the payment of a

debt incurred by sin. When the transgressor is punished he is said to

"pay off," or "pay back" his crimes; in other words, to expatiate or

atone for them.

"If not at once,

Yet soon or late will Jove assert their claim,

And heavy penalty the perjured pay

With their own blood, their children's, and their wives'."[936]

At the same time the belief is expressed that the gods may be, and often

are, propitiated by prayers and sacrifices, and thus the penalty is

remitted.

"The Gods themselves, in virtue, honor, strength,

Excelling thee, may yet be mollified;

For they when mortals have transgressed, or fail'd

To do aright, by sacrifice and pray'r,

Libations and burnt-off'rings, may be sooth'd."[937]

[Footnote 934: "Iliad," bk. xix. l. 91-101 (Lord Derby's translation).]

[Footnote 935: Ibid., bk. ix. l. 132-136.]

[Footnote 936: Ibid., bk. iv. l. 185-188.]

[Footnote 937: Ibid., bk. ix. l. 581-585.]

Polytheism, then, as Dr. Schaff has remarked, had the voice of

conscience, and a sense, however obscure, of sin. It felt the need of

reconciliation with deity, and sought that reconciliation by prayer,

penance, and sacrifice.[938]

The sense of the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and the absolute need of

expiation, is determined with increasing clearness and definiteness in

the tragic poets.

The first great law which the Tragedians recognize, as a law written on

the heart, is "that the sinner must suffer for his sins." The connection

between sin and suffering is constantly recognized as a natural and

necessary connection, like that between sowing and reaping.

A haughty spirit, blossoming, bears a crop

Of woe, and reaps a harvest of despair.[939]

"Lust and violence beget lust and violence, and vengeance too, at the

appointed time."[940] "Impiety multiplies and perpetuates itself."[941]

"The sinner pays the debt he contracted, ends the career that he

begins,"[942] "and drinks to the dregs the cup of cursing which he

himself had filled."[943] Conscience is the instrument in the hands of

Justice and Vengeance by which the Most High inflicts punishment. The

retributions of sin are "wrought out by God."

The consequences of great crimes, especially in high places, extend to

every person and every thing connected with them. "The country and the

country's gods are polluted."[944] "The army and the people share in the

curse."[945] "The earth itself is polluted with the shedding of

blood,"[946] "and even the innocent and the virtuous who share the

enterprises of the wicked may be involved in their ruin, as the pious

man must sink with the ungodly when he embarks in the same ship."[947]

[Footnote 938: Tyler, "Theology of the Greek Poets," p. 258.]

[Footnote 938: Æschylus, "Persæ," l. 821.]

[Footnote 940: "Agamemnon," l. 763.]

[Footnote 941: Ibid., l. 788.]

[Footnote 942: Ibid., l. 1529.]

[Footnote 943: Ibid., l. 1397.]

[Footnote 944: Ibid., l. 1645.]

[Footnote 945: "Persæ," _passim._]

[Footnote 946: "Sup.," 265.]

[Footnote 947: "Theb.," p. 602.]

The pollution and curse of sin, when once contracted by an individual,

or entailed upon a family, will rest upon them and pursue them till the

polluted individual or the hated and accursed race is extinct, unless in

some way the sin can be expiated, or some god interpose to arrest the

penalty. The criminal must die by the hand of justice, and even in Hades

vengeance will still pursue him.[948] Others may in time be washed away

by ablutions, worn away by exile and pilgrimage, and expiated by

offerings of blood.[949] But great crimes can not be washed away; "For

what expiation is there for blood when once it has fallen on the

ground."[950] Thus the law (_[Greek: nomos]_)--for so it is expressly

called--as from an Attic Sinai, rolls its reverberating thunders, and

pronounces its curses upon sin, from act to act and from chorus to

chorus of that grand trilogy--the "Agamemnon," the "Choephoroe," and the

"Eumenides."

[Footnote 948: "Sup.," l. 227.]

[Footnote 949: "Eum.," l. 445 seq.]

[Footnote 950: "Choeph.," l. 47.]

But after the law comes the gospel. First the controversy, then the

reconciliation. A dim consciousness of sin and retribution as a fact,

and of reconciliation as a _want_, seems to have revealed itself even in

the darkest periods of history. This consciousness underlies not a few

of the Greek tragedies. "The 'Prometheus Bound' was followed by the

'Prometheus Unbound,' reconciled and restored through the intervention

of Jove's son. The 'oedipus Tyrannus' of Sophocles was completed by the

'oedipus Colonus,' where he dies in peace amid tokens of divine favor.

And so the 'Agamemnon' and 'Choephoroe' reach their consummation only in

the 'Eumenides,' where the Erinyes themselves are appeased, and the

Furies become the gracious ones. This is not, however, without a special

divine interposition, and then only after a severe struggle between the

powers that cry for justice and those that plead for mercy."

The office and work which, in this trilogy, is assigned to Jove's son,

Apollo, must strike every reader as at least a remarkable resemblance,

if not a foreshadowing of the Christian doctrine of _reconciliation_.

"This becomes yet more striking when we bring into view the relation in

which this reconciling work stands to [Greek: Zeus Sôtêr], Jupiter

Saviour--[Greek: Zeus tritos], Jupiter the third, who, in connection

with Apollo and Athena, consummates the reconciliation. Not only is

Apollo a [Greek: Sôtêr], a Saviour, who, having himself been exiled from

heaven among men, will pity the poor and needy;[951] not only does

Athena sympathize with the defendant at her tribunal, and, uniting the

office of advocate and judge, persuade the avenging deities to be

appeased;[952] but Zeus is the beginning and end of the whole process.

Apollo appears as the advocate of Orestes only at her bidding;[953]

Athena inclines to the side of the accused, as the offspring of the

brain of Zeus, and of like mind with him."[954] Orestes, after his

acquittal, says that he obtained it

"By means of Pallas and of Loxias

And the third Saviour who doth all things sway."[955]

Platonism reveals a still closer affinity with Christianity in its

doctrine of sin, and its sense of the need of salvation. Plato is

sacredly jealous for the honor and purity of the divine character, and

rejects with indignation every hypothesis which would make God the

author of sin. "God, inasmuch as he is good, can not be the cause of all

things, as the common doctrine represents him to be. On the contrary, he

is the author of only a small part of human affairs; of the larger part

he is not the author; for our evil things far outnumber our good things.

The good things we must ascribe to God, whilst we must seek elsewhere,

and not in him, the causes of evil."[956] The doctrine of the poets,

which would in some way charge on the gods the errors of men, he sternly

resists. We must express our disapprobation of Homer, or any other poet,

if guilty of such foolish blunders about the gods as to tell us[957]

'Fast by the threshold of Jove's court are placed

Two casks, one stored with evil, one with good,'

And that he for whom the Thunderer mingles both

'He leads a life checker'd with good and ill.'

[Footnote 951: "Sup.," l. 214.]

[Footnote 952: "Eum.," l. 970.]

[Footnote 953: Ibid., l. 616.]

[Footnote 954: Ibid., l. 664, 737.]

[Footnote 955: Tyler's "Theology of the Greek Poets," especially ch. v.,

from which the above materials are drawn.]

[Footnote 956: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xviii.]

[Footnote 957: "Iliad," xxiv., l. 660.]

Nor can we let our young people know that, in the words of Æschylus--

"'When to destruction God will plague a house

He plants among the members guilt and sin.'"[958]

Whatever in the writings of Homer and the tragic poets give countenance

to the notion that God is, in the remotest sense the author of sin, must

be expunged. Here is clearly a great advance in ethical conceptions.

The great defect in the ethical system of Plato was the identification

of evil with the inferior or corporeal nature of man--"the irascible and

concupiscible elements," fashioned by the junior divinities. The

rational and immortal part of man's nature, which is derived immediately

from God--the Supreme Good, naturally chooses the good as its supreme

end and destination. Hence he adopted the Socratic maxim "that no man is

willingly evil," that is, no man deliberately chooses evil as evil, but

only as a _seeming_ good--he does not choose evil as an end, though he

may choose it voluntarily as a means. Plato manifests great solicitude

to guard this maxim from misconception and abuse. Man has, in his

judgment, the power to act in harmony with his higher reason, or

contrary to reason; to obey the voice of conscience or the clamors of

passion, and consequently he is the object of praise or blame, reward or

punishment. "When a man does not consider himself, but others, as the

cause of his own sins,.... and even seeks to excuse himself from blame,

he dishonors and injures his own soul; so, also, when contrary to

reason.... he indulges in pleasure, he dishonors it by filling it with

vice and remorse."[959] The work and effort of life, the end of this

probationary economy, is to make reason triumphant over passion, and

discipline ourselves to a purer and nobler life.

[Footnote 958: "Republic," bk. ii. ch, xviii., xix.]

[Footnote 959: "Laws," bk. v. ch. i.]

The obstacles to a virtuous life are, however, confessedly numberless,

and, humanly speaking, insurmountable. To raise one's self above the

clamor of passion, the power of evil, the bondage of the flesh, is

acknowledged, in mournful language, to be a hopeless task. A cloud of

sadness shades the brow of Plato as he contemplates the fallen state of

man. In the "Phædrus" he describes, in gorgeous imagery, the purity, and

beauty, and felicity of the soul in its anterior and primeval state,

when, charioteering through the highest arch of heaven in company with

the Deity, it contemplated the divine justice and beauty; but "this

happy life," says he, "we forfeited by our transgression." Allured by

strange affections, our souls forgot the sacred things that we were made

to contemplate and love--we _fell_. And now, in our fallen state, the

soul has lost its pristine beauty and excellence. It has become more

disfigured than was Glaucus, the seaman "whose primitive form was not

recognizable, so disfigured had he become by his long dwelling in the

sea."[960] To restore this lost image of the good,--to regain "this

primitive form," is not the work of man, but God. Man can not save

himself. "Virtue is not natural to man, neither is it to be learned, but

it comes by a divine influence. _Virtue, is the gift of God_."[961] He

needs a discipline, "an education which is divine." If he is saved from

the common wreck, it must be "by the special favor of Heaven."[962] He

must be delivered from sin, if ever delivered, by the interposition of

God.

[Footnote 960: "Republic," bk. x. ch. xi.]

[Footnote 961: "Meno."]

[Footnote 962: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. vi., vii.]

Plato was, in some way, able to discover the need of a Saviour, to

desire a Saviour, but he could not predict his appearing. Hints are

obscurely given of a Conqueror of sin, an Assuager of pain, an Averter

of evil in this life, and of the impending retributions of the future

life; but they are exceedingly indefinite and shadowy. In all instances

they are rather the language of _desire_, than of hope. Platonism

awakened in the heart of humanity a consciousness of sin and a profound

feeling of want--the want of a Redeemer from sin, a spiritual, a divine

Remedy for its moral malady--and it strove after some remedial power.

But it was equally conscious of failure and defeat. It could enlighten

the reason, but it could only act imperfectly on the will. Platonic was

a striking counterpart to Pauline experience prior to the apostle's

deliverance by the power and grace of Christ. It discovered that "the

Law is holy, and the commandment is holy, and just, and good." It

recognized that "it is spiritual, but man is carnal, the slave of sin."

It could say, "What I do I approve not; for I do not what I would, but

what I hate. But if my will [my better judgment] is against what I do, I

consent unto the Law that it is good. And now it is no more I that do

it, but sin, that dwelleth in me. For I know that in me, that is, in my

flesh, good abideth not, for to will is present with me, but the power

to do the right is absent: the good that I would, I do not; but the evil

that I would not, that I do. I consent gladly to the law of God in my

inner man ['the rational and immortal nature'[963]]; but I behold a law

in my members ['the irascible and concupiscible nature'[964]] warring

against the law of my mind (or reason), and bringing me into captivity

to the law of sin which is in my members. _Oh wretched man that I am!

who shall deliver me from the body of this death_?"[965] Paul was able

to say, "I thank God (that he hath now delivered me), through Jesus

Christ our Lord!" Platonism could only desire, and hope, and wait for

the coming of a Deliverer.

[Footnote 963: Plato.]

[Footnote 964: Ibid.]

[Footnote 965: Romans, vii.]

This consciousness of the need of supernatural light and help, and this

aspiration after a light supernatural and divine, which Plato inherited

from Socrates, constrained him to regard with toleration, and even

reverence, every apparent approach, every pretension, even, to a divine

inspiration and guidance in the age in which he lived. "'The greatest

blessings which men receive come through the operation of _phrensy_

([Greek: mania]--inspired exaltation), when phrensy is the gift of God.

The prophetess of Delphi, and the priestess of Dodona, many are the

benefits which in their phrensies (moments of inspiration) they have

bestowed upon Greece; but in their hours of self-possession, few or

none. And too long were it to speak of the Sibyl, and others, who,

inspired and prophetic, have delivered utterances beneficial to the

hearers. Indeed, this word phrenetic or maniac is no reproach; it is

identical with mantic--prophetic.[966] And often when diseases and

plagues have fallen upon men for the sins of their forefathers, some

phrensy too has broken forth, and in prophetic strain has pointed out a

remedy, _showing how the sin might be expiated, and the gods appeased_

(by prayers, and purifications, and atoning rites).... So many and yet

more great effects could I tell you of the phrensy which comes from the

gods."[967] Some have discerned in all this merely the food for a feeble

ridicule. They regard these sentiments as simply an evidence of the

power and prevalence of superstition clouding the loftiest intellects in

ancient times. By the more thoughtful and philosophic mind, however,

they will be accepted as an indication of the imperishable and universal

faith of humanity in a supernatural and supersensuous world, and in the

possibility of some communication between heaven and earth.[968] And

above all, it is a conclusive proof that Plato believed that the

knowledge of _salvation_--of a remedy for sin, a method of expiation for

sin, a means of deliverance from the power and punishment of sin, must

be revealed from Heaven.

[Footnote 966: [Greek: Mania], phrensy; _[Greek: pantis]_, a

prophet--one who utters oracles in a state of divine phrensy; _[Greek:

pantikê]_, the prophetic art.]

[Footnote 967: "Phædrus," § 47-50 (Whewell's translation).]

[Footnote 968: "_Vetus opinio est_, jam usque ab heroicis ducta

temporibus, eaque et populi Romani et _omnium gentium_ firmata consensu,

versari quandem inter homines divinationem."--Cicero, "De Divin.," i.

I.]

Paul, then, found, even in that focus of Paganism, the city of Athens,

religious aspirations tending towards Jesus Christ. A true philosophic

method, notwithstanding its shortcomings and imperfections, concluded by

desiring and seeking "the Unknown God," by demanding him from all forms

of worship, from all schools of philosophy. The great work of

preparation in the heathen world consisted in the developing of the

_desire_ for salvation. It proved that God is the great want of every

human soul; that there is a profound affinity between conscience and the

living God; and that Tertullian was right when he wrote the "Testimonium

Animæ naturaliter Christianæ."[969] And when it was sufficiently

demonstrated that "the world by philosophy knew not God (as a Redeeming

God and Saviour), then it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to

save them that believe." This was all a dispensation of divine

providence, which was determined by, or "in, the wisdom of God."[970]

The history of the religions and philosophies of human origin thus

becomes to us a striking confirmation of the truth of Christianity. It

shows there is a wondrous harmony between the instinctive wants and

yearnings of the human heart, as well as the necessary ideas and laws of

the reason, and the fundamental principles of revealed religion. There

is "a law written on the heart"--written by the finger of God, which

corresponds to the laws written by the same finger on "tables of stone."

There are certain necessary and immutable principles and ideas infolded

in the reason of man, which harmonize with the revelations of the

Eternal Logos in the written word.[971] There are instinctive longings,

mysterious yearnings of the human heart, to which that unveiling of the

heart of God which is made in the teaching and life of the incarnate God

most satisfyingly answers. Within the depths of the human spirit there

is an "oracle" which responds to the voice of "the living oracles of

God."

[Footnote 969: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ" (Introduction);

Neander, "Church History," vol. i. (Introduction).]

[Footnote 970: I Corinthians, i. 21.]

[Footnote 971: "The surmise of Plato, that the world of appearance

subsists in and by a higher world of Divine Thought, is confirmed by

Christianity when it tells us of a Divine subsistence--that Eternal Word

by whom and in whom all things consist."--Vaughan, "Hours with the

Mystics," vol. i. p. 213.]

Here, then, are two distinct and independent revelations--the unwritten

revelation which God has made to all men in the constitution of the

human mind, and the external written revelation which he has made in the

person and teaching of his Son. And these two are perfectly harmonious.

We have here two great volumes--the volume of conscience, and the volume

of the New Testament. We open them, and find they announce the _same_

truths--one in dim outline, the other in a full portraiture. There are

the same fundamental principles underlying both revelations. They both

bear the impress of _divinity_. The history of philosophy may have been

marked by many errors of interpretation; so, also, has the history of

dogmatic theology. Men may have often misunderstood and misinterpreted

the dictates of conscience; so have theologians misunderstood and

misinterpreted the dictates of revelation. The perversions of conscience

and reason have been plead in defense of error and sin; and so, for

ages, have the perversions of Scripture been urged in defense of

slavery, oppression, falsehood, and wrong. Sometimes the misunderstood

utterances of conscience, of philosophy, and of science have been

arrayed against the incorrect interpretations of the Word of God. But

when both are better understood, and more justly conceived, they are

found in wondrous harmony. When the New Testament speaks to man of God,

of duty, of immortality, and of retribution, man feels that its

teachings "commend themselves to his conscience" and reason. When it

speaks to him of redemption, of salvation, of eternal life and

blessedness, he feels that it meets and answers all the wants and

longings of his heart. Thus does Christianity throw light upon the

original revelations of God in the human conscience, and answers all the

yearnings of the human soul. So it is found in individual experiences,

so it has been found in the history of humanity. As Leverrier and Adams

were enabled to affirm, from purely mathematical reasoning, that another

planet must exist beyond _Uranus_ which had never yet been seen by human

eyes, and then, afterwards, that affirmation was gloriously verified in

the discovery of _Neptune_ by the telescope of Galle; so the reasonings

of ancient philosophy, based on certain necessary laws of mind, enabled

man to affirm the existence of a God, of the soul, of a future

retribution, and an eternal life beyond the grave; and, then,

subsequently, these were brought fully into light, and verified by the

Gospel.

We conclude in the words of Pressensé: "To isolate it from the past,

would be to refuse to comprehend the nature of Christianity itself, and

the extent of its triumphs. Although the Gospel is not, as has been

affirmed, the product of anterior civilizations--a mere compound of

Greek and Oriental elements--it is not the less certain that it brings

to the human mind the satisfaction vainly sought by it in the East as in

the West. _Omnia subito_ is not its device, but that of the Gnostic

heresy. Better to say, with Clement of Alexandria and Origen, that the

night of paganism had its stars to light it, but that they called to the

Morning-star which stood over Bethlehem."

"If we regard philosophy as a preparation for Christianity, instead of

seeking in it a substitute for the Gospel, we shall not need to

overstate its grandeur in order to estimate its real value."

CONTENTS.

A.

Abstraction, comparative and immediate, 187-189; 362-364.

Æschylus, his conception of the Supreme Divinity, 146;

his recognition of human guilt, and need of expiation, 515-517.

Ætiological proof of the existence of God, 487-489.

Anaxagoras, an Eclectic, 311;

in his physical theory an Atomist, 312;

taught that the Order of the universe can only be explained by

Intelligence, 312;

his psychology, 313;

the teacher of Socrates, 313.

Anaximander, his first principle _the infinite_, 290;

his infinite a chaos of primary elements, 290.

Anaximenes, a vitalist, 286;

his first principle _air_, 287.

Aristotle, his opinion of the popular polytheism of Greece, 157;

his classification of causes, 280, 404, 405;

his misrepresentations of Pythagoras, 299;

his classification of the sciences, 389;

his Organon, 389-394;

his Logic, 394-403;

his Theology, 404-417;

his Ethics, 417-421;

his Categories, 395;

his logical treatises, 396;

on induction and deduction, 396-398;

his psychology, 398, 401;

on how the knowledge of first principles is attained, 394, 402,

403;

on Matter and Form, 405-408;

on Potentiality and Actuality, 408-412;

his proof of the Divine existence, 412-415;

on the chief good of man, 419, 420;

his doctrine of the Mean, 420, 421;

defect of his ethical system, 505.

[Archai], or first principles, the grand object of

investigation in Greek Philosophy, 271, 274, 279, 280.

Athenians, criticism on Plutarch's sketch of their character, 45;

their vivacity, 45;

love of freedom, 46--and of country, 46;

private life of, 47;

intellectual character of, 48;

inquisitive and analytic, 48;

rare combinations of imagination and reasoning powers, 49;

religion of, 98;

the Athenians a religious people, 102;

their faith in the being and providence of God, 107;

their consciousness of dependence on God, 110, 116;

their religious emotions, 117;

their deep consciousness of sin and guilt, 122-124;

their sense of the need of expiation, 124, 125;

their religion exerted some wholesome moral influence, 162, 163.

Athens, topography of 27;

the Agora, 28;

its porticoes, 29;

the Acropolis, 30;

its temples, 31;

the Areopagus, 33;

sacred objects in, 98, 99;

images of the gods, 99;

localities of schools of philosophy in, 266-268.

Attica, geographical boundaries of, 26;

a classic land, 34;

its geographical and cosmical conditions providentially ordained

for great moral ends, 34, 35; soil of, not favorable to

agriculture, 40--necessitated industry and frugality, 41; the

climate of, 41--its influence on the mental character of the

people, 42.

B.

Bacon, his assertion that the search after final causes had misled

scientific inquirers, 222.

C.

Categories of Aristotle, 395.

Causality, principle of, 189;

assailed by the Materialists, 194--especially by Comte, 203-209;

the intuition of _power_ a fact of immediate consciousness, 204;

consciousness of _effort_ the type of all force, 211;

Aristotle on Causality, 413;

ætiological proof of existence of God, 487-489.

Cause, origin of the idea of, 204, 205.

Causes, Aristotle's classification of, 280, 404, 405.

Chief good of man, Aristotle on, 419, 420.

Cleanthes, his hymn to Jupiter, 452, 453.

Comte, his theory of the origin of religion, 57-65;

his doctrine that all knowledge is confined to material

phenomena, 203; denies all causation, both efficient and final,

203-214.

Conditioned, law of the, 227, 228;

is contradictory, 250;

as a ground of faith, meaningless and void, 251.

Cosmological proof of the existence of God, 489, 490.

Cousin, his theory that religion had its outbirth in the

spontaneous apperceptions

of reason, 78-84;

criticism thereon, 84-86.

Criterion of truth, Plato's search after, 333, 334.

Cudworth, his interpretation of Grecian mythology, 139, 143.

Cuvier, on final causes, 216, 222.

D.

Darwin, his inability to explain the facts of nature without

recognizing design, 221, 222.

Democritus, taught that atoms and the vacuum are the beginning of

all things, 292; an absolute materialist, 293.

Dependence, consciousness of, the foundation of primary religious

emotions, 110-113.

Development, law of mental, 478; three successive stages clearly

marked, in the individual, 478--in the universal mind of

humanity, 479, 480;

(1) in the field of Theistic conceptions, 481-494;

(2) in the department of morals, 495-509;

(3) in the department of religious sentiment, 509-522.

Dialectic of Plato, 353-369.

Dogmatic Theologians, assert that all our knowledge of God is

derived from the teaching of the Scriptures, 86,167; cast doubt

upon the principle of causality, 253-255--upon the principle of

the unconditioned, 255-257--upon the principle of unity,

258-261--and upon the immutable principles of morality, 261-263.

Dynamical or Vital school of ancient philosophers, 282-289.

E.

Eclecticism of Anaxagoras, 311.

Emotions, the religious, 117-122;

sentiment of the Divine exists in all minds, 119-121;

also instinctive yearning after the Invisible, 121, 122.

Empedocles, a believer in one Supreme God, 153.

Epicurus, his theory of the origin of religion, 56, 57;

his Ethics, 427-432;

his Physics, 433-438;

taught that pleasure is the chief end of life, 428--that

ignorance of nature is the sole cause of unhappiness, 432--that

Physics and Psychology are the only studies conducive to

happiness, 432--that the universe is eternal and infinite,

433--that concrete bodies are combinations of atoms, 434--that

atoms have spontaneity, 436, and some degree of freedom, 436,

437; the parts of the world self-formed, 437, 438; plants,

animals, and man are spontaneously generated, 438; a state of

savagism the primitive condition of man, 439; his Atheism, 441;

his Psychology, 442-444; the soul material and mortal, 445, 446.

Eternity, Platonic notion of, 349 (_note_), 372, 373.

Eternity of Matter, how taught by Plato, 371-373;

distinctly affirmed by Epicurus, 433.

Eternity of the Soul, Plato's doctrine of, 373-375.

Ethical ideas and principles, gradual development of, 495, 496;

(1) the age of popular and unconscious morals, 497, 498;

(2) the transitional or sophistical age, 498-500;

(3) the philosophic or conscious age, 500-506.

Ethics of Plato, 383-387, 502-505;

of Aristotle, 417-42l;

of Epicurus, 427-432;

of the Stoics, 454, 456.

Expiation for sin, the need of, 124;

universally acknowledged, 124--especially in Grecian mythology,

125--and in the language of Greece and Rome, 125.

F.

Facts of the universe, classification of, 175-177.

Fathers, the early, recognized the propædeutic office of Greek

philosophy, 473-475.

Feeling, theories which ground all religion on, 70-74;

its inadequacy, 74-78.

Final Causes, impossibility of interpreting nature without

recognizing, 221, 222;

the assumption of final causes a means of discovery, 222, 223;

Cuvier on, 216, 222;

argument of Socrates from, 320-324;

Plato on, 380-382;

Aristotle on, 405, 413, 414;

teleological proof of the existence of God, 490, 491.

Force, the idea of, rejected by Comte, 207.

Forces, all of one type, and that type mind, 211.

Freedom, human, 19;

exists under limitations, 20;

both admitted and denied by Comte, 208, 209;

of Will, as taught by Plato, 386, 387;

admitted by Epicurus, 486.

G.

Geoffrey St. Hilaire, his pretense of not ascribing any intentions

to nature, 216, 217.

Geography and History, relations between, 14;

opposite theories concerning, 15;

theory of Buckle, 16--of Ritter, Guyot, and Coubin, 16;

the relation one of adjustment and harmony, 16.

God, universality of idea of, 89;

Athenians believed in one God, 107, 147, 148;

idea of God a common phenomenon of human intelligence, 168, 169;

the development of this idea dependent on experience conditions,

169-172; the phenomena of the universe demand a God for their

explanation, 172-175: there are principles revealed in

consciousness which necessitate the idea of God, 184-189; proofs

of the existence of God employed by Aristotle, 412-416--by

Socrates, 320-324; views of God entertained by the Stoics, 452,

453; logical proofs of the existence of God developed by Greek

philosophy, 487-494; gradual development of Theistic conception,

481-487.

Gods of Grecian Mythology, how regarded by the philosophers,

151-157; views of Plato regarding them, 383.

Great men, represent the spirit of their age, 20;

the creation of a providence interposing in history, 21.

Greece, its geographical relations favorable to free intercourse

with the great historic nations, 35--to commerce, 36--to the

diffusion of knowledge, 36--and to a high degree of civilization,

36; peculiar configuration of Greece conducive to activity and

freedom, 36-38--and independence, 38; natural scenery, 43--its

influence on imagination and taste, 44.

Greek Civilization, a preparation for Christianity, 465-468.

Greek Language, a providentially prepared vehicle for the perfect

revelation of Christianity, 468-470.

Greek Philosophy, first a philosophy of Nature, 271, 281, 282;

next a philosophy of Mind, 271, 316-318;

lastly a philosophy of Life, 271, 422;

prepared the way for Christianity, 457-522.

Greeks, the masses of the people believed in one Supreme God, 147,

148.

Guilt, consciousness of, a universal fact, 122, 123;

recognized in Grecian mythology, 123, 124;

awakened and deepened by philosophy, 513-518.

H.

Hamilton, Sir W., teaches that philosophic knowledge is the

knowledge of effects as dependent on causes, 224, 225;

and of qualities as inherent in substances, 225, 226;

and yet asserts all human knowledge is necessarily confined to

phenomena, 227;

his doctrine of the relativity of all knowledge, 227, 229-236;

his philosophy of the conditioned, 228;

conditional limitation the law of all thought, 236-242;

the Infinite a mere negation of thought, 242-246;

asserts we must believe in the infinity of God, 246;

takes refuge in faith, 247;

faith grounded on the law of the conditioned, 243, 249--that is,

on contradiction, 249, 250.

Hegel, his philosophy of religion, 65-70.

Heraclitus, his first principle _ether_, 288;

change, the universal law of all existence, 288;

a Materialistic Pantheist, 289.

Hesiod, on the generation of the gods, 142.

Homer, his conception of Zeus, 144, 145.

Homeric doctrine of sin, 513,514.

Homeric theology, 143-145, 509, 510.

Humanity, fundamental ideas and laws of, 18;

developed and modified by exterior conditions, 19;

the most favorable conditions existed in Athens.

I.

Idealism, furnishes no adequate explanation of the common belief

in an external world, 193,199--and of a personal self, 200-202;

Cosmothetic Idealism, 305;

absolute Idealism, 305.

Ideas, Platonic doctrine of, 334-337;

Platonic scheme of, 364-367.

Images of the gods, how regarded by Cicero, 129--by Plutarch, 129;

the heathens apologized for the use of images, 159.

Immortality of the soul, taught by Socrates, 324--and by Plato,

375, 376; denied by Epicurus, 444-446.

Incarnation, the idea of, not unfamiliar to heathen thought, 512.

Induction, the psychological method of Plato, 356, 357.

Induction and Deduction, Aristotle on, 397, 398.

Infinite, the, not a mere negation of thought, 242-244;

known as the necessary correlative of the finite, 245;

as comprehensible in itself, as the finite is comprehensible in

itself, 246;

in what sense known, 252.

Infinite Series, the phrase, when literally construed, a

contradiction, 181,182.

Infinity, qualitative and quantitative, 239;

qualitative infinity possessed by God alone, 184, 239.

Intentionality, principle of, 190;

denied by Materialists, 194;

a first law of thought, 221-223; recognized by Socrates, 320-324.

Ionian School of Philosophy, a physical and sensational school,

281; subdivided into Mechanical and Dynamical, 282, 283.

Italian School of Philosophy, an Idealist school, 281;

subdivided into the Mathematical and Metaphysical, 282, 296.

J.

Jacobi, his faith-philosophy, 71.

K.

Knowledge, Hamilton's doctrine of relativity of, 229-236;

opposite theories of knowledge among ancient philosophers, 330,

331; the tendency of these theories, 332;

Plato's theory of, 333, 334;

Plato's science of real knowledge, 337, 338.

L.

Language, inadequate to convey the idea of God, 92-94;

Greek language the best medium for the Christian revelation,

468-470.

Leucippus, his first principles _atoms_ and _space_, 291;

a pure Materialist, 292.

Logic of Aristotle, 394-403.

Logical Treatises of Aristotle, 395, 396.

Lucretius, the expounder of the doctrines of Epicurus, 426,427;

his account of the origin of worlds, 437, 438;

of plants, animals, and man, 438.

M.

Mansel, bases religion on feeling of dependence, 72--and sense of

obligation, 73.

Materialists deny the principle of causality, 194, 203--and of

intentionality or final cause, 211-225;

Anaximander, Leucippus, and Democritus belong to the

materialistic school, 286-293:

Epicurus a materialist, 442-446.

Mathematical Infinite, not absolute, 179, 180;

capable of exact measurement, therefore limited, 180;

infinite sphere, radius, line, etc., self-contradictory, 180,

181.

Matter, did Plato teach the eternity of? 371-373;

the doctrine of the Stoics concerning matter, 449 (_note_).

Matter and Form, Aristotle on, 405-408.

Mean, Aristotle's doctrine of the, 420.

Mediator, consciousness of the need of a, awakened by Greek

philosophy, 509-513.

Metaphysical thought, law of its development, 478-480;

three different stages in the individual mind, 478, 479;

and in the universal consciousness of our race, 479.

Metempsychosis regarded by Plato as a mere hypothesis, 376

(_note_).

Mill, J. S., his doctrine that all knowledge is confined to mental

phenomena, 193;

his definition of matter, 196;

his views of personal identity, 196, 197;

his theological opinions, 197.

Miracles, not designed to prove the existence of God, 95.

Moral principles, universal and immutable, which lead to the

recognition of a God, 190;

the Dogmatic Theologians seek to invalidate the argument

therefrom, 261-263.

Mystics, base all religious knowledge on internal feeling, 70.

Mythology, philosophy of Greek, 134-139;

Cudworth's interpretation of, 139-143;

recognized the consciousness of guilt and need of expiation,

123-125.

N.

National Character, a complex result, 17;

conjoint effect of moral and physical influences, 17;

human freedom not to be disregarded in the study of, 20;

influence of geographical surroundings, 23--of climate and

natural scenery, on the pursuits and mental character of nations,

23--on creative art, 24--and literature of nations, 25.

Nations, individuality of, 22;

determined mainly from without, 22.

Natural Realism, 305;

Anaxagoras a natural realist, 311-313.

Nature, interpreted by man according to fundamental laws of his

reason, 133.

O.

Obligation, the sense of, lies at the foundation of religion, 115.

Ontological proof of the existence of God, 491-493.

Ontology, of Plato, 369-379;

the subject-matter of the world of sense, 370-373;

the permanent substratum of mental phenomena, 373-376;

the first Principle of all principles--God, 377-379, 491-493.

Optimism of Plato, 382.

Order of the Universe, had it a beginning, or is it eternal?

178-184.

Order, principle of, pervades the universe, 220, 221;

recognized by Pythagoras, 301;

Cosmological proof of the existence of God, 489, 490.

P.

Parmenides, his theory of knowledge, 307-308;

a spiritualistic Pantheist, 308, 309.

Paul, St., at Athens, 14;

his emotion when he saw the city full of idols, 100;

the subject of his discourse, 101;

brought into contact with all the phases of philosophic thought,

268, 269;

his arrival at Athens an epoch in the moral history of the world,

472;

he recognized the preparatory office of Greek philosophy, 473.

Philosophers of Athens, 101;

believed in one supreme, uncreated, eternal God, 151-157;

their views of the mythological deities, 158, 159;

their apologies for images and image-worship, 159, 160.

Philosophic Schools, classification of, 271-273;

Pre-Socratic 280-314;

Socratic, 314-421;

Post-Socratic, 422-456.

Philosophy, the world-enduring monument of the glory of Athens,

265, 260;

defined, 270, 271;

an inquiry after first causes and principles, 271, 457;

not in any proper sense a theological inquiry, 273-277, 279;

the love of wisdom, 384, 385.

Philosophy in its relation to Christianity, 268-270;

sympathy of Platonism, 268;

antagonism of Epicureanism and Stoicism, 269;

the Propædeutic office of philosophy, 457-524--recognized by St.

Paul, 473--and many of the early Fathers, 473-475;

philosophy undermined Polytheism, and purified the Theistic idea,

481-487;

developed the Theistic argument in a logical form, 487-494;

it awakened Conscience and purified the Ethical idea, 495-506;

demonstrated the insufficiency of reason to elaborate a perfect

ideal of moral excellence, 506-509;

awakened in man the sense of distance from God, and the need of

a Mediator, 509-513;

deepened the consciousness of sin, and the desire for a Redeemer,

513-522;

the history of philosophy a confirmation of the truth of

Christianity, 522-524.

Philosophy of Religion, 53;

based on the correlation between Divine and human reason,

458-462.

Plato, condemns the poets for their unworthy representations of

the gods, 130-132;

his views of the gods of Grecian mythology, 154-157:

the sympathy of his philosophy with Christianity, 268:

followed the philosophic method of Socrates, 328;

his moral qualifications for the study of philosophy, 328, 329;

his literary qualifications, 329, 330;

his search after a criterion of truth, 333, 334;

his doctrine of Ideas, 334-337;

his science of real knowledge, 337, 338;

his answer to the question, What is Science? 338, 339;

his Psychology 339-352;

his scheme of the intellectual powers, 345;

on the nature of the soul, 350;

his dialectic, 353-369;

his grand scheme of ideas, 364-367;

his Ontology, 369-379;

on the creation of time, 372;

did he teach that matter is eternal? 371, 372;

on the eternity of the rational element of the soul, 373-375;

on the immortality of the soul, 375, 376;

on God as the First Principle of all principles, 377-379;

his Physics, 380-383;

his Ethics, 383-387, 502-505;

defects of his

ethical system, 518;

his philosophy not derived from Jewish sources, 476;

felt the need of a superhuman deliverer from sin and guilt,

519-521.

Plutarch, his sketches of Athenian character, 44;

criticism on, 45;

on the universality of prayer and sacrifice, 115.

Poets, the Greek, believed in the existence of one uncreated Mind,

141;

their theogony was a cosmogony, 142;

the theologians of Greece, 274, 275.

Polytheism, Greek, a poetico-historical religion of myth and

symbol, 134;

its immoralities, 160, 161;

undermined by Philosophy, 484-487.

Post-Socratic Schools, classification of, 425;

a philosophy of life, 422-424.

Potentiality and Actuality, Aristotle on, 408-412.

Prayer, natural to man, 115.

Preparation for Christianity, not confined to Judaism alone,

464, 465;

Greek civilization also prepared the way for Christ, 465-468;

Greek language a providential development as the vehicle of a

more perfect revelation, 468-470;

Greek philosophy fulfilled a propædeutic office, 470-472.

Pre-Socratic Schools, classification of, 280-282; 295, 296.

Principles, _universal and necessary_, how attained by the method

of Plato, 361-364, 390;

how, by the method of Aristotle, 390-394, 402, 403.

Psychological analysis, logical demonstration of the existence of

God begins with, 170;

reveals principles which in their logical development attain to

the knowledge of God, 184-189.

Psychology of Heraclitus, 289;

of Pythagoras, 304;

of Parmenides, 307, 308;

of Anaxagoras, 313;

of Protagoras, 315;

of Socrates, 317, 318;

of Plato, 339-352;

of Aristotle, 392, 398-401;

of Epicurus, 442-444;

of the Stoics, 453, 454.

Pythagoras, his doctrine that numbers are the first principles of

things, 297;

how to be interpreted, 297-304;

misrepresented by Aristotle, 298-300;

psychology of, 304.

R.

Reason, insufficiency of, to elaborate a perfect ideal of moral

excellence, 505-509.

Redemption, desire of, awakened and defined by Greek philosophy,

513-521.

Relativity of all knowledge, Hamilton's doctrine of, 229-236.

Religion, the philosophy of, 53;

defined 53, 106;

universality of religious phenomena, 54;

hypothesis offered in explanation of, 55;

hypothesis of Epicurus and Comte, 56-65--of Hegel, 65-70--of

Jacobi and Schleiermacher, 70-78--of Cousin, 78-86--of Dogmatic

Theologians, 86-96--author's theory, 96, 97;

religion of the Athenians, 98--its mythological and symbolic

aspects, 128--exerted some wholesome influences, 161-163.

Reminiscence, Plato on, 354, 355.

Revelation, progressive, 462-464;

harmony of the two revelations in the volume of conscience and

the volume of the New Testament, 522-524.

S.

Sacrifice, universal prevalence of, 115, 124;

prompted by the universal consciousness of guilt, 126:

expiatory sacrifices grounded on a primitive revelation, 127.

Schleiermacher, his theory that all religion is grounded on the

feeling of absolute dependence, 71, 72.

Science, Plato's answer to the question, What is Science? 338, 339.

Self-determination, limited by idea of duty, 113;

implies accountability, 114;

recognizes a Lawgiver and Judge, 115.

Socrates, his desire for truth, 316;

his dæmon, 317 _(note_);

his philosophic method, 318, 319;

a believer in one Supreme God, 320;

his argument for the existence of God from final causes, 320-324;

his belief in immortality and a future retribution, 324, 325;

his Ethics, 325;

the great prophet of the human conscience, 500-502.

Socratic School, 314.

Sophists, 315, 316;

their skeptical tendency, 315;

their defective ethics, 498, 499.

Sophocles, believed in one Supreme God, 147.

Soul, Plato on the nature of the, 350, 373;

eternity of the rational element, 373-375.

Spencer, H., carries the law of the Conditioned forward to its

logical consequences, Atheism, 241, 242.

Stoical School, 446;

its philosophy a moral philosophy, 447.

Stoics, their Physiology, 448-453; their

Psychology, 453, 454;

their Ethics, 454-456;

their Theology, 452,453.

Substance, principle of, 189;

Idealism seeks to undermine it, 193;

Reason affirms a permanent substance as the ground of all mental

phenomena, 201--and of the phenomena of the sensible world,

202, 203.

Sufficient Reason, law of, recognized by Plato, 359.

Superstition, meaning of the term as used by Paul, 103.

T.

Teleological proof of the existence of God, 490, 491.

Thales, a believer in one uncreated God, 152;

his first principles, 283;

he regards _water_ as the material cause, 284;

and God as the efficient cause, 285.

Theistic argument, in its logical form, 487-494.

Theistic conception, gradual development of, 481-484,

Theological opinions of the early periods of Greek civilization,

150, 151; 276-278.

Theology of Aristotle, 404-417;

identical with Metaphysics, 404, 416.

Theology of the Greek poets, 143-151;

proposed reform of Poetry by Plato, 131, 132.

Thinking, conditionality of, 228;

in what sense to be understood, 237;

thought imposes no limits upon the object of thought, 237, 238.

Thought, negative and positive, 242, 243;

negative thought an impossibility, 243;

all thought must be positive, 243.

Time, Platonic notion of, 371, 372.

Tragedians, the Greek, were the public religious teachers of the

Athenians, 145;

their theology, 146, 147;

influence of the religious dramas on the Athenian mind, 161-163;

guiltiness of man, and need of reconciliation confessed by,

515-517.

U.

Unconditioned, principle of, 189;

assailed by Hamilton, 194.

Unity of God, 259;

an affirmation of reason, 259-261;

Xenophanes taught the unity of God, 307--also Parmenides,

309--and Plato, 377--and Aristotle, 415.

Unity, principle of, 189;

attempt of Dogmatic Theologians to prove its insufficiency, 194,

258-261;

recognized by Pythagoras, 296;

his effort to reduce all the phenomena of nature to a Unity, 303,

304.

Universal and necessary Principles, classification of, 189, 190;

these the foundation of our cognition of a God, 191;

how attained according to Plato, 360-364;

how by the method of Aristotle, 390-394, 402, 403.

Universe, the, is it finite or infinite? 178-184;

Epicurus teaches that it is infinite, 433.

Unknown God, the true God, 104;

God not absolutely unknown, 107-110;

classification of opponents to the doctrine that God can be

cognized by reason, 166-168;

Idealist School of Mill, 194-203;

Materialistic School of Comte, 203-223;

Hamiltonian School, 224-252;

School of Dogmatic Theologians, 252-263.

W.

Watson, Richard, represents the views of Dogmatic Theologians 86;

asserts that all our religious knowledge is derived from oral

revelation, 86-88, 167;

incompleteness and inadequacy of this theory, 88-96;

in vindicating for the Scriptures the honor of revealing all our

knowledge of God, he casts doubt upon the principle of Causality,

253-255--on the principle of the Unconditioned, 255-257--on the

principle of Unity, 258-261--and on the immutable principles of

Morality, 261-263.

Wordsworth, on the Sentiment of the Divine, 118.

X.

Xenophanes, his attack on Polytheism, 130;

his faith in one God, 153, 306, 307.

Z.

Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoical School, 446;

a Spiritualistic Pantheist, 450, 451.

Zeno of Elea, maintained the doctrine of Absolute Identity, 309.

Zeus, originally the Supreme and only God of the Greeks, 143;

the Homeric Zeus, the Supreme God, 144, 145.

THE END.

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Christianity and Greek Philosophy or, the relation between spontaneous and reflective thought in Greece and the positive teaching of Christ and His Apostles · 第 15 / 15 章