CHAPTER VII.

THE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_).

IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON? (_continued_).

"The faith which can not stand unless buttressed by

contradictions is built upon the sand. The profoundest faith

is faith in the unity of truth. If there is found any

conflict in the results of a right reason, no appeal to

practical interests, or traditionary authority, or

intuitional or theological faith, can stay the flood of

skepticism."--ABBOT.

In the previous chapter we have considered the answers to this question

which are given by the Idealistic and Materialistic schools; it devolves

upon us now to review (iii.) the position of the school of _Natural

Realism_ or _Natural Dualism_, at the head of which stands Sir William

Hamilton.

It is admitted by this school that philosophic knowledge is "the

knowledge of effects as dependent on their causes,"[278] and "of

qualities as inherent in substances."[279]

[Footnote 278: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 58.]

[Footnote 279: Ibid., vol. i. p. 138.]

1. _As to Events and Causes_.--"Events do not occur isolated, apart, by

themselves; they occur and are conceived by us only in connection. Our

observation affords us no example of a phenomenon which is not an

effect; nay, our thought can not even realize to itself the possibility

of a phenomenon without a cause. By the necessity we are under of

thinking some cause for every phenomenon, and by our original ignorance

of what particular causes belong to what particular effects, it is

rendered impossible for us to acquiesce in the mere knowledge of the

fact of the phenomenon; on the contrary, we are determined, we are

necessitated to regard each phenomenon as _only partially known until we

discover the causes_ on which it depends for its existence.[280]

Philosophic knowledge is thus, in its widest acceptation, the knowledge

of effects as dependent on causes. Now what does this imply? In the

first place, as every cause to which we can ascend is only an effect, it

follows that it is the scope, that is, the aim, of philosophy to trace

up the series of effects and causes until we arrive at _causes which are

not in themselves effects_,"[281]--that is, to ultimate and final

causes. And then, finally, "Philosophy, as the knowledge of effects in

their causes, necessarily tends, not towards a plurality of ultimate or

final causes, but towards _one_ alone."[282]

[Footnote 280: Ibid., vol. i. p. 56.]

[Footnote 281: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 58.]

[Footnote 282: Ibid., vol. i. p. 60.]

2. _As to Qualities and Substance, or Phenomena and Reality_.--As

phenomena appear only in conjunction, we are compelled, by the

constitution of our nature, to think them conjoined in and by something;

and as they are phenomena, we can not think them phenomena of nothing,

but must regard them as properties or qualities of something.[283] Now

that which manifests its qualities--in other words, that in which the

appearing causes inhere, that to which they belong--is called their

_subject_, or _substance_, or _substratum_.[284] The subject of one

grand series of phenomena (as, _e.g._, extension, solidity, figure,

etc.) is called _matter_, or _material substance_. The subject of the

other grand series of phenomena (as, _e.g._, thought, feeling, volition,

etc.) is termed _mind_, or _mental substance_. We may, therefore, lay it

down as an undisputed truth that consciousness gives, as an ultimate

fact, a primitive duality--a knowledge of the _ego_ in relation and

contrast to the _non-ego_, and a knowledge of the _non-ego_ in relation

and contrast to the _ego_[285] Natural Dualism thus establishes the

existence of two worlds of _mind_ and _matter_ on the immediate

knowledge we possess of both series of phenomena; whilst the Cosmothetic

Idealists discredit the veracity of consciousness as to our immediate

knowledge of material phenomena, and, consequently, our _immediate

knowledge of the existence of matter_.[286]

[Footnote 283: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.]

[Footnote 284: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.]

[Footnote 285: Ibid., vol. i. p. 292.]

[Footnote 286: Ibid., vol. i. pp. 292, 295.]

The obvious doctrine of the above quotations is, that we have an

immediate knowledge of the "_existence_ of matter" as well as of "the

_phenomena_ of matter;" that is, we know "_substance_" as immediately

and directly as we know "_qualities_." Phenomena are known only as

inherent in substance; substance is known only as manifesting its

qualities. We never know qualities without knowing substance, and we can

never know substance without knowing qualities. Both are known in one

concrete act; substance is known quite as much as quality; quality is

known no more than substance. That we have a direct, immediate,

presentative "face to face" knowledge of matter and mind in every act of

consciousness is asserted again and again by Hamilton, in his

"Philosophy of Perception."[287] In the course of the discussion he

starts the question, "_Is the knowledge of mind and matter equally

immediate?_" His answer to this question may be condensed in the

following sentences. In regard to the immediate knowledge of _mind_

there is no difficulty; it is admitted to be direct and immediate. The

problem, therefore, exclusively regards the intuitive perception of the

qualities of _matter_. Now, says Hamilton, "if we interrogate

consciousness concerning the point in question, the response is

categorical and clear. In the simplest act of perception I am conscious

of _myself_ as a perceiving _subject_, and of an external _reality_ as

the object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in the same

indivisible amount of intuition."[288] Again he says, "I have frequently

asserted that in perception we are conscious of the external object,

immediately and _in itself_." "If, then, the veracity of consciousness

be unconditionally admitted--_if the intuitive knowledge of matter and

mind_, and the consequent reality of their antithesis, be taken as

truths," the doctrine of Natural Realism is established, and, "without

any hypothesis or demonstration, the _reality of mind_ and the _reality

of matter_."[289]

[Footnote 287: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, part ii.]

[Footnote 288: Ibid., p. 181.]

[Footnote 289: Ibid., pp. 34, 182.]

Now, after these explicit statements that we have an intuitive knowledge

of matter and mind--a direct and immediate consciousness of self as a

real, "self-subsisting entity," and a knowledge of "an external reality,

immediately and _in itself_," it seems unaccountably strange that

Hamilton should assert "_that all human knowledge, consequently all

human philosophy, is only of the Relative or Phenomenal_;"[290] and that

"_of existence absolutely and in itself we know nothing_."[291] Whilst

teaching that the proper sphere and aim of philosophy is to trace

secondary causes up to ultimate or first causes, and that it

_necessarily tends_ towards one First and Ultimate Cause, he at the same

time asserts that "first causes do not lie within the reach of

philosophy,"[292] and that it can never attain to the knowledge of the

First Cause.[293] "The Infinite God can not, by us, be comprehended,

conceived, or thought."[294] God, as First Cause, as infinite, as

unconditioned, as eternal, is to us absolutely "_The Unknown_." The

science of Real Being--of Being _in se_--of self-subsisting entities, is

declared to be impossible. All science is only of the phenomenal, the

conditioned, the relative. Ontology is a delusive dream. Thus, after

pages of explanations and qualifications, of affirmations and denials,

we find Hamilton virtually assuming the same position as Comte and

Mill--_all human knowledge is necessarily confined to phenomena_.

[Footnote 290: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 136]

[Footnote 291: Ibid., vol. i. p. 138.]

[Footnote 292: Ibid., vol. i. p. 58.]

[Footnote 293: Ibid., vol. i. p. 60.]

[Footnote 294: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 375.]

It has been supposed that the chief glory of Sir William Hamilton rested

upon his able exposition and defense of the doctrine of Natural Realism.

There are, however, indications in his writings that he regarded "the

Philosophy of the Conditioned" as his grand achievement. The Law of the

Conditioned had "not been generalized by any previous philosopher;" and,

in laying down that law, he felt that he had made a new and important

contribution to speculative thought.

The principles upon which this philosophy is based are:

1. _The Relativity of all Human Knowledge._--Existence is not cognized

absolutely and in itself, but only under special modes which are related

to our faculties, and, in fact, determined by these faculties

themselves. All knowledge, therefore, is _relative_--that is, it is of

phenomena only, and of phenomena "under modifications determined by our

own faculties." Now, as the Absolute is that which exists out of all

relation either to phenomena or to our faculties of knowledge, it can

not possibly be _known_.

2. _The Conditionality of all Thinking_.--Thought necessarily supposes

conditions. "To think is to condition; and conditional limitation is the

fundamental law of the possibility of thought. As the eagle can not

out-soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone he is

supported, so the mind can not transcend the sphere of limitation within

and through which the possibility of thought is realized. Thought is

only of the conditioned, because, as we have said, to think is to

condition."[295] Now the Infinite is the unlimited, the unconditioned,

and as such can not possibly be _thought_.

3. _The notion of the Infinite--the Absolute, as entertained by man, is

a mere "negation of thought._"--By this Hamilton does not mean that the

idea of the Infinite is a negative idea. "The Infinite and the Absolute

are _only_ the names of two counter _imbecilities_ of the human

mind"[296]--that is, a mental inability to conceive an absolute

limitation, or an infinite illimitation; an absolute commencement, or an

infinite non-commencement. In other words, of the absolute and infinite

we have no conception at all, and, consequently, no knowledge.[297]

The grand law which Hamilton generalizes from the above is, "_that the

conceivable is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable_." Or,

again, "The conditioned or the thinkable lies between two extremes or

poles; and these extremes or poles are each of them unconditioned, each

of them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or contradictory of the

other."[298] This is the celebrated "Law of the Conditioned."

[Footnote 295: "Discussions," p. 21.]

[Footnote 296: Ibid., p. 28.]

[Footnote 297: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. pp. 368, 373.]

[Footnote 298: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 373.]

In attempting a brief criticism of "the Philosophy of the Conditioned,"

we may commence by inquiring:

I. _What is the real import and significance of the doctrine "that all

human knowledge is only of the relative or phenomenal_?"

Hamilton calls this "the great axiom" of philosophy. That we may

distinctly comprehend its meaning, and understand its bearing on the

subject under discussion, we must ascertain the sense in which he uses

the words "_phenomenal_" and "_relative._" The importance of an exact

terminology is fully appreciated by our author; and accordingly, in

three Lectures (VIII., IX., X.), he has given a full explication of the

terms most commonly employed in philosophic discussions. Here the word

"_phenomenon_" is set down as the necessary "_correlative_" of the word

"_subject_" or "_substance_." "These terms can not be explained apart,

for each is correlative of the other, each can be comprehended only in

and through its correlative. The term '_subject_' is used to denote the

unknown (?) basis which lies under the various _phenomena_ or properties

of which we become aware, whether in our external or internal

experience."[299] "The term '_relative_' is _opposed_ to the term

'_absolute_;' therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, I

virtually assert that we know nothing absolutely, that is, _in and for

itself, and without relation to us and our faculties_."[300] Now, in the

philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, "the absolute" is defined as "that

which is aloof from relation"--"that which is out of all relation."[301]

The _absolute_ can not, therefore, be "_the correlative_" of the

conditioned--can not stand in any relation to the phenomenal. The

_subject,_ however, is the necessary correlative of the phenomenal, and,

consequently, the subject and the absolute are not identical.

Furthermore, Hamilton tells us the subject _may be comprehended_ in and

through its correlative--the phenomenon; but the absolute, being aloof

from all relation, can not be comprehended or conceived at all. "The

subject" and "the absolute" are, therefore, not synonymous terms; and,

if they are not synonymous, then their antithetical terms, "phenomenal"

and "relative," can not be synonymous.

[Footnote 299: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 148.]

[Footnote 300: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.]

[Footnote 301: "Discussions," p. 21.]

It is manifest, however, that Hamilton does employ these terms as

synonymous, and this we apprehend is the first false step in his

philosophy of the conditioned. "All our knowledge is of the relative

_or_ phenomenal." Throughout the whole of Lectures VIII. and IX., in

which he explains the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge,

these terms are used as precisely analogous. Now, in opposition to this,

we maintain that the relative is not always the phenomenal. A thing may

be "in relation" and yet not be a phenomenon. "The subject or substance"

may be, and really is, on the admission of Hamilton himself,

_correlated_ to the phenomenon. The ego, "the conscious _subject_"[302]

as a "_self-subsisting entity_" is necessarily related to the phenomena

of thought, feeling, etc.; but no one would repudiate the idea that the

conscious subject is a mere phenomenon, or "series of phenomena," with

more indignation than Hamilton. Notwithstanding the contradictory

assertion, "that the _subject_ is unknown," he still teaches, with equal

positiveness, "that in every act of perception I am conscious of self,

as a perceiving _subject."_ And still more explicitly he says: "As

clearly as I am conscious of existing, so clearly am I conscious, at

every moment of my existence, that the conscious Ego is not itself a

mere modification [a phenomenon], nor a series of modifications

[phenomena], but that it is itself different from all its modifications,

and a _self-subsisting entity_."[303] Again: "Thought is possible only

in and through the consciousness of Self. The Self, the I, is recognized

in every act of intelligence as the _subject_ to which the act belongs.

It is I that perceive, I that imagine, I that remember, etc.; these

special modes are all only the phenomena of the I."[304] We are,

therefore, conscious of the _subject_ in the most immediate, and direct,

and intuitive manner, and the subject of which we are conscious can not

be "_unknown_." We regret that so distinguished a philosophy should deal

in such palpable contradictions; but it is the inevitable consequence of

violating that fundamental principle of philosophy on which Hamilton so

frequently and earnestly insists, viz., "that the testimony of

consciousness must be accepted in all its integrity".

[Footnote 302: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton (edited by O.W.

Wight), p. 181.]

[Footnote 303: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 373.]

[Footnote 304: Ibid., vol. i. p. 166.]

It is thus obvious that, with proper qualifications, we may admit _the

relativity of human knowledge_, and yet at the same time reject the

doctrine of Hamilton, _that all human knowledge is only of the

phenomenal_.

"The relativity of human knowledge," like most other phrases into which

the word "relative" enters, is vague, and admits of a variety of

meanings. If by this phrase is meant "that we can not know objects

except as related to our faculties, or as our faculties are related to

them," we accept the statement, but regard it as a mere truism leading

to no consequences, and hardly worth stating in words. It is simply

another way of saying that, in order to an object's being known, it must

come within the range of our intellectual vision, and that we can only

know as much as we are capable of knowing. Or, if by this phrase is

meant "that we can only know things by and through the phenomena they

present," we admit this also, for we can no more know substances apart

from their properties, than we can know qualities apart from the

substances in which they inhere. Substances can be known only in and

through their phenomena. Take away the properties, and the thing has no

longer any existence. Eliminate extension, form, density, etc., from

matter, and what have you left? "The thing in itself," apart from its

qualities, is nothing. Or, again, if by the relativity of knowledge is

meant "that all consciousness, all thought are relative," we accept this

statement also. To conceive, to reflect, to know, is to deal with

difference and relation; the relation of subject and object; the

relation of objects among themselves; the relation of phenomena to

reality, of becoming to being. The reason of man is unquestionably

correlated to that which is beyond phenomena; it is able to apprehend

the necessary relation between phenomena and being, extension and space,

succession and time, event and cause, the finite and the infinite. We

may thus admit the _relative character of human thought_, and at the

same time deny that it is an ontological disqualification.[305]

It is not, however, in any of these precise forms that Hamilton holds

the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. He assumes a middle place

between Reid and Kant, and endeavors to blend the subjective idealism of

the latter with the realism of the former. "He identifies the

_phenomenon_ of the German with the _quality_ of the British

philosophy,"[306] and asserts, as a regulative law of thought, that the

quality implies the substance, and the phenomenon the noumenon, but

makes the substratum or noumenon (the object in itself) unknown and

unknowable. The "phenomenon" of Kant was, however, something essentially

different from the "quality" of Reid. In the philosophy of Kant,

_phenomenon_ means an object as we envisage or represent it to

ourselves, in opposition to the _noumenon_, or a thing as it is in

itself. The phenomenon is composed, in part, of subjective elements

supplied by the mind itself; as regards intuition, the forms of space

and time; as regards thought, the categories of Quantity, Quality,

Relation, and Modality. To perceive a thing in itself would be to

perceive it neither in space nor in time. To think a thing in itself

would be not to think it under any of the categories. The phenomenal is

thus the product of the inherent laws of our own constitution, and, as

such, is the sum and limit of all our knowledge.[307]

[Footnote 305: Martineau's "Essays," p. 234.]

[Footnote 306: M'Cosh's "Defense of Fundamental Truth," p. 106.]

[Footnote 307: Mansel's "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant," pp. 21,

22.]

This, in its main features, is evidently the doctrine propounded by

Hamilton. The special modes in which existence is cognizable" are

presented to, and known by, the mind _under modifications determined by

the faculties themselves_."[308] This doctrine he illustrates by the

following supposition: "Suppose the total object of consciousness in

perception is=12; and suppose that the external reality contributes 6,

the material sense 3, and the mind 3; this may enable you to form some

rude conjecture of the nature of the object of perception."[309] The

conclusion at which Hamilton arrives, therefore, is that things are not

known to us as they exist, but simply as they appear, and as our minds

are capable of perceiving them.

[Footnote 308: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 148.]

[Footnote 309: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 129;

and also vol. i. p. 147.]

Let us test the validity of this majestic deliverance. No man is

justified in making this assertion unless, 1. He knows things as they

exist; 2. He knows things not only as they exist but as they appear; 3.

He is able to compare things as they exist with the same things as they

appear. Now, inasmuch as Sir William Hamilton affirms we do not know

things as they exist, but only as they appear, how can he know that

there is any difference between things as they exist and as they appear?

What is this "_thing in itself_" about which Hamilton has so much to

say, and yet about which he professes to know nothing? We readily

understand what is meant by the _thing_; it is the object as existing--a

substance manifesting certain characteristic qualities. But what is

meant by _in itself_? There can be no _in itself_ besides or beyond the

_thing_. If Hamilton means that "the thing itself" is the thing apart

from all relation, and devoid of all properties or qualities, we do not

acknowledge any such thing. A thing apart from all relation, and devoid

of all qualities, is simply pure nothing, if such a solecism may be

permitted. With such a definition of Being _in se_, the logic of Hegel

is invincible, "Being and Nothing are identical."

And now, if "the thing in itself" be, as Hamilton says it is, absolutely

_unknown_, how can he affirm or deny any thing in regard to it? By what

right does he prejudge a hidden reality, and give or refuse its

predicates; as, for example, that it is conditioned or unconditioned, in

relation or aloof from relation, finite or infinite? Is it not plain

that, in declaring a thing in its inmost nature or essence to be

inscrutable, it is assumed to be partially _known_? And it is obvious,

notwithstanding some unguarded expressions to the contrary, that

Hamilton does regard "the thing in itself" as partially known. "The

external reality" is, at least, six elements out of twelve in the "total

object of consciousness."[310] The primary qualities of matter are known

as in the things themselves; "they develop themselves with rigid

necessity out of the simple datum of _substance occupying space_."[311]

"The Primary Qualities are apprehended as they are in bodies"--"they are

the attributes of _body as body_," and as such "are known immediately in

themselves,"[312] as well as mediately by their effects upon us. So that

we not only know by direct consciousness certain properties of things as

they exist in things themselves, but we can also deduce them in an _à

priori_ manner. "The bare notion of matter being given, the Primary

Qualities may be deduced _à priori_; they being, in fact, only

evolutions of the conditions which that notion necessarily implies." If,

then, we know the qualities of things as "in the things themselves,"

"the things themselves" must also be, at least, partially known; and

Hamilton can not consistently assert the relativity of _all_ knowledge.

Even if it be granted that our cognitions of objects are only in part

dependent on the objects themselves, and in part on elements superadded

by our organism, or by our minds, it can not warrant the assertion that

all our knowledge, but only the part so added, is relative. "The

admixture of the relative element not only does not take away the

absolute character of the remainder, but does not even (if our author is

right) prevent us from recognizing it. The confusion, according to him,

is not inextricable. It is for us 'to analyze and distinguish what

elements,' in an 'act of knowledge,' are contributed by the object, and

what by the organs or by the mind."[313]

[Footnote 310: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 129.]

[Footnote 311: Philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton, p. 357]

[Footnote 312: Ibid., pp. 377, 378.]

[Footnote 313: Mill's "Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. p.

44.]

Admitting the relative character of human thought as a psychological

fact, Mr. Martineau has conclusively shown that this law, instead of

visiting us with disability to transcend phenomena, _operates as a

revelation of what exists beyond_. "The finite body cut out before our

visual perception, or embraced by the hands, lies as an island in the

emptiness around, and without comparative reference to this can not be

represented: the same experience which gives us the definite object

gives us also the infinite space; and both terms--the limited appearance

and the unlimited ground--are apprehended with equal certitude and

clearness, and furnished with names equally susceptible of distinct use

in predication and reasoning. The transient successions, for instance,

the strokes of a clock, which we count, present themselves to us as

dotted out upon a line of permanent duration; of which, without them, we

should have no apprehension, but which as their condition, is

unreservedly known."[314]

"What we have said with regard to space and time applies equally to the

case of Causation. Here, too, the finite offered to perception

introduces to an Infinite supplied by thought. As a definite body

reveals also the space around, and an interrupted succession exhibits

the uniform time beneath, so does the passing phenomenon demand for

itself a power beneath. The space, and time, and power, not being part

of the thing perceived, but its conditions, are guaranteed to us,

therefore, on the warrant, not of sense, but of intellect."[315]

"We conclude, then, on reviewing these examples of Space, and Time, and

Causation, that ontological ideas introducing us to certain fixed

entities belong no less to our knowledge than scientific ideas of

phenomenal disposition and succession."[316] In these instances of

relation between a phenomenon given in perception and an entity as a

logical condition, the correlatives are on a perfect equality of

intellectual validity, and the relative character of human thought is

not an ontological disqualification, but a cognitive power.

[Footnote 314: "Essays," pp. 193,194.]

[Footnote 315: Ibid., p. 197.]

[Footnote 316: Ibid., p. 195.]

There is a thread of fallacy running through the whole of Hamilton's

reasonings, consequent upon a false definition of the Absolute at the

outset. The Absolute is defined as _that which exists in and by itself,

aloof from and out of all relation_. An absolute, as thus defined, does

not and can not exist; it is a pure abstraction, and, in fact, a pure

non-entity. "The Absolute expresses perfect independence both in being

and in action, and is applicable to God as self-existent."[317] It may

mean the absence of all _necessary_ relation, but it does not mean the

absence of _all_ relation. If God can not _voluntarily_ call a finite

existence into being, and thus stand in the relation of cause, He is

certainly under the severest limitation. But surely that is not a limit

which substitutes choice for necessity. To be unable to know God out of

all relation--that is, apart from his attributes, apart from his created

universe, is not felt by us to be any privation at all. A God without

attributes, and out of all relations, is for us no God at all. God as a

being of unlimited perfection, as infinitely wise and good, as the

unconditioned cause of all finite being, and, consequently, as

voluntarily related to nature and humanity, we can and do know; this is

the living and true God. The God of a false philosophy is not the true

God; the pure abstractions of Hegel and Hamilton are negations, and not

realities.

2. We proceed to consider the second fundamental principle of Hamilton's

philosophy of the conditioned, viz., that "conditional limitation is the

fundamental law of the possibility of thought," and that thought

necessarily imposes conditions on its object.

"Thought," says Hamilton, "can not transcend consciousness:

consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and an

object known only in correlation, and _mutually limiting each

other_"[318] Thought necessarily supposes conditions; "to think is

simply to condition," that is, to predicate limits; and as the infinite

is the unlimited, it can not be thought. The very attempt to think the

infinite renders it finite; therefore there can be no infinite _in

thought_, and, consequently, the infinite can not be known.

[Footnote 317: Calderwood's "Philosophy of the Infinite," p. 179.]

[Footnote 318: "Discussions," p. 21.]

If by "the infinite in thought" is here meant the infinite compassed or

contained in thought, we readily grant that the finite can not contain

the infinite; it is a simple truism which no one has ever been so

foolish as to deny. Even Cousin is not so unwise as to assert the

absolutely comprehensibility of God. "In order absolutely to comprehend

the Infinite, it is necessary to have an infinite power of

comprehension, and this is not granted to us."[319] A finite mind can

not have "an infinite thought." But it by no means follows that, because

we can not have infinite thought, we can have no clear and definite

thought of or concerning the Infinite. We have a precise and definite

idea of infinitude; we can define the idea; we can set it apart without

danger of being confounded with another, and we can reason concerning

it. There is nothing we more certainly and intuitively know than that

space is infinite, and yet we can not comprehend or grasp within the

compass of our thought the infinite space. We can not form an _image_ of

infinite space, can not traverse it in perception, or represent it by

any combination of numbers; but we can have the _thought_ of it as an

idea of Reason, and can argue concerning it with precision and

accuracy.[320] Hamilton has an idea of the Infinite; he defines it; he

reasons concerning it; he says "we must believe in the infinity of God."

But how can he define the Infinite unless he possesses some knowledge,

however limited, of the infinite Being? How can he believe in the

infinity of God if he has no definite idea of infinitude? He can not

reason about, can not affirm or deny any thing concerning, that of which

he knows absolutely nothing.

[Footnote 319: "Lectures on History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 104.]

[Footnote 320: "To form an _image_ of any infinitude--be it of time or

space [or power]; to go mentally through it by successive steps of

representation--is indeed impossible; not less so than to traverse it in

our finite perception and experience. But to have the _thought_ of it as

an idea of the reason, not of the phantasy, and assign that thought a

constituent place in valid beliefs and consistent reasonings, appears to

us as not only possible, but inevitable."--Martineau's "Essays," p.

205.]

The grand logical barrier which Hamilton perpetually interposes to all

possible cognition of God _as infinite_ is, that to think is to

condition--to limit; and as the Infinite is the unconditioned, the

unlimited, therefore "the Infinite can not be _thought_." We grant at

once that all human thought is limited and finite, but, at the same

time, we emphatically deny that the limitation of our thought imposes

any conditions or limits upon the object of thought. No such affirmation

can be consistently made, except on the Hegelian hypothesis that

"Thought and Being are identical;" and this is a maxim which Hamilton

himself repudiates. Our thought does not create, neither does it impose

conditions upon, any thing.

There is a lurking sophism in the whole phraseology of Hamilton in

regard to this subject. He is perpetually talking about "thinking a

thing"--"thinking the Infinite." Now we do not think a thing, but we

think _of_ or _concerning_ a thing. We do not think a man, neither does

our thought impose any conditions upon the man, so that he must be as

our thought conceives or represents him; but our thought is of the man,

concerning or about the man, and is only so far true and valid as it

conforms to the objective reality. And so we do not "think the

Infinite;" that is, our thought neither contains nor conditions the

Infinite Being, but our thoughts are _about_ the Infinite One; and if we

do not think of Him as a being of infinite perfection, our thought is

neither worthy, nor just, nor true.[321]

[Footnote 321: Calderwood's "Philosophy of the Infinite," pp. 255, 256.]

But we are told the law of all thought and of all being is

determination; consequently, negation of some quality or some

potentiality; whereas the Infinite is "_the One and the All_" (ti En kai

Pyn),[322] or, as Dr. Mansel, the disciple and annotator of Hamilton,

affirms, "the sum of all reality," and "the sum of all possible modes of

being."[323] The Infinite, as thus defined, must include in itself all

being, and all modes of being, actual and possible, not even excepting

evil. And this, let it be observed, Dr. Mansel has the hardihood to

affirm. "If the Absolute and the Infinite is an object of human

conception at all, this, and none other, is the conception

required."[324] "The Infinite Whole," as thus defined, can not be

thought, and therefore it is argued the Infinite God can not be known.

Such a doctrine shocks our moral sense, and we shrink from the thought

of an Infinite which includes evil. There is certainly a moral

impropriety, if not a logical impossibility, in such a conception of

God.

[Footnote 322: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," Appendix, vol. ii.

p. 531.]

[Footnote 323: "Limits of Religious Thought," p. 76.]

[Footnote 324: Ibid.]

The fallacy of this reasoning consists in confounding a _supposed_

Quantitative Infinite with _the_ Qualitative Infinite--the totality of

existence with the infinitely perfect One. "Qualitative infinity is a

secondary predicate; that is, the attribute of an attribute, and is

expressed by the adverb _infinitely_ rather than the adjective

_infinite_. For instance, it is a strict use of language to say, that

space is infinite, but it is an elliptical use of language to say, God

is infinite. Precision of language would require us to say, God is

infinitely good, wise, and great; or God is good, and his goodness is

infinite. The distinction may seem trivial, but it is based upon an

important difference between the infinity of space and time on the one

hand, and the infinity of God on the other. Neither philosophy nor

theology can afford to disregard the difference. Quantitative Infinity

is illimitation by _quantity_. Qualitative Infinity is illimitation by

_degree_. Quantity and degree alike imply finitude, and are categories

of the finite alone. The danger of arguing from the former kind of

infinitude to the latter can not be overstated. God alone possesses

Qualitative Infinity, which is strictly synonymous with _absolute

perfection_; and the neglect of the distinction between this and

Quantitative Infinity, leads irresistibly to pantheistic and

materialistic notions. Spinozism is possible only by the elevation of

'infinite extension' to the dignity of a divine attribute. Dr. Samuel

Clarke's identification of God's immensity with space has been shown by

Martin to ultimate in Pantheism. From ratiocinations concerning the

incomprehensibility of infinite space and time, Hamilton and Mansel pass

at once to conclusions concerning the incomprehensibility of God. The

inconsequence of all such arguments is absolute; and if philosophy

tolerates the transference of spatial or temporal analogies to the

nature of God, she must reconcile herself to the negation of his

personality and spirituality."[325] An Infinite Being, quite remote from

the notion of _quantity_, may and does exist; which, on the one hand,

does not include finite existence, and, on the other hand, does not

render the finite impossible to thought. Without contradiction they may

coexist, and be correlated.

The thought will have already suggested itself to the mind of the reader

that for Hamilton to assert that the Infinite, as thus defined (the One

and the All), is absolutely unknown, is certainly the greatest

absurdity, for in that case nothing can be known. This Infinite must be

at least partially known, or all human knowledge is reduced to zero. To

the all-inclusive Infinite every thing affirmative belongs, not only to

be, but to be known. To claim it for being, yet deny it to thought, is

thus impossible. The Infinite, which includes all real existence, is

certainly possible to cognition.

The whole argument as regards the conditionating nature of all thought

is condensed into four words by Spinoza--"_Omnis determinatio est

negatio_;" all determination is negation. Nothing can be more arbitrary

or more fallacious than this principle. It arises from the confusion of

two things essentially different--_the limits of a being_, and _its

determinate and distinguishing characteristics_. The limit of a being is

its imperfection; the determination of a being is its perfection. The

less a thing is determined, the more it sinks in the scale of being; the

most determinate being is the most perfect being. "In this sense God is

the only being absolutely determined. For there must be something

indetermined in all finite beings, since they have all imperfect powers

which tend towards their development after an indefinite manner. God

alone, the complete Being in whom all powers are actualized, escapes by

His own perfection from all progress, and development, and

indetermination."[326]

[Footnote 325: North American Review, October, 1864, article, "The

Conditioned and the Unconditioned," pp. 422, 423. See also Young's

"Province of Reason," p. 72; and Calderwood's "Philosophy of the

Infinite," p. 183.]

[Footnote 326: Saisset, "Modern Pantheism," vol. ii. p. 71.]

All real being must be determined; only pure Nothing can be

undetermined. _Determination_ is, however, one thing; and _limitation_

is essentially another thing. "Even space and time, though cognized

solely by negative characteristics, are determined in so far as

differentiated from the existences they contain; but this

differentiation involves no limitation of their infinity." If all

distinction is determination, and if all determination is negation, that

is (as here used), limitation, then the infinite, as distinguished from

the finite, loses its own infinity, and either becomes identical with

the finite, or else vanishes into pure nothing. If Hamilton will persist

in affirming that all determination is limitation, he has no other

alternatives but to accept the doctrine of Absolute Nihilism, or of

Absolute Identity. If the Absolute is the indeterminate--that is, no

attributes, no consciousness, no relations--it is pure non-being. If the

Infinite is "the One and All," then there is but one substance, one

absolute entity.

Herbert Spencer professes to be carrying out, a step farther, the

doctrine put into shape by Hamilton and Mansel, viz., "the philosophy of

the Unconditioned." In other words, he carries that doctrine forward to

its rigidly logical consequences, and utters the last word which

Hamilton and Mansel dare not utter--"Apprehensible by us there is no

God." The Ultimate Reality is absolutely unknown; it can not be

apprehended by the human intellect, and it can not present itself to the

intellect at all. This Ultimate Reality can not be _intelligent_,

because to think is to condition, and the Absolute is the unconditioned;

can not be _conscious_, because all consciousness is of plurality and

difference, and the Absolute is one; can not be _personal_, because

personality is determination or limitation, and the Infinite is the

illimitable. It is "audacious," "irreverent," "impious," to apply any of

these predicates to it; to regard it as Mind, or speak of it as

Righteous.[327] The ultimate goal of the philosophy of the Unconditioned

is a purely subjective Atheism.

[Footnote 327: "First Principles," pp. 111, 112.]

And yet of this Primary Existence--inscrutable, and absolutely

unknown--Spencer knows something; knows as much as he pleases to know.

He knows that this "ultimate of ultimates is _Force_,"[328] an

"_Omnipresent Power_,"[329] is "_One_" and "_Eternal_."[330] He knows

also that it can not be intelligent, self-conscious, and a

personality.[331] This is a great deal to affirm and deny of an

existence "absolutely unknown." May we not be permitted to affirm of

this hidden and unknown something that it is _conscious Mind_,

especially as Mind is admitted to be the only analogon of Power; and

"the _force_ by which we produce change, and which serves to symbolize

the causes of changes in general, is the final disclosure of

analysis."[332]

[Footnote 328: "First Principles," p. 235.]

[Footnote 329: Ibid., p. 99.]

[Footnote 330: Ibid., p. 81.]

[Footnote 331: Ibid., pp. 108-112.]

[Footnote 332: Ibid., p. 235.]

3. We advance to the review of the third fundamental principle of

Hamilton's philosophy of the Unconditioned, viz., that the terms

infinite and absolute are names for a "mere negation of thought"--a

"mental impotence" to think, or, in other words, the absence of all the

conditions under which thought is possible.

This principle is based upon a distinction between "positive" and

"negative" thought, which is made with an air of wonderful precision and

accuracy in "the Alphabet of Human Thought."[333] "Thinking is

_positive_ when existence is predicated of an object." "Thinking is

_negative_ when existence is not attributed to an object." "Negative

thinking," therefore, is not the thinking of an object as devoid of this

or that particular attribute, but as devoid of all attributes, and thus

of all existence; that is, it is "the negation of all

thought"--_nothing_. "When we think a thing, that is done by conceiving

it as possessed of certain modes of being or qualities, _and the sum of

these qualities constitutes its concept or notion_." "When we perform an

act of negative thought, this is done by thinking _something_ as _not_

existing in this or that determinate mode; and when we think it as

existing in no determinate mode, _we cease to think at all--it becomes a

nothing_."[334] Now the Infinite, according to Hamilton, can not be

thought in any determinate mode; therefore we do not think it at all,

and therefore it is for us "a logical Non-entity."

[Footnote 333: "Discussions," Appendix I. p. 567.]

[Footnote 334: "Logic," pp. 54, 55.]

It is barely conceivable that Hamilton might imagine himself possessed

of this singular power of "performing an act of negative thought"--that

is, of thinking and not thinking at once, or of "thinking something"

that "becomes nothing;" we are not conscious of any such power. To think

without an object of thought, or to think of something without any

qualities, or to think "something" which in the act of thought melts

away into "nothing," is an absurdity and a contradiction. We can not

think about nothing. All thought must have an object, and every object

must have some predicate. Even space has some predicates--as

receptivity, unity, and infinity. Thought can only be realized by

thinking something existing, and existing in a determinate manner; and

when we cease to think something having predicates, we cease to think at

all. This is emphatically asserted by Hamilton himself.[335] "Negative

thinking" is, therefore, a meaningless phrase, a contradiction in terms;

it is no thought at all. We are cautioned, however, against regarding

"the negation of thought" as "a negation of all mental ability." It is,

we are told, "an attempt to think, and a failure in the attempt." An

attempt to think about _what_? Surely it must be about some object, and

an object which is _known_ by some sign, else there can be no thought.

Let any one make the attempt to think without something to think about,

and he will find that both the process and the result are blank

nothingness. All thought, therefore, as Calderwood has amply shown, is,

must be, _positive_. "Thought is nothing else than the comparison of

objects known; and as knowledge is always positive, so must our thought

be. All knowledge implies an object _known_; and so all thought involves

an object about which we think, and must, therefore, be positive--that

is, it must embrace within itself the conception of certain qualities as

belonging to the object."[336]

[Footnote 335: "Logic," p. 55.]

[Footnote 336: "Philosophy of the Infinite," p. 272.]

The conclusion of Hamilton's reasoning in regard to "negative thinking"

is, that we can form no notion of the Infinite Being. We have no

positive idea of such a Being. We can think of him only by "the thinking

away of every characteristic" which can be conceived, and thus "ceasing

to think at all." We can only form a "negative concept," which, we are

told, "is in fact no concept at all." We can form only a "negative

notion," which, we are informed, "is only the negation of a notion."

This is the impenetrable abyss of total gloom and emptiness into which

the philosophy of the conditions leads us at last.[337]

[Footnote 337: Whilst Spencer accepts the general doctrine of Hamilton,

that the Ultimate Reality is inscrutable, he argues earnestly against

his assertion that the Absolute is a "mere negation of thought."

"Every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is

demonstrated distinctly postulates the _positive existence_ of something

beyond the relative. To say we can not know the Absolute is, by

implication, to affirm there _is_ an Absolute. In the very denial of our

power to learn _what_ the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption

_that_ it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute

has been present to the mind, not as nothing, but as _something_. And so

with every step in the reasoning by which the doctrine is upheld, the

Noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is

throughout thought as actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive

that our knowledge is a knowledge of appearances only, without, at the

same time, conceiving a Reality of which these are appearances, for

appearances without reality are unthinkable.

"Truly to represent or realize in thought any one of the propositions of

which the argument consists, the unconditioned must be represented as

_positive_, and not negative. How, then, can it be a legitimate

conclusion from the argument that our consciousness of it is negative?

An argument, the very construction of which assigns to a certain term a

certain meaning, but which ends in showing that this term has no

meaning, is simply an elaborate suicide. Clearly, then, the very

demonstration that a definite consciousness [comprehension] of the

Absolute is impossible, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite

consciousness of it [an apprehension]."--"First Principles," p. 88.]

Still we have the word _infinite_, and we have _the notion_ which the

word expresses. This, at least, is spared to us by Sir William Hamilton.

He who says we have no such notion asks the question _how we have it?_

Here it may be asked, how have we, then, the word infinite? How have we

the notion which this word expresses? The answer to this question is

contained in the distinction of positive and negative thought.

We have a positive concept of a thing when we think of it by the

qualities of which it is the complement. But as the attribution of

qualities is an affirmation, as affirmation and negation are relatives,

and as relatives _are known only in and through each other_, we can not,

therefore, have a _consciousness_ of the affirmation of any quality

without having, at the same time, the _correlative consciousness_ of its

negation. Now the one consciousness is a positive, the other

consciousness is a negative notion; and as all language is the reflex of

thought, the positive and negative notions are expressed by positive and

negative names. Thus it is with the Infinite.[338] Now let us carefully

scrutinize the above deliverance. We are told that "relatives are known

only in and through each other;" that is, such relatives as _finite_ and

_infinite_ are known necessarily in the same act of thought. The

knowledge of one is as necessary as the knowledge of the other. We can

not have a consciousness of the one without the correlative

consciousness of the other. "For," says Hamilton, "a relation is, in

truth, a thought, one and indivisible; and while the thinking a relation

_necessarily involves the thought of its two terms,_, so it is, with

equal necessity, itself involved in the thought of either." If, then, we

are _conscious_ of the two terms of the relation in the same "one and

indivisible" mental act--if we can not have "the consciousness of the

one without the consciousness of the other"--if space and position, time

and succession, substance and quality, infinite and finite, are given to

us in pairs, then 'the _knowledge of one is as necessary as the

knowledge of the other,_' and they must stand or fall together. The

finite is known no more positively than the infinite; the infinite is

known as positively as the finite. The one can not be taken and the

other left. The infinite, discharged from all relation to the finite,

could never come into apprehension; and the finite, discharged of all

relation to the infinite, is incognizable too. "There can be no

objection to call the one 'positive' and the other 'negative,' provided

it be understood that _each_ is so with regard to the other, and that

the relation is convertible; the finite, for instance, being the

negative of the infinite, not less than the infinite of the

finite."[339]

[Footnote 338: _Logic,_ p. 73.]

[Footnote 339: Martineau's "Essays," p. 237.]

To say that the finite is comprehensible in and by itself, and the

infinite is incomprehensible in and by itself, is to make an assertion

utterly at variance both with psychology and logic. The finite is no

more comprehensible _in itself_ than the infinite. "Relatives are known

only in and through each other."[340] "The conception of one term of a

relation necessarily implies that of the other, it being the very nature

of a relative to be thinkable only through the conjunct thought of its

correlative." We comprehend nothing more completely than the infinite;

"for the idea of illimitation is as clear, precise, and intelligible as

the idea of limitability, which is its basis. The propositions "A is X"

"A is not X," are equally comprehensible; the conceptions A and X are in

both cases positive data of experience, while the affirmation and

negation consist solely in the copulative or disjunctive nature of the

predication. Consequently, if X is comprehensible, so is not--X; if the

finite is comprehensible, so is the infinite."[341]

Whilst denying that the infinite can by us be _known_, Hamilton tells us

he is "far from denying that it is, must, and ought to be

_believed_."[342] "We must believe in the infinity of God."

"Faith--belief--is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond

knowledge."[343] We heartily assent to the doctrine that the Infinite

Being is the object of faith, but we earnestly deny that the Infinite

Being is not an object of knowledge. May not knowledge be grounded upon

faith, and does not faith imply knowledge? Can we not obtain knowledge

through faith? Is not the belief in the Infinite Being implied in our

knowledge of finite existence? If so, then God as the infinite and

perfect, God as the unconditioned Cause, is not absolutely "the

unknown."

[Footnote 340: Hamilton's "Logic," p. 73.]

[Footnote 341: North American Review, October, 1864, article

"Conditioned and the Unconditioned," pp. 441, 442.]

[Footnote 342: Letter to Calderwood, Appendix, vol. ii. p. 530.]

[Footnote 343: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 374.]

A full exposition of Sir William Hamilton's views of _Faith_ in its

connection with Philosophy would have been deeply interesting to us, and

it would have filled up a gap in the interpretation of his system. The

question naturally presents itself, how would he have discriminated

between faith and knowledge, so as to assign to each its province? If

our notion of the Infinite Being rests entirely upon faith, then upon

what ultimate ground does faith itself rest? On the authority of

Scripture, of the Church, or of reason? The only explicit statement of

his view which has fallen in our way is a note in his edition of

Reid.[344] "We _know_ what rests upon reason; we _believe_ what rests

upon authority. But reason itself must rest at last upon authority; for

the original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily

accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data

are, therefore, in rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it is that,

in the last resort, we must, per force, philosophically admit that

belief is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate

ground of belief."

[Footnote 344: P. 760; also Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, p. 61.]

Here we have, first, an attempted distinction between faith and

knowledge. "We _know_ what rests upon reason;" that is, whatever we

obtain by deduction or induction, whatever is capable of explication and

proof, is _knowledge_. "We _believe_ what rests upon authority;" that

is, whatever we obtain by intellectual intuition or pure apperception,

and is incapable of explication and of proof, is "a _belief or trust_."

These instinctive beliefs, which are, as it were, the first principles

upon which all knowledge rests, are, however, indiscriminately called by

Hamilton "cognitions," "beliefs," "judgments." He declares most

explicitly "that the principles of our knowledge must themselves be

_knowledges_;"[345] and these first principles, which are "the primary

condition of reason," are elsewhere called "_à priori cognitions_;" also

"native, pure, or transcendental _knowledge_," in contradistinction to

"_à posteriori cognitions_," or that knowledge which is obtained in the

exercise of reason.[346] All this confusion results from an attempt to

put asunder what God has joined together. As Clemens of Alexandria has

said, "Neither is faith without knowledge, nor knowledge without faith."

All faith implies knowledge, and all knowledge implies faith. They are

mingled in the one operation of the human mind, by which we apprehend

first principles or ultimate truths. These have their light and dark

side, as Hamilton has remarked. They afford enough light to show _that_

they are and must be, and thus communicate knowledge; they furnish no

light to show _how_ they are and _why_ they are, and under that aspect

demand the exercise of faith. There must, therefore, first be something

_known_ before there can be any _faith_.[347]

[Footnote 345: Ibid., p. 69.]

[Footnote 346: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 26.]

[Footnote 347: M'Cosh, "Intuitions," pp. 197, 198; Calderwood,

"Philosophy of the Infinite," p. 24.]

And now we seem to have penetrated to the centre of Hamilton's

philosophy, and the vital point may be touched by one crucial question,

_Upon what ultimate ground does faith itself rest?_ Hamilton says, "we

believe what rests upon _authority_." But what is that authority? I. It

is not the authority of Divine Revelation, because beliefs are called

"instinctive," "native," "innate," "common," "catholic,"[348] all which

terms seem to indicate that this "authority" lies within the sphere of

the human mind; at any rate, this faith does not rest on the authority

of Scripture. Neither is it the authority of Reason. "The original data

of reason [the first principles of knowledge] do not rest upon the

authority of reason, but _on the authority of what is beyond itself_."

The question thus recurs, what is this ultimate ground beyond reason

upon which faith rests? Does it rest upon any thing, or nothing?

[Footnote 348: Philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton, pp. 68, 69.]

The answer to this question is given in the so-called "Law of the

Conditioned," which is thus laid down: "_All that is conceivable in

thought lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each

other, can not both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories,

one must_." For example, we conceive _space_, but we can not conceive it

as absolutely bounded or infinitely unbounded. We can conceive _time_,

but we can not conceive it as having an absolute commencement or an

infinite non-commencement. We can conceive of _degree_, but we can not

conceive it as absolutely limited or as infinitely unlimited. We can

conceive of _existence_, but not as an absolute part or an infinite

whole. Therefore, "the Conditioned is that which is alone conceivable or

cogitable; the Unconditioned, that which is inconceivable or

incogitable. The conditioned, or the thinkable, lies between two

extremes or poles; and each of these extremes or poles are

unconditioned, each of them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or

contradictory of the other. Of these two repugnant opposites, the one is

that of Unconditional or Absolute Limitation; the other that of

Unconditional or Infinite Illimitation, or, more simply, the Absolute

and the Infinite; the term _absolute_ expressing that which is finished

or complete, the term _infinite_ that which can not be terminated or

concluded."[349]

"The conditioned is the mean between two extremes--two inconditionates,

exclusive of each other, neither of which _can be conceived as

possible_, but of which, on the principle of contradiction, and excluded

middle, _one must be admitted as necessary_. We are thus warned from

recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with

the horizon of our faith. And by a _wonderful revelation_, we are thus,

in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the

relative and the finite, _inspired with a belief in_ the existence of

something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible

reality."[350] Here, then, we have found the ultimate ground of our

faith in the Infinite God. It is built upon a "mental imbecility," and

buttressed up by "contradictions!"[351]

[Footnote 349: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. pp. 368, 374. With

Hamilton, the Unconditioned is a genus, of which the Infinite and

Absolute are species.]

[Footnote 350: "Discussions on Philosophy," p. 22.]

[Footnote 351: The warmest admirers of Sir William Hamilton hesitate to

apply the doctrine of the unconditioned to Cause and Free-will. See

"Mansel's Prolegom.," Note C, p. 265.]

Such a faith, however, is built upon the clouds, and the whole structure

of this philosophy is "a castle in the air"--an attempt to organize

Nescience into Science, and evoke something out of nothing. To pretend

to believe in that respecting which I can form no notion is in reality

not to believe at all. The nature which compels me to believe in the

Infinite must supply me some object upon which my belief can take hold.

We can not believe in contradictions. Our faith must be a rational

belief--a faith in the ultimate harmony and unity of all truth, in the

veracity and integrity of human reason as the organ of truth; and, above

all, a faith in the veracity of God, who is the author and illuminator

of our mental constitution. "We can not suppose that we are created

capable of intelligence in order to be made victims of delusion--that

God is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a lie."[352] We close our

review of Hamilton by remarking:

[Footnote 352: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, p. 21.]

1. "The Law of the Conditioned," as enounced by Hamilton, is

contradictory. It predicates contradiction of two extremes, which are

asserted to be equally incomprehensible and incognizable. If they are

utterly incognizable, how does Hamilton _know_ that they are

contradictory? The mutual _relation_ of two objects is said to be known,

but the objects themselves are absolutely unknown. But how can we know

any relation except by an act of comparison, and how can we compare two

objects so as to affirm their relation, if the objects are absolutely

unknown? "The Infinite is defined as Unconditional Illimitation; the

Absolute as Conditional Limitation. Yet almost in the same breath we are

told that each is utterly inconceivable, each the mere negation of

thought. On the one hand, we are told they _differ_; on the other, we

are told they do _not differ_. Now which does Hamilton mean? If he

insist upon the definitions as yielding a ground of conceivable

difference, he must abandon the inconceivability; but if he insist upon

the inconceivability, he must abandon the definition as sheer verbiage,

devoid of all conceivable meaning. There is no possible escape from this

dilemma. Further, two negations can never contradict; for contradiction

is the asserting and the denying of the same proposition; two denials

can not conflict. If Illimitation is negative, Limitation, its

contradictory, is positive, whether conditional or unconditional. In

brief, if the Infinite and Absolute are wholly incomprehensible, they

are not distinguishable; but if they are distinguishable, they are not

wholly incomprehensible. If they are indistinguishable, they are to us

identical; and identity precludes contradiction. But if they are

distinguishable, distinction is made by difference, which involves

positive cognition; hence one, at least, must be conceivable. It

follows, therefore, by inexorable logic, that either the contradiction

or the inconceivability must be abandoned."[353]

[Footnote 353: North American Review, October, 1864, pp. 407, 408.]

2. "The Law of the Conditioned," as a ground of faith in the Infinite

Being, is utterly void, meaningless, and ineffectual. Let us re-state it

in Hamilton's own words: "The conditioned is the _mean_ between two

extremes, two inconditionates exclusive of each other, neither of which

_can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on the principle of

Contradiction and Excluded Middle, _one must be admitted as necessary_."

It is scarcely needful to explain to the intelligent reader the above

logical principles; that they may, however, be clearly before the mind

in this connection, we state that the principle of Contradiction is

this: "A thing can not at the same time be and not be; _A is_, _A is

not_, are propositions which can not both be true at once." The

principle of Excluded Middle is this: "A thing either is or is not--_A

either is or is not B_; there is no _medium_."[354] Now, to mention the

law of Excluded Middle and two contradictories with a _mean_ between

them, in the same sentence, is really astounding. "If the two

contradictory extremes are equally incogitable, yet include a cogitable

mean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either extreme? This

necessity of accepting one of the contradictories is wholly based upon

the supposed impossibility of a _mean_; if a mean exists, _that_ may be

true, and both contradictories together false. But if a mean between two

contradictories be both impossible and absurd, Hamilton's 'conditioned'

entirely vanishes."[355] If both contradictories are equally unknown and

equally unthinkable, we can not discover _why_, on his principles, we

are bound to believe _either_.

[Footnote 354: Hamilton's "Logic," pp. 58, 59; "Metaphysics," vol. ii.

p. 368.]

[Footnote 355: North British Review, October, 1864, pp. 415, 416.]

3. The whole of this confusion in thought and expression results from

the habit of confounding the sensuous imagination with the non-sensuous

reason, and the consequent co-ordination of an imageable conception with

an abstract idea. The objects of sense and the sensuous imagination may

be characterized as extension, limitation, figure, position, etc.; the

objects of the non-sensuous reason may be characterized as universality,

eternity, infinity. I can form an _image_ of an extended and figured

object, but I can not form an _image_ of space, time, or God; neither,

indeed, can I form an image of Goodness, Justice, or Truth. But I can

have a clear and precise idea of space, and time, and God, as I can of

Justice, Goodness, and Truth. There are many things which I can most

surely _know_ that I can not possibly _comprehend_, if to comprehend is

to form a mental image of a thing. There is nothing which I more

certainly know than that space is infinite, and eternity unbeginning and

endless; but I can not comprehend the infinity of space or the

illimitability of eternity. I know that God is, that he is a being of

infinite perfection, but I can not throw my thoughts around and

comprehend the infinity of God.

(iv.) We come, lastly, to consider the position of the _Dogmatic

Theologians_.[356] In their zeal to demonstrate the necessity of Divine

Revelation, and to vindicate for it the honor of supplying to us all our

knowledge of God, they assail every fundamental principle of reason,

often by the very weapons which are supplied by an Atheistical

philosophy. As a succinct presentation of the views of this school, we

select the "_Theological Institutes_" of R. Watson.

[Footnote 356: Ellis, Leland, Locke, and Horsley, whose writings are

extensively quoted in Watson's "Institutes of Theology" (reprinted by

Carlton & Lanahan, New York).]

1st. The invalidity of "_the principle of causality_" is asserted by

this author. "We allow that the argument which proves that the _effects_

with which we are surrounded have been _caused_, and thus leads us up

through a chain of subordinate causes to one First Cause, has a

simplicity, an obviousness, and a force which, when we are previously

furnished with the idea of God, makes it, at first sight, difficult to

conceive that men, under any degree of cultivation, should be inadequate

to it; yet if ever the human mind commenced such an inquiry at all, it

is highly probable that it would rest in the notion of an _eternal

succession of causes and effects_, rather than acquire the ideas of

creation, in the proper sense, and of a Supreme Creator."[357] "We feel

that our reason rests with full satisfaction in the doctrine that all

things are created by one eternal and self-existent Being; but the Greek

philosophers held that matter was eternally co-existent with God. This

was the opinion of Plato, who has been called the Moses of

philosophy."[358]

For a defense of "the principle of causality" we must refer the reader

to our remarks on the philosophy of Comte. We shall now only remark on

one or two peculiarities in the above statement which betray an utter

misapprehension of the nature of the argument. We need scarcely direct

attention to the unfortunate and, indeed, absurd phrase, "an eternal

succession of causes and effects." An "eternal succession" is a

_contradictio in adjecto_, and as such inconceivable and unthinkable. No

human mind can "rest" in any such thing, because an eternal succession

is no rest at all. All "succession" is finite and temporal, capable of

numeration, and therefore can not be eternal.[359] Again, in attaining

the conception of a First Cause the human mind does not pass up "through

a chain of subordinate causes," either definite or indefinite, "to one

First Cause."

[Footnote 357: Watson's "Institutes of Theology," vol. i. p. 273.]

[Footnote 358: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 21.]

[Footnote 359: See _ante_, pp. 181, 182, ch. v.]

Let us re-state the principle of causality as a universal and necessary

law of thought. "_All phenomena present themselves to us as the

expression of_ POWER, and refer us to a causal ground whence they

issue." That "power" is intuitively and spontaneously apprehended by the

human mind as Supreme and Ultimate--"the causal ground" is a personal

God. All the phenomena of nature present themselves to us as "effects,"

and we know nothing of "subordinate causes" except as modes of the

Divine Efficiency.[360] The principle of causality compels us to think

causation behind nature, and under causation to think of Volition.

"Other forces we have no sort of ground for believing; or, except by

artifices of abstraction, even power of conceiving. The dynamic idea is

either this or nothing; and the logical alternative assuredly is that

nature is either a mere Time-march of phenomena or an expression of

Mind."[361] The true doctrine of philosophy, of science, and of

revelation is not simply that God did create "in the beginning," but

that he still creates. All the operations of Nature are the operations

of the Divine Mind. "Thou takest away their breath, they die, and return

to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created; and thou

renewest the face of the earth."[362]

[Footnote 360: The modern doctrine of the Correlation and Homogenity of

all Forces clearly proves that they are not many, but _one_--"a dynamic

self-identity masked by transmigration."--Martineau's "Essays," pp.

134-144.]

[Footnote 361: Martineau's "Essays," pp. 140, 141.]

[Footnote 362: Psalm civ.]

The assertion that Plato taught "the eternity of matter," and that

consequently he did not arrive at the idea of a Supreme and Ultimate

Cause, is incapable of proof. The term ylê=matter does not occur in the

writings of Plato, or, indeed, of any of his predecessors, and is

peculiarly Aristotelian. The ground of the world of sense is called by

Plato "the receptacle" (ypodochê), "the nurse" (tithênê) of all that is

produced, and was apparently identified, in his mind, with _pure

space_--a logical rather than a physical entity--the mere negative

condition and medium of Divine manifestation. He never regards it as a

"cause," or ascribes to it any efficiency. We grant that he places this

very indefinite something (opoionoun ti) out of the sphere of temporal

origination; but it must be borne in mind that he speaks of "creation in

eternity" as well as of "creation in time;" and of time itself, though

created, as "an eternal image of the generating Father."[363] This one

thing, at any rate, can not be denied, that Plato recognizes creation in

its fullest sense as the act of God.

The admission that something has always existed besides the Deity, as a

mere logical condition of the exercise of divine power (_e.g._, space),

would not invalidate the argument for the existence of God. The proof of

the Divine Existence, as Chalmers has shown, does not rest on the

existence of matter, but on the orderly arrangement of matter; and the

grand question of Theism is not whether the _matter of the world_, but

whether the _present order of the world_ had a commencement.[364]

2d. Doubt is cast by our author upon the validity of "_the principle of

the Unconditioned or the Infinite_." "Supposing it were conceded that

some faint glimmering of this great truth [the existence of a First

Cause] might, by induction, have been discovered by contemplative minds,

by what means could they have _demonstrated_ to themselves that he is

eternal, self-existent, immortal, and independent?"[365] "Between things

visible and invisible, time and eternity, beings finite and beings

infinite, objects of sense and objects of faith, _the connection is not

perceptible_ to human observation. Though we push our researches,

therefore, to the extreme point whither the light of nature can carry

us, they will in the end be abruptly terminated, and we must stop short

at an immeasurable distance between the creature and the Creator."[366]

[Footnote 363: Plato, "Timæus," § xiv.]

[Footnote 364: Chalmers's "Natural Theology," bk. i. ch. v.; also

Mahan's "Natural Theology," pp. 21-23.]

[Footnote 365: Watson's "Institutes of Theol.," vol. i. p. 274.]

[Footnote 366: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 273.]

To this assertion that the connection of things visible and things

invisible, finite and infinite, objects of sense and objects of faith,

is utterly imperceptible to human thought, we might reply by quoting the

words of that Sacred Book whose supreme authority our author is seeking,

by this argument, to establish. "The _invisible_ things of God, even his

eternal power and god-head, from the creation, are clearly _seen_, being

_understood by the things which are made_." We may also point to the

fact that in every age and in every land the human mind has

spontaneously and instinctively recognized the existence of an invisible

Power and Presence pervading nature and controlling the destinies of

man, and that religious worship--prayer, and praise, and

sacrifice--offered to that unseen yet omnipresent Power is an universal

fact of human nature. The recognition of an _immediate_ and a

_necessary_ "connection" between the visible and the invisible, the

objects of sense and the objects of faith, is one of the most obvious

facts of consciousness--of universal consciousness as revealed in

history, and of individual consciousness as developed in every rational

mind.

That this connection is "not perceptible to human observation," if by

this our author means "not perceptible to sense," we readily admit. No

one ever asserted it was perceptible to human observation. We say that

this connection is perceptible to human _reason_, and is revealed in

every attempt to think about, and seek an explanation of, the phenomenal

world. The Phenomenal and the Real, Genesis and Being, Space and

Extension, Succession and Duration, Time and Eternity, the Finite and

the Infinite, are correlatives which are given in one and the same

indivisible act of thought. "The conception of one term of a relation

necessarily implies that of the other; it being the very nature of a

correlative to be thinkable only through the conjunct thought of its

correlative; for a relation is, in truth, a thought one and indivisible;

and whilst the thinking of one relation necessarily involves the thought

of its two terms, so it is, with equal necessity, itself involved in the

thought of either."[367] Finite, dependent, contingent, temporal

existence, therefore, necessarily supposes infinite, self-existent,

independent, eternal Being; the Conditioned and Relative implies the

Unconditioned and Absolute--one is known only in and through the other.

But inasmuch as the unconditioned is cognized solely _à priori_, and the

conditioned solely _à posteriori_, the recognition by the human mind of

their necessary correlation becomes the bridge whereby the chasm between

the subjective and the objective may be spanned, and whereby Thought may

be brought face to face with Existence.

[Footnote 367: Hamilton's "Metaphysics," vol. ii. pp. 536, 537.]

The reverence which, from boyhood, we have entertained for the

distinguished author of the "Institutes" restrains us from speaking in

adequate terms of reprobation of the statement that "the _First Cause_"

may be known, and yet not conceived "as eternal, self-existent,

immortal, and independent". Surely that which is the ground and reason

of all existence must have the ground and reason of its own existence in

itself. That which is _first_ in the order of existence, and in the

logical order of thought, can have nothing prior to itself. If the

supposed First Cause is not necessarily self-existent and independent,

it is not the _first_; if it has a dependent existence, there must be a

prior being on which it depends. If the First Cause is not eternal, then

prior to this Ultimate Cause there was nothingness and vacuity, and pure

nothing, by its own act, became something. But "_Ex nihilo nihil_" is a

universal law of thought. To ask the question whether the First Cause be

self-existent and eternal, is, in effect, to ask the question "who made

God?" and this is not the question of an adult theologian, but of a

little child. Surely Mr. Watson must have penned the above passage

without any reflection on its real import[368].

[Footnote 368: In an article on "the Impending Revolution in Anglo-Saxon

Theology" Methodist Quarterly Review, (July, 1863), Dr. Warren seems to

take it for granted that the "aiteological" and "teleological" arguments

for the existence of God are utterly invalidated by the Dynamical theory

of matter. "Once admit that _real power_ can and does reside in matter,

and all these reasonings fail. If inherent forces of matter are

competent to the production of all the innumerable miracles of movement

in the natural world, what is there in the natural world which they can

not produce. If all _the exertions of power_ in the universe can be

accounted for without resort to something back of, and superior to,

nature, what is there which can force the mind to such a resort?" (p.

463). "Having granted that _power_, or _self-activity_, is a natural

attribute of all matter, what right have we to deny it _intelligence_?"

(p. 465). "_Self-moving matter must have thought and design_" (p. 469).

It is not our intention to offer an extended criticism of the above

positions in this note. We shall discuss "the Dynamical theory" more

fully in a subsequent work. If the theory apparently accepted by Dr.

Warren be true, that "_the ultimate atoms of matter are as uniformly

efficient as minds_, and that we have the same ground to regard the

force exerted by the one _innate_ and _natural_ as that exerted by the

other" (p. 464), then we grant that the conclusions of Dr. Warren, as

above stated, are unavoidable. We proceed one step farther, and boldly

assert that the existence of God is, on this hypothesis, incapable of

proof, and the only logical position Dr. Warren can occupy is that of

spiritualistic Pantheism.

Dr. Warren asserts that "the Dynamical theory of matter" is now

generally accepted by "Anglo-Saxon _naturalists_." "One can scarcely

open a scientific treatise without observing the altered stand-point"

(p. 160). We confess that we are disappointed with Dr. Warren's

treatment of this simple question of fact. On so fundamental an issue,

the Doctor ought to have given the name of at least _one_ "naturalist"

who asserts that "the ultimate atoms of matter are as uniformly

efficient as minds." Leibnitz, Morrell, Ulrici, Hickok, the authorities

quoted by him, are metaphysicians and idealists of the extremest school.

At present we shall, therefore, content ourselves with a general denial

of this wholesale statement of Dr. Warren; and we shall sustain that

denial by a selection from the many authorities we shall hereafter

present. "No particle of matter possesses within itself the power of

changing its existing state of motion or of rest. Matter has no

spontaneous power either of rest or motion, but is equally susceptible

to each as it may be acted on by _external_ causes" (Silliman's

"Principles of Physics," p. 13). The above proposition is "a truth on

which the whole science of mechanical philosophy ultimately depends"

(Encyclopædia Britannica, art. "Dynamics," vol. viii. p. 326). "A

material substance existing alone in the universe could not produce any

effects. There is not, so far as we know, a self-acting material

substance in the universe" (M'Cosh, "Divine Government, Physical and

Moral," p. 78). "Perhaps the only true indication of matter is

_inertia_." "The cause of gravitation is _not resident_ in the particles

of matter merely," but also "_in all space_" (Dr. Faraday on

"Conservation of Force," in "Correlation and Conservation of Force." (p.

368). He also quotes with approbation the words of Newton, "That gravity

should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, is so great an

absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophic matters a

competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it" p. 368). "The

'force of gravity' is an improper expression" (p. 340). "Forces are

transformable, indestructible, and, _in contradistinction from matter_,

imponderable" (p. 346). "The first cause of things is Deity" (Dr. Mayer,

in "Correlation and Conservation of Force," p. 341). "Although the word

_cause_ may be used in a secondary and subordinate sense, as meaning

antecedent forces, yet in an abstract sense it is totally inapplicable;

we can not predicate of any physical agent that it is abstractedly the

cause of another" (p. 15). "Causation is the _will_," "creation is the

act, of God" Grove on "Correlation of Physical Forces," (p. 199).

"Between gravity and motion it is impossible to establish the equation

required for a rightly-conceived _causal_ relation" ("Correlation and

Conservation of Force," p. 253). See also Herschel's "Outlines of

Astronomy," p. 234.

It certainly must have required a wonderful effort of imagination on the

part of Dr. Warren to transform "weight" and "density," mere passive

affections of matter, into self-activity, intelligence, thought, and

design. Weight or density are merely relative terms. Supposing one

particle or mass of matter to exist alone, and there can be no

attractive or gravitating force. There must be a cause of gravity which

is distinct from matter.]

3d. The validity of "_the principle of unity_" is also discredited by

Watson. "If, however, it were conceded that some glimmerings of this

great truth, the existence of a First Cause, might, by induction, have

been discovered, by what means could they have demonstrated to

themselves that the great collection of bodies which we call the world

had but _one_ Creator."[369]

[Footnote 369: "Institutes of Theology," vol. i. p. 275.]

We might answer directly, and at once, that the oneness or unity of God

is necessarily contained in "the very notion of a First Cause"--a

_first_ cause is not many causes, but _one_. By a First Cause we do not,

however, understand the first of a numerical series, but an archê--a

principle, itself unbeginning, which is the source of all beginning. Our

categorical answer, therefore, must be that the unity of God is a

sublime deliverance of reason--God is one God. It is a first principle

of reason that all differentiation and plurality supposes an incomposite

unity, all diversity implies an indivisible identity. The sensuous

perception of a plurality of parts supposes the rational idea of an

absolute unity, which has no parts, as its necessary correlative. For

example, extension is a congeries of indefinitesimal parts; the

continuity of matter, as _empirically_ known by us, is never absolute.

Space is absolutely continuous, incapable of division into integral

parts, illimitable, and, as _rationally_ known by us, an absolute unity.

The cognition of limited extension, which is the subject of quantitative

measurement, involves the conception of unlimited space, which is the

negation of all plurality and complexity of parts. And so the cognition

of a phenomenal universe in which we see only difference, plurality, and

change, implies the existence of a Being who is absolutely unchangeable,

identical, and one.

This law of thought lies at the basis of that universal desire of unity,

and that universal effort to reduce all our knowledge to unity, which

has revealed itself in the history of philosophy, and also of inductive

science. "Reason, intellect, nous, concatenating thoughts and objects

into system, and tending upward from particular facts to general laws,

from general laws to universal principles, is never satisfied in its

ascent till it comprehends all laws in a single formula, and consummates

all conditional knowledge in the unity of unconditional existence." "The

history of philosophy is only the history of this tendency, and

philosophers have borne ample testimony to its reality. 'The mind,' says

Anaxagoras, 'only knows when it subdues its objects, when it reduces the

many to the one.' 'The end of philosophy,' says Plato, 'is the intuition

of unity.' 'All knowledge,' say the Platonists, 'is the gathering up

into one, and the indivisible apprehension of this unity by the knowing

mind.'"[370]

[Footnote 370: Hamilton's "Metaphysics," vol. i. pp. 68, 69.]

This law has been the guiding principle of the Inductive Sciences, and

has led to some of its most important discoveries. The unity which has

been attained in physical science is not, however, the absolute unity of

a material substratum, but a unity of _Will_ and of _Thought_. The late

discovery of the monogenesis, reciprocal convertibility, and

indestructibility of all Forces in nature, leads us upward towards the

recognition of one Omnipresent and Omnipotent Will, which, like a mighty

tide, sweeps through the universe and effects all its changes. The

universal prevalence of the same physical laws and numerical relations

throughout all space, and of the same archetypal forms and teleology of

organs throughout all past time, reveals to us a Unity of Thought which

grasps the entire details of the universe in one comprehensive

plan.[371] The positive _à priori_ intuitions of reason and the _à

posteriori_ inductions of science equally attest _that God is one_.

[Footnote 371: We refer with pleasure to the articles of Dr. Winchell,

in the North-western Christian Advocate, in which the _à posteriori_

proof of "the Unity of God" is forcibly exhibited, and take occasion to

express the hope they will soon be presented to the public in a more

permanent form.]

4th. By denying that man has any intuitive cognitions of right and

wrong, or any native and original feeling of obligation, Mr. Watson

invalidates "the moral argument" for the existence of a Righteous God.

"As far as man's reason has applied itself to the discovery of truth or

_duty_ it has generally gone astray."[372] "Questions of morals do not,

for the most part, lie level to the minds of the populace."[373] "Their

conclusions have no _authority_, and place them under no

_obligation_."[374] And, indeed, man without a revelation "is without

_moral control_, without _principles of justice_, except such as may be

slowly elaborated from those relations which concern the grosser

interests of life, without _conscience_, without hope or fear in another

life."[375]

[Footnote 372: "Institutes of Theology," vol. ii. p. 470.]

[Footnote 373: Ibid., vol. i. p. 15.]

[Footnote 374: Ibid., vol. i. p. 228.]

[Footnote 375: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 271.]

Now we shall not occupy our space in the elaboration of the proposition

that the universal consciousness of our race, as revealed in human

history, languages, legislations, and sentiments, bears testimony to the

fact that the ideas of right, duty, and responsibility are native to the

human mind; we shall simply make our appeal to those Sacred Writings

whose verdict must be final with all theologians. That the fundamental

principles of the moral law do exist, subjectively, in all human minds

is distinctly affirmed by Paul, in a passage which deserves to be

regarded as the chief corner-stone of moral science. "The Gentiles

(ephnê, heathen), which have not the written law, do by the guidance of

nature (reason or conscience) the works enjoined by the revealed law;

these, having no written law, are a law unto themselves; who show

plainly the works of the law written on their hearts, their conscience

bearing witness, and also their reasonings one with another, when they

accuse, or else excuse, each other."[376] To deny this is to relegate

the heathen from all responsibility. For Mr. Watson admits "that the

will of a superior is not in justice binding unless it be in some mode

sufficiently declared." Now in the righteous adjudgments of revelation

the heathen are "without excuse." The will of God must, therefore, be

"sufficiently declared" to constitute them accountable. Who will presume

to say that the shadowy, uncertain, variable, easily and unavoidably

corrupted medium of tradition running through forty muddy centuries is a

"sufficient declaration of the will of God?" The law is "written on the

heart" of every man, or all men are not accountable.

[Footnote 376: Romans, ch. ii. ver. 14-15.]

Now this "law written within the heart" immediately and naturally

suggests the idea of a Lawgiver who is over us. This felt presence of

Conscience, approving or condemning our conduct, suggests, as with the

speed of the lightning-flash, the notion of a Judge who will finally

call us to account. This "accusing or excusing of each other," this

recognition of good or ill desert, points us to, and constrains us to

recognize, a future Retribution; so that some hope or fear of another

life has been in all ages a universal phenomenon of humanity.

It is affirmed, however, that whilst this capacity to know God may have

been an original endowment of human nature, yet, in consequence of the

fall, "the understanding and reason are weakened by the deterioration of

his whole intellectual nature."[377] "Without some degree of education,

man is _wholly_ the creature of appetite. Labor, feasting, and sleeping

divide his time, and wholly occupy his thoughts."[378]

[Footnote 377: "Institutes of Theology," vol. i. p. 15.]

[Footnote 378: Ibid., vol. i. p. 271.]

We reverently and believingly accept the teaching of Scripture as to the

depravity of man. We acknowledge that "the understanding is darkened" by

sin. At the same time, we earnestly maintain that the Scriptures do not

teach that the fundamental laws of mind, the first principles of reason,

are utterly traversed and obliterated by sin, so that man is not able to

recognize the existence of God, and feel his obligation to Him. "_Though

they_(the heathen) _knew God_ (dioti gnontes), they did not glorify him

as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imagination, and

their foolish hearts were darkened. They changed the truth of God into a

lie, and worshipped and served the creature _more_ than the Creator."

"And as they did not _approve of holding God with acknowledgment_, God

delivered them over to an unapproving mind, to work those things which

are not suitable." After drawing a fearful picture of the darkness and

depravity of the heathen, the Apostle adds, "Who, _though they_ KNOW

_the law of God_, that they who practise such things are worthy of

death, not only do them, but even are well pleased with those who

practise them."[379] The obvious and direct teaching of this passage is

that the heathen, in the midst of their depravity and idolatry, are not

utterly ignorant of God; "they _know_ God"--"they _know_ the law of God

"--"they worship Him," though they worship the creature _more than_ Him.

They know God, and are unwilling to "acknowledge God." "They know the

righteousness of God," and are "haters of God" on account of his purity;

and their worshipping of idols does not proceed from ignorance of God,

from an intellectual inability to know God, but from "corruption of

heart," and a voluntary choice of, and a "pleasure" in, the sinful

practices accompanying idol worship. Therefore, argues the Apostle, they

are "without excuse." The whole drift and aim of the argument of Paul

is, not to show that the heathen were, by their depravity, incapacitated

to know God, but that because they knew God and knew his righteous law,

therefore their depravity and licentiousness was "inexcusable."

[Footnote 379: Romans, ch. i. ver. 23-32.]

We conclude our review of opposing schools by the re-affirmation of our

position, _that God is cognizable by human reason._ The human mind,

under the guidance of necessary laws of thought, is able, from the facts

of the universe, to affirm the existence of God, and to attain some

valid knowledge of his character and will. Every attempt to solve the

great problem of existence, to offer an explanation of the phenomenal

world, or to explore the fundamental idea of reason, when fairly and

fully conducted, has resulted in the recognition of a Supreme

_Intelligence_, a personal _Mind_ and _Will_, as the ground, and reason,

and cause of all existence. A survey of the history of Greek Philosophy

will abundantly sustain this position, and to this we shall, in

subsequent chapters, invite the reader's attention.