CHAPTER XXV

THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWARD THE JUDICIARY

Americans are proud of their country and of their State. They

are proud of their scheme of government, by which an imperial

world-power has been created for certain national and

international purposes, resting on a collection of States, each

of which is an independent sovereignty, absolutely as respects

the others, and for the most part as respects the United States.

They are in the mass an educated and intelligent people. The

public schools have thus far been found adequate to Americanizing

the children of foreign immigrants. The colored population of

the South stands largely by itself, and constitutes no active and

self-moving force in matters of political concern. An educated

and intelligent people living under a government of written law

of their own making cannot but know how vital it is that this law

should be fully guarded and fairly administered. Americans have

become distrustful of their legislatures. They believe that much

of their work is ill-considered, and that some of it has its

source in corruption. They are far removed from the chief

executive magistrates, and from the sphere in which they move.

The President comes nearer to them than the Governor of their

State because he stands for more, and personifies their country,

but it is not from him that they look for peace and safety in the

ordinary affairs of life and home. They look for these to the

courts, and they know that they will seldom look in vain.

Only an educated and intelligent people can live under a written

Constitution. It requires of those whom it governs a certain

spirit of conservatism, a certain sentiment of reverence for

ancient institutions. Our Constitutions are mainly the work of

former generations. We may amend or recast them, but the

substantial framework will remain the same. Our Declarations of

Rights speak the language and the lessons of the eighteenth

century. Their provisions are almost wholly aimed at our

executives and legislators. They give guarantees which the

judiciary only can enforce. No people can steadily prosper

unless a just mean be preserved between reform and conservatism

in the administration of the government. The courts stand for

conservatism, but by their recognition of custom as law, and

their free use of logic and analogy to develop law, they also

keep a door open for the entrance of reform.

The courts also come very close to the people. They are to be

found in every county and almost every township. They settle the

estates of the dead. They protect the living. They act largely

through juries made up of the people and returning to them after

a brief term of public service.

All these considerations put Americans in a friendly attitude

toward the judiciary. It makes less show of authority than the

policeman or the militiaman. But the people feel that it has

authority and is ready to exercise it always to secure that right

be done. When a plain man who thinks that he has been wronged by

another declares that he "will have the law on him," it expresses

his conviction that he can get justice from the courts.

The creation of the judiciary of the United States was welcomed

at the outset by all.[Footnote: See "Life of Peter Van Schaick,"

435.] It was not until party feeling had become intense that

Republicans found it difficult to look with approval on a force

evidently becoming stronger every day, and that Jefferson could

describe the Supreme Court as the sappers and miners who were

gradually undermining the foundations of American

liberty.[Footnote: Letter to Thomas Ritchie of Dec. 25, 1870.

"Works of Thomas Jefferson," VII, 192.]

Of the political questions which engaged attention over the whole

country from time to time from the adoption of the Constitution

to the close of the Civil War, almost all bore some relation to

the institution of slavery and derived their real vitality from

that connection. Slavery depended on State laws. Unless the

authority of each State to allow and regulate it were preserved,

its countenance would be endangered. This was largely the source

of the "State Rights" cry.

Almost all the powers which the United States possessed the

States had lost. For thirteen years each had been in the

position of a full sovereign. Its courts had exercised

jurisdiction over all kinds of actions. Now a new set of courts

had risen up having over many actions an equal jurisdiction, over

some a superior one.[Footnote: See Chap. X.]

The case of Chisholm _v._ Georgia,[Footnote: 2 Dallas'

Reports, 419.] in 1793, and the institution of similar suits

against other States of the South showed that the Supreme Court

of the United States claimed authority to render a money judgment

against a State, which meant that it could then issue an

execution to collect it by levying on the property of the State.

In 1798, the Alien and Sedition Laws were passed, and a crime

previously cognizable exclusively in the State courts was made a

subject of prosecution in those of the United States if it

affected an officer of the United States. A member of Congress,

Matthew Lyon, of Vermont, who was sentenced in the Fall of that

year to a fine of $1,000 and four months in jail for writing of

the President and Senate, that his message to Congress in 1797

was a bullying speech, which the Senate in a stupid answer had

echoed with more servility than ever Geo. III. experienced from

either house of parliament, served his time and paid the fine,

but for the amount of the latter he was reimbursed by Congress in

1840.

The case of Jonathan Robbins[Footnote: See Chap. III.] in South

Carolina in 1799, showed that the Circuit Court at the request of

the President could surrender an American citizen to a foreign

government to be carried off and tried for murder. This and the

sentence of Lyon became immediately the subject of hot discussion

in Congress, and both contributed to the political revolution

which put Jefferson in the seat of Adams in 1801.

The creation by the outgoing party of places for eighteen new

Circuit Judges appointed by Adams in the last month of his

administration strengthened the popular feeling that the courts

of the United States were too powerful. That Act was at once

repealed,[Footnote: See Chaps. IX, XXII.] and also the provision

for the next regular term of the Supreme Court. The latter

measure was taken to prevent any legal proceedings in the Supreme

Court to secure its intervention in behalf of the displaced

judges.

The new circuit system had been swept away, but the full bench at

Washington, headed by Marshall, remained. The unsuccessful

impeachment of one of them followed in 1804.[Footnote: See

Chap. III.]

His acquittal the next year, and that of a majority of the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,[Footnote: McMaster, "History of

the United States," III, 159.] who were impeached there at the

same time for punishing a libel on certain proceedings before

that court by a sentence of imprisonment, satisfied all that it

was practically impossible to secure the removal of a judge

except for the gravest cause. Judicial independence had been

secured by the very struggle to defeat it. What has won in any

contest finds favor with the multitude. They admire a victor.

From this time on the courts both of the United States and the

States grew in public esteem. When those of the former seemed to

trench on the fields of State sovereignty, particularly in the

South, the inroad was resented.[Footnote: See letters of Marshall

alluding to this, in "Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical

Society," 2d Series, XIV, 325, 327, 329, 330.] In one Southern

State it was even opposed by force.[Footnote: See Chap. X.] As

late as 1854 the supremacy of the Supreme Court of the United

States in expounding the federal Constitution was contested by

the courts of a Northern State; there also in a case growing out

of the system of slavery.[Footnote: Ableman _v._ Booth, 21

Howard's Reports, 506.]

Another decision by the same tribunal of a similar nature--that

in the Dred Scott case[Footnote: Dred Scott _v._ Sandford,

19 Howard's Reports, 393.]--greatly strengthened the confidence

of the Southern people in the federal courts, and weakened that

of the North.

It did much to bring on the Civil War, but the result of that

struggle was to confirm the authority not only of the Supreme

Court but of the Supreme Court as it was under Marshall and his

original associates. In 1901, the centenary of his appointment

was celebrated all over the country, North and South. Such a

tribute was never paid before in any country to the memory of a

judge. His services were commemorated for the very reason that

led Jefferson to depreciate them--because they led to the

establishment of a strong national government with a controlling

judicial authority adequate to protect it within its sphere from

interference or obstruction in any way by any State.

Confidence in the State courts has also been strengthened during

the last century. It was greatly shaken at the time of the fall

of the Federalists. They had lost the executive and legislative

power, but they retained the judicial, and the Republicans found

it hard to tolerate courts that represented the political ideas

of a former generation. This continued long after the extinction

of the Federalist party, and often extended to distrust of judges

elected by the Republicans who were thought to have become

affected by the influence of their senior associates.

In the New York constitutional convention of 1821, Peter

R. Livingston appealed to the lawyers present to say "whether it

has not been the case that when a man in the country of any

political standing has had a suit depending at a circuit court,

he has not consulted with his counsel to know what judge was to

preside at the circuit; and whether he has not been frequently

told that a political judge was to preside and it would not do to

let the cause come on."[Footnote: Reports of the Proceedings and

Debates of the Convention of 1821, 618.] Who, he asked, were the

present judges of their Supreme Court? "Judge Spencer came into

office under a republican administration; Judge Van Ness was

appointed by a mongrel council; and the elevation to the bench of

Judge Platt was occasioned by the defection from the Republican

ranks of a man elected to the Senate from the county of Dutchess,

who acted the part of a political Judas, and sold his party. We

have been bought and sold--there is not one of these men who

would have been on the bench if our administration had been truly

republican.... There is not a man in this Convention who is a

republican of any standing or character who would like to have

his liberty or property placed in the hands of a political judge

of a different party."[Footnote: Reports of the Proceedings and

Debates of the Convention of 1821, 620.]

The judiciary may also have suffered somewhat in the esteem of

dispassionate observers on account of its attitude in many of the

States toward the financial enterprises in corporate form, in

which so much money was made and lost in the first third of the

nineteenth century. In commenting on a judicial opinion in a

Southern bank case, the author of one of our leading American

legal treatises, himself once a judge, has referred to this

period in these plain words:

Decisions of this kind, which were not infrequent in the era of

State banks of issue, can only be "reconciled" with modern

holdings in view of the well-known fact that nearly all the

politicians were creditors of those political banks, by notes

often renewed, at the time when they finally suspended, and

that all the judges were politicians. It can hardly be doubted

that in many of those semi-barbarous decisions the judges were

either rendering decisions to exonerate themselves from their

liabilities to the insolvent banks or to exonerate powerful and

influential politicians upon whom they depended for the tenure

of their offices.[Footnote: Thompson on "Private Corporations,"

V, p. 5306.]

It is quite probable that an insensible bias in favor of friends

and neighbors may have had its share in producing the judgments

to which reference was thus made, but quite improbable that they

were the fruit of baser motives. Independently of other

considerations, every judge is watched by sharp eyes in every

step which he may take in the progress of a cause. He acts in

view of the bar at large, and of two of their number in

particular, one of whom probably will be disappointed by his

decision, and solicitous to ascertain and employ every reasonable

ground for overturning it.

The Bar Association of the country have exercised a large

influence during the past thirty years in maintaining public

confidence in the purity of the bench.

It is extremely rare that suspicion of corruption attaches to a

judge; and rarer still that it attaches justly. Jurors are

occasionally found who are guilty of it, and more who, without

being chargeable with so black a crime, are more interested in

serving a friend than in doing justice. As a whole, however,

American courts are clean-handed throughout, and the people know

it.

The judiciary has been popularized in most States by

constitutional provisions replacing tenure during good behavior

by stated terms of years, and appointment by the Governor or

legislature by election by the people.

The powers of judges have been on the whole increased. The only

matter in which they have been substantially cut down is that of

punishment for contempt. Serious attempts have been made to

abridge their jurisdiction over injunctions, but without success.

These attacks have come from those representing certain labor

unions. The more thorough organization of working-men in all

trades and callings during the last half century, and the

development of collectivism as a working theory, have produced a

class of leaders among them who regard the courts as manned by

representatives of capital and controlled in the interests of

capital.[Footnote: The number of the _Pennsylvania Grange

News_ for Sept., 1904, states this view at length.] As a

judicial office can only be properly filled by one who has had a

legal education and as, aside from a few petty magistrates and

local tribunals, practically all our judges are trained lawyers,

it necessarily follows that they cannot belong to the class of

working-men in the general acceptation of that term. Their

education has cost money and is generally the fruit of capital.

The judges of the higher courts are usually men of some means.

If they were not, they could not have afforded to accept their

places. But the people at large do not believe that only the

poor man can be relied on to deal justly on the bench. The mass

of working-men do not believe it. They do believe that courts

have too much power over them in their associated relations.

They are in favor of cutting off the right of issuing injunctions

to suppress boycotts or "picketing" in case of strikes. But they

know that it is from the legislatures and not from the courts

that this must be sought.

The federal judges stand higher in public estimation than the

State judges of corresponding rank. This is partly on account of

the paramount authority of the government which they represent.

It is partly also because there are none of them who occupy the

lower grades of judicial station with a petty jurisdiction over

petty controversies. It is more because of their permanence of

tenure. This removes them from that field of criticism which

surrounds every public officer who holds for a term limited in

duration, and is always in the position of a candidate for

re-appointment.

Our methods of judicial appointment are not such as always to

exclude political feeling from the bench either of the States or

of the United States, but the people know that there is less of

it there than in any other department of governmental action.

President Hadley of Yale University has thus expressed what is

the general view of the work of the courts held by thoughtful men

in the United States; and it is they who in the long run form and

lead public opinion.

"On the whole, federal and State courts alike have been not only

a protection, but the one really efficient protection of minority

interests against oppression by the majority.... It has more

than once happened that an impatient majority has denounced these

courts as instruments of partisanship. The anti-slavery leaders,

the soft money leaders, and the labor leaders have in turn taken

exception to their utterances, and even ventured to impugn their

motives. But I think that most intelligent men who know the

history of the country will say that our courts have been the

real bulwarks of American liberty; and that while Hamilton and

his associates would be somewhat disappointed in the working of

the machinery of legislation and administration if they could see

it in its present shape, they would be filled with admiration at

the work which has been accomplished by the judiciary. I believe

it to be the judgment of sober-minded men that the courts have

furnished the agency which has guarded us against excesses, and

have saved the American republic from the necessity of repeating

the successive revolutionary experiences which France underwent

before she could attain to a stable democracy."[Footnote:

"Freedom and Responsibility," 23, 24.]

This confidence in and respect for the judiciary as a whole has

increased with the general advance of the country in population

and wealth. There have been larger questions with which to deal,

and the courts have been found adequate to the task. But at the

same time the personal consequence and reputation of every

individual American judge has been steadily decreasing. As

States multiply and the range of litigation widens, the work of

judicial exposition of legal principles comes to be shared by so

many hands that what any one man does is of comparatively small

account. There is no room for star players upon the stage.

Broad as it is, it is too crowded for one to make a conspicuous

place for himself and stand as Marshall or Story, Kent or

Parsons, did, apart from his fellows. Popular confidence is now

not placed in courts because this or that man is the ruling

spirit in them. It is impersonal and attaches itself to the

institution of the judiciary as, all things considered, the best

guaranty of good government in the United States.

This spirit of confidence is, of course, not universal and

unqualified. It is often not found in bodies of working men,

associated as Labor Unions. They have repeatedly found a court

enforcing public order in a way that interfered with their manner

of conducting a strike. They have been met by injunctions, and

more often by criminal prosecutions. The membership of a Labor

Union, in many parts of the country, is apt to be largely of

foreign birth. The leaders not infrequently know little of the

English language and less of American institutions. They have

been led, in their native land, to regard the law and its

officers as their enemies, and they look at them in the same way

here. It is believed, however, that a large majority of the

Unions regard them with respect, and it is certain that such is

the prevailing feeling of non-union men.

But that the public trust in our judges is less than it was when

the first edition of this work was published,[Footnote: See

_supra_, page 340.] is indicated by the favor with which, in

many quarters, the doctrine of the "judicial recall" has been

received. The dangers incident to its practice are obvious, and

seem far to outweigh any attending advantages.

In the United States, of all lands on the face of the earth, it

is important that the judges should act with resolution and

without thought of the consequences personal to themselves.

Elsewhere in form, but here only in fact, are judges armed with

the power of declaring legislative action void which is in

conflict with a higher form of law, that proceeded directly from

the people, and mainly from the people of a former generation.

To expose one who exercises this power to immediate displacement,

by a popular vote--largely, perhaps, composed of his political

opponents--is to invite the enactment of questionable statutes,

and still worse--to weaken the attractions of the bench for able

and honest men. Our judicial terms, in most of the States, are

already too brief for the public good. To make them determinable

at the will of the electoral constituency tends powerfully to

keep good lawyers at the bar, who might otherwise have done honor

to a judicial station.

End of Project Gutenberg's The American Judiciary, by Simeon E. Baldwin

The American Judiciary · 第 17 / 17 章