Go to the Library of one of our Colleges; survey its five, or ten
thousand volumes. You are astonished, that human thought or human
industry could have produced such an accumulation of quarto upon
folio, of duodecimo upon octavo--of Science, Literature--of History,
Fiction--of Prose, and Poetry. But look into other collections
northward of us, and in each, of several, you find more than forty
thousand volumes! When you have wondered sufficiently at these, turn
your 'mind's eye' to Europe; and behold, libraries containing each one
hundred, or even one hundred and fifty thousand books! Look around
you, then, and see how many hundreds every week is adding to the mass
of tomes already in existence. Glance at the book-sellers'
catalogues--at their notices in the gazette--at the _monthly and
quarterly_ "Lists of New Publications," in Magazines and Reviews--at
the countless host of Reviews and Magazines themselves, and of
newspapers, tracts, pamphlets, speeches, addresses--effusions of ten
thousand various forms and merits--craving your attention and
bewildering your choice! Go forth into society: in one circle,
politics--in another, canalling, or railroad lore--in a third, some
point touching the Campaigns of Bonaparte, the Wars of the League, the
American Revolution, or the Conquests of Tamerlane--in a fourth, the
beauties of Greek and Roman literature--in a fifth, some topic in
Chemistry or Geology--in a sixth, Byron, Campbell, Moore and
Wordsworth--in a seventh, the fifty last novels--are discussed by
their respective coteries, each, as if _that_ subject alone threw all
others into the shade. And if you are not so torpid as to be incapable
of excitement by sympathy with others, and by themes inherently
interesting, or so self-possessed as to curb and regulate discreetly,
the curiosity and proneness to imitation which will on such occasions
be kindled in any but a blockhead--you cannot, for your life, help
wishing to be familiar with each theme. You go home; and plunge
headlong into a dozen different studies. Your acquisitions are huddled
chaotically into your knowledge-box, so that you have a full, distinct
idea, of no one subject: you can never get hold of what you want, at
the moment when you need it; but must rummage over an immense pile of
trumpery, with a bare _hope_, after all, of finding the useful article
you want. _You are a shallow smatterer._
If you would be otherwise, DARE _to be ignorant_ of all books, and all
things, which you are not sure will repay your trouble in reading
them, or which are not parts of a pre-arranged course, laid down for
you by yourself, or by some judicious friend. DARE to disavow an
acquaintance with a fashionable novel, or even with a fashionable
science, if it fall not within your plan. Always reflect, when the
claims of a new book are pressed upon your notice,--that, _if you have
forty years to employ in reading, and can read fifty pages a day, you
will be able, in those forty years, to accomplish only about_ SIXTEEN
HUNDRED VOLUMES, _of 500 pages each_. Yes--out of the millions of
tomes that litter the world, you can read, in twice the time that
most, even of the studious, employ in reading--only sixteen hundred
volumes! Surely, the motto of every one who reads for improvement,
ought to be "SELECT WELL!"
"It is a great, nay the _greatest_ part of wisdom," says an old
philosopher, "to rest content with not knowing some things."[1]
[Footnote 1: ----"magna, immo, maxima, pars sapientiæ est, quædam
æquo animo nescire velle."]
Dugald Stewart justly observes, that by confining our ambition to
pursue the truth with modesty and candor, and learning to value our
acquisitions only so far as they contribute to make us wiser and
happier, we may perhaps be obliged to sacrifice the temporary
admiration of the common dispensers of literary fame; but, we may rest
assured, it is thus only we can hope to make real progress in
knowledge, or to enrich the world with useful inventions.
"'It requires courage indeed' (as Helvetius has remarked,) 'to remain
ignorant of those useless subjects which are generally valued:' but it
is a courage necessary to men who either love the truth, or aspire to
establish a permanent reputation."[2]
[Footnote 2: Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. I.]
SKETCHES OF THE HISTORY AND PRESENT CONDITION OF TRIPOLI, WITH SOME
ACCOUNTS OF THE OTHER BARBARY STATES. NO. X.--(Continued.)
To return to Algiers. The Dey having as he conceived, effectually
closed every avenue to reconciliation with France, actively prepared
to resist the attack which he had every reason to believe would soon
be made on him. The fortifications of his capital had been much
enlarged and strengthened since the bombardment by Lord Exmouth in
1816; the arsenal was well provided with naval stores and munitions of
every description; the treasury was filled with specie, men were not
wanting, and provisions could be procured in abundance from the
interior. In this condition, he had no reason to dread an attack from
a naval force, nor the consequences of a blockade however rigorously
maintained. Against internal commotions he also felt himself secure.
From the commencement of his reign, he had steadily though cautiously
pursued the plan in which so many of his predecessors had failed, of
preventing the enrolment of foreigners, and supplying their places by
native troops; in this he had so far succeeded, that the number of the
former in 1827 was less than seven thousand, while he had more than
sixteen thousand Moorish soldiers, regularly disciplined and attached
to his system, by the strongest ties of interest. When the whole
military force of the country, consisted of a few foreigners, any one
of whom might be raised to the highest offices of the State at the
will of the remainder, {142} it is not surprising that dissatisfaction
and turbulence should have constantly prevailed; for under such
circumstances the election of a new chief only caused a change in the
ranks of the malcontents, without diminishing their numbers or their
violence. That the alteration made by Hussein would contribute vastly
to ensure the stability of his power, it is unnecessary to
demonstrate; it had been often attempted by his predecessors and it is
only extraordinary that it had not been effected long before.
Having secured this important object, Hussein no longer took pains to
conceal his views with regard to rendering the Sovereignty hereditary
in his family; he had no son, but his eldest daughter was married to
Ibrahim, whom he raised to the office of Aga or Commander of the
troops and Minister of War, and who appears to have been his intended
successor; that officer having no children, his nephew was married to
the Dey's youngest daughter, who was for that purpose divorced from
her husband. It was also probably in furtherance of the same ends,
that Hussein maintained a degree of state unusual in Algiers,
manifesting in his intercourse with the ministers and officers, that
he was a Prince, and not the mere chief of the Janizaries. In order to
insure his personal safety he seldom appeared in public, but remained
within the walls of the Casauba, surrounded by a chosen guard of
Moors, sufficiently strong to defend that fortress against any attack
which could be expected.
The French appeared by no means disposed to drive Hussein to
extremities; their squadron generally consisted of two frigates, and
four or five smaller vessels, which hovered before the entrance to the
bay, but offered little or no impediment to the passage of vessels
either outwards or inwards. Within a few days after the declaration of
war, several Algerine cruisers quitted the harbor, and committed great
ravages upon the unprotected commerce of France, sending their prizes
into various ports of Barbary, and even of Spain. The prisoners were
generally spared and brought to Algiers, in consequence of the Dey's
humane or politic proclamation, that he would give for each living
Frenchman twice as much as for his head alone. The inactivity and want
of skill thus displayed by the blockading squadron, at length
encouraged Hussein to bolder attempts. By great exertions, he had been
enabled at the end of September 1827, to have ready a frigate, two
corvettes, two brigs and six schooners in addition to the vessels at
sea; this force however not being sufficient either in size or in
weight of metal, to authorize a regular engagement with the heavy
ships of the French, his plan was to surprise some one of them at a
distance from the others, and endeavor to carry her by boarding. With
this intention, which was kept secret until the moment for carrying it
into execution, a number of soldiers accustomed to the sea having on
the morning of the 4th of October, been suddenly embarked in the
vessels, they set sail immediately and bore down upon the nearest
French ship. The movement was immediately perceived by the rest of the
squadron, and a general action, or at least a general discharge of
guns on both sides ensued; this having continued for some hours,
without any notable damage to either party, the Algerine Commander
found that it was impossible to board any of the French vessels as
they had the weather gauge of him, and in consequence he returned with
his whole force into port. This action is duly noticed in the French
papers; the commander of the squadron in his despatch, compliments his
officers highly for the success of their efforts in preventing the
Algerine flotilla from getting out of the harbor, and assures the
Minister of Marine, that nothing but the heaviness of the sea
prevented his destroying the greater part of them.
In the following spring, (1828) an offer was made by Admiral Collet to
renew the negotiations for peace; and after some difficulties, Captain
Bézart who commanded one of the French brigs, was allowed to enter
Algiers and communicate with the Sardinian Consul on the subject. He
subsequently had a conference with the Algerine Minister of Foreign
Affairs, the results of which induced the Admiral to despatch him to
Paris, in order to receive the instructions of their Government.
The French government probably received with satisfaction, the account
that the Algerines were disposed to treat for peace. The Martignac
Ministry which had just come into power, were employing every means to
secure the tottering throne of Charles the Tenth against the efforts
of the Liberal party, and they were anxious for the adjustment of a
dispute, which occasioned an enormous addition to the budget of
expenses without any return whatever. Dignity, or rather the fear of
wounding the vanity of the nation, however forbade their seeming to
make any advances after the Dey's insulting rejection of the demands
first proposed to him. Great care was therefore taken to avoid any
appearance of direct communication with the Algerine government; but
the Admiral was instructed unofficially to hint, that if the Dey would
send an ambassador to Paris, the differences between the two countries
might be accommodated.
With these instructions Bézart returned to the African coast. During
his absence Admiral Collet worn down with disease had retired to
Toulon where he shortly after died; Admiral Botherel de la Bretonniere
who succeeded to the command, on learning the views of the Ministers,
instantly wrote a letter to the Dey in the sense enjoined by them, and
despatched the Captain with it to Algiers. He arrived there on the
11th of September 1828, but when it was known that he only bore a
communication from the Admiral, he was not suffered to proceed farther
than the landing place on the mole, where he was required to await the
answer. A Barbary Prince of a more pliable character than Hussein,
might probably have gratified the French Ministers by sending an
Ambassador to Paris, who would have figured in the pages of the
Moniteur as a supplicant for peace; but the Dey was made of stubborn
stuff. He had expected a direct communication from the French
government, and was indignant at being addressed instead, by one of
its officers not even an authorized agent; moreover the letter
contained a proposition that he should take a humiliating step,
without any assurance that it would be attended with favorable
results. Seeing at once through the whole manœuvre of the French
government, his reply was a peremptory order to Bézart instantly to
quit Algiers.
A few days after, the same proposition was conveyed more distinctly to
the Dey through the Sardinian Consul, with an assurance on the part of
the Admiral, that his Government no longer expected apology or {143}
reparation, but wished merely to place affairs between the two nations
on their former footing. Hussein however remained firm in his refusal
to make any advances, only telling the Consul, that after Peace had
been signed at Algiers, he might perhaps to please the Ministers, send
them an Ambassador. The French Government finding its recommendations
thus treated, authorized the Sardinian Consul to inform the Dey, that
no farther overtures would be made by it towards reconciliation, and
that measures would be soon taken to obtain complete satisfaction for
the injury committed against France. Hussein coolly answered, that he
had men and ammunition in abundance, and that he preferred the fortune
of war to making or seeming to make any apology.
The destruction of three Algerine feluccas of six guns each, was the
next event worthy of note in the history of the war. These vessels
were returning from a successful cruise and endeavoring to enter the
harbor of Algiers on the 1st of October 1828, when they were
discovered and chased into the adjacent Bay of Sidi Ferruch. The prize
was soon recaptured; the other vessels took refuge close to the shore,
under a small and ruinous battery mounting twelve guns, where they
were attacked by the whole of the blockading squadron. After the first
fire, the feluccas and the battery were abandoned; boats were then
sent by the Admiral to destroy the vessels, which having been effected
the fire was continued on the battery until it was nearly demolished.
The loss on the side of the Algerines is believed to have been very
small; the French had six men killed and seventeen wounded, by the
bursting of a gun on board the Admiral's ship the Provence. This
trifling affair was made the subject of a special report by the
Minister of the Marine to the King of France, which may be found at
length in the Moniteur of the 17th of October; it was so far
important, as it enabled His Majesty to say in his Address to the
Legislative Chambers in January following, that--"most striking
examples had already taught the Algerines, that it was neither easy
nor safe to brave the vigilance of his ships."
Another attempt on the part of the French to teach the Algerines
prudence, was not attended with equal success; for on the 19th of June
1829, twenty-four of their men, who had landed in pursuit of the crew
of a stranded Algerine vessel, were surrounded by Arabs and put to
death. The heads of these unfortunate men were carried to Algiers,
where the Dey paid for them according to the tariff established; they
were however on the application of the Sardinian Consul immediately
delivered to him for burial.
The Government of France was by this time convinced of the futility of
the measures which had been for two years pursued with regard to
Algiers. The blockade had produced none of the results which were
anticipated; it had been maintained at an annual expense of more than
seven millions of francs, and although the number of persons killed in
action was small, yet many had fallen victims to the diseases
occasioned by the climate; in return the Dey appeared less inclined
than ever to agree to satisfactory terms of peace, and the commerce of
France in the Mediterranean had been severely injured by his cruisers.
The opposition had also taken advantage of the circumstances, and the
Ministry were frequently denounced in the Legislature and in the
public journals of Paris, for their vacillating and dishonoring
conduct in the affair.
Unable to resist these demonstrations of their own inefficiency, the
French Ministry prepared for more decisive operations, by assembling
troops in the Southern Departments of the Kingdom and collecting
vessels for their transportation. Before employing these extreme
measures however, they were induced to make one more attempt at
negotiation; the circumstances which led them thus to recede from the
determination expressed in the previous year, are reported to have
been the following.
The Dey had several times expressed to the Sardinian Consul, his
admiration of the form and sailings of a brig called the Alerte
belonging to the blockading squadron; something in his manner at
length induced the Consul to inform M. de la Bretonniere, that
possibly His Highness might be inclined to negotiate for peace, in the
manner desired by the French Government, if it were understood that
the brig would be presented to him after the signature of the treaty.
The Admiral eagerly accepted this overture as he considered it, and
authorized the Consul to say in general terms, that he had no doubt
the Government of France would willingly accede to the Dey's wishes in
this particular, if an arrangement of the difficulties between the two
countries could be effected. Hussein's reply was encouraging, and the
Admiral in consequence sailed for France to receive in person the
instructions of his Government. He found the Ministers anxious to have
the affair peaceably adjusted; they were ready to treat with the Dey
provided it could be made to appear that he had himself proposed the
negotiation, and were willing to promise the brig in return for the
mission of an Algerine Ambassador to Paris. The Admiral was
accordingly instructed to assure the Dey, that if he would comply with
this formality, peace would be immediately signed and the brig would
be presented to him; but in order that no proofs might exist of the
advances made by the French Ministry, the whole negotiation at Algiers
was to be conducted verbally, through an interpreter chosen for the
purpose from the School of Oriental Languages at Paris.
With these instructions, and accompanied by M. Bianchi the
interpreter, M. de la Bretonniere returned to the Bay of Algiers. The
Sardinian Consul, who undertook to arrange the preliminaries of the
negotiation proposed to the Dey that it should be conducted in
conferences between His Highness and the French interpreter, who had
arrived at Algiers for the purpose on the 23d of July. This, Hussein
immediately refused to allow, and the Admiral was thrown into the very
dilemma which he wished to avoid; that is to say he was obliged to
write a letter, or to abandon the attempt at negotiation. In order to
avoid this difficulty a letter was written in the Turkish language,
proposing in very general terms the renewal of former relations
between the two Governments, but saying nothing either about the
Ambassador or the brig. Hussein in reply expressed his satisfaction at
the offer which had been made by the French Admiral, whom he invited
to come on shore and confer personally with himself on the subject. M.
de la Bretonniere accepted this invitation, and accordingly entered
the harbor on the 30th of September 1829, in his flag ship the
Provence of eighty guns, {144} accompanied by the brig which had been
the proximate cause of the negotiation. He landed on the following
morning, and had a long conference with the Dey, of which the
particulars have not transpired. On the 3d of August they had another
conference, which lasted but a short time; on this occasion it is said
the Admiral insisted on the mission of an ambassador as an act of
reparation to France, at which the Dey became so enraged, that he
ordered him immediately to leave Algiers; certain it is that the
conference was suddenly broken up, and the parties separated, each in
a state of high excitement. M. de la Bretonniere immediately embarked,
and sailed with his ships out of the harbor; on passing by the Mole
the Provence received a shot from the fort, and although the flag of
truce was displayed at her mast head, the firing was continued until
she was beyond their reach. The ship is said to have received eighty
balls; her port holes were however kept closed, for had she returned
the fire, it is probable that she would have been sunk. That this
flagrant violation of good faith was the result of the Dey's orders,
no one in Algiers at the time for a moment doubted; Hussein however
pretended that it arose from a mistake, and that he had only ordered a
gun to be fired in case the ship should approach too near to the
batteries, as a signal for her to keep off. He moreover dismissed from
office the Minister of Marine, on whom the responsibility of the act
rested; in so doing however, he only advanced one of his own ends, for
the vacancy was immediately filled by the appointment of his
son-in-law Ibrahim Kara-Dengirzli, the nephew of the Aga Ibrahim.
The feeble and distracted Ministry which authorized this negotiation,
had been dissolved ere the news of its result arrived in France; and
those who succeeded to power in that country, though possessing energy
and union of purpose, were for some time wholly occupied in preparing
to confront the liberal party at the ensuing session of the
Legislature. No decisive measures were therefore taken with regard to
Algiers during the remainder of 1829; the blockade was indeed
maintained, but with so little rigor as to be scarcely more than
nominal; the Algerine cruisers were spread over the western part of
the Mediterranean, and occasionally appeared before Marseilles, while
the French Admiral with the greater part of his ships remained
generally at Port Mahon.
Attempts were made at this period, to effect an adjustment of the
differences, by the Governments of Great Britain and Turkey, which
were the most interested in preventing any change in the political
condition of the Barbary States. When the British Government received
the news of Hussein's flagrant violation of good faith, in firing upon
the French Admiral, the Pelorus sloop of war was despatched to
Algiers, where her commander Captain Quin united with the British
Consul Mr. St. John, in endeavoring to prevail upon the Dey to propose
terms of peace. This effort proving vain, the Pelorus sailed to
Constantinople, where it was agreed between the Ambassadors of France
and England, that the Sultan should be requested to interpose; to this
the Turkish Government readily assented, and Halil Effendi a venerable
and respectable Turk, who had long known Hussein and been much
esteemed by him, was ordered to proceed to Algiers, and to entreat or
command the Dey no longer to provoke the vengeance of his powerful
enemies. Halil arrived in the Pelorus on the 28th of November at
Algiers, where he was received with great kindness and affection by
the Dey and by all classes of the inhabitants. His arguments and
entreaties soon produced effects, from which the mediators augured the
most favorable consequences; for Hussein after some days of reflection
and consultation with his Ministers, agreed to propose to M. de la
Bretonniere the renewal of the negotiations, offering him every
assurance of honorable treatment in case he should come to Algiers,
and as an earnest of the sincerity of his intentions, promising the
surrender of all the French prisoners. The Pelorus sailed with these
proposals on the 10th of December for Mahon, where she was detained
nearly three months in expectation of the Admiral's reply; at length
M. de la Bretonniere declared, that as he was still bound by the first
instructions from his Government, he could admit of negotiation on no
other terms, than the mission of an Ambassador to Paris to bear the
explanations of the Dey. With this answer Captain Quin returned to
Algiers on the 1st of April 1830; but no arguments could induce
Hussein to adopt the measure proposed: "God is Great!" said he, "Let
the French come."
In the mean time the French Ministry had taken a most serious
determination. The insult offered by the Dey in firing upon M. de la
Bretonniere, was concealed from the public as completely as possible;
no mention of it was made in the Moniteur, yet it finally became
known, and the opposition press of Paris eagerly seized the
opportunity, to vilify the hated Ministry of Polignac for delaying to
avenge the insulted honor of France. In this condition of things it
became absolutely necessary for the Government to take some decisive
step towards a conclusion of the war, in order to relieve itself from
a heavy and increasing burthen of popular odium on this account. To
effect this purpose, two plans were proposed in the Ministerial
Council. Count de Bourmont the bold and active chief of the War
Department, was in favor of an expedition sent directly from France,
against the capital city of the offending Sovereign. Prince Polignac
the head of the Ministry, was doubtful of the propriety of risking
such an attempt upon a place defended by nature, by art, and above all
by the savage fanaticism of the surrounding population; he moreover
conceived that even if Algiers were to fall into the hands of the
French, it would be impossible for them to retain it, without a
constant expenditure of force and treasure, for which no return could
be reasonably expected. His plan was therefore to arm against the
Algerines, an enemy professing the same faith with themselves, who in
the event of success might be bound by his interests, to pursue a
policy accordant with the wishes of France and of Europe in general.
The ideas of Polignac were adopted by the King, and the French
Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to propose to the
ambitious Pasha of Egypt, that he should undertake the conquest of
Algiers, or even of all Barbary, in which France would under certain
conditions aid him by the co-operation of its naval force. The
Ambassador accordingly despatched M. Huder one of the officers of his
Embassy to Cairo in order to submit this proposition to the Pasha;
Mehemet Ali readily acceded to it, the projet of a Convention on the
subject was drawn up, and the French agent arrived {145} in Paris with
it about the end of January 1830. The British Government had however
by this time penetrated the secret of the negotiation, and ever
jealous with regard to the occupation of the Barbary coast by any
strong Power, its Ambassador at Paris was immediately instructed to
protest against the plan. As the correspondence on this subject was
never published, we have no means of knowing precisely the grounds of
opposition taken by the British Ministry; they probably had reference
only to the interests of the Sultan, which might be seriously affected
by so great an addition to the force of his refractory Viceroy.
Whatever may have been the influence of this opposition, the project
of a co-operation with Mehemet Ali was abandoned, and it was
determined that an expedition should with the least possible delay, be
sent from France against Algiers.
Preparations for carrying this resolution into effect were immediately
commenced in all the ports and arsenals in France, and they were
prosecuted with a degree of vigor which excited the admiration of
Europe. The various branches of the service were placed under the
superintendence of the most experienced persons, apparently without
reference to their known political inclinations; and all the resources
of mechanical and medical, as well as military and naval science, were
employed to add to the health and comforts of the soldiers and to give
efficiency to their operations. Works relating to Northern Africa were
examined with attention, and the records of preceding expeditions
against Algiers were studied, in order to discover and provide against
the circumstances which occasioned their failure. Toulon having been
chosen as the place from which the armament was to sail, troops were
collected in its vicinity, and prepared by peculiar exercises for the
duties which they would be required to perform. Ships of war lying at
the different naval establishments, were ordered to be fully equipped,
and as soon as ready to be sent to the rendezvous, where a number of
merchant vessels for the transportation of men and materials were
bound by contract to assemble at the appointed time.
The object of these preparations after having been communicated in
general terms to the Governments of the other great European nations,
were publicly announced by the King in his address at the opening of
the Legislative session on the 2d of March 1830. The reply made by the
Chamber of Deputies, shewed clearly that the Ministry would find no
favor with that body; this had been anticipated and the session was
accordingly prorogued, with a view to the ulterior dissolution of the
intractable Chamber. The Liberal Party having by this time taken the
alarm, their journals which had been previously filled with invectives
against the Ministers for their apathy under the insults of a
Barbarian, now loudly condemned the objects of the expedition and
prophesied that it would be fruitless. The violence of these
denunciations induced the Ministry to insert an article in the
Moniteur of April 20th, which although unofficial, was afterwards
formally acknowledged to be the expression of the sentiments of the
Government. This article was composed with much care, and although no
one of its statements taken separately can be contradicted, yet their
arrangement, the omissions of important circumstances and the studied
obscurity of the language on certain points, renders the result of the
whole the opposite of that which would arise from a candid exposition.
General Alexandre de Laborde made an able reply in the Constitutionnel
of the 26th of the same month; he fully demonstrated the unimportance
of the African Concessions, the seizure of which was made the
principal grounds of the difference, in the Ministerial declaration;
he shewed that the bad faith of the Government and of its agents had
given the Dey just cause of discontent, that the weakness and
indecision of the late Ministry had provoked and encouraged his
insults, and that the real end of the expedition then in preparation,
was to subdue, not the barbarians of Africa, but the friends of true
liberty in France. Motives of patriotism, and feeling for the honor of
the country may indeed have influenced the Ministry in adopting this
resolution; but there can be no doubt that its principal object was to
sustain the despotic party in France, by reproducing in the people
that admiration for military glory, which experience has shewn to be
incompatible with respect for institutions founded on equality of
rights.
To the announcement of its intentions with regard to Algiers, the
French Ministry received the most satisfactory answers from many of
the Powers of the European Continent. The British Government however,
which had manifested its disapprobation of the plan for establishing
the Egyptian authority in Barbary, was still more unwilling that
France should possess a country, "which in the hands of a more
civilized and enlightened Government, could not fail to exercise an
important influence over the commerce and maritime interests of the
Mediterranean Powers." The French Ambassador at London, when requested
to explain more fully, replied by "the most positive assurances of the
entirely disinterested views of the Cabinet of the Tuilleries;" and
the British Ambassador at Paris on addressing the same demand to
Prince Polignac, was informed "that a satisfactory answer would soon
be given respecting the objects of the expedition, and the future
destiny of the Regency of Algiers in case of success."
Accordingly on the 20th of March the French Ambassador at London
communicated to Lord Aberdeen then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a
letter from Prince Polignac, in which after enumerating the various
grievances suffered by France from Algiers, and stating the conviction
of his Government that treaties would be of no avail in preventing
their recurrence, he declared that his Sovereign had resolved to seek
redress by force, and at the same time to advance the interests of
humanity, by abolishing piracy, Christian slavery and the payment of
tribute to the Barbary Regencies; "and if," concludes the Prince, "in
the approaching struggle, the Government now existing at Algiers
should be dissolved, the King whose views in this question are
entirely disinterested, will concert with his Allies respecting the
new order of things, which should for the greatest advantage of the
Christian world replace the system overthrown, and be most proper to
secure the ends thus proposed by His Majesty." This letter was
considered by the British Cabinet, as "scarcely affording that entire
satisfaction which might be reasonably expected;" and its Ambassador
at Paris was in consequence instructed to insist upon an official
assurance from the {146} French Government, that it "renounced all
views of territorial possession or aggrandizement." The despatch
containing this instruction was read to Prince Polignac, who repeated
in general terms that "the expedition was not undertaken with a view
to obtain territorial acquisitions," adding however that "he had no
objection to give any assurance, which might be calculated to remove
the uneasiness of the British Government."
For this assurance Lord Aberdeen waited for some time in vain; on the
21st of April the French Ambassador read to him a letter from the
Prince containing a declaration sufficiently explicit and
satisfactory; but he was not authorized to give a copy of it, and
applications were again made to the French Government. Polignac whose
only object was to gain time, evaded these applications by the liberal
employment of petty artifices; at length on the 17th of May, when the
expedition was about to sail, the French Ambassador delivered to Lord
Aberdeen an official copy of a despatch addressed to him by his
Government in the form of a circular to the different courts of
Europe. In this circular the King of France declared to his Allies
that his objects were to obtain redress for the injuries committed by
Algiers, to secure the French possessions in Africa from future
aggressions, and to receive indemnification for the expenses of the
war, as well as to effect the abolition of piracy Christian slavery
and the exaction of tribute; and that until these ends should be
attained and sufficiently secured he would not lay down his arms nor
recall his troops from Africa. In case the existing Government of
Algiers should be overthrown, he would immediately concert with the
other Powers as to the new order of things to be there established,
for the greatest advantage of the Christian world; and as it was
probable that they might soon be required to give their opinions on
this subject, he invited each Government without delay to furnish its
Representative in France with the proper instructions. "His majesty,"
says the French Minister in the despatch, "will appear at these
deliberations, ready to furnish every additional explanation which may
be desired, disposed to take into consideration the rights and
interests of all, not bound by anterior engagements, at liberty to
accept any proposition which may tend to assure the attainment of the
result indicated, and free from all feelings of personal interest."
Not satisfied with such vague promises, the British Minister replied
through the Ambassador at Paris, that although "no further suspicion
could be entertained of any design on the part of the French
Government to establish a military occupation of the Regency, or to
accomplish such a change in the state of territorial possession on the
shores of the Mediterranean, as should affect the interest of European
Powers," yet "he could not avoid calling the attention of Prince
Polignac to the peculiar situation of Algiers in its relation to the
Ottoman Porte;" that although "many Governments of Europe had
contracted engagements with that Regency as an independent State," and
others "continued to regard the Barbary States as essentially
dependant on the Turkish Empire," yet "the supremacy of the Sultan was
allowed by all;" he therefore "submitted to the serious consideration
of the Prince, what must be the effect of a precedent, which thus
disposes of the rights of a third party, against whom no complaint
whatever has been alleged." To this no reply was made, and the
negotiation or rather the discussion ended.
The preceding statement of the correspondence between the French and
British Governments, relative to the disposition to be made of Algiers
in the event of its conquest, is drawn from the official letters which
passed on the occasion; they were published in compliance with a call
made by Lord Aberdeen in the House of Peers of Great Britain on the 3d
of May 1833. From an examination of those documents, it appears that
no engagement was entered into by the French Government to recall its
troops from Algiers at any period; equally unfounded is the assertion
made by the French historical writers, respecting the reply of Prince
Polignac to the British Ambassador, that "France when insulted asked
the aid of no power in avenging its honor, and would be accountable to
none for the disposal of its conquests." It would be impossible to
give a summary of the results of the negotiation more satisfactory, or
drawn from a source entitled to greater consideration, than that
presented by Lord Aberdeen when he called for the production of the
Correspondence in the House of Lords; "no Convention was signed on the
subject, nor was any express stipulation entered into for the
evacuation of Algiers by the French force; but important engagements
were contracted, which in reference to all the Powers interested in
the commerce of the Mediterranean, and in the territorial arrangements
of that part of the world, were calculated to allay apprehensions
which might reasonably have existed respecting the occupation of
Algiers by the French."
There were difficulties also within the Ministerial Council. The
preparations for the expedition were nearly completed, before it was
known who was to command it. Three Marshals and six Lieutenant
Generals are said to have been successively proposed and rejected; at
length the Moniteur of the 20th of April, the same which contained the
defence of the objects of the expedition, announced that the King had
appointed Count de Bourmont the Minister of War, to the command of the
_Army of Africa_, as it was termed. The appointment to a station so
responsible of a man who had betrayed every cause in which he engaged
is said to have received the unwilling assent of the King; it was
considered a fortunate circumstance by the Liberal Party, as it
contributed to excite the indignation of the whole country, and to
deprive the Government of the popularity, which it might otherwise
have gained by the expedition.
On the day when his nomination was published, Bourmont left Paris for
Toulon, the affairs of his Department having been committed during his
absence to Prince Polignac. He was followed by the Minister of the
Marine, and soon after by the Duke d'Angouleme, who as grand Admiral
of France came to review the armament before its departure.
Certainly never did the harbor of Toulon, nor any other harbor exhibit
a more gallant spectacle.
The Army of Africa was composed of thirty-seven thousand six hundred
and fifty men; the number of horses employed in the different branches
of its service was three thousand eight hundred and fifty-three, and
the artillery consisted of one hundred and eighty pieces of cannon.
This force was arranged in three divisions, which were placed
severally under the commands of {147} Lieutenant Generals the Baron de
Barthezène, Count de Loverdo, and the Duke d'Escars; the Chief
Engineer was General Valazé and the artillery was directed by Count de
la Hitte. The number of ships of war was one hundred and three,
including eleven of the line, twenty-three frigates and seven steam
ships; they were manned by twenty-seven thousand seamen, and carried
more than three thousand guns. They were arranged in three squadrons;
the _Squadron of Battle_ commanded by Admiral Duperré, who conducted
the naval operations of the expedition; the _Squadron of
Disembarkation_ by Admiral Rosamel, and the _Squadron of Reserve_ by
Captain Lemoine. Between four and five hundred merchant vessels were
engaged for the transportation of horses, provisions and materials,
and many others were allowed to accompany the fleet, laden with
various articles which might be needed. Of the equipments and
accompaniments of this force, it would be difficult to convey an
adequate idea, without entering into details which might not prove
generally interesting; suffice it to say that no expense was spared to
render them complete, and that nothing was neglected, which could
contribute to the attainment of the end proposed. Upon the whole, the
armament was superior to any other which in modern times has crossed a
sea; those led by Charles the Fifth against Tunis and Algiers, the
famed _Spanish Armada_ sent by Philip the Second for the invasion of
England, and even the mighty expedition conducted by Napoleon to Egypt
being each inferior to it in appointments, in naval force, and in the
numerical amount of the persons engaged.
All things being in readiness the embarkation of the troops was
commenced on the 11th of May, and having been conducted with the
utmost order and precision, it was terminated in a week. On the 25th
the wind being favorable the first squadron sailed out of the harbor;
the second followed on the 26th, and the third on the 27th. They
directed their course for Algiers; it was however arranged that in
case of separation by storm or other unexpected occurrence, the place
of rendezvous would be Palma the capital of the Island of Majorca.
Scarcely had the first squadron quitted Toulon, ere it was met by a
Turkish frigate escorted by one of the ships of the squadron which was
blockading Algiers. The Turkish frigate bore no less a personage than
Tahir Pasha the Capudan Pasha or High Admiral of Turkey, who had been
sent by the Sultan with full powers to arrange the differences between
France and the Dey. He had sailed first to Algiers, where he intended
to command Hussein to accept the terms required by the French, and in
case of refusal to depose him and take possession of the place in the
name of the Sultan; but the commander of the blockading squadron off
that place had received orders to suffer no ship to enter the harbor,
and Tahir finding it impossible to land, hastened to Toulon in hopes
that his representations might prevent the sailing of the expedition.
Well was it for the Pasha, that he was not permitted to enter Algiers,
for Hussein who knew of his approach and of the objects of his visit,
had prepared to have him strangled as soon as he landed.
The Turkish Ambassador on meeting the French fleet, boarded the
Admiral's ship, and had a conference with Bourmont which of course
proved ineffectual; he then continued his voyage to Toulon, where he
was placed in quarantine immediately on his arrival. Thence he
attempted to transmit his communications to the Government, but great
care had been taken to prevent them from reaching their destination.
The British Ambassador asked explanations from the French Minister as
to the objects of his visit, and endeavored to procure a hearing for
him; but Prince Polignac adroitly evaded the questions, by confessing
with the greatest apparent frankness, that he was entirely ignorant
for what purpose the Turkish Ambassador was sent. Tahir at length
seeing that it was useless to remain longer, and have "his beard thus
laughed at," went back to Constantinople.
Before the scene of the history is changed to Africa, it may be
stated, that on the 15th of May, while all France was intent upon the
preparations for the departure of the expedition, an ordinance
appeared in the Moniteur dissolving the Chamber of Deputies. A few
days after a partial change was made in the Ministerial Body by the
introduction of persons still more opposed to liberal institutions
than those whom they replaced, and still more odious to the nation at
large. The French Ministry subsisted as thus organized until the 28th
of July, when Charles the Tenth ceased to reign.