Fort San Bernardo—Siege of Fort George—Explosion of Magazine—The
Capitulation—The March Through the Breach—British Troops Sail from
Pensacola to Brooklyn.
The Spanish operations against Fort George were conducted with extreme
caution. What, in the beginning, was one of a circle of intrenchments,
developed into a fort as extensive and strong as the former. Like Fort
George, it was built of earth and timber. Its position was about
one-third of a mile to the northward of the latter. During its
construction it was hidden from observation by a dense pine forest and
undergrowth, which, after its completion, were cleared to give play to
its guns. It was named San Bernardo, for the patron saint of the Spanish
commander.
The magnitude of San Bernardo indicated that it must have been
constructed for exigencies besides that of assailing the British works.
Galvez probably feared an attack in his rear from the Indians coming to
the relief of their allies, or that he might have to encounter a
relieving expedition coming by sea. In either event his fortress would
be a place of security for his supplies and a rallying point in case of
disaster.
The siege was a struggle between two forts, with the advantage to one of
them in being supported by intrenchments which with itself formed a
circle around its antagonist. The latter began the contest.
Among the works constructed by the British to strengthen their position,
was a redoubt, named Waldeck. On April 27, a Spanish intrenchment was
seen to be in the course of construction opposite to Waldeck, under
cover of the woods. Against that intrenchment the besieged directed a
heavy fire, but with little effect, as the work was nearly completed
when discovered. This attack upon the besiegers was the signal for all
their batteries to open fire upon Fort George and its defenses.
The firing was incessant on both sides until May 1, when that of the
British was almost entirely suspended, for the purpose of enabling the
garrison to make some indispensable repairs on their works. On the
second, however, the British guns were again in full play.
But the demand for repairs was so continuous and urgent as to impose a
heavy tax upon the limited numbers of the besieged. Short reliefs from
duty became a stern necessity, and want of rest, as well as
overexertion, so impaired their strength that men were seen falling
prostrate beside their guns from fatigue and exhaustion.
Galvez’s failure to storm the British works, during the silence of their
guns on May 1, seemed to indicate his determination to reduce the
contest to the question, how long the ammunition of the besieged would
last and their artillery remain serviceable? He may, however, have
regarded the suspension of the British firing as a strategem to invite
an assault.
There was a vital spot in the defenses for which the Spanish shot and
shell had been vainly seeking—the powder magazine. But as the gunners
were without requisite information to enable them to procure its range,
it was but a wild chance that a shell would strike it. That its position
was not drawn from the Waldeck corporal, is an impeachment of the
military sagacity of the Spanish officers, and an act of gross
negligence which would have prolonged the siege indefinitely, but for an
imprudence of the British commander equally as gross.
A provincial colonel for infamous conduct—of what character we are
uninformed—was drummed out of the Fort, instead of being, as prudence
required, carefully kept within it during the siege. The man, as should
have been expected, went to the Spaniards and informed them of the
condition of the garrison and defenses, and especially of the angle in
which the magazine was situated. That disclosure sealed the fate of Fort
George. Thenceforward, that angle became the mark of every Spanish shot
and shell. For three days and nights did those searching missiles beat
upon it, until at last on the morning of May 8, there occurred an
explosion that shook Gage Hill to its deep foundations as though once
again in the throes of an earthquake.
A yawning breach was made in the Fort. Fifty men were killed outright
and as many more wounded fatally and otherwise.
At that thunder-like signal 15,000 men are marshalled for the assault.
But there is no panic in Fort George. Calmly the British commander
orders every gun to be charged, and many to be moved so as to sweep the
breach. That work done, he hoists a white flag and sends an officer
under another to the Spanish general with a communication, which
doubtless had been prepared in anticipation of the conjuncture in which
he at last found himself. It was an offer to capitulate upon the
following terms: “The troops to march out at the breach with flying
colors and drums beating, each man with six cartridges in his cartridge
box; at the distance of 500 paces the arms were to be stacked; the
officers to retain their swords; all the troops to be shipped as soon as
possible, at the cost of the Spaniards to a British port, to be
designated by the British commander, under parole not to serve against
Spain or her _allies_, until an equal number of the same rank of
Spaniards, or the troops of her allies, were exchanged by Great Britain,
and the best care to be taken of the sick and wounded remaining behind,
who were to be forwarded as soon as they recovered.”
Knowing that those were the terms which the gallant Dickson and Durnford
had demanded and obtained at Baton Rouge and Mobile, the spirit in which
General Campbell dictated the terms of the capitulation can be readily
imagined. To submit to less than had been conceded to his inferior
officers would be dishonor.
Galvez answered, that the terms proposed could not be conceded without
modification. General Campbell replied that no modification was
permissible; adding, that in case they were not conceded he would hold
“the Fort to the last man.” That bold reply was followed by the consent
of Galvez to the capitulation proposed by the British commander.
It would be a grateful task to record humanity or chivalry as the motive
for the concession; and it would be the duty of history to assign it, in
the absence of facts, inconsistent with such a conclusion. But the
victor, by his own confession, has precluded such a presumption.[37] In
a letter of General Washington’s to Don Francisco Rendon, agent of the
Spanish government in the United States, written at “Headquarters before
Yorktown, twelfth of October, 1781,” occurs the following: “I am obliged
by the extract of General Galvez’s letter to Count de Grasse, explaining
at large _the necessity_ he was under of granting the terms of
capitulation to the garrison at Pensacola, which the commandant
_required_. I have no doubt, from General Galvez’s well known attachment
to the cause of America, that he would have refused the articles, which
have been deemed exceptionable, had there not been very powerful reasons
to induce his acceptance of them.”
What, it may be asked, were “those very powerful reasons?” He had an
army at his command only one thousand less in number than General
Washington had before Yorktown, when he wrote the letter to Rendon; he
had ample supplies of every description; he was backed by a powerful
fleet; he had selected for his expedition a time when de Grasse’s
movements on the Atlantic coast required the presence, in that quarter,
of the whole British naval force on this side of the Atlantic; and
hence, we can find no “necessity he was under of granting terms,” which
General Campbell “required,” unless we find it in his want of faith in
his ability by force of arms, to compel the British commander to modify
his requirements.
In order to fully appreciate the transaction, it should be borne in mind
that there was an understanding between Galvez and the French commanders
in America, that he should not grant to British troops that might fall
into his power during his operations in West Florida, such terms as
would enable them to become a part of the armies operating against the
United States.
This understanding Galvez violated at Baton Rouge and Mobile, and again
for the third time, in conceding the terms demanded by General Campbell;
for the articles bound the garrison not to serve against Spain and _her
allies_ only, and the United States was not her ally, but only a
sympathizer.
To say that the “powerful reasons,” to quote from General Washington,
were not in Fort George, would be to accuse Galvez of bad faith to his
French ally, and untruth, as to the existence of any necessity for his
concession to the British.
Such being the conclusions that impartial history must draw, impressive
was the spectacle presented, on the ninth of May, 1781, upon that hill
now crowned by the monument to the Confederate dead. In a circle around
Fort George the Spanish army stands in array. The roll of a drum breaks
the stillness, followed by the sound of mustering in the Fort. Again as
it beats to the fife’s stirring military air, the British commander, in
the dress of a major-general, sword in hand, emerges from the breach,
followed by his less than eight hundred heroes. Proudly does the gallant
band step the five hundred paces; then successively come the orders to
halt, fall into line, and stack arms.
The scene would have thrilled the heart of every soldier whose memory is
consecrated by the shaft that springs from that historic hill, then the
centre of a landscape, whence, northward, the eye could rest on a
limitless expanse of verdure; eastward and westward upon the
far-sweeping curves of the shore; southward upon the glorious mirror of
the Bay, with the hills of Santa Rosa rising out of the blue waters like
snow-clad peaks above the azure of a distant horizon, and far beyond
them upon the tremulous sky-line of the heaving gulf.
The formal signing of the articles of capitulation in the Council
Chamber of Fort George, which occurred on the ninth of May, immediately
before the British marched out, was anticipated in a former page.
On June the fourth the British troops sailed for Havana, where they
arrived on the fourteenth of the same month; and thence the same vessels
transported them to Brooklyn. A further addition was made to the
strength of the British, by the garrisons of Baton Rouge and Fort
Charlotte, which after many obstacles, and several voyages from point to
point, finally reached Brooklyn about the time the Pensacola troops
arrived there. And thus, in consequence of Galvez’s breach of faith, a
force of 1,200 veterans, with their gallant officers, was added to the
British army.
It was doubtless this accession of British strength, at New York, in
that rallying year, when each side required every available man, that
caused de Grasse to complain to the Spanish government of the
capitulation at Pensacola, and called forth the apology of Galvez
referred to by General Washington in his letter to Rendon.
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Footnote 37:
Sparks, Vol. 8, p. 175.
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