CHAPTER XXIV. PROMETHEUS BOUND

The event which put Roosevelt's patriotism to the final test,

and, as it proved, evoked all his great qualities in a last

display, was the outbreak of the Atrocious World War in August,

1914. By the most brutal assault in modern times, Germany, and

her lackey ally, Austria, without notice, overran Belgium and

Northeastern France, and devastated Serbia. The other countries,

especially the United States, were too startled at first to

understand either the magnitude or the possible implications of

this war. On August 18th, President Wilson issued the first of

his many variegated messages, in which he gave this warning: "We

must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a

curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that

might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle

before another." He added that his first thought was of America.

Any one who analyzed his message carefully must have wondered how

it was possible, in the greatest moral issue which had ever been

thrust before the world's judgment, to remain impartial "even in

thought" between good and evil. Perhaps it was right, though

hardly necessary, to impress upon Americans that they must look

after their own interests first. Would it not have been more

seemly, however, especially for President Wilson, who on the

previous Fourth of July had uttered his sanctimonious tribute to

the superiority in virtue of the United States to all other

nations, to urge his countrymen to put some of this virtue into

practice at that crisis?

But the masses did not reason. They used his admonition to remain

neutral "even in thought" to justify them in not having any great

anxiety as to who was right and who wrong; and they interpreted

his concern for "America first" as authorizing them to go about

their affairs and profit as much as they could in the warlike

conditions. Some of us, indeed, took an opposite view. We saw

that the conflict, if fought to a finish, would decide whether

Democracy or Despotism should rule the earth. We felt that the

United States, the vastest, strongest, and most populous Republic

in the world, pledged to uphold Democracy, should throw itself at

once on the side of the European nations which were struggling,

against great odds, to save Democracy from the most atrocious of

despots. Inevitably, we were regarded as incorrigible idealists

whose suggestions ran counter to etiquette and were, after all,

crazy.

For several years, Roosevelt had been a contributing editor of

the Outlook, and although his first instinct, when the Germans

ravished Belgium, was to protest and then, if necessary, to

follow up our protest by a show of force, he wrote in the Outlook

an approval of our taking immediately a neutral attitude. Still,

he did not let this preclude stern action later. " Neutrality,"

he said, "may be of prime necessity to maintain peace . . . but

we pay the penalty of this action on behalf of peace for

ourselves, and possibly for others in the future, by forfeiting

our right to do anything on behalf of peace for the Belgians at

present." Three years afterwards these sentences of his were

unearthed by his enemies and flung against him; but his dominant

purpose, from the start, was too well known for any one to accuse

him of inconsistency. He assumed, when President Wilson issued

his impartial "even in thought" message, that the President must

have some secret diplomatic information which would vindicate it.

As the months went on, however, it became clear to him that Mr.

Wilson was pursuing towards the European War the same policy of

contradictions, of brief paroxysms of boldness, followed by long

periods of lassitude, which had marked his conduct of our

relations towards the Mexican bandits. He saw only too well,

also, into what ignoble depths this policy led us. Magnificent

France, throttled Belgium, England willing but not yet ready,

devastated Serbia, looked to us for sympathy and help, and all

the sympathy they got came from private persons in America, and

of help there was none. Meanwhile, the Germans undermined and

gangrened the American people. Every ship brought over their

slyest and most unscrupulous propagandists, who cooperated with

the despicable German professors and other agents already planted

here, and opened the sewers of their doctrines. Their spies began

to go up and down the land, without check. Count Bernstorff, the

German Ambassador, assumed to play with the Administration at

Washington as a cat might play with half a score of mice, feeling

sure that he could devour them when he chose. A European

gentleman, who came from a neutral country, and called on

Bernstorff in April, 1915, told me that when he asked the

Ambassador how he got on with the United States, he replied:

"Very well, indeed; we pay no attention to the Government, but go

ahead and do what we please." Within a fortnight the sinking of

the Lusitania showed that Bernstorff had not boasted idly.

Roosevelt understood the harm which the German conspiracy was

doing among our people, not only by polluting their ideals, but

actually strengthening the coils which the propagandists had been

winding, to strangle at the favorable moment American

independence itself. We discovered then that the process of

Germanization had been going on secretly during twenty years.

Since England was the chief enemy in the way of German world

domination, the German-Americans laid themselves out to render

the English odious here. And they worked to such good purpose

that the legal officers of the Administration admonished the

American people that the English, in holding up merchant vessels

laden with cargoes for Germany, committed breaches against

international law which were quite as heinous as the sinking by

German submarines of ships laden with American non-combatants.

They magnified the loss of a cargo of perishable food and set it

against the ferocious destruction of neutral human beings.

Senator Lodge, however, expressed the clear thought and right

feeling of Americans when he said that we were more moved by the

thought of the corpse of an innocent victim of the Hun submarines

than by that of a bale of cotton.

These enormities, these sins of omission and commission, of which

Roosevelt declared our Government guilty, amazed and exasperated

him, and from the beginning of 1915 onward, he set himself three

tasks. He wished to expose and circumvent German machinations

over here. Next, he deemed it a pressing duty to rouse our

country to the recognition that we must prepare at once for war.

He saw, as every other sensible person saw, that as the conflict

grew more terrible in Europe and spread into Asia and Africa, we

should be drawn into it, and that therefore we must make ready.

He seconded the plan of General Leonard Wood to organize a camp

for volunteers at Plattsburg and other places; and what that plan

accomplished in fitting American soldiers to meet and vanquish

the Kaiser's best troops, has since been proved. President

Wilson, however, would not officially countenance any preparation

which, so far as the public was allowed to know his reasons,

might be taken by the Germans as an unfriendly act. Finally,

Roosevelt labored unceasingly to revive and make militant the

ideals of true Americanism.

That the Germans accurately gauged that President Wilson would

not sanction any downright vigorous action against them, was

sufficiently proved on May 7, 1915, when German submarines

torpedoed and sank, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the British

passenger steamship Lusitania, eastward bound, a few miles south

of the Point of Kinsale on the Irish coast. With her went down

nearly thirteen hundred persons, all of them non-belligerents and

more than one hundred of them American men, women, and children.

This atrocious crime the Germans committed out of their stupid

miscalculation of the motives which govern non-German peoples.

They thought that the British and Americans would be so

terrorized that they would no longer dare to cross the ocean. The

effect was, of course, just the opposite. A cry of horror swept

over the civilized world, and swiftly upon it came a great demand

for punishment and retribution.

Then was the moment for President Wilson to break off diplomatic

relations with Germany. The very day after the waters of the

British Channel had closed over the innocent victims, President

Wilson made an address in which he announced that "a nation may

be too proud to fight." The country gasped for breath when it

read those words, which seemed to be the official statement of

the President of the United States that foreign nations might out

rage, insult, and degrade this nation with impunity, because, as

the rabbit retires into its hole, so we would burrow deep into

our pride and show neither resentment nor sense of honor. As soon

as possible, word came from the White House that, as the

President's speech had been written before the sinking of the

Lusitania, his remarks had no bearing on that atrocity. Pride is

a wonderful cloak for cowards, but it never saves them. Perhaps

the most amazing piece of impudence in Germany's long list was

the formal visit described by the newspapers which the German

Ambassador, Bernstorff, paid to Mr. Bryan, the Secretary--of

State, to present to our Government the formal condolence of

Germany and him self at this painful happening. Bernstorff, we

know now, planned the sinking and gave the German Government

notice by wireless just where the submarines could best destroy

the Lusitania, on that Friday afternoon.

Ten days later, Mr. Wilson sent a formal protest to Germany in

which he recalled "the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto

assumed by the Imperial German Government in matters of

international right, and particularly in regard to the freedom of

the seas"; and he professed to have "learned to recognize the

German views and the German influence in the field of

international obligation as always engaged upon the side of

justice and humanity." If Mr. Bryan had written this, no one

would have been astonished, because Mr. Bryan made no pretense of

knowing even the rudimentary facts of history; but that President

Wilson, by profession a historian, should laud, as being always

engaged in justice and humanity, the nation which, under

Frederick the Great, had stolen Silesia and dismembered Poland,

and which, in his own lifetime, had garroted Denmark, had forced

a wicked war on Austria, had trapped France by lies into another

war and robbed her of Alsace-Lorraine, and had only recently

wiped its hands, dripping with blood drawn from the Chinese, was

amazing! Small wonder if after that, the German hyphenates lifted

up their heads arrogantly in this country, or that the Kaiser in

Germany believed that the United States was a mere jelly-fish

nation which would tolerate any enormity he might concoct. This

was the actual comfort President Wilson's message gave Germany.

The negative result was felt among the Allied nations which,

struggling against the German Monster like Laocoon in the coils

of the Python, took Mr. Wilson's praise of Germany's imaginary

love of justice and humanity as a death-warrant for themselves.

They could not believe that he who wrote such words, or the

American people who swallowed them, could ever be roused to give

succor to the Allies in their desperation.

Three years later I asked Roosevelt what he would have done, if

he had been President in May, 1915. He said, in substance, that,

as soon as he had read in the New York newspaper* the

advertisement which Bernstorff had inserted warning all American

citizens from taking passage on the Lusitania, he would have sent

for Bernstorff and asked him whether the advertisement was

officially acknowledged by him. Even Bernstorff, arch-liar that

he was, could not have denied it. "I should then have sent to the

Department of State to prepare his passports; I should have

handed them to him and said, 'You will sail on the Lusitania

yourself next Friday; an American guard will see you on board,

and prevent your coming ashore.' The breaking off of diplomatic

relations with Germany," Roosevelt added, "would probably have

meant war, and we were horribly unprepared. But better war, than

submission to a humiliation which no President of this country

has ever before allowed; better war a thousand times, than to let

the Germans go on really making war upon us at sea, and

honeycombing the American people with plots on land, while our

Government shamelessly lavishes praise on the criminal for his

justice and humanity and virtually begs his pardon."

* The advertisement was printed in the New York Times of April

23, 1915.

Thus believed Roosevelt in the Lusitania crisis, and many others

of us agreed with him. The stopping of German intrigues here, the

breaking-off of diplomatic relations, would have been of

inestimable benefit to this country. It would have caused every

American to rally to the country's defense. It would have forced

the reluctant Administration to prepare a navy and an army. It

would have sifted the patriotic sheep from the sneaking and

spying goats. It would have brought immense comfort to the Allies

and corresponding despondency to the Huns. For Germany plunged

into the war believing that England would remain neutral. When

England came in, to redeem her word of honor, Germany's frantic

purpose was to have us keep neutral and supply her with food and

munitions. Had she known that there was any possibility of our

actively joining the Allies, she would have hastened to make

peace. Our first troops could have reached France in the early

spring of 1916. They would not have been, of course, shock

troops, but their presence in France would have been an assurance

to the Allies that we were coming with all our force, and the

Germans would soon have understood that this meant their doom. By

the summer of 1916, the war would have been over.

Think what this implies! Two years and a half of fighting would

never have taken place. At least three million lives among the

Allied armies would have been saved. Russia would have been

spared revolution, chaos, Bolshevism. Some, at least, of the

myriads of massacred Armenians would not have been slain.

Thousands of square miles of devastated territory would not have

been spoiled. A hundred billions of dollars for equipping and

carrying on the war would never have been spent. All this is not

an idle dream; it is the calm statement of what would probably

have happened if President Wilson, after the Lusitania outrage,

had dared to break with Germany. History will hold him

accountable for those millions of lives sacrificed, for the

unspeakable suffering which the people of the ravaged regions had

to endure, for the dissolution of Russia, which threatened to

throw down the bases of our civilization, and for the waste of

incalculable treasure. President Wilson's apologists assert that

the country was not ready for him to take any resolute attitude

towards Germany in May, 1915. They argue that if he had attempted

to do so there would have been great internal dissension, perhaps

even civil war, and especially that the German sections would

have opposed preparations for war so stubbornly as to have made

them impossible. This is pure assumption. The truth is that

whenever or wherever an appeal was made to American patriotism,

it met with an immediate response. The sinking of the Lusitania

created such a storm of horror and indignation that if the

President had lifted a finger, the manhood of America, and the

womanhood, too, would have risen to back him up. But instead of

lifting a finger, he wrote that message to Germany, praising the

Germans for their traditional respect for justice and humanity.

And a long time had yet to pass before he made the least sign of

encouragement to those Americans who would uphold the honor of

the United States and would have this, the greatest of Republics,

take its due part in defending Democracy against the Huns'

attempt to wipe Democracy off the earth forever.

Having missed his opportunity then, Mr. Wilson could of course

plead that the country was less and less inclined to go to war,

because he furnished the pro-German plotters the very respite

they had needed for carrying on their work. By unavowed ways they

secured a strong support among the members of the National House

of Representatives and the Senate. They disguised themselves as

pacifists, and they found it easy to wheedle the "lunatic fringe"

of native pacifists into working for the domination of William of

Hohenzollern over the United States, and for the establishing of

his world dominion. The Kaiser's propagandists spread evil

arguments to justify all the Kaiser's crimes, and they found

willing disciples even among the members of the Administration to

repeat and uphold these arguments.

They told us, for instance, that their massacre served the

victims of the Lusitania right for taking passage on a British

steamship. They even wished to pass a law forbidding Americans

from traveling on the ocean at all, because, by doing so, they

might be blown up by the Germans, and that would involve this

country in diplomatic difficulties with Germany. Next, the

Germans protested against our selling munitions of war to the

Allies. Neither custom nor international law forbade doing this,

and the protest stood out in :stark impudence when it came from

Germany, the country which, for fifty years and more, had sold

munitions to every one who asked and had not hesitated to sell

impartially to both antagonists in the Russo-Japanese War. By

playing on the sentimentality of this same "lunatic fringe," the

German intriguers almost succeeded in driving through a bill to

stop this traffic. They knew the true Prussian way of whimpering

when bullying did not avail them. And so they not only whimpered

about our sending shells over to kill- the German soldiers, but

they whimpered also over the dire effects which the Allied

blockade produced upon the non-combatant population of Germany.

These things went on, not only a whole year, but far into the

second after the sinking of the Lusitania. Roosevelt never

desisted from charging that the person ultimately responsible for

them was President Wilson, and he believed that the President's

apparent self-satisfaction would avail him little when he stands

at the bar of History.

It may be that an entire people may lose for a time its sense of

logic. We have just had the most awful proof that, through a

long-continued and deliberate education for that purpose, the

German people lost its moral sense and set up diabolical

standards in place of those common to all civilized races. We

know that religious hysteria has at different times, like the

influenza, swept over a nation, or that a society has lost its

taste for generations together in art, and in poetry. We remember

that the Witchcraft Delusion obsessed our ancestors. It is not

impossible, therefore, that between 194 and 1918 the American

people passed through a stage in which it threw logic to the

winds. This would account at least for its infatuation for

President Wilson, in spite of his undisguised inconsistencies and

appalling blunders. A people who thought logic ally and kept

certain principles steadily before it, could hardly otherwise

have tolerated Mr. Wilson's "too-proud-to-fight" speech, and his

message to Germany after the sinking of the Lusitania, or his

subsequent endeavor to make the Americans think that there was no

choice between the causes for which the Allies and the Teutons

were fighting. Was it not he who said that Europe was war-mad,

and that America had better mind her own business, and look the

other way? Did he not declare that we were forced into war, and

then that we were not? That a President of the United States

should assert or even insinuate these things during the great War

for Humanity -and by Humanity I mean every trait, every advance

which has lifted men above the level of the beast, where they

originated, to the level of the human with its potential ascent

to heights undreamed of--is amazing now: what will it be a

generation hence?

Roosevelt watched impatiently while these strange phases passed

before him. He listened angrily at the contradictory utterances.

He felt the ignominy of our country's being at such a depth. He

knew Germany too well to suppose that she could be deterred by

President Wilson's messages. He saw something comic in shaking a

long fore-finger and saying, "Tut, tut! I shall consider being

very harsh, if you commit these outrages three more times.." To

shake your fist at all, and then to shake your finger, seemed to

Roosevelt almost imbecile. Cut off from serving the cause of

American patriotism in any public capacity, Roosevelt struggled

to take his part by writing. Every month in the Outlook, and

subsequently in the Metropolitan Magazine, he gave vent to his

pent-up indignation. The very titles of some of his papers reveal

his animus: "Fear God and Take Your Own Part"; "A Sword for

Defense"; "America First: A Phrase or a Fact?"; "Uncle Sam's Only

Friend is Uncle Sam"; "Dual Nationality"; "Preparedness." In each

of these he poured forth with unflagging vehemence the

fundamental verities on which our American society should rest.

He showed that it was not a mere competition in letter-writing

between the honey-worded Mr. Wilson and the sophisticated

Bernstorff or the Caliban-sly Bethmann Hollweg, but that God was

in the crisis, and that no adroitness of phrase or trick of

diplomacy could get rid of Him. He showed that there could not be

two kinds of Americans: one genuine, which believed wholly and

singly in the United States, and the other cunning and mongrel,

which swore allegiance to the United States--lip service--and

kept its allegiance to Germany--heart service. He lost no

opportunity to make his illustrations clear. On resigning as

Secretary of State after the sinking of the Lusitania, because

President Wilson insisted on mildly calling Germany's attention

to that crime, Mr. Bryan addressed a large audience of Germans.

Then Roosevelt held him up to the gaze of the American people as

a man who had no true Americanism. Lest I should be suspected of

misinterpreting or exaggerating Roosevelt's opinion of President

Wilson, during the first two years of the war, I quote two or

three passages, taken at random, which will prove, I hope, that I

have summarized him truly. He says, for instance:

Professional pacifists of the type of Messrs. Bryan, Jordan, and

Ford, who in the name of peace preach doctrines that would entail

not merely utter infamy, but utter disaster to their own country,

never in practice venture to denounce concrete wrong by dangerous

wrongdoers .... These professional pacifists, through President

Wilson, have forced the country into a path of shame and dishonor

during the past eighteen months. Thanks to President Wilson, the

most powerful of Democratic nations has refused to recognize the

binding moral force of international public law. Our country has

shirked its clear duty. One outspoken and straightforward

declaration by this government against the dreadful iniquities

perpetrated in Belgium, Armenia, and Servia would have been worth

to humanity a thousand times as much as all that the professional

pacifists have done in the past fifty years .... Fine phrases

become sickening when they represent nothing whatever but

adroitness in phrase making, with no intention of putting deeds

behind the phrases.

After the American messages in regard to the sinking of the

Lusitania had brought no apology, much less any suggestion of

redress, Roosevelt said: Apparently President Wilson has believed

that the American people would permanently forget their dead and

would slur over the dishonor and disgrace to the United States by

that basest of all the base pleas of cowardly souls which finds

expression in the statement: "Oh, well, anyhow the President kept

us out of war!" The people who make this plea assert with

quavering voices that they "are behind the President." So they

are; well behind him. The farther away from the position of duty

and honor and hazard he has backed, the farther behind him these

gentry have stood--or run.

Finally, Roosevelt stated with deadly clearness the position into

which Wilson's vacillating policy had driven us:

The United States has not a friend in the world. Its conduct,

under the leadership of its official representatives, for the

last five years and, above all, for the last three years, has

deprived it of the respect and has secured for it the contempt of

every one of the great civilized nations of mankind. Peace

treaties and windy Fourth-of-July eloquence and the base

materialism which seeks profit as an incident to the abandonment

of duty will not help us now. For five years our rulers at

Washington have believed that all this people cared for was easy

money, absence of risk and effort, and sounding platitudes which

were not reduced to action. We have so acted as to convince other

nations that in very truth we are too proud to fight; and the man

who is too proud to fight is in practice always treated as just

proud enough to be kicked. We have held our peace when our women

and children were slain. We have turned away our eyes from the

sight of our brother's woe.

"He kept us out of war," was a paradoxical battle-cry for one who

in a very short time thereafter wished to pose as the winner of

the greatest war in history.

But the battle-cry, it turned out, was used chiefly for political

purposes. The year 1916 was a Presidential year and his opponents

suspected that every thing President Wilson had done at home or

abroad had been planned by him with a view to the effect which it

might have on his reelection. Politicians of all parties saw that

the war was the vital question to be decided by the political

campaign. For the Democrats, Wilson was, of course, the only

candidate; but the Republicans and the Progressives had their own

schism to settle. First of all, they must attempt to reunite and

to present a candidate whom both factions would support; if they

did not, the catastrophe of 1912 would be repeated, and Wilson

would again easily win against two warring Progressive and

Republican candidates. The elections in 194 showed that the

Progressive Party was disintegrating. Should its leaders strive

now to revive its strength or should they bow to the inevitable,

combine with the Republicans on a satisfactory candidate, and

urge all the Progressives as a patriotic duty to support him?

All depended on Roosevelt's decision. After reflection, he

consented to run for nomination by the Progressives. It soon

became plain, however, that the Republicans would not take him

back. The Machine did not want him on any terms: many of the

Republicans blinding themselves to the fact that, as the number

of votes cast in 1912 proved, Taft and not he had split the

Republican Party, held Roosevelt responsible for the defeat in

that year. One heard also of some Republicans who, for lack of a

better reason, opposed Roosevelt because, they said, that

Roosevelt having put Taft into the Presidency, ought not to have

"gone back" on him. Yet these same persons, if they had taken a

partner into their firm to carry on a certain policy, and had

found him pursuing a different one, would hardly have argued that

they were in loyalty bound to continue to support this partner as

long as he chose. The consideration which weighed with a much

larger number, however, was that Roosevelt had so antagonized the

German vote and the Pacifist vote and all the other anti-American

votes, that he might not be a winning candidate. Accordingly, the

Republicans sought for somebody who would please everybody, and

yet would have enough personal strength to be a leader. They

pitched on Charles E. Hughes, former Governor of New York State,

and then a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. The

unwisdom of going to the Supreme Bench for a standard-bearer was

immediately apparent; because all the proprieties prevented

justice Hughes from expressing any opinion on political subjects

until he resigned from the Court. Hence, it followed that no

great enthusiasm could be aroused over his candidacy for

nomination since nobody knew what his policy would be.

The Progressives held their Convention in Chicago on June 5th,

the same day that the Republicans met there. Some of the

original, Simon-Pure Progressives disapproved of this collusion,

declaring that it represented a "deal," and that the Progressive

Party, which had come into existence as a rebuke of Machine

politics, ought never to soil itself by entering into a "deal."

Nevertheless, the will of the more worldly-minded prevailed, and

they probably thought that there would be a better chance to have

the Republicans nominate Roosevelt if he were already the nominee

of the Progressives. But they were disappointed. They nominated

Roosevelt and the Republicans Justice Hughes. Suspense followed

as to whether Roosevelt, by accepting, would oblige the

Progressives to organize another campaign. He sent only a

conditional acceptance to the Progressive Committee and, a few

days later, he announced publicly that he would support justice

Hughes, because he regarded the defeat of Wilson as the most

vital object before the American people. I find among my

correspondence from him a reply to a letter of mine in which I

had quite needlessly urged this action upon him. I quote this

passage because it epitomizes what might be expanded over many

pages. The letter is dated June 16, 1916:

I agree entirely with you. I shall do all I can for Mr. Hughes.

But don't forget that Mr. Hughes alone can make it possible for

me to be efficient in his behalf. If he merely speaks like Mr.

Wilson, only a little more weakly, he will rob my support of its

effectiveness. Speeches such as those of mine, to which you

kindly allude, have their merit only if delivered for a man who

is himself speaking uncompromisingly and without equivocation. I

have just sent word to Hughes through one of our big New York

financiers to make a smashing attack on Wilson for his actions,

and to do it immediately, in connection with this Democratic

Nominating Convention. Wilson was afraid of me. He never dared

answer me; but if Hughes lets him, he will proceed to take the

offensive against Hughes. I shall do everything I can for him,

but don't forget that the efficiency of what I do must largely

depend upon Hughes.

Roosevelt was as good as his word, and made four or five powerful

speeches in behalf of Mr. Hughes, speeches which gave a sharper

edge to the Republicans' fight. But their campaign was obviously

mismanaged. They put their candidate to the torture of making two

transcontinental journeys, in which he had to speak incessantly,

and they warned him against uttering any downright criticism of

the anti-American throng, whose numbers being unknown were

feared. President Wilson, on the other hand, unexpectedly flared

up in a retort which doubtless won votes for him. Jeremiah

O'Leary, an Irish agitator in relations with the German

propagandists, tried to catch Mr. Wilson in a pro-British snare.

The President replied: " I would feel deeply mortified to have

you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to so

many disloyal Americans, and I have not, I will ask you to convey

this message to them."

The result of the election, which took place on November 5th,

hung in suspense for many days. Then it appeared that Wilson, by

capturing thirteen California votes, had won by 277 electoral

votes to 254. for Hughes. Of the popular vote, Wilson got

9,128,00 and Hughes, 8,536,000. So the slogan, "He kept us out of

war," accomplished its purpose.

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