Section 902 of rules on state and county financial organs, practically

ends the entire reform of uniting the treasuries with the institutions

of the Bank.

This reform constitutes the greatest revolutionary departure, in strict

accordance with the instructions contained in the party program. Prior

to the completion of this reform, the old pre-revolutionary principle

continued to prevail—that of opposition of the State Treasury to the

State Bank, which was independent financially, having its own means,

operating at the expense of its capital stock, and acting as a

depository for the funds of the State Treasury and as its creditor.

Insofar as the new scheme of our financial life has been realized, this

dualism, has finally disappeared in the process of realization of the

reform. The Bank has now actually become the only budget-auditing

savings account machinery of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet

Republic. At the present moment it is serving all the departments of the

state administration, in the sense that it meets all the government

expenditures and receives all the state revenue. It takes care of all

accounting between the governmental institutions, on the one hand, and

the private establishments and individuals on the other. Through the

hands of the People’s Bank pass all the budgets of all institutions and

enterprises, even the state budget itself; in it is concentrated the

central bookkeeping which is to unify all the operations and to give a

general picture of the national economic balance.

Thus, we may consider that the fundamental work, i.e., "the

monopolization of the entire banking business in the hands of the Soviet

Government, the radical alteration and the simplification of banking

operations by means of converting the banking apparatus into an

apparatus for uniform accounting and general bookkeeping of the Soviet

Republic"—has been accomplished by the Commissariat of Finance.

IV

As regards the carrying into practice of a number of measures intended

to widen the sphere of accounting without the aid of money, the

Commissariat of Finance has, during the period above referred to,

undertaken some steps insofar as this was possible under the

circumstances.

As long as the state did not overcome the shortage of manufactured

articles, caused by the general dislocation of industrial life, and as

long as it could arrange for a moneyless direct exchange of commodities

with the villages, nothing else remains for it than to take, insofar as

possible, all possible steps to reduce the instances where money is used

as a medium of exchange. Through an increase of moneyless operations

between the departments, and between the government and individuals,

economically dependent upon it, the ground is prepared for the abolition

of money.

The first step in this direction was the decree of the Soviet of

People’s Commissaries of January 23rd, 1919, on accounting operations,

containing regulations on the settling of merchandise accounts

(products, raw material, manufactured articles, etc.) among Soviet

institutions, and also among such industrial and commercial

establishments as have been nationalized, taken over by the

municipalities, or are under the control of the Supreme Council of

National Economy, the People’s Commissariat for Food Supply, and

Provincial Councils of National Economy and their sub-divisions.

In accordance with this decree, the above-mentioned accounts are to be

settled without the medium of currency, by means of a draft upon the

state treasury for the amount chargeable to the consuming institution,

and to be credited to the producing institution, or enterprise. In the

strict sense, the decree establishes a principle, in accordance with

which any Soviet institution or governmental enterprise requiring

merchandise, must not resort to the aid of private dealers, but is in

duty bound to apply to the corresponding Soviet institutions,

accounting, producing or distributing those articles. Thus, it was

proposed, by means of the above-mentioned decree, to reduce an enormous

part of the state budget to the mere calculation of interdepartmental

accounts, income on one side and expenditures on the other. In other

words, it becomes possible to transact an enormous part of the

operations without the use of money as a medium of exchange.

As regards the policy of the Commissariat of Finance in the domain of

the circulation of money, one of the most important measures in this

respect was the decree of the Soviet of People’s Commissaries of May

15th, 1919, on the issue of new paper money of the 1918 type.

This decree states the following motive for the issue of new money:

“this money is being issued with the object of gradually replacing the

paper money now in circulation of the present model, the form of which

in no way corresponds to the foundations of Russia’s new political

order, and also for the purpose of driving out of circulation various

substitutes for money which have been issued due to the shortage of

paper money.”

The simultaneous issue of money of the old and new type made it

impossible for the Commissariat of Finance to immediately commence the

exchange of money, but this in no way did or does prevent it from

preparing the ground for such exchange, in connection with the annulment

of the major part of the old money in a somewhat different manner.

Creating a considerable supply of money of the new model (1918) and

increasing the productivity of the currency printing office, the

Commissariat is to gradually pass over to, in fact has already begun,

the issue of money exclusively of the new type. A little while after the

old paper money has ceased to be printed, the laboring population, both

rural and urban, as well as the Red Guards all of whom are not in

position to accumulate large sums, will soon have none of the old money.

Then will be the time to annul the money of the old type, since this

annulment will not carry with it any serious encroachment on the

interests of the large laboring masses.

Thus the issue of new money is one of the most needed first steps on the

road to the preparation of the fundamental problem, that is the

annihilation of a considerable quantity of money of the old type,

reducing in this way the general volume of the mass of paper money in

circulation.

We thus see that here, too, the Commissariat of Finance followed a

definite policy. It goes without saying that from the point of view of

Socialist policy all measures in the domain of money circulation are

mere palliative measures. The Commissariat of Finance entertains no

doubts as to the fact that a radical solution of the question is

possible only by eliminating money as a medium of exchange.

The most immediate problem before the Commissariat of Finance is

undoubtedly the accomplishment of the process which has already begun,

namely, the selection of the most convenient moment for the annulment of

the old money. As regards the part which currency generally (at this

moment of transition) plays, there can be no doubt that now it is the

only and therefore inevitable system of financing the entire

governmental machinery and that the choice of other ways in this

direction entirely depends upon purely economic conditions, i.e., mainly

upon the process of organization and restoration of the national economy

as a whole.

V

The explanatory note, attached to the budget for July to December, 1918,

thus depicts our future budget: “When the Socialist reconstruction of

Russia has been completed, when all the factories, mills and other

establishments have passed into the hands of the government, and the

products of these will go to the government freely and directly, when

the agricultural and farming products will also freely flow into the

government stores either in exchange for manufactured articles or as

duty in kind ... then the state budget will reflect not the condition of

the monetary transactions of the State Treasury ... but the condition of

the operations involving material values, belonging to the State, and

the operations will be transacted without the aid of money, at any rate

without money in its present form.”

It is clear that at present the conditions are not yet fully prepared

for the transition to the above-stated new form of state budget. But, in

spite of this, the Commissariat of Finance has taken a big step forward

in the direction of reforming our budget.

The budget of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, adopted by

the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on May 20, 1919, represents

the experiment in effecting a survey not so much of the financial

activity of the state, as of its economic activity, even though it is as

yet in the form of money.

In the work of reforming the budget, the Commissariat of Finance has

come across two obstacles which are a heritage of the pre-revolutionary

time: the division of revenue and expenditures into general state and

local, and the hesitation on the part of some to include in the budget

all the productive and distributive operations of the Supreme Council of

National Economy and of the Commissariat for Food Supply. Both, the

first and second obstacles have been somewhat surmounted, and the

above-mentioned (third) revolutionary budget is already different from

the two preceding budgets in many peculiarities which are very typical.

These consist in a complete account of all production and distribution

which the state has taken upon itself. This experiment is by no means

complete, but the achievement should nevertheless be judged as

considerable. The concrete conditions for making out the budget, as is

stated in the explanatory note, have already made it possible to enter

upon the road of accounting for the entire production and distribution

of the nation, and that thereby the foundation has been laid down for

the development of the budget in the only direction which is proper

under the present conditions.

The budget of the first half of 1919 has followed the same fundamental

principles for the construction of the state budget by including the

expenditures of the entire state production and distribution as well as

the sum total of the revenue-in the form of income from the productive

and distributive operations of the state. In other words, this budget

for the first time takes into account all the transactions of the

Supreme Council of National Economy and of the Commissariat for Food

Supply.

The further development of the budget will be directed toward the

working out of the details of this general plan, and, in particular,

toward differentiating revenue and expenditures: (1) direct, actual

money received or paid, and (2) transactions involved in the accounting

of material and labor, but not involving any actual receipts of money,

or requiring any actual disbursements in money.

VI

In the field of taxation one must bear in mind first that the entire

question of taxation has been radically changed with the beginning of

Communist reconstruction.

Under the influence of the combined measures of economic and financial

legislation of the Republic, the bases for the levying of land, real

estate, industrial taxes, taxes on coupons, on bank notes, on stock,

stock exchange, etc., completely disappeared, since the objects of

taxation themselves have become government property. The old statute

regulating the income tax (1916), which has not as yet been abolished,

was in no way suitable to the changed economic conditions. All this

compelled the Commissariat of Finance to seek new departures in the

field of taxation.

However, it was impossible to give up the idea of direct taxation prior

to the complete reformation of the tax system as a whole. Our work of

Communist reconstruction has not been completed; it would be absurd to

exempt from taxation the former capitalists as well as the newly forming

group of people who strive for individual accumulation. This is why the

system of direct taxation, which has until recently been in operation,

was composed of fragments of the old tax on property and of the partly

reformed income tax law. However, beginning with November, 1918, to this

old system there were added two taxes of a purely revolutionary

character which stand out apart within the partly outgrown system “taxes

in kind” (decree of October 30, 1918) and “extraordinary taxes”

(November 2, 1918).

Both decrees have been described as follows by Comrade Krestinsky,

Commissary of Finance, at the May session of the financial

sub-divisions:

“These are decrees of a different order, the only thing they have in

common is that they both bear a class character and that each provides

for the tax to increase in direction proportion with the amount of

property which the tax-payer possesses, that the poor are completely

free from both taxes, and the lower middle class pays them in a smaller

proportion.”

The extraordinary tax aims at the savings which remained in the hands of

the urban and larger rural bourgeoisie from former times. Insofar as it

is directed at non-labor savings it cannot be levied more than once. As

regards the taxes in kind, borrowing Comrade Krestinsky’s expression,

“it will remain in force during the period of transition to the

Communist order, until the village will from practical experience

realize the advantage of rural economy on a large scale compared with

the small farming estate, and will of its own accord, without

compulsion, _en masse_ adopt the Communist method of land cultivation.”

Thus, the tax in kind is a link binding politically the Communist

socialized urban economy and the independent individual petty

agricultural producers.

Such are the two “direct” revolutionary taxes of the latest period. In

regard to the old system of pre-revolutionary taxes, the work of the

Commissariat of Finance during all of the latest period followed the

path of gradual change and abolition of the already outgrown types of

direct taxation and partial modification and adaptation to the new

conditions of the moment, of the old taxes still suitable for practical

purposes.

At the present moment the Commissariat of Finance has entered, in the

domain of direct taxation reforms, upon the road toward a complete

revolution in the old system. The central tax board is now, for the

transitional period, working on a project of income and property

taxation, the introduction of which will liquidate all the existing

direct taxes, without exception. The single tax which is being proposed,

is so constructed that it covers the very property of the citizen, i.e.,

it constitutes a demand that the citizen yield that part of his savings

which is above a certain standard, etc.

In closing the review of the activity of the Commissariat of Finance

during the two years of its existence, one must note briefly the great

purely organizational work, conducted by it on a natural as well as a

local scale.

The reform has been definitely directed towards simplifying the

apparatus and reducing its personnel as far as possible.

Finally, with this reform, the Commissariat of Finance has been

organized in the following manner: the central office, the central

budget-accounting board (former People’s Bank and Department of State

Treasury) and, finally, the central tax board (former Department of

Assessed Taxes and of Unassessed Taxes). Upon the same pattern are also

being modeled the local financial bodies.

-----------------------

DOCUMENT IV—A, B, C

From _Economic Life_, (Nov. 7, 1919). The official organ

of the Supreme Council of National Economy

Finance, food, trade, and industry

------------------

A—OUR METAL INDUSTRY

The two years that have passed since the November Revolution have been

marked by civil war, which still continues. Russia’s isolation from the

outside world, the loss and, later on, the recapture of entire provinces

of decisive importance to her industries, the feverish, and therefore

unsystematic, transfer of the industries to a peace basis, and then,

during the last year the reorganization of the industries, the unusual

conditions of transportation, the fuel and the food questions, and as a

result of these, the question of labor power growing more acute—this is

the sad picture of conditions under which the Russian proletariat has

organized and maintained the nation’s economic life.

And though these familiar conditions of actual life have affected all

branches of industry, the greatest sufferer in this respect has been the

metal industry, which forms the basis for our defence and the foundation

for all our industrial life.

We might add here that the metal industry, and in particular the metal

working industry as its most complicated and many-sided phase, both in

assortment of products and in the nature of production, was by no means

strong in Russia even under the rule of the bourgeoisie. As compared

with the more developed capitalist countries, the metal industry in

Russia has been at a disadvantage because of the very geographical

situation of its centers, remote from the sources of raw material and

fuel, artificially built up and having suffered all the consequences of

an unsound foundation. As a result of these conditions, there is lack of

specialization and poor development of large scale production which

means a lack of the necessary prerequisites for successful production.

These are the external conditions under which the administration of our

metal industry has been compelled to work.

The first and most fundamental problem has been that of systematic

monopolization of industry. Only under this form of industrial

organization—if freed from all the negative features of the capitalist

trust,—is operation possible, even on a reduced scale, so that later on

we might lay the solid foundations for new constructive work in the

organization of the nation’s economic life of Socialist principles. The

process of monopolization may be considered as complete by this time.

Large associations have been formed, such as the trust of united

government machine shops “Gomza,” amalgamating the largest mills

producing the means of transportation and machine construction, and the

large metallurgical mills, the trust of state copper working factories,

the trust of government automobile works, the trust of government

aviation work, the trust of government wire nail, bolt and nut

factories, the trust of the Maltzoff Metallurgical mills, the

association of the Kaluga metallurgical mills (cast iron, utensils, and

hardware), the trust of the Podolsk mechanical and machine construction

shops the Petrograd mills for heavy production, the Petrograd mills for

medium machine construction, and the Petrograd mills for heavy output

(production on large scale) are united under individual district

administration boards.

Not all the enterprises consolidated within the associations have become

closely bound up among themselves during this transitional period. In a

matter of such gigantic proportions mistakes have been, of course,

inevitable and they will have to be rectified. However, the results of

the experience of the last two years are sufficient ground for the claim

that the working class has solved the problem of consolidating industry.

The central administration of the Gomza mills thus characterizes the

significance of this consolidation: "The consolidation of the mills

working on transportation equipment, working with the metallurgical

group makes it possible to utilize most efficiently all the resources

available, such as fuel, raw material, technical forces, and the

experience of the various mills with a view to obtaining the best

possible results under the existing conditions. The amalgamation of the

mills has already, during the past year, made it possible to distribute

among them in the most rational manner, that inconsiderable quantity of

metal products and mineral fuel, all products included, which the groups

had in its possession. This enabled the mills to adapt themselves to the

usage of local fuel. The concentration, even though only partial, of

some of the branches of the metallurgical industry, also of the

blacksmithing and iron foundry branches, was made possible entirely by

the amalgamation. The specialization of the mills, according to the

types of steam engines, Diesel or other machines, has been decided along

general lines, by the Metal Department of the Supreme Council of

National Economy, and the question is being worked out in closest

cooperation with the Technical Department of the “Gomza.” The

amalgamation of the mills will make it possible to carry out gradually

this specialization and utilize its results.

The central administration of the united mills states, in a report of

its activities, that owing to the consolidation of the mills, the

problems of supplying them with raw material, fuel and labor power, were

solved in a fairly satisfactory way, thus placing production on a more

or less constant basis. The mills entering this combination, if left to

their own resources, would have been doomed to a complete shutdown.

The trust of the airplane building works has so completely amalgamated

all the mills, which entered the combination that it now would be at a

loss to determine in advance which of the mills would perform any given

part of its program of production; to such an extent are these mills

bound up together through constant interchange of fuel, raw material,

supplies and even labor power.

The process of concentration of the industries in the Ural region is

being successfully carried out by the Bureau of the Metal Department,

through the organization of district and circuit officers.

Outside of the combine only those mills remained where production is

merely organized: the Moscow works “Metal,” “Electrosteel,” “Scythe,”

“Aviation Outfits,” and the Satatov mill—“Star” (Zwezda). These works

are temporarily in the immediate charge of the Metal Department.

The Gomza trust during the entire period of its existence, up to July

1st, 1919, has produced 69 new locomotives and repaired 38 old ones; it

has produced 1,744 new and repaired 1,040 old coaches; it has completed

670 small cars; 261,327 poods of axles and tires; 7,543 poods of

switches; and 118,659 poods of various locomotive and car parts. The

table given below representing the output for the first six months of

1919, as compared with the same period for 1916 and 1918, of the Vyxunsk

Mining District, gives an idea of the work of the Department of

Metallurgy of our largest trust:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Output in Thousands of Poods Ratio

I II III IV IV:I IV:II IV:III

January January July January

to to to to

June, June, Dec., June,

1916 1918 1918 1919

------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------

Standard bars 86,7 91,4 74,2 133,6 154 146,1 179,9

Roofing iron

and billets ... ... 37,3 37,3 ... .. 100,0

Sheet iron and

boiler

plates 112,1 59,3 3,5 10,9 9,7 18,4 321,1

Plough shares

and

mould-boards ... ... ... 7,7 ... ... ...

Pipes 225,4 125,0 56,4 61,1 24,7 78,8 108,2

Wire 255,2 106,7 4,9 22,6 8,8 21,2 455,1

Nails 114,9 117,4 79,3 51,4 44,8 43,8 64,9

Pitchforks ... 2,8 3,7 1,0 ... 36,6 27,2

Shovels 6,6 6,0 4,5 2,2 33,7 37,3 50,5

------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------

800,9 508,6 263,8 327,8 40,9% 64,5 124,2

------------------------------------------------------------------------

It is apparent from the data given in the above table that the total

output for the first six months of 1919 was almost 41 per cent of the

total output for the corresponding period of 1916, and 64.5 per cent of

the total product for the first half year of 1918, and 124.2 per cent of

the last six months of 1918. The figures expressing the ratio of the

total output of metal for the same periods are respectively—91.4 per

cent, 120.6 per cent and 153.2 per cent.

Taking into consideration the extremely difficult conditions of

production, the results may be considered satisfactory.

If we turn to the production of another of our trusts—“Central Copper

Works” (Centromed), we note that during the period of October to

December, 1916, the main Tula factory has produced 73.4 per cent of its

capacity, during January to June of 1919—89.9 per cent, and finally

during July and August of this year (1919)—about 87 per cent. The

Kolchugin works have produced the various articles of their manufacture

during the same periods in quantities which amounted to from 16 to 48

per cent, 30 per cent to 77 per cent and 20 per cent to 36 per cent of

the quantities it was scheduled to produce, while the samovar factories

have produced 44 per cent of the scheduled output.

The mills entering the association of the Central Aviation Works have

produced 36 per cent to 180 per cent of the quantity they planned to

turn out, while during July, August and September of 1918 this

percentage ranged in the various mills and branches of production from

26 per cent to 120 per cent.

A comparatively considerable increase of production has been noted on

the works combined in the automobile trust

It would be absolutely impossible, within the limits of a newspaper

article, to amplify the illustration of the above statements by means of

statistical data, especially in view of the fact that the data

pertaining to the latest period has not been arranged systematically.

However, the figures cited above, we trust, give some idea of the

process and results of the concentration of industry and permit the

deduction that the productivity of labor in our large works, insofar as

it did not completely depend upon conditions which under the present

circumstances are insuperable,—has increased as compared with that for

the preceding year, and in some exceptional cases, it has even arisen to

the pre-war level.

Nevertheless, our large industry has been getting into even greater

difficulties. A number of crises weighing on it are breaking down its

last forces. Of these the most acute and serious are the fuel and food

crises, the latter demoralizing labor. This enforced comparative

idleness has been thoroughly utilized during the revolutionary period,

for the purpose of preparing for the time when the external conditions

would permit our large industries to run at full speed.

In addition to the work of adapting our industry to modern conditions of

production (altering the mills to suit them to the usage of wood fuel,

by changing the construction of the furnaces and cupolas) the Technical

Council of the Metals Department of the Supreme Council of National

Economy is conducting the enormous work of standardizing the industry

and specializing the mills by means of a detailed study of the

individual branches of industry. It is also engaged in the restoration

of the old, and in the organization of new, industries on the basis of

specialized labor and production on a large scale. This latter task has

been carried out by a number of commissions organized by the Metal

Department of the Supreme Council of National Economy.

The Technical Council of the Metals Department conducted its work

chiefly on the plane of standardizing production within the metal

industry, reducing to a minimum the types of construction of the same

article. Under capitalist conditions of production the law of

competition frequently led individual manufacturers to deliberately

flood the market with a multitude of various constructions of the same

machines in order to compel the consumer purchasing a machine or

implement at a given mill, to buy all the parts and often have his

machine repaired in the same shop. It is needless to point out to what

extent this increased the cost of production and, what is still more

important, the cost of exploitation. The Technical Council has tackled

the question not from an abstractly scientific viewpoint, but from a

practical standpoint, working in close cooperation with our metal works.

Every master part, every detail is being worked out on the basis of data

collected at the mills by subcommittees consisting of specialists. Then

the project is submitted to the mills where the necessary changes and

coordination are suggested. The comments given by the mills are compiled

and revised, before this or the other table or drawing is introduced;

the same applies to the technical specifications and assortments.

Master parts of three categories are being worked out: (1) for the

production of metal ware on a large scale, (2) for general machine

construction, (3) for the construction of Diesel engines, which is now

developing into a general division of thermo-technics.

In addition to this, a project is being completed for a lathe designed

for the needs of home industries, and for repair work. A project is

being worked out for a series of lathes of all sizes, required for

machine construction shops.

Besides work on the standardization of industry, efforts are also being

made to lay down the technical conditions.

Of the above mentioned committees, the following deserve special

mention:

(1) The committee on steam turbine construction is distributing orders

for the construction of turbines of various types. The Petrograd metal

works and the Putiloff wharf have already completed part of their

orders. In addition to this, the committee has investigated the

construction of steam turbines in Russia.

(2) The committee on tractor construction has redistributed and again

alloted orders among the Obukhov factory, the Mamin mill and the

Kolomenksky mill for 75, 16 and 30 horse-power tractors. The drawings

for the latter type of tractor have been worked out by the committee.

Out of the number of tractors ordered at the Obukhov works, the first

three Russian-made tractors are already completed. The others will be

turned out in January and in June of 1920. It is proposed to organize

the production of tractors on a large scale at the new Vyxunsk mill, the

building of which is being completed.

(3) The committee on the construction of gas generating installations

which has determined the basic type of gas generating engine most

suitable for the conditions of Russian machine construction, has

standardized the normal power of the engines; it has also outlined the

preliminary measures for the adaptation of certain mills to large scale

production of gas-generating engines.

(4) The committee for the development and improvement of steam boiler

construction in Russia, has prepared the material and worked out

detailed conditions for a contest of stationary water-tube boilers, the

cheapest as to cost of production and the most economical in operation

to be adopted by the committee. The committee also prepares the

conditions for a contest on the production of a mechanical stoker,

having investigated possible productivity and modern methods of

production of steam boilers in Russia.

(5) The committee on the construction of refrigerating machinery

ascertained the requirements for 1919–1920 in the line of refrigerating

machinery; it is laying down and determining the types of refrigerating

machines and apparatus that would be most desirable; it is working out

the construction of the same, etc. Finally, it has drawn up plans for

the construction of refrigerator-barges to sail regularly on the Volga

between Astrakhan and Rybinsk.

In addition to the above-mentioned commissions, the Metal Department has

a number of committees now functioning, such as the committee in charge

of supplying the country with high grades of steel, having a technical

convention of its own the committee on the organization of the Ural

industries, the committee on locomotive construction, etc.

As we have mentioned before, simultaneously with rendering support to

large industries and taking steps for their conversion to normal

conditions, particularly careful attention had to be given to the

intermediate, small and home industries.

Intermediate industry comprises almost all of the agricultural machine

construction, under the direction of the agricultural machinery section

of the Metal Department of the Supreme Council of National Economy. This

section operates in close contact with the local governing bodies in

charge of the people’s industries: provincial, councils of national

economy. According to the data of the section, covering the period of

October 1st, 1918 to October 1st, 1919, the following simple as well as

complicated agricultural machines and implements have been produced:

147,453 ploughs

3,717 winnowing machines

1,440 straw cutters

11,451 harrows

98,689 scythes

684,420 sickles

11,980 harvesting machines

For the purpose of organizing the production of scythes in the most

efficient manner possible the agricultural machine section created a

special Scythes Bureau, which is investigating this line of production,

ascertaining the possible amount of productivity if manufactured in the

machine shop manner or according to the home industry method, both in

the central provinces and in the Ural region. The bureau has laid down a

plan for radical change in the nature of production by means of

splitting it into two fundamental processes: the metallurgical—the

rolling of steel of worked out profile; and the finishing process in the

mills and shops. For the purpose of rolling the metal it has been

proposed to utilize the Vyxunsk mill, which has been requested to

include in its program the rolling of steel for the production of

scythes.

In the field of home industry production on a small scale the committee

on metal products and apparatus of the Metal Department is working in

close cooperation with other government institutions, having organized

agencies in Pavlovsk, Tula, Murom, and Vladimir, for the purpose of

financing artisans and distributing raw material among them on the one

condition that they turn in their product to the government stores for

organized distribution. The results of this work can be judged by the

following approximate data on the cost of manufactured products, the

stock on hand from previous year returned to the factories and

enterprises of the Murom, Pavlovsk, Tula region, as well as to the group

of cast iron foundries of the provinces of Kaluga and Ryazan.

The Murom district, manufacturing cutlery and to some extent also

instruments, has turned out, during the period following the

organization of the government agency, 15 million roubles’ worth of

goods, while the total worth of it, including remnants returned, amounts

to 25 million roubles; the Pavlovsk district engaged in the manufacture

of cutlery, locks and instruments,—among others, surgical

instruments—has produced since October 1st, 1918, 70 million roubles’

worth of merchandise; including the remnants, this would aggregate to

100 million roubles. The Tula district (hardware, locks, stove

accessories, samovars, hunters’ rifles), has produced since May 1919, 30

million roubles’ worth of goods, which, including the remnants, amount

to 60 million roubles. The cast-iron foundries of the Kaluga and Ryazan

districts (manufacturing cast-iron utensils, stove accessories and

various other castings) have produced since October 1st, 1918, 50

million roubles’ worth of merchandise, including the remnants.

Thus, the total amount of goods produced amounts to 165 million

roubles,—or to 235 million roubles, if the value of the remnants is

added,—taking 40 as the co-efficient of its value according to

peace-time prices.

The central administration could not take upon itself the direct

organization of home industries to the full extent. Its best assistants

in this matter are the local institutions of national economy—the

provincial and district metal committees, which have been brought in

close contact with the central administration by the conventions of the

representatives of the district and provincial metal committees. These

conventions were being called at regular intervals for the purpose of

working out and ratifying their programs concerning production and

distribution of metals, and financial questions.

We must also mention the fact that all the measures in the domain of the

metal industry are being carried out with the close and immediate

cooperation of the workers’ producing association—the union of metal

workers.

Thus, as has been proven from practical experience, the methods and

forms of organization of the metal industry have turned out to be

correct. Their application is therefore to be continued and widened,

strengthening the ties binding these organizations with the local

administrative bodies, such as the provincial and district metal

committees and with the central management of the amalgamated

enterprises.

The great obstacle in the path of future development in our metal

industry is the food question, which carries with it the dissolution of

labor power. Considering the fact that circumstances have compelled our

industry in general, and particularly the metal industry, to supply

chiefly the needs of national defence, to which it is necessary to give

right of way over all other interests, the authorities and the labor

organizations must do everything in their power to avert the food crisis

threatening the metal workers, even if this be to the detriment of the

population.

It is necessary not only to cease all further mobilization of laborers

and responsible workers, but also to select a considerable portion of

those already mobilized for the purpose of transferring them from the

army into industry.

The course of work of the metal industry during the past two years gives

us reason to hope that these measures, if introduced systematically,

might make it possible to cope with the difficult external conditions

and furnish a mighty stimulus for preparing the metal industry for the

needs of peaceful construction.

M. VINDELBOT.

------------------

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RURAL INDUSTRIES

B—FROM “ECONOMIC LIFE,” Nov. 7, 1919.

The Supreme Council of National Economy has put into practice the idea

of nationalization of all our industries: at present there is not one

mill or factory of any considerable size that is not the property of the

people.

During the second year of its existence, the Supreme Council of National

Economy has made some headway in the work of nationalization of land. As

a particular instance we might cite the fact that it was upon the

initiative and due to the energetic efforts of the Supreme Council of

National Economy that the land fund for the sugar industry has been

nationalized. The total area of land nationalized for the sugar industry

amounts to 600,000 dessiatins.

The sugar-beet industry has furnished the initial step in the

development of the rural industries, since this particular industry has

been better preserved during the transitional period of the Revolution.

The alcohol industry occupies the next place. Its development has been

begun by the Supreme Council of National Economy during the last few

days.

These two large branches of rural industry are followed by a number of

lesser significance, such as the production of starch, molasses, butter,

milk, tobacco, medicinal herbs, the group of fibre plants, etc. The

Supreme Council of National Economy is now laying a solid foundation for

the development of all these industries.

What then is the program of action of the Supreme Council of National

Economy for the development of the rural industries? In the first place,

to supply definite land areas for the cultivation of certain plants, the

introduction of definite forms of agricultural labor, and of uniform

management for the manufacturing and agricultural industries, the

establishment of close connections between the industrial proletariat

and the citizens engaged in the rural industries.

Among the problems enumerated above, foremost is that of uniting the

industrial proletariat with the rural workers. The Supreme Council of

National Economy has already begun to work on this task. Thus the

industrial proletariat is now officially in possession of 90,000

dessiatins of land, on which communes have been organized. The crops

from these estates go to satisfy the needs of the associations in whose

name the estates are registered. At the same time, the industrial

proletariat, through participation in agricultural labor, is introducing

new ideas into the rural industries.

The Supreme Council of National Economy is mining the coal from the

depths of the earth and exploiting the peat deposits. In order to

utilize the resources completely, it is paying particular attention to

the conversion of swampy areas and exhausted turf deposits into areable

land, transforming the bottom of the exploited turf areas into vegetable

gardens, the sections bordering upon the swamps into artificial meadows,

and the uplands into fields. During last summer similar work was

accomplished on a considerable scale on the lands of the central

electric station, in the Government of Moscow, the Ilatur electric

station, in the Government of Ryazan, Gus-Hrustalny, in the Government

of Vladimir, and the Gomza estates in the Government of Nizhni-Novgorod.

Thus, during last summer, the work was organized in four central

provinces, abounding in large areas of land, which cannot be

conveniently used for agricultural purposes.

Simultaneously the improvement of dwellings, and the building of

garden-cities is being given careful and immediate consideration. This

work is being carried on by the Supreme Council of National Economy at

the electric station of Kashirsk, the Shatur station and the Central

Electric station.

In order to unify rural industries the Supreme Council of National

Economy has formed the central administration of agricultural estates

and industrial enterprises, assigning to it the task of uniting and

developing as far as possible, the work of the rural mills.

The Central Administration of Agriculture considers it one of its

immediate problems to propagate widely the idea of nationalization of

land for all rural industries and the opening of new districts for those

industries.

In apportioning the land, especially valuable districts should be set

apart, such as the meadows, flooded with water from the Don river, fully

suitable for the cultivation of tobacco, fibre plants, and olives, on a

large scale.

These lands, if distributed among the peasants will never yield such

wealth as they could do were they nationalized for rational

exploitation.

Next on the program of the Central Administration of Agriculture is the

building up of new branches of rural industry, such as the working of

sugar beets into molasses and into beet flour, in the northern

districts, the production of ammonium sulphate out of the lower grades

of peat, the preparation of fodder out of animal refuse, the production

of turf litter material, the preparation of new sources of nitrate

fertilizer out of peat, etc.

Electric power must be utilized for the cultivation of land. The

practical realization of this problem has been started on the fields of

the electric power transmission department. This Fall we succeeded in

tilling the ground by means of a power-driven plow.

In order to build up the rural industries, practical work must be

carried on, simultaneously with that which is being done on the

particularly important lands, also on such lands as will not be the bone

of contention between the proletariat and the peasantry.

What lands are these? The swampy areas, the forest-covered lands, those

districts where the people are starving, the dry lands, the scarcely

populated districts, etc.

These are the brief outlines of the program. The foundations of

absolutely all of the development of rural industry mentioned have been

laid down. The practical steps for the materialization of the plans have

to some extent already been, or are being, undertaken.

All of this work the Supreme Council of National Economy had to carry

out under extremely difficult conditions. Prior to that, a considerable

part of the sources of raw material for the rural industries has been

completely torn away from the Soviet Republic. Another serious hindrance

was the insufficient number of already existing organizations, which

would be capable of fulfilling the tasks outlined by the Council. A

considerable amount of harm has been done to this work by

interdepartmental friction.

But difficult as the present conditions may be, and no matter how strong

is the desire of the former ruling classes to turn back the tide of

life, this is impossible and can never take place.

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION OF AGRICULTURE.

------------------

NATIONALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

C—FROM “ECONOMIC LIFE,” Nov. 7, 1919.

The nationalization of agriculture is one of the most complicated

problems of the Socialist Revolution, and perhaps in no other country is

this problem as complex as in Soviet Russia.

At the time when the decree on Socialist land management was made

public, the fundamental elements of nationalization had hardly begun to

take shape: the territory affected by nationalization was by no means

defined; there was not the personnel necessary for the creation and

enforcement of any plan concerning production; the large masses of

laborers hardly understood the idea of nationalization and in some

instances were hostile to the measures by means of which the Soviet

power was carrying out the program of nationalization.

In order to summarize the results of the work, which began on a

nation-wide scale in March, 1919, and to estimate these results, one

must first realize the conditions which formed the starting-point for

the work of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture at the time when it

commenced to carry out the nationalization of agriculture.

The extent of the capitalist heritage, which our organized Soviet

estates now have at their disposal, amounts to 615,503 dessiatins or

areable land, situated in the Soviet provinces and formerly in the hands

of private owners. Eighty-five per cent of the areable land, which

formerly belonged to the landed aristocracy was taken over for the

purpose of both organized and non-organized distribution—chiefly the

latter.

The equipment of the various estates was diminished and destroyed to no

lesser extent. Instead of the 386,672 privately owned horses, registered

in the Soviet provinces, according to the census of 1916, the Soviet

estates in the hands of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture

received 23,149 horses—a number hardly sufficient for the cultivation of

one-third of the area under cultivation now belonging to the Soviet

estates. Of the 290,969 cows—only 43,361 came into the possession of the

Soviet estates. The entire number of horses and cows will yield

sufficient fertilizer for only 13,000 dessiatins of fallow land, i.e.,

about 10 per cent of the area intended to be converted into areable

land.

The supply of agricultural machinery and implements was in the same

condition.

The Soviet estates had almost no stocks of provisions. The workmen were

compelled either to steal or to desert for places where bread was more

abundant.

The winter corn was sowed in the fall of 1918 on very limited areas (not

over 25 per cent of the fallow land), very often without fertilizer,

with a very small quantity of seeds to each dessiatin. In 13 out of 36

Soviet provinces (governments) no winter corn has been sowed at all.

A considerable portion of the estates taken over by the People’s

Commissariat of Agriculture could not be utilized due to the lack of

various accessories, such as harness, horseshoes, rope, small

instruments, etc.

The workers were fluctuating, entirely unorganized, politically

inert—due to the shortage of provisioning and of organization. The

technical forces could not get used to the village; besides, we did not

have sufficient numbers of agricultural experts familiar with the

practical organization of large estates. The regulations governing the

social management of land charged the representatives of the industrial

proletariat with a leading part in the work of the Soviet estates. But

torn between meeting the various requirements of the Republic of prime

importance, the proletariat could not with sufficient speed furnish the

number of organizers necessary for agricultural management.

The idea of centralized management on the Soviet estates has not been

properly understood by the local authorities, and the work of

organization from the very beginning had to progress amidst bitter

fighting between the provincial Soviet estates and the provincial

offices of the Department of Agriculture. This struggle has not yet

ceased.

Thus, the work of nationalizing the country’s agriculture began in the

spring, i.e., a half year later than it should have, and without any

definite territory (every inch of it had to be taken after a long and

strenuous siege on the part of the surrounding population), with

insufficient and semi-ruined equipment, without provisions, without an

apparatus for organization and without the necessary experience for such

work, with the agricultural workers engaged in the Soviet estates having

no organization at all.

According to our preliminary calculations, we are to gather in the Fall

of this year a crop of produce totaling in the 2,524 Soviet estates as

follows:

Area in

Poods Dessiatins

Winter crop 1,798,711 54,000

Spring corn 4,765,790 97,720

Potatoes 16,754,900 23,754

Vegetables, approximately 4,500,000 4,659

Of the Winter corn we received only a little over what was required for

seed (in a number of provinces the crops are insufficient for the

consumption of the workers of the Soviet estates).

The Soviet estates are almost everywhere sufficiently supplied with

seeds for the spring crops.

The number of horses used on the Soviet estates has been increased

through the additional purchase of 12,000 to 15,000.

The number of cattle has also been somewhat increased.

The Soviet estates are almost completely supplied with agricultural

implements and accessories, both by having procured new outfits from the

People’s Commissariat for Provisioning and by means of energetic repair

work on the old ones.

The foundation has been laid (in one-half of the provinces sufficiently

stable foundations) for the formation of an organizational machinery for

the administration of the Soviet estates.

Within the limits of the Soviet estates the labor union of the

agricultural proletariat has developed into a large organization.

In a number of provinces the leading part in the work of the Soviet

estates has been practically assumed by the industrial proletariat,

which has furnished a number of organizers, whose reputation had been

sufficiently established.

Estimating the results of the work accomplished, we must admit that we

have not as yet any fully nationalized rural economy. But during the

eight months of work in this direction, all the elements for its

organization have been accumulated.

We have strengthened our position in regard to supplies, having been

enabled not only to equip more efficiently the Soviet estates (2,524)

already included in our system of organization, but also to nationalize

during the season of 1920 additional 1,012 Soviet estates, with an area

of 972,674 dessiatins. The combined area of the nationalized enterprises

will probably amount in 1920 to about 2,000,000 dessiatins within the

present Soviet territory.

A preliminary familiarity with individual estates and with agricultural

regions makes it possible to begin the preparation of a national plan

for production on the Soviet estates and for a systematic attempt to

meet the manifold demands made on the nationalized estates by the

agricultural industries: sugar, distilling, chemical, as well as by the

country’s need for stock breeding, seeds, planting and other raw

materials.

The greatest difficulties arise in the creation of the machinery of

organization. The shortage of agricultural experts is being replenished

with great difficulty, for the position of the technical personnel of

the Soviet estates, due to their weak political organization, is

extremely unstable. The mobilization of the proletarian forces for work

in the Soviet estates gives us ground to believe that in this respect

the spring of 1920 will find us sufficiently prepared.

The ranks of proletarian workers in the Soviet estates are drawing

together. True, the level of their enlightenment is by no means high,

but “in union there is strength” and this force, if properly utilized,

will yield rapidly positive results.

In order to complete the picture of the agricultural work for the past

year we are citing the following figures: the total expenditures

incurred on the Soviet estates and on account of their administration up

to January 1st, 1920, is estimated to amount to 924,347,500 roubles. The

income, if the products of the Soviet estates are considered at firm

prices, amounts to 843,372,343 roubles.

Thus, the first, the most difficult year, has ended without a deficit,

if one excludes a part of the liabilities which are to be met during a

number of years, i.e., horses and implements.

Of course, it is not the particular experience which the workers possess

that has caused the favorable balance of the Soviet estates, this being

mainly due to the fact that the productive work in the realm of

agriculture under modern conditions is a business not liable to lose.

And this is natural: industry in all its forms depends upon the supply

of fuel, raw material, and food. Nationalized rural economy has an

inexhaustible supply of solar energy—a fuel supply independent of

transportation of the blockade.

The fundamental element of production—land—does not demand any

“colonial” means of restoration of its productivity. And as for

provisions, these we get from the earth under the sun!

After eight months of work on the nationalization of our rural economy,

as a result of two years of titanic struggle on the part of the

proletariat for the right to organize the Socialist industries with its

own hands,—is it not high time to admit that the most expedient, most

far-sighted, and correct method to stabilize the Soviet power would be

to use the greatest number of organized proletarian forces for the work

of nationalizing our agriculture?

N. BOGDANOV.

Transcriber’s Note

The page reference in the list of Illustrations to p. 54 (LENIN AT HIS

DESK IN KREMLIN, 1919) is incorrect. The photograph appears facing p.

50. The entry has been corrected.

On p. 149, a train station town is variously spelled ‘Kreisberg’ and

‘Kreizberg’. Both are retained.

In the Appendix, the organizational names of various Unions are

variously called ‘Trades’ or ‘Trade’. No attempt was made to make them

consistent.

On p. 257, the quoted passage beginning "The consolidation of the

mills..." has no closing quote, and it is unclear where it might have

been intended.

The following table provides information on the relatively few

typographical errors, and their resolution.

p. 25 Rej[z]istza Removed.

p. 46 sold[i]ers Added.

p. 98 [o/O]ne priceless painting Corrected.

p. 192 I[t/f] at the First Corrected.

p. 207 [(]five groups and 15 Added.

categories)

p. 222 follow[low]ing Line break repetition.

p. 227 con[s]truction Added.

p. 228 Vo[ac/ca]tional Transposed.

p. 232 Commit[mit]tees Line break repetition.

p. 256 econo[o]mic Line break repetition.

p. 274 territor[it]y Removed.

End of Project Gutenberg's Barbarous Soviet Russia, by Isaac McBride

"Barbarous Soviet Russia" · 第 14 / 14 章