To understand it you must know that on the London Stock Exchange

you can buy a share and not have to pay for it, or sell a share and

not have to hand over the share certificate, until next settling

day, which may be a fortnight off. You may not see at first what

difference that makes. But a great deal may happen in a fortnight.

Just recollect what you have learnt about the continual fluctuations

in the prices of incomes and of spare subsistence in the Money Market!

Think of the hopes and fears raised by the flourishing and decaying

of the joint stock companies as their business and prospects grow or

shrink according as the harvests are good or bad: rubber harvests, oil

harvests, coal harvests, copper harvests, as well as the agricultural

harvests: all meaning that there will be more or less money to divide

among the shareholders as yearly income, and more or less spare money

available to buy shares with. The prices of shares change not only from

year to year but from day to day, from hour to hour, and, in moments of

excitement on the Stock Exchange, from minute to minute. The share that

was obtained years ago or centuries ago by giving £100 spare money to

start a new company may bring its owner £5000 a year, or it may bring

her thirty shillings, or it may bring her nothing, or it may bring her

all three in succession. Consequently that share, which cost somebody

£100 spare money when it was new, she may be able to sell for £100,000

at one moment, for £30 at another, whilst at yet another she may be

unable to sell it at all, for love or money. As she opens her newspaper

in the morning she looks at the city page, with its list of yesterday’s

prices of stocks and shares, to see how rich she is today; and she

seldom finds that her shares are worth the same price for a week at a

time unless she has been prudent enough to lend it to the Government or

to a municipality (in which case she has communal security) instead of

to private companies.

Now put these two things together: the continual change in the prices

of shares, and the London Stock Exchange rule that they need not be

paid for nor delivered until next settling day. Suppose you have not

a penny of spare cash in your possession, nor a share (carrying an

income) to sell! Suppose you believe for some reason or other that the

price of shares in a certain company (call it company A) is going to

rise in value within the next few days! And suppose you believe that

the price of shares in a certain other company (company B) is going

to fall. If you are right, all you have to do to make some money by

your good guessing is to buy shares in company A and sell shares in

company B. You may say “How am I to buy shares without money or sell

them without the share certificates?” It is very simple: you need not

produce either the money or the certificates until settling day. Before

settling day you sell the A shares for more than you bought them for on

credit; and you buy the B certificates for less than you pretended to

sell them for. On settling day you will get the money from the people

you sold to, and the certificates from the people you bought from; and

when you have paid for the A shares and handed over the B certificates,

you will be in pocket by the difference between their values on the

day you bought and sold them and their values on settling day. Simple

enough, is it not?

This is the game of speculation. Nobody will blame you for engaging in

it; but on the Stock Exchange they will call you a bull for pretending

to buy the A shares, and a bear for pretending to sell the B shares. If

you pay a small sum to get shares allotted to you in a new company on

the chance of selling them at a profit before you have to pay up, they

will call you a stag. If you ask why not a cow or a hind, the reply

is that as the Stock Exchange was founded by men for men its slang is

exclusively masculine.

But, you may say, suppose my guess was wrong! Suppose the price of

the A shares goes down instead of up, and the price of the B shares

up instead of down! Well, that often happens, either through some

unforeseen event affecting the companies, or simply because you guessed

badly. But do not be too terrified by this possibility; for all you can

lose is the difference between the prices; and as this may be only a

matter of five or ten pounds for every hundred you have been dealing

in you can pawn your clothes and furniture and try again. You can

even have your account “carried over” to next settling day by paying

“contango” if you are a bull, or “backwardation” if you are a bear, on

the chance of your luck changing in the extra fortnight.

I must warn you, however, that if a great many other bears have guessed

just as you have, and sold imaginary shares in great numbers, you may

be “cornered”. This means that the bears have sold either more shares

than actually exist, or more than the holders will sell except at a

great advance in price. Bulls who are cunning enough to foresee this

and to buy up the shares which are being beared may make all the money

the bears lose. Cornering the bears is a recognized part of the game of

speculation.

As the game is one of knowledge and skill and character (or no

character) as well as of chance, a good guesser, or one with private

(inside) information as to facts likely to affect share prices, can

make a living at it; and some speculators have made and lost princely

fortunes. Some women play at it just as others back horses. Sometimes

they do it intelligently through regular stockbrokers, with a clear

understanding of the game. Sometimes they are blindly tempted by

circulars sent out from Bucket Shops; so I had better enlighten you as

to what a bucket shop is.

You will remember that a speculator does not stand to lose the whole

price she offers for a share, or the whole value of the share she

pretends to buy. If she loses she loses only the difference between

the prices she expected and the prices she has to pay. If she has

a sufficient sum in hand to meet this she escapes bankruptcy. This

sufficient sum is called “cover”. A bucket shop keeper is one who

undertakes to speculate for anyone who will send him cover. His

circulars say, in effect, “Send me ten pounds, and the worst that can

happen to you is to lose it; but I may be able to double it for you or

even double it many times over. I can refer you to clients who have

sent me £10 and got back £50 or £100.” A lady, not understanding the

business in the least, is tempted to send him £10, and very likely

loses it, in which case she usually tries to get it back by risking

another £10 note if she has one left. But she may be lucky and pocket

some winnings; for bucket shops must let their clients win sometimes or

they could hardly exist. But they can generally prevent your winning,

if they choose, by taking advantage of some specially low price of

shares to shew that your cover has disappeared, or even by selling two

or three shares themselves at a low price and quoting it against you.

Besides, if you sue them for your winnings they can escape by pleading

the Gaming Act. They cannot be mulcted or expelled by the Stock

Exchange Committee; for they are not members of the Stock Exchange, and

have given no securities. A bucket shop keeper is not necessarily a

swindler any more than a bookmaker is necessarily a welsher; but if he

fleeces you you have no remedy, whereas if a stockbroker cheats you it

may cost him his livelihood.

If you speculate through a regular stockbroker you must bear in mind

that he is supposed to deal in genuine investments only: that is, in

the buying of shares by clients who have the money to pay for them,

and the sale of shares by those who really possess them and wish to

exchange them for a lump sum of spare money. The difference is that

if you go into a bucket shop and say frankly “Here is a five pound

note, which is all I have in the world. Will you take it as cover, and

speculate with it for me in stocks of ten times its value”, the bucket

shop will oblige you; but if you say this to a stockbroker he must have

you shewn out. You must allow him to believe, or pretend to believe,

that you really have the spare money or the shares in which you want to

deal.

You will now understand what gambling on the London Stock Exchange

means. The game can be played with certain variations, called options

and double options and so on, which are as easily picked up as the

different hazards of the roulette table; and the foreign stock

exchanges have rules which are not so convenient for the bears as our

rules; but these differences do not change the nature of the game.

Every day speculative business is done in Capel Court in London, on

Wall Street in New York, in the Bourses on the Continent, to the tune

of millions of pounds; and it is literally only a tune: the buyers have

no money and the sellers no goods; and their countries are no richer

for it all than they are for the gaming tables at Monte Carlo or the

bookmakers’ settlements at the end of a horse race. Yet the human

energy, audacity, and cunning wasted on it would, if rightly directed,

make an end of our slums and epidemics and most of our prisons in fewer

hours than it has taken days of Capitalism to produce them.

54

BANKING

The Stock Exchange is only a department of the money market. The

commonest way of hiring money for business purposes is to keep an

account at a bank, and hire spare money there when you want it. The

bank manager will lend it to you if he feels reasonably sure that

you will be able to repay him: in fact that is his real business, as

we shall see presently. He may do it by letting you overdraw your

account. Or if somebody with whom you are doing business has given you

a written promise to pay you a sum of money at some future time (this

written promise is called a bill of exchange) and the bank manager

thinks the promise will be kept, he will give you the money at once,

only deducting enough to pay him for its hire until your customer pays

it. This is called discounting the bill. All such transactions are

forms of hiring spare money; and when you read in the city articles

in the papers that money is cheap or money is dear, it means that the

price you have to pay your banker for the hire of spare money is low or

high as the case may be.

Sometimes you will see a fuss made because the Bank of England has

raised or lowered the Bank Rate. This means that the Bank of England is

going to charge more or less, as the case may be, for discounting bills

of exchange, because spare money has become dearer or cheaper: that is

to say, because spare subsistence has become scarcer or more plentiful.

If you are overdrawn at your bank, the announcement that the Bank Rate

is raised may bring you a letter from the manager to say that you must

not overdraw any more, and that he will be obliged to you if you will

pay off your overdraft as soon as possible. What he means is that as

spare subsistence has become scarce and dear he cannot go on supplying

you with it, and would like you to replace what he has already

supplied. This may be very inconvenient to you, and may prevent you

from extending your business. That is why there is great consternation

and lamentation among business people when the Bank Rate goes up, and

jubilation when it goes down. For when the terms on which spare money

can be hired at the Bank of England go up, they go up everywhere;

so that the Bank Rate is an index to the cost of hiring spare money

generally.

And now comes the question, where on earth do the banks get all the

spare money they deal in? To the Intelligent Woman who is not engaged

in business, or who, if she has a bank account, never overdraws it

or brings a bill to be discounted, a bank seems only a place where

they very kindly pay her cheques and keep her money safe for her for

nothing, as if she were paying them a compliment by allowing them to do

it. They will even hire money from her when she has more than enough to

go on with, provided she will agree not to draw it out without giving

them some days’ notice (they call this placing it on deposit). She must

ask herself sometimes how they can possibly afford to keep up a big

handsomely fitted building and a staff of respectably dressed clerks

with a most polite and sympathetic manager to do a lot of her private

business for her and charge her nothing for it.

The explanation is that people hardly ever draw as much money from the

bank as they put in; and even when they do, it remains in the bank for

some time. Suppose you lodge a hundred pounds in the bank on Monday to

keep it safe because you will have to draw a cheque for it on Saturday!

That cheque will not be presented for payment until the following

Monday. Consequently the bank has your hundred pounds in its hands

for a week, and can therefore hire it out for a week for a couple of

shillings.

But very few bank transactions are as unprofitable as this. Most people

keep their bank accounts open all the year round; and instead of paying

in every week exactly what they want to spend and drawing it out again

by their cheques as they spend it, they keep a round sum always at

their call so as to be ready when they may happen to want it. The

poorest woman who ever dreams of keeping a bank account at all is not

often driven to draw the last half crown out: when her balance falls

as low as that, she knows it is time to put in another pound or two.

Indeed it is not every bank that will do business on so small a scale

as this: the Governor of the Bank of England would turn blue and order

the porters to remove you if you offered him an account of that sort.

Bank customers are people some of whom keep £20 continually at call,

some £100, some £1000, and some many thousands, according to the extent

of their business or the rate at which they are living. This means that

no matter how much money they may put into the bank or take out, there

always remains in the bank a balance that they never draw out; and when

all these balances are added up they come to a huge amount of spare

money in the hands of the bank. It is by hiring out this money that the

banks make their enormous profits. They can well afford to be polite to

you.

And now the Intelligent Woman who keeps a bank account, and most

conscientiously never lets her balance fall below a certain figure, may

ask in some alarm whether her bank, instead of keeping her balance

always in the bank ready for her to draw out if she should need it,

actually lends it to other people. The reply is, Yes: that is not only

what the bank does, but what it was founded to do. But, the Intelligent

Woman will exclaim, that means that if I were to draw a cheque for

my balance there would be no money in the bank to pay it with. And

certainly that would happen if all the other customers of the bank drew

cheques for their balances on the same day. But they never do. “Still”,

you urge, “they might.” Never mind: the bank does not trouble about

what might happen. It is concerned only with what does happen; and what

does happen is that if out of every pound lodged with them the bankers

keep about three shillings in the till to pay their customers’ cheques

it will be quite sufficient.

Only, please remember that the woman who has a bank account should

never frighten the others by letting them know this. They would all

rush to the bank and draw out their balances; and when the bankers had

paid to the first comers all the three shillingses they had kept, they

would stop payment and put up the shutters. This sometimes actually

happens when a report is spread that some particular bank is not to be

trusted. Something or somebody starts a panic; there is “a run on the

bank”; the bank is broken; and its customers are very angry with the

directors, clamoring to have them prosecuted and sent to prison, which

is unreasonable; for they ought to have known that banks, with all the

services they give for nothing, can exist only on condition that their

customers do not draw out their balances all on the same day.

Perhaps, by the way, you know some woman who not only always draws her

full balance, but overdraws it; so that she is always in debt to the

bank. Her case is very simple. The bank lends her the other customers’

money to go on with, and charges her for the hire of it. That sort of

business pays them very well.

And now that you know what banking is from the inside, and how the

bankers get all the spare money they let on hire, may I remind you

again, if I am not too tiresome, that this spare money is really spare

subsistence, mainly perishable stuff that must be used at once. One of

the greatest public dangers of our day is that the bankers do not know

this, because they never handle or store the stuff themselves; and the

right to take it away and use it which they sell on the hire system

is disguised under the name of Credit. Consequently they come to think

that credit is something that can be eaten and drunk and worn and made

into houses and railways and factories and so on, whereas real credit

is only the lender’s opinion that the borrower will be able to pay him.

Now you cannot feed workmen or build houses or butter parsnips with

opinions. When you hear of a woman living on credit or building a house

on credit or having a car on credit you may rest assured that she is

not doing anything of the kind: she is living on real victuals; having

her house built of bricks and mortar by men who are eating substantial

meals; and driving about in a steel car full of highly explosive

petrol. If she has not made them nor paid for them somebody else has;

and all that her having them on credit means is that the bank manager

believes that at some future time she will replace them with equally

substantial equivalent goods of the same value after paying the bank

for waiting meanwhile. But when she goes to the bank manager she does

not ask for food and bricks and cars: she says she wants credit. And

when the bank manager allows her to draw the money that is really an

order for so much food and so many bricks and a car, he says nothing

about these things. He says, and thinks, that he is giving her credit.

And so at last all the bankers and the practical business men come to

believe that credit is something eatable, drinkable, and substantial,

and that bank managers can increase or diminish the harvest by becoming

more credulous or more sceptical as to whether the people to whom they

lend money will pay them or not (issuing or restricting credit, as

they call it). The city articles in the papers, the addresses of bank

chairmen at the annual shareholders’ meetings, the financial debates

in Parliament, are full of nonsensical phrases about issuing credit,

destroying credit, restricting credit, as if somebody were shovelling

credit about with a spade. Clever men put forward wonderful schemes

based on the calculation that when a banker lends five thousand pounds

worth of spare subsistence he also gives the borrower credit for five

thousand pounds, the five thousand credit added to the five thousand

spare subsistence making ten thousand altogether! Instead of being

immediately rushed into the nearest lunatic asylum, these clever ones

find disciples both in Parliament and in the city. They propose to

extend our industries (that is, build ships and factories and railway

engines and the like) with credit. They believe that you can double

the quantity of goods in the country by changing the cipher 2 into the

cipher 4. Whenever a scarcity of spare subsistence forces the Bank of

England to raise the Bank Rate they accuse the directors of playing

them a dirty trick and preventing them from extending their business,

as if the Governor and Company of the Bank of England could keep the

rate down any more than the barometer can keep the mercury down in fair

weather. They think they know, because they are “practical business

men”. But for national purposes they are maniacs with dangerous

delusions; and the Governments who take their advice soon find

themselves on the rocks.

What is it, then, that really fixes the price you have to pay if you

hire ready money from your bank, or that you receive for lending it to

the bank (on deposit), or to trading companies by buying shares, or to

the Government or the Municipalities? In other words, what fixes the

so-called price of money, meaning the cost of hiring it? And what fixes

the price of incomes when their owners sell them for ready money in the

Stock Exchange?

Well, it depends on the proportion between the quantity of spare

subsistence (“saved” money) there may be in the market to be hired, and

how much the people who want to use it up are able and willing to pay

for the hire of it. On the one hand you have the property owners who

are living on less than their incomes and therefore want to dispose of

their spare stuff before it goes rotten. On the other are the business

men who want what the property owners have not consumed to feed the

proletarians whose labor they need to start new businesses or extend

old ones. Beside these, you have the spendthrift property owners who

have lived beyond their incomes, and must therefore sell the incomes

(or part of them) for ready money to pay their debts. Between them all,

you get a Supply and Demand according to which spare money and incomes

are cheap or dear. The price runs up when the supply runs short or the

demand becomes more pressing. It runs down when the supply increases or

the demand slackens.

By the way, now that we are picking up the terms Supply and Demand,

remember that Demand in the money market sense does not mean want

alone: it means only the want that the wanter can afford to satisfy.

The demand of a hungry child for food is very strong and very loud; but

it does not count in business unless the mother has money to buy food

for the child. But with this rather inhuman qualification supply and

demand (called “effective demand”) settle the price of everything that

has a price.

Banks are safe when they lend their money (or rather yours)

judiciously. If they make bad investments, or trust the wrong people,

or speculate, they may ruin themselves and their customers. This

happened occasionally when there were many banks. But now that the

big ones have swallowed up the little ones they are so few and so big

that they could not afford to let one another break, nor indeed could

the Government. So you are fairly safe in keeping your money at a big

bank, and need have no scruple about availing yourself of its readiness

to oblige you in many ways, including acting as your stockbroker,

borrowing from you at interest (on deposit account), and lending you,

though at a considerably higher rate, any ready money for the repayment

of which you can offer reasonably satisfactory security.

As we now see why the hiring terms for money vary from time to time,

sometimes from hour to hour, let us amuse ourselves by working out what

would happen at the banks if the Government, misled by the practical

business men, or by the millennial amateurs, were to attempt to raise

say £30,000 millions by a tax on capital, and another £30,000 millions

by a tax on credit.

The announcement of the tax on credit would make an end of that part of

the business at once by destroying all credit. The financial magnate

who the day before could raise a million at six or seven per cent by

raising his finger would not be able to borrow five shillings from his

butler unless the butler let him have it for the sake of old times

without the least hope of ever seeing it again.

To pay the tax the capitalists would have to draw out every farthing

they had in the bank, and instruct their stockbrokers to sell out all

their shares and debentures and Government and municipal stock. There

would be such a prodigious demand for ready money that the Governor

and Company of the Bank of England would meet at eleven o’clock and

resolve, after some hesitation, to raise the Bank Rate boldly to ten

per cent. After lunch they would be summoned hurriedly to raise it

to a hundred per cent; and before they could send out this staggering

announcement they would learn that they might save themselves the

trouble, as all the banks, after paying out three shillings in the

pound, had stopped payment and stuck up a notice on their closed doors

that they hoped to be able to pay their customers the rest when they

had realized their investments: that is, called in their loans and sold

their stocks and shares. But the stockbrokers would report only one

price for all stocks, that price being no pounds, no shillings, and

no pence, not even farthings. For that is the price in a market where

there are all sellers and no buyers.

When the tax collector called for his money, the taxpayer would have

to say “I can get no money for you; so instead of paying the tax on

my capital, here is the capital itself for you. Here is a bundle of

share certificates which you can sell to the waste paper dealer for

a halfpenny. Here is a bundle of bonds payable to bearer which you

can try your luck with, and a sheet of coupons which in a few years’

time will be as valuable as rare and obsolete postage stamps. Here is

a transfer which will authorize the Bank of England to run its pen

through my name in the War Loan register and substitute your own.

And much good may they all do you! I must shew you out myself, as my

servants are in the streets starving because I have no money to pay

their wages: in fact, I should not have had anything to eat myself

today if I had not pawned my evening clothes; and precious little the

pawnbroker would give me on them, as he is short of money and piled up

to the ceiling with evening suits. Good morning.”

The intelligent woman's guide to socialism and capitalism · 第 27 / 52 段