CHARACTER OF MAHOMET THE SECOND; RECEIVES DEPUTATION FROM
CITY; RETURNS TO ADRIANOPLE FROM ASIA MINOR; HIS REFORMS;
BUILDS ROUMELIA-HISSAR; REJECTS OVERTURES FROM EMPEROR;
CASTLE COMPLETED, AUGUST 1452; WAR DECLARED; MAHOMET RETURNS
TO ADRIANOPLE; HE DISCLOSES HIS DESIGNS FOR SIEGE OF CITY.
CONSTANTINE’S PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE; ARRIVAL OF SIX
VENETIAN SHIPS; AID REQUESTED FROM VENICE; JUSTINIANI ARRIVES,
JANUARY 1453; BOOM ACROSS HARBOUR PLACED IN POSITION. TURKISH
ARMY, ESTIMATE OF; NOTICE OF JANISSARIES; MOBILITY OF ARMY;
RELIGIOUS SPIRIT OF; CASTING OF GREAT CANNON; TURKISH FLEET
ARRIVES IN BOSPORUS; DESCRIPTION OF VESSELS COMPOSING IT.
MAHOMET’S ARMY MARCHES TO CITY; OFFER OF PEACE.
[Sidenote: Character of Mahomet.]
As Mahomet plays the principal part in the great tragedy of the Capture
of Constantinople, we may turn aside from the narrative in order to
form a general estimate of the young man, leaving until after the
conquest of the city the attempt to make a more complete sketch of his
character.
As he was only twenty-one years old when he became sultan, the events
of his subsequent life inevitably colour any attempt to delineate him
in his youth. There exist many notices in regard to his character
drawn by contemporary writers, and though Gibbon’s remark, that it is
dangerous to trust either Turkish or Christian authors when describing
Mahomet, is useful as a warning, these notices and especially the Life
of Mahomet by Critobulus[190] enable us to get a fair view of the man.
He was well-formed and handsome, about the middle height, with piercing
eyes and arched eyebrows. His most conspicuous feature was his long
aquiline nose, which seemed to overhang his thick red lips and made
the Turks describe him in after years as having the beak of a parrot
surmounting cherries.
The dream of his boyhood was to capture Constantinople. He would
succeed where Bajazed and Murad had failed. Ducas gives a striking
picture of his sleeplessness and anxiety while at Adrianople before the
siege of the city commenced. His one thought was how he might obtain
his object. He passed his days in active preparations. He went in
disguise among his men accompanied by two soldiers to hear what they
had to say of him and of his enterprise, and is said to have killed
any man who ventured to recognise and salute him. He passed his nights
arranging the plan of his attack--where he should place his cannon;
where he would endeavour to undermine the walls; where the attack with
scaling ladders should commence. The anxiety he displayed when on the
eve of this and many subsequent undertakings; his desire to learn the
opinion formed of him by his own men and by foreigners; his many hasty
acts and the many legends which grew up during his lifetime and after
his death representing him as a rash and impulsive ruler, all indicate
that he was of a highly strung and nervous temperament.
There are two sides to his character, each well marked and distinct;
the man lived a double life, whereof one aspect would almost seem to be
irreconcilable with the other. In one he presents himself as a student,
sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought, doubting of everything
and anxious to learn what answers the best men of his time and of
former ages, philosophers and theologians, had to give to the greatest
problems of life. In the other aspect he is a bloodthirsty tyrant,
a _hunkiar_ or drinker of blood; one who recked nothing of human
slaughter and who seems even to have delighted in human suffering. Yet
the two lives are inseparably blended. He would turn from study to
slaughter, and after slaughter and torture would show himself to be
full of pity for the sufferings of his victims.
Nature had endowed him with intelligence far above the average of
that possessed by men of his race. He was the son of a slave, and
probably of a Christian, and like so many of the sultans before his
time and until the middle of the eighteenth century probably owed his
intelligence to the non-Turkish blood in his veins. His early struggles
while yet a lad, and the great responsibilities he had to assume in
order to protect his very life, had quickened his faculties and had
made him both suspicious and self-reliant. His environment, among men
who were simply soldiers of the original Turkish type; the tradition
of his house and race, in accordance with which any slaughter or any
cruelties might be committed; the religion to which he belonged, which
regarded all non-Mussulmans as enemies of the true faith, who were
to be subdued: all tended to make him regardless of human life. But
amid his cruelties his better nature and his more thoughtful side
occasionally asserted itself.
In one respect his characteristics are those of his race. No man can
show himself more cruel and relentless in slaughter than the Turk
whenever his religious sentiment comes into play. The unbeliever is
an enemy of God and of Mahomet, and it is a sacred duty when he is
fighting against the Moslem to slay him. Those who are at war against
Islam must be utterly destroyed, root and branch, unless indeed they
will accept the faith. Men, women, and children must alike suffer the
penalty. But when no religious sentiment obscures the natural feelings
of humanity, the same Turk is goodnatured and kindly. Probably no race
is more charitable towards its own poor or treats animals with more
kindness. Mahomet the Second both in his cruelty towards his enemies
and in his spasmodic kindness was a not unfair representative of his
race.
But in another respect the characteristics of Mahomet are quite
un-Turk-like. His interest in questions of philosophy and theology, in
science and even in art, recall the names of Western rather than of
Turkish rulers. It was indeed his interest in theological questions
that led to various reports that he was an atheist,[191] that he was an
unbeliever in the dogmas of his own religion and that he contemplated
embracing Christianity. That he felt an interest in such questions
separates him at once from the mass of his race: for, probably more
completely than the professors of any other religion, Moslems accept
their creed without question.[192]
Phrantzes notes that when as a mere boy he had been entrusted with
kingly power, some of the old viziers had warned Sultan Murad that it
was not prudent to leave the government to his son.[193] Their warning
was not altogether disregarded, and the viziers who gave it paid dearly
for their counsels.
[Sidenote: Mahomet’s accession.]
His father, Murad the Second, had died in February 1451 at Adrianople.
When Mahomet learned the news he was in Magnesia. Calling upon all who
loved him to follow, he hastened as rapidly as possible to Gallipoli.
During the two days he remained there a great crowd flocked to his
standard. Then he pushed on to Adrianople. On the day after his arrival
he was proclaimed sultan. Halil Pasha the grand vizier and Isaac Pasha
were in attendance, but as they were the advisers who prevented the
young sultan from retaining supreme power, they were doubtful of their
reception and kept themselves in the background. Mahomet, however,
ordered Halil to take his place as grand vizier and appointed Isaac
Pasha governor of Anatolia or Asia Minor.
Mahomet commenced his reign by one of those acts of cruelty which at
once proclaimed the brutal and the treacherous side of his character.
Being himself the son of a slave mother and having a younger brother,
named Ahmed, an infant still at the breast, who was the son of Murad by
his marriage with the sister of the Serbian kral, he ordered a certain
Ali to drown the young Ahmed in his bath. His predecessors had killed
their brothers, but the latter, as we have seen, were in open revolt.
Von Hammer states that there are Turkish historians who praise Mahomet
the Second for this act of cruelty, and this for the reason that it
is easier to kill a babe than a boy who is grown up.[194] Fearing
apparently the effect so wanton an act of cruelty would have upon his
followers, Mahomet disclaimed all participation in it and put Ali to
death.[195]
Mahomet is entitled to be classed among the men who at an early age
showed exceptional military skill. This skill was developed during
almost continual warfare to the end of his reign. His industry, his
boundless desire for conquest, his careful attention to every detail
that was necessary to secure success, and his confidence in his own
judgment, recall the names of Alexander and Napoleon. From his first
and most important enterprise against Constantinople itself down to
the last expedition of his reign he was not merely the nominal but the
actual commander of the Turkish troops. He would brook no interference.
He allowed no council or other body of his subjects to thwart his
designs. The New Troops or Janissaries, flushed with victory and
already conscious of that solidarity which in later years made them the
terror of sultans, exacted from him a donative on his accession, but
they paid dearly for their temerity and soon learned that their new
master would neither be dictated to nor divide his sovereignty.
For the present we must be content to note that the young sultan was a
man of unusual intelligence, who as a boy had accepted responsibility
with eagerness; that he still had in 1452 the alternate confidence and
hesitancy of youth; that he was of great energy, of studious habits, of
nervous temperament, painstaking in the formation of his designs, ready
to obtain the judgment of others, but otherwise quick in arriving at
a decision. His maxim in later years was that in warfare secrecy and
rapidity are the main elements of success. In reply to an officer of
high rank who asked why great warlike preparations were being made he
answered, ‘If a hair of my beard knew, I would pluck it out and burn
it.’[196] His ambition was great. He proposed to attack Naples, dreamed
of leading his armies to the elder Rome, and regarded his conquests as
stages in a great design of conquering the world.[197] These objects
were however in the future. The immediate one before him was the
capture of the city, and to its accomplishment he directed all his
thoughts and all his energy without wavering until he had attained it.
[Sidenote: Conciliating embassies.]
Within a few weeks of Mahomet’s arrival in Europe from Magnesia
ambassadors were sent to his court at Adrianople from Constantine and
other rulers in Europe and Asia Minor who were under his suzerainty to
congratulate him on his accession. As his first care was to make sure
of his own position and to gain time, Mahomet received them all with
apparent cordiality and promised to observe the treaties made by his
father. At the request of the representatives of the emperor he not
merely confirmed the existing treaties, but declared his willingness to
pay an annual sum of three hundred thousand aspers chargeable upon the
produce of the Strymon Valley for the maintenance of Orchan.[198]
Then he returned to Caramania, where Ibrahim Bey, who had already
shown himself ready to join Hunyadi and other enemies of the Turks, was
in revolt.[199] There must be no repetition of the incident which had
made Murad’s attempt to capture the city a failure. No sooner had the
sultan left Europe than, with an indiscretion which Ducas condemns,
ambassadors from the emperor were sent to ask that the pension promised
for the support of Orchan should be doubled and at the same time to
demand leave, if the request were refused, that Constantine might be at
liberty to set him free. The messengers insinuated that in such case
Orchan would be an acceptable candidate for the Ottoman throne. The
request was of course a threat, and was so treated by Halil Pasha--who
had been friendly to the late emperor and who continued his friendship
to Constantine--and by Mahomet himself. When Halil heard their demand
he bluntly asked them if they were mad. He told them that they had a
very different man to deal with from the easy-going Murad; the ink on
the treaty was not yet dry, and yet they came as if they were in a
position to demand better conditions than had been already granted.
‘If you think,’ said Halil, ‘you can do anything against us, do it:
proclaim Orchan prince; bring the Hungarians across the Danube and
take from us, if you can, the lands we have captured; but I warn you
that you will fail and that if you try you will lose everything.’[200]
The account given by Ducas has every appearance of truthfulness. Halil
felt that his own attempts to save the city were being thwarted by the
emperor himself. He, however, promised to report to Mahomet what they
had said and kept his word.
His master dealt with the ambassadors much more diplomatically. He was
outside Europe, and it would be inconvenient if any attempt should be
made to prevent him returning to Adrianople. Besides, he must have time
to come to terms with Caramania. He therefore represented that he was
quite disposed to accede to the demands submitted to him, but that, as
he was going to Adrianople in a short time, it would be better that
they should submit to him there that which was judged best for the
empire and the citizens.
[Sidenote: Returns to Adrianople, and begins his active preparations.]
Thereupon the sultan with all haste made terms with Ibrahim Bey of
Caramania and returned to his European capital. When there he at once
gave orders that the pension to Orchan should no longer be paid, and
sent to arrest all the tax-gatherers in the Strymon Valley who were
collecting the money to pay it.
He had quieted one possible ally of the empire. He addressed himself
next to another opponent who had shown that he could be terribly
formidable. He made a truce with John Hunyadi for three years and
concluded arrangements with the rulers of other states. He strengthened
his army. He amassed stores of arms, arrows, and cannon-balls. He
superintended the thorough reform of the administration of the revenue,
and in the course of a year he accumulated a third of the taxes which
would otherwise have been squandered.
[Sidenote: Purposes building fort on Bosporus.]
Then he determined to carry into execution a plan which would give
him a strong base for operations against the city he was resolved to
capture. He was already master of the Asiatic side of the Bosporus.
At what is now Anatolia-Hissar he possessed the strong fortification
built by Bajazed. It is at the place where Darius crossed from Asia
into Europe and where the Bosporus is narrowest, being indeed only
half a mile broad. Mahomet already possessed by treaty, made with
his father, the right to cross the straits and to march through the
peninsula behind Constantinople to his capital at Adrianople. He now,
however, proposed to build another fortification at some point on
the opposite--that is the European--shore. It would serve the double
purpose of enabling him to command the straits and of giving him a base
for obtaining his supplies from Asia and for the attack by sea upon
the city. With a fleet already large at the Dardanelles and with the
command of the Bosporus, he hoped to isolate Constantinople so far as
to prevent it from receiving any aid in men or supplies of food. The
command of the Bosporus would be a blow to the trade of Venice and
Genoa as well as to the emperor. Ships would be prevented from trading
freely with, and bringing supplies from, the Black Sea. It might have
been expected that the emperor would have put forth all his strength to
oppose the execution of such a design. The all-sufficient explanation
is, that, even if his naval strength had been sufficient to delay the
crossing of Mahomet’s crowd of builders, the army was too hopelessly
insignificant to hold the shore against that which could soon arrive
from Adrianople on its rear.
[Sidenote: Remonstrances against project.]
When the emperor and citizens learned, in the spring of 1452, the
preparations which were being made by the collection of building
materials and the bringing together of crowds of workmen, they
recognised all the importance of the project and its danger to the
city. Ambassadors were sent to the sultan at Adrianople to learn
whether it was possible in any way to divert Mahomet from his purpose.
They urged the existence of treaties with the grandfather, the
father, and even with Mahomet himself: treaties which had expressly
stipulated that no fortification or other building should be erected
on the European side of the Bosporus.[201] They claimed that these
stipulations had hitherto been scrupulously observed, that armies had
been allowed to pass, but Mahomet’s predecessors had prevented any
of their subjects putting up fortifications or other buildings. The
messengers urged upon the sultan that to break the treaties was to
commit an act of injustice to the emperor.
[Sidenote: Mahomet’s reply.]
In reply, the sultan, who was determined to avoid war till he was
ready, declared to the messengers that he had no intention of breaking
treaties: a statement which was, of course, in flagrant violation of
the truth. He pointed out, however, that in the time of his father the
Italians had tried to hinder the passage of his troops when it had
become necessary to fight the Hungarians, and urged that it had become
essential for the protection of his European possessions that he should
be in a position to prevent such detention in future. He claimed that
the land on which he proposed to build his fortress belonged to him,
and professed to think it strange that the emperor should wish to place
any difficulties in the way of the execution of so necessary a project.
If indeed, he significantly added, the emperor was not peaceably
disposed, that would be a different matter.[202]
When the messengers reported their interview, the emperor’s first idea
was to fight, and he was only prevented by the entreaties of the clergy
and people from sending a detachment of his troops to destroy the
builders and their work. Some indeed of the inhabitants were in favour
of such action, but the emperor[203] had to come to the miserable
conclusion that it was impossible to prevent the young sultan from
carrying out his project except by war in the open country, and that
for such war he was not prepared.
[Sidenote: Selects a site at Roumelia-Hissar.]
When the spring of 1452 was further advanced the sultan himself
took the lead in the execution of his project. He assembled thirty
well-armed triremes and a large number of transports and sent them from
Gallipoli to the Bosporus. At the same time he himself marched at the
head of a large army towards its European shore.
On his arrival he selected, with the aid of his engineers, the most
advantageous position for his proposed fortifications. This was found
immediately opposite Anatolia Hissar.[204]
[Sidenote: Building begins.]
Once the plan had been decided upon, every available man seems to
have been set at work to aid in its speedy execution. Mahomet himself
superintended the construction of the new fortification and pushed
on the works with the energy that characterised all his military
undertakings.
At the beginning of the operations Constantine with the object of
saving the crops of the peasants around the city, and of appearing
to be reconciled to the project which he could not prevent, sent
provisions to the workmen. Mahomet in reply, and probably with the
intention of forcing on war in the open, permitted his men to scour the
country and gather or destroy the crops. All the neighbouring churches
and houses, including the famous church of the Asomatoi at Arnoutkeui,
were destroyed to furnish material.[205]
The land enclosed, says Critobulus, was rather a fortified town than a
fort. The walls and towers still remain and form the most picturesque
object which the traveller sees on his passage through the Bosporus.
Each of two peaks is crowned with a strong tower. These are connected
by a long high wall interrupted with smaller towers, and from the two
largest towers similar walls at right angles to the long wall connect
them with great towers on the shore at the end of another line of walls
parallel to the channel. Small guns or bombards enabled the enclosure
to be defended against any attack by land. On the sea shore and under
the protection of the walls were stationed large cannon which threw
heavy stone balls and commanded the passage.
[Sidenote: Completed middle of August 1452.]
[Sidenote: War declared.]
The work had been commenced in March 1452. It was completed by the
middle of August of the same year. The city had hoped to maintain
peace and Turks had entered and left it apparently without difficulty.
When the fortification was finished and Mahomet’s army had robbed the
peasants of their crops, this hope vanished. Constantine closed the
gates, making the few Turks within its walls prisoners. They were,
however, a few days afterwards sent to the sultan. Upon the closing
of the gates, Mahomet formally declared war and followed up his
declaration by appearing with an army of fifty thousand men before the
walls. But his preparations for a siege were far from ready. After
remaining three days he withdrew on September 6 to Adrianople and at
the same time the fleet returned to the Dardanelles.[206]
[Sidenote: Capture of ships at Roumelia-Hissar.]
Within the next few weeks the city as well as the Venetian and Genoese
colonies learned how greatly the new fortification of Roumelia-Hissar
had strengthened Mahomet’s position. On November 10, two large
Venetian galleys under the command of Morosini were fired at as they
were passing and captured. A fortnight later, on November 26, another
Venetian ship was fired at and also captured. Some of the crew were
sawn in halves. These captures, says Barbaro, led to the beginning of
the war with the Venetians. For the first time the Turks commanded the
Bosporus.
[Sidenote: Mahomet’s address to the pashas.]
Now that he had provided himself with a safe base of operations against
the city and withdrawn to Adrianople, Mahomet threw off all disguise,
and calling together the principal officers of the army announced to
them the object of his preparations, which, in accordance with his
habitual practice, he had hitherto kept secret. Critobulus gives us
an address which he represents Mahomet as making to his leaders. He
describes the progress made by his ancestors in Asia Minor, how they
had established themselves at Brousa and had taken possession of the
Hellespont; had conquered part of Thrace and Macedonia, Bulgaria,
Serbia, and even Selymbria, and had overcome nearly every obstacle.
The great barrier to their progress was the city and the army of
the Romans. Whatever the sons of Othman wanted to do was opposed at
Constantinople. The citizens had fought them everywhere pertinaciously
and continually. This opposition must be ended; this barrier removed.
It was for his hearers, said Mahomet, to complete the work of their
fathers. They had now against them a single city, one which could not
resist their attacks; a city whose population was greatly reduced
and whose former wealth had been diminished by Turkish sieges and by
the continual incursions made by his ancestors upon its territory,
a city which was now only one in name, for in reality it contained
cultivated lands, orchards, and vineyards. Its buildings were useless
and its walls abandoned and for the greater part in ruins. Even from
its weakness, however, they knew that from its favourable situation,
commanding both land and sea, it had greatly hindered their progress
and could still hinder it, upsetting their plans, and being always
ready to attack them. Openly or secretly it had done all it could
against them. It was the city which had brought about the attack by
Tamerlane and the suffering which followed. It had instigated Hunyadi
to cross the Danube and on every occasion had been in every possible
manner their great enemy. The time had now come when in his opinion
it should be captured or wiped off the face of the earth. One of two
things: he would either have it within his empire, or he would lose
both. With Constantinople in his possession the territories already
gained could be safely held and more would be obtained; without it, no
territory that they possessed was safe.
Critobulus professes that the sultan claimed to have information that
the Italians in Constantinople would not give any aid to the emperor,
and were indeed his enemies, and that on account of the difference of
religion there was bitter strife between them and the Greeks. Mahomet
concluded by urging that there was great risk in delay and that the
city should be attacked before any aid could be sent to its relief.
He gave his vote for war, and nearly all the assembly followed his
example.[207]
Mahomet now pushed on his preparations for the siege with the utmost
activity. The general commanding the European troops was ordered to
take a portion of them into the neighbourhood of Constantinople and
clear the country. This he did, and attacked in the usual Turkish
fashion all the villages on the route which still remained under the
rule of the emperor. Selymbria, Perinthos, and other places on the
north shore of the Marmora were sacked.
[Sidenote: Hopes that siege could be avoided.]
The inhabitants of Constantinople seem at first to have hoped
against hope, notwithstanding the construction of the fortress at
Roumelia-Hissar, that the sultan would have remained content with his
position on the Bosporus thus strengthened. They soon realised that
an attempt was about to be made to capture the city far more serious
than any that had been made within living memory. They knew their
weakness and the strength of their foe. They knew that in a siege they
would be under greater disadvantages than ever before; that conquest
would mean falling into the hands of implacable enemies, the slaughter
of their young men, the loss of all their property, the plunder of
their churches, and the enslaving of their women. The statement of
Critobulus is probable enough that the inhabitants remarked to each
other that in former sieges the position of the city was better,
because it had command of the sea and the inhabitants had therefore
only need to defend the walls on the landward side. We may dismiss, as
being merely curious and characteristic of the period, the stories of
supernatural events which increased the tribulation of the inhabitants,
of earthquakes, and strange unearthly groanings, of lightning and
shooting stars, of hurricanes, torrential rains and floods, and of
other signs which indicated the wrath of God against the city. Those of
the inhabitants who did not believe in omens had something more serious
to think about than perspiring pictures, men and women possessed of
the devil, and mad enthusiasts who prophesied misfortune to the city,
and helped to depress the spirits of the fighters. Those who kept
their heads, with the emperor as their leader, behaved like men and
met the danger bravely. They set themselves in the first place to
strengthen the defences. Their first task was to repair the walls, for
which purpose tombstones and all other materials available were freely
employed. Arrows and all other kinds of arms were collected.
[Sidenote: Arrival of Isidore with 200 soldiers; of Venetian ships; of
Cretans.]
During the whole of the winter the emperor and his people pushed
on their preparations. In November 1452, as we have seen, Cardinal
Isidore had arrived with two hundred soldiers sent by the pope.
Six Venetian vessels--not, indeed, intended for war but capable of
being adapted to such purpose--came to the city, and their captains
together with those of three large ships from Crete yielded to the
request and promises of the emperor and consented to render help. The
leading Venetian commander was Gabriel Trevisano, who, in reply to the
imperial request, consented to give his services ‘per honor de Dio et
per honor de tuta la Christianitade.’[208] When the Venetian ships
coming from the Black Sea were destroyed by the Turks at Hissar, the
emperor and leading nobles, the cardinal and Leonard, with the ‘bailey’
of the Venetian colony and its leading members, held a council to
arrange conditions on which Venice should be asked to send aid. Their
deliberations took place on December 13, the day after the famous
service of reconciliation in Hagia Sophia, and on several following
days. Trevisano and Diedo, the most important sea captains, were
also present. An agreement was concluded and messengers were sent to
Venice to ask that immediate aid should be sent to the city. Finally
the council decided that no Venetian vessel should leave the harbour
without express permission.[209]
[Sidenote: Arrival of Justiniani.]
On January 29 the city received the most important of all its
acquisitions; for on that day arrived John Justiniani. A Genoese of
noble family, he was well skilled in the art of war and had gained
great reputation as a soldier. On board his two vessels were four
hundred cuirassiers, whom he had brought from Genoa, and others whom
he had hired at Chios and Rhodes, making together with his crew in
all seven hundred men.[210] A soldier of fortune, he had come on his
own accord to offer his sword when he heard of the straits in which
the emperor found himself, and had received a promise that in case
of success he should receive the island of Lesbos. He was cordially
welcomed by the emperor and nobles and was shortly afterwards, by
the consent of all, named commander-in-chief, with the powers of a
dictator in everything that regarded the war. He at once took charge
of the work already begun of strengthening the defences. He distributed
small guns upon the walls where they could throw their stone balls to
greatest advantage. He classified the defenders and appointed to each
his station.
In the last days of March Trevisano with his crew, aided also by
Alexis (or Aloysius) Diedo, whose three galleys had come from Tana
on the Azof, reopened a foss from the Golden Horn in front of the
landward walls as far as the ground remained level, and at the same
time repaired the walls in the neighbourhood.[211] A few days later
the Italians were assigned to the most important positions on the
landward walls. Barbaro, with the enthusiasm of a Crusader, gives a
list of Venetian nobles who took part in the defences, and this ‘for a
perpetual memorial’ of his brave countrymen.
Justiniani appears at first to have chosen to defend the walls at
Caligaria.
[Sidenote: Closing the harbour.]
On April 2 the chain or boom which defended the entrance to the Golden
Horn was either closed for the first time or strengthened.[212] It
extended from the Tower of Eugenius near Seraglio Point to the Tower of
Galata,[213] within the Galata Walls, and near the present Moumhana,
and was supported on logs. Ten large ships, of which five were Genoese,
three from Crete, one from Ancona, and an imperial ship, were stationed
at the boom, bows towards it, and with long triremes near them for
support. The guardianship of the boom was entrusted to the Genoese.[214]
By the end of March Mahomet’s preparations were nearly complete. He
had already summoned all available cavalry and infantry from Asia and
the parts of Europe under his control. As they arrived he drilled,
classified, and formed them into bodies of cuirassiers (or men with
breastplates), slingers, archers, and lancers.
[Sidenote: The Turkish army.]
While it is impossible to state with anything like certainty what was
the number of fighting men whom Mahomet was shortly to bring before the
walls of the city, the materials for forming a general computation are
not wanting. The Turkish army was composed of regulars and irregulars.
The first and most important division of regulars were the Janissaries.
After them came a great horde of Turks from those who had occupied
Asia Minor and Europe. Every Turk was bound to serve, and a call had
been made on all. The Turkish nation was the Turkish army. Among
them were many men who represented the class subsequently known as
Derrybeys, chieftains who held their lands from the sultan on condition
of bringing a number of retainers into the field during war. The
irregulars, or, as they may be conveniently called, the Bashi-Bazouks,
consisted partly of the poorest class of Turks, who did not possess a
horse, and partly of Christians attracted by the hope of plunder.
Amid the estimates of the number of men in Mahomet’s army, that of
Barbaro may be taken as safe and substantially correct. He takes note
of both regulars and irregulars--that is, of all the combatants--while
he disregards the camp-followers as non-combatants. He states, when
speaking of the siege, that there were a hundred and fifty thousand men
stationed between the Golden Horn and the Marmora. As, excluding the
men on the fleet, all Mahomet’s followers took part in it, the number
mentioned may be taken as Barbaro’s estimate of the whole Turkish army.
Cheirullah, a Turkish chronicler, affirms that there were not more than
eighty thousand effective fighting men, excluding in this estimate
apparently the Bashi-Bazouks.[215]
Barbaro’s estimate of one hundred and fifty thousand fighting men
is substantially confirmed by Tetaldi, who states that there were
two hundred thousand men under Mahomet, of whom a hundred and forty
thousand were effective soldiers including thirty thousand to forty
thousand cavalry, the rest ‘being thieves, plunderers, hawkers, and
others following the siege for gain and booty.’[216] Taking the
estimate of Cheirullah and Tetaldi, we may perhaps safely say that in
the army of one hundred and fifty thousand men there were at least
twenty thousand cavalry.
In this great army the Janissaries played the most important part and
formed beyond all doubt the most efficient division. These were at
least twelve thousand in number.[217] The name Janissaries signifies
‘New Troops,’ and was given by a famous dervish and saint, Hadji
Bektash, when they were formed, in 1326, into a new infantry by Sultan
Orchan. From their institution they constituted a fraternity governed
in religious matters by the rules of Hadji Bektash.[218] Under the
care of the first Murad, the son of Orchan, their organisation had
been developed, and by the time of Mahomet the Second they had already
acquired high repute for discipline and daring.
The part they played in the capture of the city and their subsequent
renown deserve a somewhat complete notice. The order took its origin
in a long recognised Moslem rule, that when a people at war with
Mahometans is summoned to make submission and refuses it may be
enslaved, and that in such a case one fifth of the property captured
should belong to the sultan. Christian captives fell within the limit
of this rule. In practice, however, the sultans by no means considered
themselves bound to restrict themselves to the prescribed one fifth.
They held that as many of the children as the conqueror thought
fit should be given over to him to be trained for the public, and
especially for military, services. Accordingly, without regard to the
fact that the parents had already surrendered one or more sons to the
ruler, they were often called upon to furnish others. The demand for
Christian children to be given up absolutely to the sultan was regular
and methodic. No tithe or other tax required for the service of the
Church was ever claimed with more regularity and insistence than this
blood tax for the service of Islam. A formal examination of Christian
children available for service was made every five years, when a
Turkish inspector, at the head of a troop of soldiers and bearing an
imperial firman of authorisation, visited the portions of the empire
assigned to him. The registers of the churches were carefully examined
to see how many children ought to be brought forward for inspection,
and the priests, under the penalty of death, were bound to show a
correct list. The boys selected were usually between the ages of ten
and twelve years. Those were preferred who were distinguished either by
their strength, intelligence, or beauty. In addition to these regular
and legal contributions to the services of the state, it was the custom
of the pashas, on returning from the provinces to bring presents of
Christian children to their imperial master.
The boys thus taken away from their parents and their homes were
forcibly converted to Mahometanism. From the day of their reception
into Islam they were kept under strict surveillance and instructed
with the object of making them useful servants of the sultan. After
a while they were divided according to their aptitudes and told off
for special training for different branches of civil and military
service. It is with the latter that we are most concerned, though it
may be mentioned that many of those who had been Christian slaves rose
to the highest positions in the civil service and greatly increased
the efficiency of Turkish rule. All were thoroughly drilled in the
observances and taught the precepts of the Moslem religion. All were
subjected to a severe discipline, were trained to practise self-denial,
to endure hardships cheerfully and not to repine at scantiness of
food or loss of sleep. Day and night they were under supervision. The
obedience exacted from them towards their superiors was absolute,
prompt, and, in appearance at least, willing. All were taught to be
expert in archery, and to ride well.
After a probation lasting usually six years, those who were drafted
into the military service were still subject to severe restraints.
Bertrandon de la Brocquière bears witness to the excellence of their
discipline, and the same testimony is borne by a series of other
witnesses for two centuries later. What may be called the Articles of
War to which they were subject, besides prescribing absolute obedience
to every command of their chief, required abstinence from every kind of
luxury and the strict performance of the many rules of devotion laid
down by Hadji Bektash.[219] All men who were not within barracks at
the hour fixed were detained for punishment. No Janissary was allowed,
until long after the conquest, to marry.[220]
On the other hand, the same Articles contained regulations which enable
us to understand how in time service among the Janissaries came even
to be coveted. Though discipline was strict, punishment could only
be inflicted upon a Janissary by one of his own officers. It is true
that, after receiving the bastinado, the offender had to rise, bend
low, and salute the officer who had superintended the punishment, but
no disgrace was attached to this act of discipline. The boy who was
admitted into the brotherhood of the Janissaries was provided for as
completely as if he had become a monk. When by reason of age or wounds
he became weak, he was retired from active service and received a
pension of three aspers daily more than he had received when on service.
In times of warfare the sternest features of the barracks were relaxed.
Camp life was the recreation, and furnished the joy and hope, of the
Janissary. War was for him a delight. His regiment marched to battle
with every sign of rejoicing and of military display compatible with
discipline.
The effect of the long training, with its strictness on the one hand
and its relaxations on the other, was to develop an _esprit de corps_
among them such as has rarely existed in any other army. Everything
was done that could be done to cultivate this spirit. Every means was
employed to make the Janissary live his life in and look only to the
interests of his regiment. He was forbidden to exercise any trade
or occupation whatever, lest he should possess an interest outside
his regiment. In the time of Suliman the sultan ordered the aga of
a regiment of Janissaries to be beheaded because one of his men was
found mending his clothes. The officer was spared at the request of
his comrades, but the private soldier was dismissed from the service.
The regiment was to be everything to the Janissary; the outside world
nothing. No man was allowed to accumulate wealth, although his regiment
could do so. Each man followed the good or ill fortune of the powerful
body of which he was a member.
The result was that the regiment represented to the Janissary
everything that he held dear. He became jealous of its honour, and
the regiment in its turn became exclusive towards outsiders. The
Janissary came before long to think of his position as privileged and
to regard entrance into his corps as only to be allowed under severe
restrictions. So careful indeed did he become of the rights of his
regiment that before long no person born of Mahometan parents was
admitted, even though his father had been one of themselves. As a
consequence of this cultivation of regimental rights, the popularity
of the New Troops became so great that many young Christians of
adventurous spirit voluntarily sought to join their ranks.
The Janissaries developed into a species of _imperium in imperio_.
Perhaps the body in Western Europe to which they may most aptly be
compared is the Order of Knights Templars. Each was a partly religious,
partly military Order. Each was jealous of its own privileges and
constituted a fraternity largely isolated from the rest of the
community. But the isolation of the Janissary was more complete than
that of the Templar at any time. The Moslem had been cut off from
his own family and had forgotten all the Christians he had known as
a child, and his regiment had taken the place of father and mother,
wife and home. His individual rights had been merged in those of his
regiment. The resemblance between the Janissaries and the Templars
might be noted in one other respect--namely, that their religion sat
lightly upon them. Though the former were bound by the precepts of
Hadji Bektash, these precepts were, from the Mahometan point of view,
extremely latitudinarian.[221]
All their discipline and training tended to make them devoted to the
sultan as commander-in-chief. The Janissary had nothing to gain and
nothing to fear from any person except his military superiors. Each
man’s promotion depended on the arbitrary will of his commanding
officer, or ultimately of the sovereign. Each man saw before him a
career in which he could rise to the command of an army or to other
high office, provided he won the approval of his sultan.
Such a military organisation had never been seen in the world’s
history, and furnished to the early sultans a force which was almost
irresistible. Wholly Christian and largely European in origin, it was
yet completely Mahometan in spirit and in action. It was indeed an army
which would have satisfied Frederick the Great or any other ruler who
has desired to model a force according to preconceived ideas. Take a
number of children from the most intelligent portion of the community;
choose them for their strength and intelligence; instruct them
carefully in the art of fighting; bring them up under strict military
discipline; teach them to forget the home of their childhood, their
parents and friends; give them a new religion of a specially military
type; saturate them with the knowledge that all their hope in life
depends upon their position in the regiment; make peace irksome and war
a delight, with the hope of promotion and relaxation from the hardships
and restraints of the barracks: the result will be a weapon in the
hands of a leader such as the world has rarely seen. Such a weapon was
the army of the Janissaries.
The success of Mahomet’s predecessors in the Balkan peninsula had been
largely due to the New Troops. Though their numbers appear to have
been limited to twelve thousand, they had already proved their value.
We have seen that when John Hunyadi had put the Turks under Murad the
Second to rout, it was the Janissaries who saved the day and turned the
disaster of Varna into a great victory. Their discipline and strength
were even more triumphant in the defeat of the great Hungarian on the
plain of Cossovo in 1448. Black John, as the Turks named him from the
colour of his banner, succeeded in putting to flight the Anatolian and
the Rumelian divisions of his enemy. But the attack on the Janissaries
failed utterly. They stood like a wall of brass until the moment came
for them to become the attacking force, and through their efforts the
triumph of the sultan was complete.
The force which had thus shown its quality only five years previously
was by far the most important division under Mahomet’s command. The
ablest, bravest, most terrible portion of the army of the arch-enemy of
Christendom was composed exclusively from Christian families. The most
formidable instrument employed by the Turks for the conquest of the
Christians of South-eastern Europe and for attacking the nations of the
West was formed of boys born of Christian parents, enslaved, forcibly
converted to a hostile religion, who yet became devotedly attached to
the slavery to which they had been condemned. It was their boast in
after years that they had never fled from an enemy, and the boast was
not an idle one.
The remainder of the Turkish forces which may be classed among regular
troops came from all parts occupied by the Turks but mainly from
Anatolia. Their organisation, discipline, and powers of endurance
probably made them as formidable an army as any which a European power
of the period could have put into the field.
The Bashi Bazouks constituted an undisciplined mob who were good enough
to be employed where numbers and wild courage were of use in annoying
or weakening the enemy. La Brocquière states that the ‘innumerable
host’ of these irregulars took the field with no other weapon than
their curved swords or scimitars. ‘Being,’ says Philelphus, ‘under no
restraint, they proved the most cruel scourge of a Turkish invasion.’
In speaking of the Turkish host it must not be forgotten that in 1453
hardly any European power can be said to have possessed a standing
army. It is with no surprise, therefore, that we note that contemporary
European writers from the West speak with astonishment of the
discipline which prevailed. ‘Their obedience to superiors,’ says La
Brocquière, ‘is boundless; none dare disobey even when their lives are
at hazard, and it is chiefly owing to their steady submission that such
great exploits have been performed and such conquests gained.’ The same
writer bears testimony to the great mobility of the Turkish army. ‘Ten
thousand Turks on the march will make less noise than a hundred men in
our Christian armies. In their ordinary marches they only walk, but
in forced marches they always gallop, and, as they are lightly armed,
they will thus advance further from evening to daybreak than others in
three days. It is by these forced marches that they have succeeded in
surprising and completely defeating the Christians in their different
wars.’[222]
The army which Mahomet commanded was not merely endued with the
fatalism and confidence of an ordinary army of Islam; it was engaged
upon a work in which many generations of Moslems had longed to take
a part. The prophet himself was represented in the Sacred Traditions
as holding converse with Allah respecting the capture of New Rome,
and was told that the Great Day of Judgment would not come before
Constantinople had been captured by the sons of Isaac. On another
occasion Mahomet declared that ‘the best prince is he who shall capture
Constantinople, and his the best army.’ The inspired words had filled
his immediate followers with the determination to capture the city. The
Arabs attempted the task no less than seven times. At the third, in
672, they were accompanied by the aged Eyoub, who in his youth had been
the standard-bearer and favourite of the Prophet. The huge army had
sat down before the city during seven years, sowing the fields on the
neighbouring coasts and gathering in the harvest, but determined to win
the reward which Mahomet had promised to those who should capture the
New Rome. Eyoub’s death before its walls and the failure in these Arab
attempts of the largest and most powerful army and fleet which Islam
could ever collect had not rendered the words of the Prophet void. The
sacred promise still held good and served to stimulate every soldier to
increased exertion. Seven centuries had passed since the long struggle
against the Arabs, in which the Queen City saved European civilisation,
and now, once again in the fulness of time, that which the early
Moslems had desired to see was within the reach of those who fought
under a leader who bore the same name as the Prophet. Among those who
in the army were under the influence of religious ideas or traditions
the coming attempt to capture the city was looked forward to hopefully
and joyfully. To the ignorant and thoughtless among his barbarous
followers the promise of unlimited plunder which Mahomet the Second
held out was a stronger inducement; but to the better informed and more
religious, and to some extent to all, the hope of winning paradise
furnished a powerful allurement to battle or at least a compensatory
consolation at the prospect of death.
After this digression I return to the preparations which Mahomet was
making at Adrianople for the execution of his great design, and to
those which the emperor had in hand for the defence of the city.
[Sidenote: Urban’s great bombard.]
In the first weeks of January, the fame reached Constantinople of a
monster bombard or gun which was being cast in Adrianople. Ducas gives
interesting information of its history and describes it as the largest
possessed by the Turks.
In the autumn of 1452, while Mahomet was finishing the castle on the
Bosporus, a Hungarian or Wallachian cannon founder named Urban, who
had offered his services to the emperor and had been engaged by him,
was induced by higher pay to go over to the enemy. He would have
been content, says Ducas, with a quarter of the pay he received from
Mahomet.[223] After learning from him what he could do, the Turks
commissioned him to make as powerful a gun as he could cast. Urban
declared that if the walls were as strong as those of Babylon he could
destroy them. At the end of three months he had succeeded in making a
cannon which remained for many years the wonder of the city and even
of Europe, and marks an epoch in the continually increasing power of
guns. The casting was completed at Adrianople.[224]
In January it was started on its journey to the capital. Sixty oxen
were employed to drag it, while two hundred men marched alongside
the wagon on which it was placed to keep it in position. Two hundred
labourers preceded it to level the roads and to strengthen the bridges.
By the end of March[225] it was brought within five miles of the city.
But, though the fame of this monster gun has overshadowed all the rest,
we shall see that it was only one amongst many.[226]
[Sidenote: Turkish fleet.]
Above all, says Critobulus, Mahomet had given special attention to his
fleet, ‘because he considered that for the siege the fleet would be
of more use than even his army.’[227] He built many new triremes and
repaired his old ones. A number of long boats, some of them decked
over, and swift vessels propelled by from twenty to fifty oarsmen were
also ready. No expense had been spared. The crews of his fleet were
gathered from all the shores of Asia Minor and the Archipelago. He
selected with great care the pilots, the men who should give the time
to the oarsmen and the captains.
At the beginning of April, his fleet was ready to leave Gallipoli,
which had been the place of rendezvous. Baltoglu, a Bulgarian renegade,
was placed in command. A flotilla of a hundred and forty sailing ships
started for the Bosporus.[228] Of these, twelve were fully armed
galleys, seventy or eighty were _fustae_, and twenty to twenty-five
were _parandaria_. Amid shouts from one ship to another, the beating
of drums, and the sound of fifes, all marking the delight of the Turks
that their period of inactivity was at an end, the fleet made its way
through the Marmora. The sight carried dismay to the remnant of the
inhabitants of the Christian villages along the shores, for within
the memory of none had such a fleet been seen. Within the city itself
the news of the enormous number of vessels on their way was not less
alarming.
The fleet arrived in the Bosporus on April 12 and anchored at the
Double Columns or Diplokionion just below the present Palace of Dolma
Bagtche.[229]
At the Double Columns the detachment of the fleet which had come from
the Dardanelles was joined by other vessels which had been swept in
from the Black Sea and the Marmora. Phrantzes gives the total number at
four hundred and eighty.[230] Many of the vessels from the Black Sea
were laden with wood or with stone balls.
The Turkish fleet under Baltoglu’s command thus consisted of a number
of vessels from all the shores of the Marmora, the Bosporus, and the
Black Sea. Among them were triremes, biremes, _fustae_, _parandaria_,
and galleys. As we shall find these terms recurring, it will be well
to realise what they signified. The trireme of the fifteenth century
was a long and fast vessel which had usually two masts, was very low
in the water and, though employing sails, was mainly dependent for
propulsion on her oars. The arrangement of oars from which she derived
her name was not in tiers one above the other and thus requiring oars
of different length. The ‘banks’ or benches, unlike those in ancient
ships, were all on the same level. The oars were short and all of the
same length: but three oars projected through one rowlock port, each
oar working on a tholepin. ‘One man one oar’ was the invariable rule.
Three men occupied one bench or seat. Down the middle of the trireme
ran a central gangway called the _histodokè_, primarily intended as
a rest for the mast, but upon which the officer passed to and fro to
keep time for the oarsmen. There were thus three upon each side of him,
or six men nearly abreast throughout the length of the trireme. The
arrangement upon a bireme was of a similar character, except that two
men instead of three occupied one bench. There was also but one mast.
The _fusta_ resembled the bireme in having two oarsmen on each bench on
each side of the _histodokè_ from the stern to the one central mast,
but only one on each side from the mast forward.[231]
The _fusta_ was a lighter boat than the trireme, and could thus be
propelled more rapidly. The _parandaria_ were heavy boats, probably
not differing much from the sailing barges or _mahoons_ still used in
the harbour of Constantinople, the Bosporus, and Marmora. The name
‘galley’ was in the fifteenth century applied to war vessels propelled
by a single bank of long oars on each side. Leonard employs the term
_dromon_, not, as it had been used in earlier days from about 500
A.D., as a generic term for war ships,[232] but to indicate the large
_caiques_, usually of twelve oars, which could not be classed as
triremes, biremes, or fustæ.
Probably the majority of the vessels in Mahomet’s fleet were not larger
than the ordinary bazaar caiques which ply between Constantinople and
distant villages on the Bosporus or the Marmora or are employed in
deep-sea fishing.[233]
[Sidenote: Turkish army arrives before the walls, April 5.]
Mahomet, leaving Adrianople in the early days of April with the whole
of his army, overspread and ravaged the country which had not already
been swept by the vanguard of his force and arrived on the 5th of
that month before the city. He encamped at about a mile and a half’s
distance from the landward walls.
Apparently, before the arrival of the main body of Mahomet’s army,
a sortie was made by the Greeks and Italians against those who had
arrived, and this was possibly led by Justiniani.[234] They met at
first with success, wounded many and killed a few Turks, but when
Mahomet arrived the advantage of the besiegers in numbers was so
overwhelming that no further sorties were attempted. The bridges
leading across the foss to the Gates were broken down; the Gates were
closed and were not again opened so long as the siege lasted.
The Turkish army on April 6 advanced three quarters of a mile nearer
to the walls, and on the following day again approached still closer.
The imperial guard extended from the height crowned by Top Capou[235]
to the Adrianople Gate, and thus occupied the valley of the Lycus. This
district was known as the Mesoteichion. Their camp was so near to the
walls as only to be just out of range of missiles discharged by the
besieged.[236]
[Sidenote: Formal offer of peace.]
The law of the Koran requires, or is believed to require, that before
war is definitely declared there shall be a formal offer of peace, and
accordingly before the siege commenced Mahomet made such a proposal.
To men who knew their own weakness and the tremendous odds against
them any such offer must have been tempting. He sent messengers to
declare that if the city were given up to him he would consent to allow
the citizens to remain; he would not deprive them of their property,
their wives or their children, but take all under his protection. As
the inhabitants knew well the fate of a population when conquered by a
Turkish army, they might possibly have accepted the proposal, if they
had had any confidence in the oath of the proposer. The answer sent was
that they would consent to other conditions, but never to the surrender
of the city.[237]
Upon this refusal Mahomet at once made his dispositions for a regular
siege.
[Illustration: Map of BYZANTINE CONSTANTINOPLE.
Drawn by F. R. von Hubner for and under the direction of Professor A.
van Millingen.
_Walker & Boutall sc._
Reproduced by kind permission of Prof. A. van Millingen from ‘Byzantine
Constantinople’ (John Murray).
The indications in red ink are inserted by Mr. Pears. The bridges shown
on the Golden Horn are modern. The red line at its mouth indicates the
Boom.]