CHAPTER VII

PROGRESS OF TURKS BETWEEN 1391 AND 1425: SULTAN BAJAZED’S

REIGN: CONQUESTS IN EUROPE: BULGARIAN KINGDOM ENDED: WESTERN

ARMIES DEFEATED AT NICOPOLIS: ANATOLIA-HISSAR BUILT: CAPITAL

THREATENED: SUMMONS BY TIMOUR TO BAJAZED: TIMOUR’S PROGRESS:

REPLY OF BAJAZED: BATTLE OF ANGORA AND CRUSHING DEFEAT OF

TURKS: FURTHER PROGRESS OF TIMOUR: DEATH OF BAJAZED, 1403:

ALARM IN WESTERN EUROPE: DEPARTURE OF TIMOUR: STRUGGLE

BETWEEN THE SONS OF BAJAZED: ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF MAHOMET:

HIS GOOD UNDERSTANDING WITH MANUEL: DEATH OF MAHOMET, 1420:

ACCESSION OF MURAD: WAR WITH EMPIRE: SIEGE OF CONSTANTINOPLE,

1422: DEATH OF MANUEL, 1425: TRIUMPHAL PROGRESS OF MURAD: HE

BESIEGES AND TAKES SALONICA: BESIEGES BELGRADE BUT FAILS:

COMBINED MOVEMENT UNDER HUNYADI AGAINST MURAD: BATTLE OF

SLIVNITZA, 1443, AND DEFEAT OF TURKS: MURAD SUES FOR PEACE:

TREATY MADE WITH LADISLAUS: VIOLATED BY CHRISTIANS: BATTLE OF

VARNA, 1444: MURAD RAVAGES MOREA: ISKENDER BEY, HIS ORIGIN:

CAPTURES CROIA: HUNYADI AGAIN ATTACKS MURAD: DEFEATED AT

COSSOVO-POL, 1448: REASONS FOR FAILURE OF CHRISTIAN ATTEMPTS:

JOHN HAS TO FOREGO JOINING WESTERN COMBINATION AGAINST TURKS:

DEATH OF MURAD, 1451: MAHOMET THE SECOND BECOMES SULTAN.

It is convenient to halt here and to retrace the steps of the Ottoman

conquerors from the accession of Manuel, in 1391, with more care than

was necessary in describing their direct attacks upon the empire. The

number of Turks in Asia Minor and in Europe had now so much increased

that their leaders began to dream, perhaps were already planning, the

conquest of as wide a territory as had fallen before the immediate

successors of the prophet. They had already almost succeeded in

completing a ring of conquered states round Constantinople itself. The

defeat of the Bulgarians and South Serbians on the Maritza, the great

victory over the Serbians at Cossovo-pol, in 1389, enabled them to

join forces with the Turks in the Morea and at isolated places on the

eastern shore of the Adriatic. Nearly all Asia Minor acknowledged the

rule of the Ottomans, and it was to the European portion of the empire

that the attention of the Turk would now be turned.[112]

An observer looking back upon all that was going on in Eastern Europe

during the first half of the fifteenth century can now see that all

the great events were part of a gigantic struggle against the hordes

of Asia, represented by the Turks on the south of the Danube and in

Asia Minor and the races whom it is convenient to call Tartars to the

north of that river. The humiliation of the emperors to obtain aid from

the West, the proceedings at Florence, the repeated calls upon Hungary

and other Christian nations, were all incidents of that struggle. The

statesmen of the West were gradually learning that the Ottomans had

developed into a nation of fighters, and that it was not merely the

remnant of the Greek empire which was threatened, but Christendom

itself.

[Sidenote: Reign of Sultan Bajazed, 1389–1403.]

Upon the assassination of Murad at Cossovo-pol, his son Bajazed

became sultan. He had already acquired, or acquired shortly after his

accession, the nickname of _Ilderim_ or the Thunderbolt.

He commenced his reign by strangling his elder brother, Jacoub. Ducas

declares that he was an irreconcilable enemy of the Christian name and

a passionate follower of Mahomet. During the reign of his predecessor,

the struggle between the empire and the Turks had taken a theological

character, and it is beyond reasonable doubt that religious animosity

of a kind which had not shown itself among the first armies of the

Turks had now diffused its baneful influence among the Ottoman armies.

Under Bajazed, this fanaticism was intensified to such an extent that

it led to cruelties of which it may be said that it is hardly possible

to believe that even Mongol barbarity was ever greater than that

exercised by the followers of the successor of Murad against Christians.

The commencement of his reign was marked by a series of rapid movements

which were crowned with success. He stands out in Turkish history as

the maker of swift marches and as the striker of sudden and effective

blows. It was on this account that he received the name of ‘Ilderim.’

He forced Stephen of Serbia, the son of Lazarus (whom he had caused

to be hewn in pieces upon the assassination of Murad), to become his

vassal and to give him his sister in marriage. Bulgaria, Wallachia,

Albania, and Macedonia with Salonica as its capital acknowledged his

rule. His fleet plundered the islands of the Archipelago and burnt the

town of Chios.[113]

[Sidenote: Reign of Manuel.]

The last message the emperor John had received before his death, in

1391, from Murad was that unless he destroyed the work he had executed

in repairing the towers of the Golden Gate, he would put out the eyes

of his son Manuel, who was then at Brousa. Happily, his threat came

to naught. On learning of the death of his father, Manuel, as we have

seen, escaped to the capital. Thereupon Bajazed, upon the rejection of

his impossible demands, commenced a series of attacks upon the empire.

[Sidenote: End of Bulgarian kingdom.]

Bajazed carried war into every part of the Balkan peninsula. Durazzo

was threatened by a Turkish army, and the Venetian senate was

compelled to send aid to the relief of its signor. His armies employed

themselves in Thrace in raiding cattle and in capturing the Christian

inhabitants, thousands of whom were either killed or sold into slavery.

Tirnovo was taken, and Shishman, the king of Bulgaria, made prisoner in

1393. With his death, in the same year, the kingdom of Bulgaria came

to an end. Ali Pasha, the grand vizier of Bajazed, blockaded Manuel in

Constantinople, and urged the citizens to dethrone him and declare for

John, the son of Andronicus, the elder son of the late emperor John.

But after the Turks had continued near the capital for upwards of a

year, Manuel attacked and defeated both them and his nephew John.

The greater part of the Morea was still under the rule of the empire.

Bajazed organised a great expedition of fifty thousand men for its

conquest. He captured Argos, plundered the country nearly as far as

Coronea and Methone, in the Morea, and exterminated or brought away

thirty thousand captives.

[Sidenote: Battle of Nicopolis 1396.]

In consequence of the success of these various expeditions, the

pope and the other princes of the West became thoroughly alive to

the necessity of putting forward all their strength to check the

Thunderbolt’s progress. Their hopes centred in the leadership of

Sigismund, king of Hungary and brother of the emperor in the West. The

Venetian senate decided to treat with him for an alliance. The pope

and the chief of the Holy Roman Empire did their best to engage the

Christian powers to place themselves under his leadership. In 1393,

Sigismund had beaten the Turks at Little Nicopolis, and hope rose high

of greater successes. In the spring of 1396, the duke of Burgundy, at

the head of a thousand knights and nine thousand soldiers--French,

English, and Italians--arrived in Hungary and joined his forces.

German knights also came in considerable numbers. The Christian

armies defeated the Turks in Hungary, and gained victory in several

engagements. The emperor Manuel was secretly preparing to join them.

Then the allies prepared to strike a decisive blow. They gathered on

the banks of the Danube an army of at least fifty-two thousand--and

possibly a hundred thousand--men, and encamped at Nicopolis. The

_élite_ of several nations were present, but those of the highest rank

were the French knights. When they heard of the approach of the enemy,

they refused to listen to the prudent counsels of the Hungarians and,

with the contempt which so often characterised the Western knights for

the Turkish foe, they joined battle confident of success.

Bajazed, as soon as he had learned the presence of the combined

Christian armies, marched through Philippopolis, crossed the Balkans,

made for the Danube, and then waited for attack. In the battle which

ensued (1396), Europe received its first lesson on the prowess of the

Turks, and especially of the Janissaries. The Christian army, with

rash daring, broke through the line of its enemies, cut down all who

resisted them, and rushed on irresistible to the very rearguard of the

Turks, many of whom either retreated or sought refuge in flight. When

the French knights saw that the Turks ran, they followed, and filled

the battlefield with dead and dying. But they made the old military

blunder, and it led to the same old result. The archers, who always

constituted the most effective Turkish arm, employed the stratagem of

running away in order to throw their pursuers into disorder. Then they

turned and made a stand. As they did so, the Janissaries, ‘Christians

of origin, from many Christian nations,’ as Ducas bewails, came out

of the place where they had been concealed, surprised and cut to

pieces Frenchmen, Italians, and Hungarians. The pursuers were soon the

pursued. The Turks chased them to the Danube, into which many of the

fugitives threw themselves. The defeat was complete. Sigismund saved

himself in a small boat, with which he crossed the river, and found his

way, after long wandering, to Constantinople. The duke of Burgundy and

twenty-four noblemen who were captured were sent to Brousa to be held

for ransom. The remaining Burgundians, to the number of three hundred,

who escaped massacre, and refused to save their lives by abjuring

Christianity, had their throats cut by order of the sultan.[114]

The battle at Nicopolis gave back to Bajazed almost at once all that

the allies had been able to take from him. The defeat of Sigismund,

with his band of French, German, and Italian knights, sent dismay to

their countrymen and the princes of the West.

In the same year, Bajazed gained successes over the Moslem prince

of Caramania and a Turkish pretender at Sinope, rebels who had been

induced to rise in the hope that they might take advantage of the

attack of Sigismund and his allies.

The sultan’s great object, however, was to complete his triumphs by

the capture of Constantinople. His grand vizier had, in 1396, while

blockading the city, urged the inhabitants to declare for the young

Prince John, who was the Turkish _protégé_. On refusal, Bajazed sat

down to besiege the city, and only abandoned the idea of an assault

when it was pointed out that to do so would make enemies of all the

Christian powers.

In 1396, apparently immediately after the battle of Nicopolis, and as

an essential step towards the capture of the city, he built on the

Bosporus the castle still remaining at Anatolia-Hissar, about six

miles from the city. It served at once, and continued to serve until

1453, as a useful base of operations. After having completed it, says

Chalcondylas, he went to besiege Byzance, and summoned Manuel to

surrender the city.[115] The emperor, who had just welcomed six hundred

French knights, sent by Charles the Sixth of France, did not deign to

reply. Two years later, in 1398, in order to avoid an attack by the

Turks, who were drawing near the capital with an army numbering ten

thousand, nominally to support John, Manuel consented, as we have seen,

to share the throne with his nephew, and thereupon went to Western

Europe to endeavour to secure help.

The aid sent to Sigismund from the West and that now sent to the

Bosporus under Boucicaut show that many statesmen had awakened to the

need of checking Turkish progress. The empire was able for a while to

hold its own against the attacks made by the sultan.

Bajazed, whose life was alternately one of great activity in warfare

and of indescribable debauchery in the intervals between his campaigns,

had kept the capital under terror of sieges during six weary years. In

1402, he summoned John to surrender the city, and swore by God and the

Prophet that if he refused he would not leave in it a soul alive. John

gave a refusal. Chateaumorand, the lieutenant of Boucicaut, who, as we

have seen, had gone west to endeavour to obtain aid, took charge of the

defence, and waited for an attack.

At this time, remarks Ducas, the empire was circumscribed by the

walls of Constantinople, for even Silivria was in the hands of the

Turks.[116] Bajazed had gained a firm hold of Gallipoli and thus

commanded the Dardanelles. The long tradition of the Roman empire

in the East, save for the capture of the city itself, seemed on the

eve of coming to an end. No soldier of conspicuous ability had been

produced by the empire for upwards of half a century: none who was

capable of inflicting a sufficient defeat, or series of defeats, on the

Turks to break or seriously check their power. The empire had fought

on for three generations against an ever increasing number of Turks,

but without confidence and almost without hope. It was now lacking in

sufficiency of men and money. The often promised aid from the West

had so far proved of little avail. The armies defeated by the empire,

either alone or aided by Italians, were renewed by the constant stream

of immigrants from Asia. The power of Serbia had been almost destroyed.

Bulgaria had perished. The two states had been alternately at the

mercy of hordes of infidels from the north or those under the Turkish

sultan. From Dalmatia to the Morea the enemy was triumphant. The men of

Macedonia had everywhere fallen before Bajazed’s armies. Constantinople

was between the hammer and anvil: Asia Minor, on the one side, was

nearly all under Turkish rule; the European part of the empire, on the

other, contained as many Turks as there were in Asia Minor itself.

The insolent tyrant passed in safety between his two capitals--one at

Brousa, the other at Adrianople--and repeated his proud boasts of what

he would do beyond the limits of the empire. It seemed as if, with

his overwhelming force, he had only to succeed once more in a task

which, in comparison with what he and his predecessors had done, was

easy, and his success would be complete. He would occupy the throne of

Constantine, would achieve that which had been the desire of the Arab

followers of Mahomet, and for which they had sacrificed hundreds of

thousands of lives, and would win for himself and his followers the

reward of heaven promised to those who should take part in the capture

of New Rome. The road to the Elder Rome would be open, and he would yet

feed his horse on the altar of St. Peter.

We have seen what was the insolent message he sent in his arrogance, in

1402, to John. The answer given would have completed a dramatic story

if it had seemed well to the gods. ‘Tell your master we are weak, but

that in our weakness we trust in God, who can give us strength and can

put down the mightiest from their seats. Let your master do what he

likes.’ Thereupon Bajazed had laid siege to Constantinople.

Suddenly, in the blackness of darkness with which the fortunes of

the city were surrounded, there came a ray of light. Had there been

an interpreter there as of old time, Bajazed might have learned the

significance of the handwriting on the wall. All thought of the siege

was abandoned for the time, and Constantinople breathed again freely.

What had happened was that Timour the Lame had challenged, or rather

ordered, Bajazed to return to the Greeks all the cities and territories

he had captured. The order was categorical and, given to a ferocious

barbarian like Bajazed, drove him to fury. The man who gave it was,

however, accustomed to be obeyed.

Timour[117] or Tamarlane was a Mahometan and a Turk, though he claimed

to be of the same race as Genghis, who was a Mongol. Under him the

warrior shepherds of the south plains of Asia came westward in even

greater numbers than they had done under his famous predecessor. They

advanced in well-organised armies, under generals who seem to have

had intelligence everywhere of the enemy’s country and great military

skill. After having annexed Kharizon and Persia to Transoxiana and

reduced Turkestan to obedience, Timour turned westward. In 1386, he

appeared at Tiflis, which he subsequently captured at the head of an

enormous host estimated at eight hundred thousand men. At Erzingan he

put all the Turks sent there by the sultan to the sword.

Bajazed seems from the first to have been alarmed and went himself to

Erzingan in 1394, but returned to Europe without making any attempt to

resist the invader, probably believing that Timour had no intention

of coming further west.[118] He soon learned his mistake. Timour was

not merely as great and cruel a barbarian but as ambitious as Bajazed

himself. In 1395, while the emperor was in the Balkan peninsula,

Timour summoned the large and populous city of Sivas to surrender. The

inhabitants twice refused. Meantime, he had undermined the wall. On

their second refusal, his host stormed and captured the city. A hundred

and twenty thousand captives were massacred. Bajazed’s son was made

prisoner and put to death. A large number of the prisoners were buried

alive, being covered over in a pit with planks instead of earth so as

to prolong their torture. Bajazed was relieved when he learned that

from Sivas, which had been the strongest place in his empire, the ever

victorious army had gone towards Syria.

Timour directed his huge host towards the frontier city of the sultan

of Egypt--namely, Aleppo--his object being to punish the sultan for

his breach of faith in imprisoning his ambassador and loading him with

irons. On his march to that city, he spread desolation everywhere,

capturing or receiving the submission of Malatia, Aintab, and other

important towns. At Aleppo, the army of the Egyptian sultan resisted. A

terrible battle followed, but the Egyptians were beaten, and every man,

woman, and child in the city was murdered.

After the capture of Aleppo, Hama and Baalbek were occupied. The

latter, which, like so many other once famous cities, has become under

Turkish rule a desolation with only a few miserable huts amid its

superb ruins, was still a populous city, and contained large stores of

provisions. Thence he went to Damascus and in January 1401 defeated the

remainder of the Egyptian army in a battle which was hardly less bloody

than that before Aleppo. The garrison, composed mostly of Circassian

mamelukes and negroes, capitulated, but the chief was put to death for

having been so slow in surrendering. Possibly by accident, the whole

city was burned.

Timour was stopped from advancing to Jerusalem by a plague of locusts,

which ate up every green thing. The same cause rendered it impossible

to attack Egypt, whose sultan had refused to surrender Syria.[119]

From Damascus, Timour went to Bagdad, which was held by contemporaries

to be impregnable. Amid the heat of a July day, when the defenders had

everywhere sought shade, Timour ordered a general assault, and in a few

minutes the standard of one of his sheiks, with its horsetail and its

golden crescent, was raised upon the walls.[120] Then followed the

usual carnage attending Timour’s captures. The mosques, schools, and

convents with their occupiers were spared: so also were the _imaums_

and the professors. All the remainder of the population between the

ages of eight and eighty were slaughtered. Every soldier of Timour, of

whom there were ninety thousand, as the price of his own safety, had to

produce a head. The bloody trophies were, as was customary in Timour’s

army, piled up in pyramids before the gates of the city.

It was on his return northwards from Damascus that, in 1402, Timour

sent the message to Bajazed which at once forced him to raise the

siege of Constantinople. Contemporaneously with this message, Timour

requested the Genoese in Galata and at Genoa to obtain aid from the

West and to co-operate with him to crush the Turkish sultan.

[Sidenote: Bajazed’s reply to Timour’s summons.]

Timour organised or sent a large army on the Don and around the Sea of

Azof on the Cimmerian Bosporus, connecting that sea with the Euxine,

in order that, in case of need, it might act with his huge host now

advancing towards the Black Sea from the south. His main body passed

across the plain of Erzingan, and at Sivas Timour received the answer

of Bajazed. The response was as insulting as a Turkish barbarian could

make it. Bajazed summoned Timour to appear before him and declared

that if he did not obey, the women of his harem should be divorced

from him, putting his threat in what to a Mahometan was a specially

indecent manner. All the usual civilities in written communications

between sovereigns were omitted, though the Asiatic conqueror himself

had carefully observed them. Timour’s remark when he saw the sultan’s

letter contained the name of Timour in black writing under that of

Bajazed which was in gold, was ‘The son of Murad is mad!’ When he read

the insulting threat as to his harem, Timour kept himself well in hand,

but, turning to the ambassador who had brought the letter, told him

that he would have cut off his head and those of the members of his

suite if it were not the rule among sovereigns to respect the lives of

ambassadors. The representative of Bajazed was, however, compelled to

be present at a review of the whole of his troops and was requested to

return to his master and relate what he had seen.

Meantime, Bajazed had determined to strike quickly and heavily against

Timour and by the rapidity of his movements justified the name of

Ilderim. His opponent’s forces, however, were hardly less mobile.

Timour’s huge army marched in twelve days from Sivas to Angora. The

officer in command of that city refused to surrender. Timour made

his arrangements for the siege in such a manner as to compel or

induce Bajazed to occupy a position where he would have to fight at a

disadvantage. He undermined the walls and diverted the small stream

which supplied it with water. Hardly had these works been commenced

before he learned that Ilderim was within nine miles of the city.

Timour raised the siege and transferred his camp to the opposite side

of the stream, which thus protected one side of his army while a ditch

and a strong palisade guarded the other. Then in an exceptionally

strong position he waited to be attacked.

Disaffection existed in Bajazed’s army, occasioned by his parsimony,

and possibly nursed by emissaries from Timour. Bajazed’s own

licentiousness had been copied by his followers, and discipline among

his troops was noted as far less strict than among those of his

predecessor. In leading them on what all understood to be the most

serious enterprise which he had undertaken, his generals advised him to

spend his reserves of money freely so as to satisfy his followers; but

the capricious and self-willed Ilderim refused. They counselled him,

in presence of an army many times more numerous than his own, to act

on the defensive and to avoid a general attack. But Bajazed, blinded

by his long series of successes, would listen to no advice and would

take no precautions. In order to show his contempt for his enemy, he

ostentatiously took up a position to the north of Timour and organised

a hunting party on the highlands in the neighbourhood, as if time to

him were of no consequence. Many men of his army died from thirst under

the burning sun of the waterless plains, and when, after three days’

hunting, Bajazed returned to his camping ground, he found that Timour

had taken possession of it. The enemy had almost altogether cut off his

supply of drinking water and had fouled what still remained.

Under these circumstances, Bajazed had no choice but to force on a

fight without further delay. The ensuing battle was between two great

Turkish leaders filled with the arrogance of barbaric conquerors,

each of whom had been almost uniformly successful. Nor were pomp and

circumstance wanting to impress the soldiers of each side with the

importance of the issue. Each of the two leaders was accompanied by

his sons. Four sons and five grandsons commanded the nine divisions

of Timour’s host. In front of its leader floated the standard of the

Red Horse-tail surmounted by the Golden Crescent. On the other side,

Bajazed took up his position in the centre of his army with his sons

Isa, Mousa, and Mustafa, while his eldest son Suliman was in command of

the Asiatic troops who formed the right wing. Lazarus of Serbia was in

command of his own subjects, who had been forced to accompany Bajazed

and formed the left wing of the army. The Serbians gazed in wonder and

alarm upon a number of elephants opposite to them, which Timour had

brought from India.

At six o’clock in the morning of July 28, 1402, the two armies joined

battle. The left wing of Bajazed’s host was the first to be attacked,

but the Serbians held their ground and even drove back the Tartars. The

right wing fought with less vigour, and when the troops from Aidin saw

their former prince among the enemy, they deserted Bajazed and went

over to him. Their example was speedily followed by many others, and

especially by the Tartars in the Ottoman army, who are asserted by the

Turkish writers to have been tampered with by agents of Timour.[121]

[Sidenote: Defeat of Bajazed.]

The Serbians were soon detached from the centre of the army, but

Lazarus, their leader, at the head of his cavalry, cut his way through

the enemy, though at great loss, winning the approval of Timour

himself, who exclaimed, ‘These poor fellows are beaten, though they

are fighting like lions.’ Lazarus had advised Bajazed to endeavour,

like himself, to break through, and awaited him for some time. But

the sultan expressed his scorn at the advice. Surrounded by his

ten thousand trustworthy Janissaries, separated from the Serbians,

abandoned by a large part of his Anatolian troops and many of his

leading generals, he fought on obstinately during the whole of the

day. But the pitiless heat of a July sun exhausted the strength of his

soldiers, and no water was to be had. His Janissaries fell in great

numbers around him, some overcome by the heat and fighting, others

struck down by the ever pressing crowd of the enemy. It was not till

night came on that Bajazed consented to withdraw. He attempted flight,

but was pursued. His horse fell, and he was made prisoner, together

with his son Mousa and several of the chiefs of his household and of

the Janissaries. His other three sons managed to escape. The Serbians

covered the retreat of the eldest, Suliman, whom the grand vizier and

the Aga of the Janissaries had dragged out of the fight.

The Persian, Turkish, and most of the Greek historians say that Timour

received his great captive with every mark of respect, assured him

that his life would be spared, and assigned to him and his suite three

splendid tents. When, however, he was found attempting to escape, he

was more rigorously guarded and every night put in chains and confined

in a room with grilled windows. When he was conveyed from one place to

another, he travelled much as Indian ladies now do, in a palanquin with

curtained windows. Out of a misinterpretation of the Turkish word which

designated at once a cage and a grilled room, grew the error into which

Gibbon and historians of less repute have fallen that the great Ilderim

was carried about in an iron cage.[122] Until his death, in 1403, he

was an unwilling follower of his captor.

After the battle of Angora, Suliman (the eldest son of Bajazed), who

had fled towards Brousa, was pursued by a detachment of Timour’s

army. He managed to cross into Europe and thus escaped. But Brousa,

the Turkish capital, fell before Timour’s attack, and its inhabitants

suffered the same brutal horrors as almost invariably marked either

Tartar or Turkish captures. The city, after a carefully organised

pillage, was burned. The wives and the daughters of Bajazed and his

treasure became the property of Timour. Nicaea and Ghemlik were also

sacked and their inhabitants taken as slaves. From the Marmora to

Caramania, many towns which had been captured by the Turks were taken

from them. Asia Minor was in confusion. Bajazed’s empire appeared to

be dropping away in every part east of the Aegean. Suliman, however,

established himself on the Bosporus at Anatolia-Hissar, and about the

same time both he and the emperor at Constantinople received a summons

from Timour to pay tribute. The emperor had already sent messengers

to anticipate such a demand. Timour learned with satisfaction that the

sons of Bajazed were disputing with each other as to the possession of

such parts of their father’s empire as still remained uncaptured by him.

[Sidenote: Timour captures Smyrna.]

In 1402, the conqueror left Kutahia for Smyrna, which was held, as

it had been for upwards of half a century, by the Knights of Rhodes.

In accordance with the stipulation of Moslem sacred law, he summoned

them either to pay tribute or become Mahometans, threatening them at

the same time that if they refused to accept one or other of these

conditions all should be killed. No sooner were the proposals rejected

than Timour gave the order to attack the city. With his enormous

army, he was able to surround Smyrna on three sides, and to block the

entrance to it from the sea. The ships belonging to the knights were

at the time absent. All kinds of machines then known for attack upon

walled towns were constructed with almost incredible speed and placed

in position. The houses within the city were burned by means of arrows

carrying flaming materials steeped in naphtha or possibly petroleum,

though, of course, not known under its modern name.

After fourteen days’ vigorous siege, a general assault was ordered, and

the city was taken. The knights fought like heroes, but were driven

back into the citadel. Seeing that they could no longer hold out, and

their ships having returned, the grand master placed himself at their

head, and he and his knights cut their way shoulder to shoulder through

the crowd of their enemies to the sea, where they were received into

their own ships. The inhabitants who could not escape were taken before

Timour and, without distinction of age or sex, were butchered.

The Western settlers hastened to come to terms with Timour, who, like

his great predecessor, was not opposed to any Christians on account of

their religion. The Genoese in Phocaea, in the islands of Mitylene and

Scios, sent to make submission, and became tributaries of the conqueror.

Smyrna was the last of Timour’s conquests in western Asia Minor. He

went to Ephesus, and during the thirty days he passed in that city his

army ravaged the whole of the fertile country in its neighbourhood and

in the valley of the Cayster. The cruelties committed by his horde

would be incredible if they were not continually repeated during the

course of Tartar and Turkish history. In fairness, it must also be said

that the Ottoman Turks, although their history has been a long series

of massacres, have rarely been guilty of the wantonness of cruelty

which Greek and Turkish authors agree in attributing to the Tartar

army. One example must suffice. The children of a town on which Timour

was marching were sent out by their parents reciting verses from the

Koran to ask for the generosity of their conqueror but co-religionist.

On asking what the children were whining for, and being told that they

were begging him to spare the town, he ordered his cavalry to ride

through them and trample them out: an order that was forthwith obeyed.

[Sidenote: Death of Timour.]

Timour, wearied with victories in the west, now determined to leave

Asia Minor and return to Samarcand. This resolution he carried out.

He contemplated the invasion of China, but in the midst of his

preparations died, in 1405, after a reign of thirty-six years.

Bajazed the Thunderbolt died at Aksheir two years earlier, and his son

Mousa was permitted to transport his body to Brousa.[123]

The battle of Angora gave the greatest check to the Ottoman power

which it had yet received. Considering the number of men engaged and

the complete victory obtained by Timour, one might have expected it

to have been fruitful in more enduring consequences than it produced.

But its immediate results, though not far-reaching, were important.

The fourteen years’ victorious career of the Thunderbolt was brought

suddenly to an end. The empire of the Ottoman Turks which he had

largely increased, and especially by the addition to it of the

north-west portion of Asia Minor, was for a time shattered to pieces.

The sons of the vanquished sultan, after the departure of Timour and

his host, were quarrelling over the possession of what remained. Three

of them gained territories in Asia Minor, while the eldest, Suliman,

retook possession of the lands held by his father in Europe. Most of

the leaders of the Ottoman host, the viziers, governors, and scheiks,

had been either captured or slain, and in consequence the sons of

Bajazed fighting in Asia Minor found themselves destitute of efficient

servants for the organisation of government in the territories which

they seized on the departure of Timour.

The progress of the great Asiatic horde created a profound impression

in Western Europe. The eagerness of the Genoese to acknowledge the

suzerainty of Timour gives an indication of their sense of the danger

of resistance. The stories of the terrible cruelties of the Tartars

lost nothing in their telling. When the news reached the neighbouring

nations of Hungary and Serbia and the republics of Italy of the defeat

of Bajazed, the capture of Brousa, of Smyrna, of every other town

before which the Asiatic army had sat down, and of the powerlessness

of the military knights, it appeared as if the West were about to be

submerged by a new flood from Asia. No terror so great had threatened

Europe since the time when Charles Martel defeated the Moslem hordes

on the plains around Tours, or since the even more threatening attack

upon Christendom when the main body of the Arab armies sat down for

successive years before Constantinople and were signally defeated by

the obstinacy of its defenders.

Then, when news came of the sudden departure of the Asiatics and of

the breaking up of the Ottoman power, hope once more revived, and it

appeared possible to the pope and Christian peoples to complete the

work which Timour had begun by now offering a united opposition to the

restoration of an Ottoman empire. Constantinople itself when Bajazed

passed it on his way to Angora was almost the last remnant of the

ancient empire, and seemed as if it required only one more attempt, and

that not needing that the sultan should put forth all his strength, to

secure its capture. The battle of Angora saved it and gave it half a

century more of life.

A struggle which lasted for six years began between the sons of

Bajazed. Suliman, in 1405, sought to ally himself with the emperor,

and his proposals show how low the battle of Angora had brought the

Turkish pretensions. He offered to cede Salonica and all country in the

Balkan peninsula to the south-west of that city as well as the towns

on the Marmora to Manuel and his son John, now associated as emperor,

and to send his brother and sister as hostages to Constantinople. The

arrangement was accepted.

Suliman, having thus made himself secure, attacked his brother Isa in

1405, defeated and killed him.[124] Another brother, Mousa, in the

following year, attacked the combined troops of Suliman and Manuel in

Thrace, but the Serbians and Bulgarians deserted the younger brother,

and thereupon Suliman occupied Adrianople. Manuel consented to give

his granddaughter in marriage to Suliman, who in return gave up not

merely Salonica but many seaports in Asia Minor: a gift which was

rather in the nature of a promise than a delivery, since they were

not in his possession. Unhappily, Suliman, like many of his race,

had alternate fits of great energy and great lethargy, and was given

over to drunkenness and to debauchery. This caused disaffection among

the Turks; and Mousa, taking advantage of it, led an army in 1409,

composed of Turks and Wallachs, against him. The Janissaries, who

were dissatisfied with the lack of energy displayed by their sultan,

deserted and went over to the side of Mousa. Suliman fled with the

intention of escaping to Constantinople, but was captured while

sleeping off a drinking bout and killed.

Then Mousa determined to attack Manuel, who had been faithful to his

alliance with Suliman. He denounced him as the cause of the fall of

Bajazed and set himself to arouse all the religious fanaticism possible

against the Christian population under the emperor’s rule. According to

Ducas, Mousa put forward the statements that it was the emperor who had

invited Timour and his hordes, that his own brother Suliman had been

punished by Allah because he had become a giaour, and that he, Mousa,

had been entrusted with the sword of Mahomet in order to overthrow

the infidel. He therefore called upon the faithful to go with him to

recapture Salonica and the other Greek cities which had belonged to his

father, and to change their churches into mosques for the worship of

God and Mahomet.[125]

In 1412, he devastated Serbia for having supported his brother, and

this in as brutal a manner as Timour had devastated the cities and

countries in Asia Minor. Then he attacked Salonica. Orchan, the son

of Suliman, aided the Christians in the defence of the city, which,

however, was forced to surrender, and Orchan was blinded by his uncle.

While successful on land Mousa was defeated at sea, and the inhabitants

of the capital, in 1411, saw the destruction of his fleet off the

island of Plataea in the Marmora. In revenge for this defeat he laid

siege to the city. Manuel and his subjects stoutly defended its

landward walls, and before Mousa could capture it news came of the

revolt of his younger brother, Mahomet, who appeared as the avenger

of Suliman. The siege of Constantinople had to be raised. Mahomet

had taken the lordship of the Turks in Caramania shortly after the

defeat of his father at Angora, and had been unattacked by Timour. The

emperor proposed an alliance with him, which was gladly accepted and

the conditions agreed to were honourably kept by both parties. Mahomet

came to Scutari where he had an interview with the emperor. An army

formed of Turks and Greeks was led by Mahomet to attack his brother.

But Mousa defeated him in two engagements. Then Manuel, after a short

time, having been joined by a Serbian army, attempted battle against

him, and with success. The Janissaries deserted Mousa and went over to

Mahomet and Manuel, and his army was defeated. He was himself captured

and by order of Mahomet was bowstrung.[126]

[Sidenote: Sultan Mahomet the First, 1413–1420.]

Mahomet was now the only survivor of the six sons of Bajazed, with the

exception of Isa, the youngest, who was still living with Manuel as a

hostage. Three of his brothers had been the victims of fratricide. In

1413, Mahomet proclaimed himself Grand Sultan of the Ottomans.

He had been loyally aided by Manuel and the Serbians, and in return

loyally respected the agreements he had made with both. He gave up,

as we have seen, Salonica and the fortified towns on the Euxine, the

Marmora and in Thessaly which had been taken from the Greeks.

In 1415, the Turks, who had remained nearly undisturbed on the

western side of the Balkans, entered Bosnia. The inhabitants were

mostly Bogomils, who had been constantly persecuted by their Catholic

neighbours in order to force them to Union with the Church of Rome,

were menaced, on account of their refusal, by the king of Hungary, and

in reply threatened that they would coalesce with the Turks. Upon such

an intimation, the Turks entered the country.[127]

The two rulers, Manuel and Mahomet, continued on friendly terms. It was

probably due to the emperor’s influence that the sultan consented, in

1415, to allow the Knights of Rhodes to build a strong fortification on

the boundaries of Caria and Lycia as a place of refuge for Christians

who should escape from the hands of the Moslems. Ducas gives an

account of the interview which took place between the grand master

and Manuel and adds that the emperor went so far towards conciliating

the Christians that he contented the rulers of Chios, Mitylene, and

Phocaea. In returning from the Morea in 1416, Manuel met Mahomet at

Gallipoli, the sultan going on board Manuel’s galley and eating with

him.

[Sidenote: Death of Mahomet.]

Two years later, the good understanding between Mahomet and the emperor

was interrupted by an incident which is creditable to Manuel. A Turkish

pretender who claimed to be Mustafa, the elder brother of the sultan,

who is supposed to have been killed at Angora, aided by a body of

Wallachs, attempted to dethrone Mahomet. They were attacked and beaten

back and then took refuge in Salonica. Manuel declined to give them up,

but promised that he would prevent the pretender and the leader of the

Wallachs from making further attacks upon Mahomet. To accomplish this,

he sent the pretender Mustafa to the island of Lemnos and imprisoned

the chief of the Wallachs in the monastery of Pammacaristos in

Constantinople. But Mahomet would not be satisfied with any punishment

less than the death of the pretender, and from this time ceased to

trust Manuel. Nevertheless, when, in 1420, the sultan was in passage

through Constantinople towards his Asiatic possessions, Manuel behaved

loyally. All the members of his council, says Phrantzes,[128] advised

the emperor to seize him. Manuel refused and declared that, though the

sultan might violate his oath of friendship, he would rather trust

to God and respect his own. On Mahomet’s return to Europe through

Gallipoli, the council again urged the emperor to capture him. Again,

however, he refused, and sent a trusty general to escort him from the

Dardanelles to Adrianople. A short time after his arrival, in 1420,

Mahomet died.

[Sidenote: Reign of Murad, 1420–1451.]

His death was kept secret for forty days, in order to give time for the

arrival of his son, Murad, who was then at Amasia. Murad was proclaimed

at Brousa and began his reign by proposing to Manuel the renewal of the

alliance which had existed with his father. We have already seen that

this proposal was rejected, and that, after fruitless negotiations for

the surrender of two of Murad’s sons, war was declared. The emperor

thereupon sent to Mustafa the pretender, who still remained prisoner

at Lemnos, and, giving him assistance, recognised or appointed him

governor of Thrace and of all the places in that province held by the

Turks which he could occupy. In return, Mustafa swore to deliver

Gallipoli, which had been taken by the Turks in the reign of Bajazed,

to the emperor as soon as he had captured it, as well as certain towns

on the Black Sea. Mustafa succeeded for a while and with the aid of

the imperial troops captured Gallipoli (1420). A number of its Turkish

garrison joined his army. Manuel’s general now claimed the fulfilment

of his promise to deliver this important town, but Mustafa stated what

has often been advanced in our own time as a generally recognised rule

in Islam, that a true believer could not surrender to unbelievers

territory held by Moslems except by force, that his religion bound him

to build a city on the ruins of the Christian city, and that he would

rather break his oath than violate the duty imposed by his religion.

It was in vain that the emperor’s representative reminded him of his

past history: how he had sought refuge at Salonica, how the emperor

had risked the anger of Mahomet by insisting upon his refusal to give

him up; how at Lemnos he had still been protected. The pretender was

obdurate.[129]

When Manuel heard of the bad faith of Mustafa, he endeavoured

to re-establish the same friendly relation with Murad which had

existed with his father. He offered to assist the sultan to recover

all that his father possessed, provided he would send his sons to

Constantinople. According to Phrantzes (who from this time takes an

active part in many of the incidents he relates), the sultan was

equally ready to be friendly, provided that no further aid should be

given to Mustafa,[130] but no understanding could be arrived at.

The perjured Mustafa was probably a very poor creature. He soon lost

the confidence of his followers, and shut himself in Gallipoli, giving

himself up to pleasures and paying little attention to the measures

which Murad was taking against him. The latter passed over into Asia,

made arrangements with the Genoese at Phocaea to send him a fleet and a

number of Italian and French soldiers, and, when they arrived, crossed

the Dardanelles from Lampsacus to Gallipoli.[131]

The troops who remained faithful to the pretender attempted to prevent

the landing of Murad and his native and foreign troops, but failed.

Thereupon Mustafa fled. Murad took possession of Gallipoli and then

followed the pretender to Adrianople with all possible speed. Mustafa

hastened towards Wallachia on the approach of the sultan. A band of

young soldiers followed and captured him. He was brought before the

sultan, condemned, and hanged like an ordinary malefactor.

Then the sultan thought himself strong enough to take up the task which

Bajazed had undertaken when summoned by Timour. He decided at once

to attempt the capture of Constantinople. He laid siege to it in the

second week of June 1422 and ended in failure, as we have already seen,

at the end of August in the same year.

One at least of the reasons why the siege in 1422 had been abandoned

was a rising against Murad on behalf of his younger brother named

Mustafa. One of his two brothers, had been strangled by his orders,

but Mustafa was saved by Elias Pasha. Murad had ordered Elias to bring

the boy to Brousa. Elias, however, succeeded in having him recognised

in that city and at Nicaea as sultan. The rebellion, therefore, had

assumed alarming proportions. Murad with a trusty band of followers

went to Nicaea, gained access to the city, and the boy Mustafa, who

was only six years old, was bowstrung, possibly without the consent of

his brother. Then Murad in great haste crossed again to Europe,[132]

occupied Adrianople, and made it his European capital.

We have now arrived at the period when many of those who were

destined to be great actors in the tragedy of the Moslem conquest of

Constantinople appear on the scene. The young emperor John, who had

become co-emperor with his father in 1420 and who now alone possessed

power, owing to the debility of his father, went, in 1423, to Hungary

to seek help against the common enemy. He left his brother Constantine,

who was destined to be the last Christian emperor of the city, in

charge of the capital with the title of Despot. A few months later,

Phrantzes, the historian of the conquest, and Lucas Notaras, afterwards

made Grand Duke, who also took a prominent part in the events of 1453,

were sent by Constantine to Murad and arranged terms of peace, subject

to ratification by John, when he returned from Hungary. The associated

emperor came back by sea to his capital in October and terms of peace

were ratified by which the empire had to pay a heavy tribute and to

surrender many towns on the Black Sea.

In July 1425, Manuel died. He was seventy-seven years old and had

reigned thirty-four years--or, counting the eighteen years when he

was co-emperor with his father, fifty-two years. In his old age, he

had become hopeless of saving the empire, or even the capital. He

counselled John to make the best of the situation, to try to live on

good terms with the sultan, and to be content to remain the vassal of

Murad.

The Turks had now largely recovered from the disorganization produced

by the invasion of Timour. Everywhere they were regaining territory,

and their internal divisions were disappearing. Those occupying the

south and south-west of Asia Minor were the first to recover from

the blow of the Tartars. As early as 1415, Manuel had to resist them

in the Morea. They had defeated the Venetians, had plundered Euboea

and carried off thousands of Christian captives. Others had invaded

Dalmatia and the Adriatic coast. Their numbers in Hungary and south

Russia had been enormously increased by the conquests of Timour, the

Turks of south Russia fleeing before his host. In 1419, the Hungarians

had defeated an army of three hundred thousand who entered the great

plain north of the Danube. Most of the Turks in Asia Minor, if not all

willing subjects of Murad, still rendered him at the time of the death

of Manuel, in 1425, a nominal submission. The prince of Caramania was,

however, always a troublesome feudatory.

Murad’s reputation may be judged by the fact that in the year in which

Manuel died he made a triumphal progress. Having traversed Thrace, he

went to Brousa, to Pergamos, Magnesia, Smyrna, and Ephesus. While at

the last-mentioned city, homage was done to him by the ambassadors

of the emperor John, of Lazarus, king of Serbia, Dan, prince of the

Wallachs, and the signors of Mitylene, Chios, and Rhodes. He was, in

fact, the almost undisputed lord of Asia Minor and of all places in

the Balkan peninsula, with the exception of a few fiefs in Greece,

and of Constantinople, with a small territory behind it. With the

exception of the Venetians and the Hungarians, he was at peace with

all the world. But the Venetians were still holding their own. They

had supported the insurrection in Caramania. Their fleet had been sent

to prevent Murad from crossing into Asia, and they were masters of

Salonica. But even in that city Murad had still a triumph to achieve.

Pressed by famine when the inhabitants were besieged by the Turks,

shortly before Murad’s siege of the capital, the population had offered

the city to the Venetians, who gladly accepted it and sent a fleet

to its relief. But the Turks had constantly claimed that they had

been improperly deprived of their intended prey, and the answer given

by Murad to proposals of peace made by the republic were: Surrender

Salonica first. In 1428, Murad determined to fight for it. While

he went south-west into Macedonia, the whole population, including

the southern Serbs and southern Bulgarians, submitting to his rule,

one of his leading generals laid siege to Salonica. Ducas says that

the besiegers were a hundred to one, and there can be no doubt that

there was a fatal discrepancy in numbers. On the arrival of Murad,

the Janissaries were promised permission to pillage the city. In a

general assault, they captured it without much difficulty, and the

brutalities, the atrocities, the wanton and useless cruelties inflicted

upon the population made a profound impression upon Western Christians.

Probably they learned more of the nature of these cruelties, owing to

the presence of Italians and the comparative proximity of Salonica

to Western Europe, than ever before. But though women were violated,

houses pillaged, churches profaned, and seven thousand of the captives

sold into slavery, Europe did not yet understand that these were the

ordinary incidents of Turkish conquest. Upon the capture of the city,

in 1430, Murad and the Venetians made peace.[133]

Great efforts, however, were yet to be made to check the progress of

Murad, and if in the course of his triumphal progress to Ephesus he

was under the illusion that the European nations were content to allow

Moslem invasion to remain unchecked, he was soon undeceived. Hungary,

Serbia, and Poland now formed the great line of defence against a

Turkish advance, and when, in 1428, the first two states were invaded

by the Turks, it became evident to the West that Catholic as well as

Orthodox nations would have to resist the progress of Turkish arms.

Before the nations attacked were ready, Murad struck swiftly and

heavily, and Sigismund, king of Hungary, not having received the aid he

expected from Ladislaus, king of Poland, suffered a serious disaster on

the Danube.

[Sidenote: Preparations to resist Murad.]

On receiving news of the Turkish advance, the pope once more preached

a new Crusade and called upon all Christians to go to the aid of the

Poles and Hungarians. But messengers travelled slowly, and preparations

were long. Four years afterwards, in 1433, Murad again invaded Hungary,

but was stoutly resisted by Elizabeth, mother of the infant Ladislaus,

and had to retire. In withdrawing he attempted to annex Serbia, on

the pretext that Bajazed having married the sister of Stephen, the

former sovereign, the crown belonged to him as the heir of Ilderim.

In 1435, he laid siege to Belgrade, and put out the eyes of two sons

of the kral, under the pretext that they had attempted to escape to

their father. The siege lasted six months, but the attempt failed. The

Serbians defended the city bravely. The Turkish army suffered from

malarial fever, and a relieving army under a Polish general compelled

them to raise the siege.

It is worthy of note that during the absence of the emperor at Ferrara

and Florence in order to treat of the Union of the Churches--an absence

from his capital of two years and two months (November 1437 to February

1440)--Murad proposed to attack the city and was advised to do so by

all his council with the exception of Halil pasha,[134] who pointed

out that as John had gone to confer with the representatives of the

Christian powers on questions of religion, at the request of the pope,

they would feel bound to come to his aid, if advantage were taken of

his absence to attack the capital. Halil’s advice was taken.[135]

[Sidenote: Hunyadi leader of Christian armies.]

Immediately on John’s return, he and other European Christian rulers

began to make more or less combined movements against Murad. The

influence of the pope was energetically used to make an alliance

successful. The question was no longer one merely of defending a

schismatic though Christian emperor, but of preserving the existence

of great Catholic states. Nor were the means for offering a strong

resistance to Turkish advance wanting. The crown of Hungary was worn by

Ladislaus, the young king of Poland, who was crowned in 1440. Almost

immediately after his accession, his army succeeded in defeating a

Turkish detachment in Hungary. In the same year Scanderbeg--that is,

Alexander Bey--at the head of a large body of Albanians, declared war

on Murad. Though John on his return from Florence sent an embassy to

the sultan to protest that he was a loyal vassal, he was only waiting

for the ships and aid promised by the pope and by Western princes

in order to join in a combined attack. Although the ships promised

were long in arriving, the West was known to be full of anxiety, and

preparations were being hurried forward. On New Year’s Day 1442, the

pope again preached a Crusade and called on all Christian princes, and

especially on Ladislaus, king of Poland and Hungary, to help in the

defence of the three bulwarks of Christendom--Constantinople, Cyprus,

and Rhodes.[136] Cardinal Julian was commissioned to advise Ladislaus,

and the king was ordered to render every aid possible to him as the

legate of Eugenius. George Brancovich of Serbia bound himself to aid

the Hungarian king and for this purpose to send twenty-five thousand

men and large sums of money, the produce of the Serbian mines. The

combined army of Hungarians and Serbs, with the co-operation also of

Scanderbeg, was placed in June under the command of John Corvinus

Hunyadi, the waywode of Transylvania. Hunyadi had already distinguished

himself as a brave and skilful leader against the Turks. In a short

campaign of less than half a year, he had captured five strongholds

north of the Danube, won as many battles, and had returned laden with

booty and trophies of victory. In 1442, at the head of twelve thousand

chosen cavalry, he chased the Turks out of Serbia and defeated in

succession several armies. Christians from France, Italy, and Germany

hastened to enrol themselves under his leadership. Not even before the

terrible disaster at Nicopolis in 1396 had so powerful an army been

gathered together to attack the common enemy as was now collected under

Hunyadi. It represented all the force that the pope and Western Europe

could muster, and the presence of Cardinal Julian gave it the sanction

of an international army representing Christendom. Seldom have soldiers

had more confidence in their leader, and apparently that confidence was

well bestowed.

[Sidenote: His victories.]

Near Nisch the army of twelve thousand chosen cavalry under Hunyadi

was joined by that of Ladislaus, consisting of twenty thousand men,

with whom were the king and the cardinal. The first and most important

battle of the campaign with the united army was fought between Sofia

and Nisch, probably near Slivnitza on November 3, 1443. The Turks

were completely defeated, and thirty thousand of them are said to

have been left on the field. Four thousand were made prisoners and

nine standards captured. Thereupon the Christian army advanced to

Sofia, which it captured, and then pushed on towards Philippopolis.

At Isladi near Ikhtiman, the beginning of the pass about midway

between Sofia and Philippopolis, Hunyadi found that Murad had arranged

for making a stand. The natural strength of the pass, the principal

entrance to which is the Gate of Trajan, and the measures taken on

the high tableland at the head of this pass to make the frozen

ground impassable to cavalry, made Hunyadi hesitate. A second pass

appeared more practicable. On Christmas Eve, the Christian army forced

a passage, triumphing over the Turks and over the equally serious

obstacles of rocks and ice. Murad’s strong entrenchments were carried

by brilliant and persistent attacks, the Christians having to make

their way through snowdrifts, while the enemy rolled rocks and masses

of ice from the heights. The Turks were driven from their stronghold

and the Christian army followed them down the slopes of the Balkans

into the plain. Once more the Turks stood, and again they were

beaten.[137] Upon this, the triumphant Christian army halted and waited

for reinforcements before further advance.

It was probably immediately after this campaign, or possibly during

the halt in Roumelia, that Murad hastened into Asia, where the prince

of Caramania had engaged in a conspiracy with others of the emirs

of Anatolia to rise against the sultan and to attack his territory

simultaneously with the attacks made by Christians in Europe. Konia and

many other cities had been sacked and desolation carried far and wide

even among the Turks wherever they had stood for Murad.[138] The sultan

suppressed the rising with his usual cruelty, treating the Turks as he

had done the Christians.

[Sidenote: Peace solemnly accepted.]

The successes of Hunyadi compelled Murad, and this for several

reasons, to sue for peace. He sent an embassy to the Hungarian, but

as the latter was awaiting new troops to pursue his campaign, he at

first declined to treat, and sent Murad’s delegates to Szegedin, then

occupied by the king and the cardinal. Finding, however, that his

reinforcements did not arrive, Hunyadi consented to retire and take

part in the negotiations. The Turks on their side agreed to terms.

Murad was to give up to George Brankovitch all the places in Serbia

which he had captured, to allow Wallachia to be added to Hungary, to

leave Scanderbeg in possession of Albania and Macedonia, and to give up

the two lads whom he had blinded and the other hostages. Ladislaus and

Hunyadi on the return of the latter to Hungary made a triumphal entry

into Buda. Thirteen pashas, nine Turkish standards, and four thousand

prisoners bore testimony to the success of the campaign. The mission

from Murad had gone forward into Hungarian territory to complete the

formalities of peace which had been agreed to at Szegedin. A formal

truce for ten years was concluded in June 1444 between Murad and the

king of Poland and Hungary and his allies. The treaty was not, however,

signed by Hunyadi, who declared that he was only a subject. Each party

swore that the army of his nation would not cross the Danube to attack

the other. Ladislaus took the oath to this effect solemnly on the

Gospels and Murad on the Koran.[139]

[Sidenote: Treaty violated by Christians.]

The treaty of June 1444 thus solemnly ratified was almost immediately

broken.[140] To the eternal disgrace of Ladislaus and of the cardinal

legate, Julian Cesarini, who had accompanied Hunyadi on the campaign

just described, and who figures as the evil genius of Ladislaus until

his death, it was broken by the Christians. History furnishes few

examples of equally bad faith.

All the evidence goes to prove that the Turks intended to respect the

treaty. The sultan, indeed, had taken the opportunity of abdicating

and of formally handing over the government to his son, Mahomet, a

boy fourteen years old, and had already retired to Brousa with the

intention of going on to Magnesia, to live in peace and quietness.

Murad wanted rest. Even when he was seen by La Brocquière, probably in

1436, he was ‘already very fat.’ A short, thick-set man with a broad

brown face, high cheekbones, a large and hooked nose, he looked, says

the same writer, like a Tartar--that is, like a Mongol. Voluptuous in

the worst Turkish sense of the word, he also loved wine and banished

a believer who dared to reprove him for drinking it. ‘He is thought,’

adds La Brocquière, ‘not to love war, and this opinion seems to me

well founded.’[141] Just about this time also he lost his eldest son,

Aladdin, to whom he was much attached, and was overcome with grief.

Hence his determination to get rid of the cares of government.

The opportunity to the Christians seemed tempting. News had arrived

that a powerful fleet of seventy ships had appeared in the Bosporus,

ten triremes having been sent by the pope and ten others at his request

by Latin princes. The duke of Burgundy and a French cardinal had

arrived at Constantinople to urge John to join in a Christian league.

The cities of Thrace were undefended by the Turks, and the fleets, it

was believed, could prevent Murad with his army from crossing into

Europe. The only obstacle to vigorous and successful action was the

newly signed treaty.

Pretexts were found that Ladislaus had had no right to agree to a

truce without the consent of the pope, and that Murad had not executed

his part of the treaty. Ladislaus hesitated to break his oath, but

Cardinal Julian urged that his league with the Christian princes of

the West was better worth respecting than his oath to the miscreant.

According to more than one author, he maintained the proposition that

no faith need be kept with infidels.[142] Finally, the cardinal called

down upon his own head all punishment due to the sin, if sin there

were, in violating the oath. But in the name of the pope, the vicar of

God on earth, he formally released the king from the obligations to

which he had sworn.[143]

The action of Ladislaus was in reality not merely wicked and immoral,

but ill-advised and hasty. Even in the short interval between the

conclusion of peace and the declaration of war, the French, Italian,

and German volunteers had gone home. John was not ready to aid him.

Phrantzes had been sent to Ladislaus, to the cardinal, and even to

the sultan, to temporise and to prevent an outbreak of war before a

coalition could be formed. Hunyadi very reluctantly gave his consent

to the violation of the truce, and then only on condition that the

declaration of war should be postponed until September 1. George of

Serbia not only refused to violate the engagement into which he had

solemnly entered with Murad but refused to permit Scanderbeg to join

Ladislaus. The whole business was ill-considered and ill-managed, and

the fault lies mainly with the cardinal.

When Murad’s dream of quiet days at Brousa was disturbed by the news

that the treaty solemnly accepted a few weeks earlier had been violated

by the faithless Christians, who in this case are justly characterised

by the Turks as infidels, he at once resumed the duties of a ruler

and prepared to go to the aid of his son, young Mahomet. With the aid

of the Genoese he crossed the Bosporus, probably at the extreme north

end below the Giant’s Mountain, where the entrance into the Black Sea

was, and long continued to be, known, from the number of temples which

had existed there from pre-Christian times, as the Sacred Mouth. The

Italian and Greek fleets near the capital were unable successfully to

resist the passage, the ascent of the Bosporus being almost impossible

for sailing vessels during the continuance of the prevailing north

winds. From thence Murad hastened to meet the army of Ladislaus.[144]

[Sidenote: Battle of Varna, Nov. 11, 1444.]

The place of rendezvous for the Christian armies was Varna. Ladislaus

took the field in the autumn, with only ten thousand fighting men.

He marched along the valley of the Danube, and was joined by Drakul,

prince of Wallachia, with five thousand of his subjects. The total of

the two armies probably never exceeded twenty thousand men.

The Wallachian prince advised prudence and delay. He pointed out that

even a hunting party of the sultan contained as many men as were now

collected to oppose him. Hunyadi, however reluctant he had been to

enter on the campaign, seems to have thought that, once the armies had

started, their only hope of safety lay in expedition and in being able

to obtain a strong position for fighting. The discussion between the

two brave leaders led to a quarrel, in which Drakul drew his sword, but

was immediately overpowered and compelled to purchase safety by the

promise of a further reinforcement of four thousand men.[145] Drakul

then retired, and his place was taken by his son. Many of the towns

and villages passed through on their march were held by Turks, but the

Christian armies, in most cases, easily overcame all opposition, and in

their course plundered the schismatic Bulgarians and their churches as

if they had been enemies.

At Varna the army proposed to rest. Further advance, if desirable, was

difficult, on account of the illness of Ladislaus.[146] Hunyadi took up

a strong position.

Varna is at the head of a bay. On the south side was situated,

at a distance of about four miles from the town, a village named

Galata. Between the two stretched a long line of marsh, which is the

termination of a lagoon, bounded on the south side by a steep range of

hills.[147] Between the end of the marsh and the bay the Christian army

encamped with the hill on its rear. Hardly had it taken up its position

when scouts brought the startling news that Murad’s army was encamped

at a distance of four thousand paces. The night was bright and clear,

and by ascending the hill they could see the fires, and make even an

estimate of the number of their enemies. Their astonishment at the

rapidity with which Murad had advanced added to their alarm. They found

that he was at the head of an army of at least sixty thousand men--a

hundred thousand men are said to have crossed into Europe--while their

own consisted only of eighteen or twenty thousand. Guards were doubled,

and a council at once held, to decide upon what was to be done.

Cardinal Julian’s advice was that they should entrench themselves,

make a barrier around them of their carts, and await attack. Their

machines, or guns, the alarming effect of which had already been seen

at Belgrade, would be of value for their defence. He also urged that

probably a fleet would soon come to their aid. The bishops with the

army, and a few others, agreed with him.

On the other hand, Hunyadi and the leader of the Wallachs declared the

proposal to be absurd. The great Hungarian urged that the enemy was

only to be conquered by daring and dash. Every sign of hesitation,

especially at the beginning of a campaign, was fatal. Suppose the Turks

also chose to play the waiting game, were the Christians ready to stand

a siege? Their only salvation lay in audacity. He characterised what

was said about the coming of a fleet as ridiculous. Ships would be of

no more use in their present position than cavalry at sea. Even if the

sailors landed, what could they do against horsemen?

The advice of the experienced soldier carried the day. The young king,

though he was suffering great bodily pain, supported Hunyadi, and

declared against delay.

Hardly was the council of war over before the scouts announced that the

Turks had settled the question for them and were preparing to attack.

Though the alarm was false, or at least premature, Hunyadi at once made

all arrangements for defence, and strengthened his position. His army

had its back to a hill; on one side was the marsh, and on the other

he placed his baggage and other wagons, so as to make a rampart. He

blocked up the passes through the marsh as well as he could with carts

and chariots. He placed four companies of Wallachians on the left,

where the marshes afforded protection, while the Hungarians formed the

right wing, of which he himself took command. This was the position

of greatest danger, as being least protected. Ladislaus was placed in

the safest place in the centre, surrounded by Hungarians and Poles.

The great black standard of Hungary floated over Hunyadi, while the

flag of St. George marked the place near the king occupied by the

cardinal and the Wallachian chief. A reserve of Wallachs was stationed

to act wherever there was necessity. Murad, however, did not begin his

attack as soon as the Christians expected. He took four days before

he completed his preparations. He came down further into the plain,

and carefully formed his plan of battle. The invincible Janissaries

occupied the centre, with the sultan in their midst. They formed what

may be called a zariba. Around them was a ditch or trench. Behind that

stood the camels, while behind them was a breastwork formed of shields

fixed to the ground immediately in front of the Janissaries surrounding

the sultan. The Anatolian troops, some of whom were armed with

arquebuses, were on the Sultan’s left, and the European or Rumelian

troops on his right. In front of the sultan, hoisted on a long spear,

was placed the violated treaty.

The Turks sent forward six thousand of their cavalry, who occupied the

hill near the Christian army. Their purpose was to examine the ground,

and to take note of the numbers of the enemy, and of their position.

Nevertheless, they discharged showers of arrows against the Christians,

their archers being, as usual, their best troops.[148] When Franco, one

of the standard-bearers of Ladislaus, prevented his men from attacking

them, the Turks, believing that the Christians were overawed by their

superior numbers and dared not leave their entrenchments, came down

into the plain and began the battle. Then Franco let his troops go, and

with such effect that the Turkish cavalry were soon in full retreat.

Murad thereupon brought forward the main body of his army, and the

fight became general. Hunyadi sustained successfully the shock of the

Anatolian division, drove it back and put it to rout. The remainder of

the Christian army in the plain were attacked at the same time, but the

Turkish horsemen were hard pressed, and fled. One of the bishops

who, says Callimachus, was more skilful in ecclesiastical than in

military matters, seeing the Turks retreating, hastened after them

with a band of soldiers, and, arriving at the densely packed host, was

soon floundering in the marsh, and he and his men were of no further

use in the fight. But the Turks were pursuing their usual method of

fighting; ‘for,’ remarked La Brocquière only half a dozen years before

this battle, ‘it is in their flight that they are most formidable,

and it has been almost always then that they have defeated the

Christians.’[149]

Meantime, Hunyadi, who knew their tactics well, on returning from his

fight with the Asiatic division, strictly charged the young king not

to allow the troops around him to move, to remain with them, and to

wait for his return after attacking the European division, or at least

until he knew the issue of the fight, because, if successful, he would

then have to deal with the Janissaries.[150] The Christians of the

left wing and even around the standard of Ladislaus were hard pressed.

The cardinal and Franco, with the son of Drakul, had to fall back to

the barricade of wagons. A fierce struggle took place near and among

the wagons, and the Turks for a while gained ground. Hunyadi hastened

to the aid of the Christians, and his arrival changed for a while the

tide of battle. The Turks retreated from the wagons and were driven

back two thousand paces. Hunyadi and his men were fighting splendidly

and manifestly succeeding. In their attack, Caradja, the leader of the

European division of the Turks, was killed.

At this moment occurred an incident which in all probability influenced

and perhaps altogether changed the fortunes of the day. According to

Chalcondylas, some who were near the king and were jealous of the fame

of Hunyadi persuaded Ladislaus not to leave the glory of the day to

the Hungarian, as if he were the only leader. ‘His would be the sole

renown; ours the ignominy of having remained idle.’ Influenced by

these taunts, the king led his followers into the fight while Hunyadi

was attacking Murad’s right, and made direct for the sultan himself in

the midst of his entrenchments. Hunyadi, who during the day was always

at the point of greatest danger, on galloping back after the retreat of

the Turks before the troops forming the left wing, found that the brave

but too impulsive young king had left his post. Hunyadi immediately

went to his aid. He found that Ladislaus and his followers had broken

through the entrenchments, the line of camels and the shields, and were

among the Janissaries. Struggling desperately, he had laid low many of

the enemy, but had become separated from his own men.

His absence caused many of the Christians to believe that he had been

either captured or killed and, in consequence, many of them began

to give way. The fortune of the day was at this time doubtful. Many

among the Turks and Christians were in flight, neither party being

able to judge how the battle was going. The unconquerable Janissaries,

however, remained firm and resisted the young king’s attack vigorously.

In the crisis of the battle, according to the Turkish annals, Murad

prayed, ‘O Christ, if Thou art God, as Thy followers say, punish their

perfidy.’[151]

Hunyadi was in despair. He saw his men deserting and that his army had

already been greatly reduced in numbers, but he managed to reach the

king. Ladislaus was still fighting when his general drew near, but his

horse fell forward with him, in consequence of a great blow from an

axe. As the king fell, says Callimachus, he was instantly, not merely

pierced, but simply buried beneath the weapons of the Janissaries. His

head was taken to Murad, who had it at once hoisted upon a lance.[152]

The issue of the battle had been at various stages doubtful. Two

divisions of the Turks had been beaten and fled, but both had rallied

and returned. At one moment the sultan himself contemplated flight,

but was stopped by a Turk who cursed him as a coward and prevented him

from leaving the field. Hunyadi attempted to recover the king’s body,

but when he saw one after another of the small number of Wallachs who

were with him struck down, he looked to his own safety and made good

his escape. The battle was lost. He, Julian, Franco, and as many as

could, when darkness came on, retreated across the hills into the great

neighbouring forest.

The fortune of battle had so often changed that it was not until the

following day that the Turks recognised how great was the success they

had gained. The slaughter in the small army of the Christians had been

heavy. Many, too, had perished in the marsh or had been drowned in the

lagoon. Others, among whom was Julian, were afterwards caught in the

forest. The remnant of Huns and Wallachs had the utmost difficulty

in making their way across the Danube. On his way home, Hunyadi was

taken prisoner by his old enemy, Drakul, prince of Wallachia, but was

set free when the Hungarians threatened war, as they immediately did,

unless he was at once released.

The great effort from which the emperor and the West had hoped so much

had proved futile. The fleets had been powerless. The struggle was

over before aid was received from the emperor or the Western princes.

The remark of a careful traveller is justified, that the bad faith

of the Christians did much to intensify among the Moslems dislike

and distrust, and led to reprisals commonly justified by the Turkish

teaching that ‘no faith is to be kept with infidels.’[153]

The part which the emperor John played, if he took any, in this

campaign, is doubtful. Chalcondylas states that he had declared war

against the sultan, but he is the only contemporary who makes this

assertion. Probably he was ready, though unable, to aid the Western

ships in preventing Murad from crossing the Bosporus.

Murad had inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Christians, was weary of

fighting, and readily promised the emperor that, if he abandoned all

concerted action with the Western powers, he should not be attacked.

He once more abdicated the throne in favour of his son Mahomet, and

withdrew to his beautiful gardens and palace at Magnesia, hoping once

more for peace in retirement.[154]

The same year--always 1444--he was forced by the Janissaries, who

were already beginning to claim a share in the government, and who

had marked their discontent by burning a large part of Adrianople, to

resume the guidance of the state.

After reducing them to complete submission, he turned his attention to

Greece, which on the death of the previous emperor had been divided

between three of his seven sons.

Constantine, brother of John, and afterwards the last emperor, had

shown energy in the Morea. He was in possession of a large part of the

Peloponnesus, and had chased the Turks out of Boeotia, Pindus, and part

of Thessaly. This weakening of their hold compelled Murad to bestir

himself. In November, 1446, he started for Greece at the head of an

army of sixty thousand men. Constantine sent an ambassador, the

historian Chalcondylas, to propose terms, which were, however,

rejected. Murad then advanced and attacked Constantine, who held a

strong position behind the famous rampart of the Hexamilion, extending

across the Isthmus of Corinth. Murad carried it by assault, and killed

all the garrison. His principal general then ravaged the Morea, and

carried off sixty thousand Christians into slavery. Patras was captured

and burnt, and Constantine, who had fought well but whose army was

much smaller than the Turkish, had to pay tribute and surrender all

territory that he had conquered from the Turks beyond the Isthmus of

Corinth. He was still, however, able to retain possession of a large

part of the Morea.

[Sidenote: Iskender Bey and the Albanians.]

After the campaign in Greece, Murad marched northwards to attack the

Albanians, and endeavoured to capture Kroya,[155] the capital of the

country. But it was held by the Albanian leader, George Castriotes,

whom we have already met under the name of Iskender (or Alexander) Bey,

a man who was a military genius, and who in some respects recalls the

adventures and characteristics of Garibaldi. But he was unscrupulous

as well as energetic. Devoting himself like a new Hannibal to the

salvation of his country, he held and continued to hold absolute, but

willingly rendered, sway during twenty-five years over the Albanian

mountaineers. Christian by birth, but given over with his brothers to

the Turks as hostages, and forcibly converted to Mahometanism, he had

become a favourite of Murad for his handsome appearance, his strength

of body, and his courage. He had gained power over his countrymen in

the first instance by a ruse as bold as it was relentless. Scimitar

in hand, he offered as an alternative to the reis-effendi, or

commander-in-chief, either immediate death or the affixing of his

signature and seal to a document ordering the governor of Kroya to hand

over to him the fortress and the adjacent country. Having obtained the

document in due form, he then killed the reis-effendi. At this time

Iskender Bey was only nineteen years old. Gathering a small band of

Albanians about him, he hastened across the peninsula and obtained

possession of Kroya by a stratagem even more desperate and dangerous

than that by which he had obtained the order for his appointment

as Turkish governor. Leaving his followers outside the city and in

hiding, he presented his credentials and obtained the keys of the

fortress. During the night, he personally admitted his followers, and

the Turkish garrison were murdered while they slept. Then he rapidly

made his preparations for defence against the attack of Murad which he

knew would follow. It is sufficient for our purpose to say that he was

successful, and that at the approach of the winter of 1447–8, Murad’s

attempt to recapture Kroya entirely failed, and the great sultan

withdrew to Adrianople.

Meantime the Christians north of the Danube were preparing to make a

greater effort than ever to strike at the power of the sultan. The new

pope, Nicholas the Fifth, urged the duty of aiding the Hungarians and

the Poles as vigorously as his predecessor. But his appeals to other

states were of little avail. Hunyadi, notwithstanding the defeat at

Varna, was named lieutenant-general of the kingdom almost immediately

on his return, and at once set himself to reconstruct an army. In less

than four years he possessed the best-disciplined host which Hungary

had yet seen. But it was far too small for the purpose on hand. Among

its twenty-four thousand men were two thousand German arquebusers and

eight thousand Wallachians. With this force Hunyadi crossed the Danube

near Turn-severin and invaded Serbia, because its ruler, whose sister

was married to the sultan, refused to break the engagement with Murad.

When the sultan, who was preparing for another attempt to defeat

Iskender Bey and the Albanians, heard that George of Serbia was on

the point of being attacked, he at once made all haste to go to his

assistance. Hunyadi encamped near Cossovo, on the same Plain of

Blackbirds where, in 1389, Murad the First had been assassinated after

his victory. The Turkish army, probably numbering a hundred and fifty

thousand men,[156] occupied three days in crossing the Sitnitza, a

small river which runs through the plain into the Vardar. Hunyadi, for

some reason which is not evident, left his entrenchment and crossed the

stream, apparently with no other object than of forcing on the fight.

Why he should have done so, since he was hourly expecting the arrival

of a detachment of Albanians under Iskender Bey, it is impossible to

understand.

[Sidenote: Second battle of Cossovo-pol, 1448.]

The battle commenced on October 18, 1448. The Turks were drawn up in

the same order as at Varna, the Janissaries in the centre surrounded by

a trench, behind which were ranged the camels, and behind them again a

belt of shields or bucklers fixed in the ground. To the right of the

Janissaries was the European, and to the left the Asiatic, division of

Murad’s army. On the other side, the centre of the Christian army was

occupied by the German and Bohemian arquebusers and some of the best

troops of Transylvania. The right wing was formed of Hungarians with a

few Sicilian auxiliaries, while the Wallachs were on the left.

The first day’s fight was not general. But at noon on the second, the

whole lines on both sides were engaged, and continued till sunset,

when, in spite of the superiority in numbers on the Turkish side,

no advantage had been gained. Hunyadi, indeed, believed that during

the night his enemy intended to break up his camp and commence a

retreat. For this reason, he determined upon a night attack--one of the

measures, as General Skobeleff testified after fighting in Central Asia

under somewhat similar circumstances, in which the best-disciplined

army almost necessarily wins. All the valour of the Hungarian army

was powerless to break through the line of the Janissaries, and the

attack consequently failed. On the morning of the third day, the fight

was again renewed, and victory appeared doubtful. But the Wallachs

turned traitors, and in the midst of the fight, their leader having

obtained terms from Murad, passed over to the Turkish side. The army

of Hunyadi was now attacked in front and rear, but contrived to reach

its entrenchments. Judging that its condition was hopeless, Hunyadi

made his escape in the evening, leaving the Germans and Bohemians

to hold the central position of his encampment. This they did with

magnificent courage, but the battle was already lost. Out of the army

of twenty-four thousand, seventeen thousand men, including the flower

of the Hungarian nobility, are said to have been left dead on the

field.[157] But the victory had been dearly bought by Murad. During the

three days’ fight, forty thousand Turks had fallen.[158]

The Christians had lost the battle through the rash courage and

confidence of their leader. Hunyadi had refused to wait for Iskender

Bey and his Albanians, had abandoned a strong position in order to

attack an enemy largely superior in numbers, and his desertion of the

best of his auxiliaries is inexplicable or unjustifiable. The defeat at

Cossovo-pol, following that at Varna, made men forget for a time the

series of brilliant victories which the great Hungarian had gained over

the Turks in Transylvania and elsewhere. But in the glorious defence of

Belgrade against Mahomet after the capture of Constantinople, Hunyadi

recovered greater reputation than ever, and the West recognised in that

city the first bulwark of Christendom, and in its defender the greatest

soldier of the age.[159]

The effect in Hungary and Constantinople of these victories of Murad

was appalling. The sultan and his successors for many years had nothing

to fear from the enemy north of the Danube.

[Sidenote: Reasons for failure of Western attempts against Turks.]

The great combined efforts of the West to break the Ottoman power and,

incidentally, to save Constantinople had failed disastrously. Nor are

the reasons for such failure difficult to understand. They are mainly

two: underestimating the power of the enemy, and dividing their own

forces. First and above all, neither the pope nor the statesmen of

Europe had realised the enormous number of fighting men which the Turk

could bring into the field. They knew that the empire of Constantinople

had been dismembered by Turkish armies, but they attributed this loss

to secondary causes, and do not appear to have realised that Turkish

armies beaten again and again constantly reappeared. The empire’s loss,

in their opinion, was due to the incapacity of some of its emperors, to

civil war, to the pressure of Serbia and Bulgaria, and to the judgment

of Heaven upon the Greeks for having refused to come within the one

Christian fold, and to acknowledge the one shepherd. The Turks were

the instruments of divine justice to punish schismatics, but, having

done their work against the empire, they would, now that they ventured

to attack Catholic states, no longer be permitted to make further

encroachments.

The failure of the men of the West was largely due to the fact that

they despised the common enemy. They were under the curious delusion

that the Turk was not a fighting man; that, though he had been

successful in beating Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians, he was no warrior,

and that he had thus far succeeded because he had never encountered

European soldiers. This delusion lasted for at least two centuries

after the capture of the city. Almost every Western writer who visited

Constantinople spoke of the defeat of the Turks as a task well within

the power of a European state. That such a blunder influenced the men

of the West before the capture of the city, may be illustrated by the

statement of two contemporaries. In an oration by Aeneas Sylvius, who

afterwards became Pope Pius the Second, delivered at Rome in 1452,

before Pope Nicholas, King Ladislaus, and a number of cardinals,

the orator appealed to the knowledge of his audience to recognise

that the Turks were ‘unwarlike, weak, effeminate, neither martial in

spirit nor in counsel; what they have taken may be recovered without

difficulty.’[160] A like testimony is given by La Brocquière in 1438,

but with much more caution, since he had been through Asia Minor and

had seen the Turks. Nevertheless, this Western traveller states that,

though he would not depreciate them, he is ‘convinced that it would

be no difficult matter for troops well mounted and well led to defeat

them,’ and, in regard to himself, he adds, ‘I declare that with one

half of their numbers I should never hesitate to attack them.’[161] He

fully realised, as he explains again and again, that their victories

had been gained by their enormous superiority in numbers, but though

he was very far from despising them as soldiers, he regards them

individually as greatly inferior to the soldiers of Western states. His

estimate of the inferiority of the Turk was shared by his countrymen

and Western statesmen generally,[162] but they did not recognise to the

same extent as he did how great and ever increasing was the host which

had to be fought. Nor did they recognise, as did he, the wonderful

mobility of the Turkish army. It was the same error of forgetting

their mobility which brought disaster upon Hunyadi at Varna and at

Cossovo-pol.

While the first mistake was in underrating the might of the enemy in

regard to numbers, warlike spirit, and mobility, the Western powers

blundered also in dividing their forces. The sermon before the pope

already referred to, on New Year’s Day 1452, called for international

concerted action to defend Constantinople, Cyprus, and Rhodes. The

mistake was in trying to do too much. On many occasions, as we have

seen, the forces sent against the Turk were divided, and an army which

might have been sufficiently strong to strike an effective blow against

one of the Turkish divisions was defeated in detail when split into two

or three, to be sent against Saracens, or to the aid of the military

knights, as well as against the Turks.

The one chance of safety for Constantinople now lay in the inhabitants

themselves, with such forces as, at the instigation of the pope,

should be sent to the aid of the emperor. But to add to the chagrin

and difficulties of the aged John at seeing the Christian armies

defeated, he had once more formally to promise the sultan that he

would not assist any of the enterprises set on foot from the West.

Nor did the influence of the disasters upon the emperor and people of

Constantinople stop here. A formidable party in the city, headed by the

bishop of Ephesus, which was opposed to the Union, and which strongly

resented the proceedings at the Council of Florence, was greatly

strengthened. Its members pointed to the victories of Murad, and asked,

with scorn, what had been gained by the abandonment of their faith.

They knew that they had the support of Murad in their opposition to

the Unionists, and the fact that they were not forcibly suppressed by

the Court party during the reign of John’s successor can probably be

best accounted for on the ground that any strong steps taken against

their members would be represented to the sultan as a violation of the

engagement to have no further intrigues with the West.

[Sidenote: Death of John, October 1448.]

The disaster of Cossovo-pol hastened the death of John, which took

place on the last day of October 1448, within a few days after he had

heard the news.[163]

[Sidenote: Of Murad, February 1451.]

In February 1451, his great contemporary, Murad, died at Adrianople. He

had been a successful warrior, and, with the exception of his failure

to capture Belgrade, had succeeded in most of his enterprises. Gibbon

is perhaps justified in speaking of him as a philosopher in matters

of religion, but he was relentless in imposing his creed. Cantemir,

his eulogist, relates that in Epirus he converted all the churches

into mosques, and ordered every male Epirot, under penalty of death,

to be forcibly made a Mahometan. He deserves the praises of Turkish

writers. Chalcondylas and Ducas recognise in him certain good traits of

character. The first says that he was a just and equitable man, and

Ducas gives him credit not undeserved for having scrupulously respected

the treaties which he made with Mahometans or Christians. His son

Mahomet, who now becomes the second sultan of that name in the Ottoman

dynasty, was at Magnesia when he heard the news of his father’s death.