had two 9-pounders and four smaller pieces.
17.26. Only six shells were captured with the howitzer at San
Pascual, and owing to its construction the gun could use no other
ammunition. Flores reported that he had also a 6-pounder, a 3-pounder,
and a 2-pounder (=76=Mar. 31).
17.27. _The insurrection in the south._ =330=Taylor to brother,
Jan. 19, 1848. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 266-8. Hist. Soc. So. Calif., iii,
pt. 1, pp. 47-54; ix, p. 19. =237=Kearny to Stockton, [Jan.
13, 1847]. =47=Flores, procl., Oct., 1846. =47=_Id._ to
Stockton, Jan. 1, 1847. =47=Stockton to Bancroft, Nov. 23, 1845;
Jan. 11, 15; Feb. 4, 5, 1846. =51=Queen to Henderson, Apr. 30,
1848. =61=R. B. Mason, Oct. 7, 1847. =61=Emory, Feb. 2,
1847. =373=Evans, narrative. =376=Nicholson, recolls. Kell,
Recolls., 29, 80. =12=Admty. records, class 1, 5577, enclosure in
Y 93. Apuntes, 355-61. =247=Gillespie to Larkin, Nov. 29, 1846.
=247=Larkin to wife, Dec. 14, 1846. =115=Belden, statement.
=3=Alvarado, Calif., v, 220, 240, 267-8. =126=Botello, Anales,
140, 158-61. Colton, Three Years, 64, 74, 78, 82, 95, 98, 123, 131,
169-70, 201. _Proceeds. U. S. Naval Instit._, 1888, pp. 139, 539-49.
Phelps, Fore and Aft, 311, 316-19. Parker, Recolls., 50. Richman,
Calif., 317. =334=Torres, Peripecias, 49. =103=Avila, notas.
=258=Marshall, recolls. Upham, Frémont, 258. Morrell, Four Voyages,
201. =171=Journal of the _Cyane_. Wash. _Union_, Apr. 23; May 7;
July 24, 1847. N. Y. _Journ. Commerce_, Apr. 2, 1847. _Diario_, Dec.
1, 1846; Jan. 24, 1847. Sherman, Home Letters, 100. Schafer, Pacific
Slope, 266. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 47-323. Ho. 70; 30, 1, p. 45. Sen. 1;
30, 1, pp. 516-7. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1045-54, 1065-70. McGroarty, Calif.,
246-52. Bandini, Calif., 143, 146. Revere, Tour, 164-6. Sen. 7; 30, 1
(Emory). Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 49-52. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 15-20,
22-4, 30-6 (Stockton). =207=Griffin, diary. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31,
1. =172=_Cyane_ log book. =263=Mervine to Stockton, Oct. 25
(2). _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 608 (Benton). Porter, Kearny, 7-9, 25-9.
Life of Stockton, 129-48 and appendices. Cutts, Conquest, 156, 197, 203,
207. Bryant, What I Saw, 330. Royce, Calif., 185-94. =47=Stockton
to Bancroft, July 25, 1846. =52=Larkin, no. 63, Jan. 14, 1847.
And from =76= the following. Flores, Sept. 30; Oct. 7, 9, 24,
25, 1846; undated; Jan. 2; Mar. 31 (2), 1847. Carrillo, Oct. 8, 1846.
Gillespie to Flores, Oct. 2 (2), 3 (2), 4. Flores to Gillespie, Oct.
4 (2). Flores-Gillespie, terms of capitulation, Sept. 29. Carrillo to
Flores, Oct. 9. To Flores, Feb. 6, 1847. Bustamante, Mar. 8, 13, 1847.
Moreno to Bust., Mar. 20, 1847. Stockton, procl., Jan. 5, 1847. Flores
to Stockton, Jan. 1, 1847. And others of minor importance. Jan. 9 some
Mexicans charged our front.
17.28. Frémont's methods were unscrupulous. He promised the men
large pay, and took horses, saddles, etc., where he could get them (Sen.
Report 75; 30, 1, particularly Wilson, p. 42). Probably he intended to
pacify the owners later by paying liberally. Apparently one must accept
the explanation of his policy proposed in the text, or ascribe to him a
tenderness not suggested by his choice of a profession and his conduct
in June, or accuse him--as did many at the time--of a cowardice that
would explain, after all, only a part of the facts.
17.29. It is particularly singular that Frémont did not use the
_Savannah_ to communicate with Stockton.
17.30. The reports of Flores show that Frémont's approach
embarrassed the insurgents. Frémont now had six guns. January 10 Kearny
wrote a note to Frémont stating that the Americans were entering Los
Angeles.
17.31. For later events see chap. xxxi. Disturbances, resulting
partly from the insurrection in the south and partly from depredations
committed by Americans, occurred in the north. Monterey was threatened,
and some fighting occurred near San Francisco Bay; but those who had
taken up arms to protect their property gladly laid them down (about
the time Stockton entered Los Angeles) when satisfied there would be
no more plundering, and the treaty of Cahuenga quieted those still
acting in sympathy with Flores. (See particularly Colton, Three Years,
73-6, 86, 152, 155, 158, 170; Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 378-383;
=10=Aram, statement; =4=Amador, memorias, 175; Aldrich, Marine
Corps, 95.) During these troubles Larkin was made a prisoner, and but
for the fear of reprisals might have suffered severely for what the
Californians regarded as double-dealing. Just before leaving California
Flores released him. (See particularly =52=Larkin, no. 63, January
14, 1847; Bryant, What I Saw, 361; =263=Mervine to Frémont, Nov.
21.)
17.32. _Frémont's operations._ =316=Fulsom to Sherman, Jan.
9, 1848. =47=Stockton to Bancroft, Nov. 23, 1846; Jan. 11, 15,
1847. Colton, Three Years, 98. =47=Frémont, orders, Jan. 12, 1847.
=122=Bidwell, Calif., 203. =258=Marshall, recolls. Bryant,
What I Saw, 365-94. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 6, 73-7, 119-21, 131, 184,
194, 260, 377-9, 405. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1045, 1052, 1067-9. Revere,
Tour, 78. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 40-2 (Wilson), 50 (Russell). Sen.
31; 30, 2, pp. 18, 21-2. Tuthill, Calif., 222. Porter, Kearny, 29.
Life of Stockton, 148-9. Royce, Calif., 194. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory).
=76=Flores, Mar. 31, 1847 (2). =76=Moreno to Bustamante, Mar.
20, 1847. Cutts, Conquest, 156-64. Sherman, Home Letters, 113.
XVIII. THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS
18.1. As early as August 16 Pillow wrote to his wife that Taylor
thought it would be necessary to attack the city of Mexico by way of
Vera Cruz.
18.2. The fortress of San Juan de Ulúa stood on a reef about
three-quarters of a mile from the strong fort which guarded the north
end of Vera Cruz at the water line. U. S. Consul Campbell of Havana
informed Conner before June 10, 1846, that the defences of Ulúa on the
side facing the city were partially undermined and poorly armed, and
that, as all the Mexican preparations had been founded on the belief
that future assailants would adopt the French plan of attack, he could
place his vessels on that side at night with little or no injury, and
easily take the fortress by escalade; but Conner does not appear to have
endorsed this opinion. An American named Jobson, who resided at Vera
Cruz, wrote to the war department, Feb. 14, 1847, that nobody except
the Americans was afraid of Ulúa; that in September, 1846, it had been
garrisoned by only 180 men, who, being neither paid nor fed, ran up
the American flag on the night of Sept. 17; and that Conner might have
passed in by the south channel, put 500 men ashore, and captured the
fortress in half an hour. See chap. xxx, note 20.
18.3. These regiments were to come from Mass., New York, Penn.,
Va., No. and So. Carolina, Miss., La. and Texas (mounted men)--one from
each; and in December a second regiment was invited from Penn. There
was considerable hesitation about calling on Massachusetts, but it was
concluded that should she fail to supply her quota, the country would
take note of her attitude. Marcy issued the calls on Nov. 16 (Nov. 27
Florida was asked for a company), and the abruptness of the change
wrought by Benton is shown by the fact that only five days earlier Marcy
had stated that the volunteers then in service were "deemed sufficient
for the prosecution of the war" (Wash. _Union_, May 28, 1847). The field
and staff officers were to be a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major,
an adjutant (a lieutenant from one of the companies), a sergeant major,
a quartermaster sergeant and two principal musicians. Each of the ten
companies of a regiment was to have a captain, a lieutenant, two second
lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians and eighty
privates, but a company including sixty-four effective privates was to
be accepted. These privates were to be in physical vigor and apparently
18-45 (inclusive) years of age. The field and company officers were to
be men appointed and commissioned under the laws of their state. The
rendezvous of the infantry were to be Boston, New York, Pittsburgh,
Guiandotte (Va.), Wilmington, Charleston, Vicksburg, New Orleans. Most
of the regiments were made up rather slowly, and there was so much
difficulty in Virginia that her recruiting officers went into Maryland.
This difficulty appears to have been due to a lack of enthusiasm for
the war (first part of chap. xxxiv). The supposedly brilliant victory
at Monterey had exercised a favorable influence, but the obligation to
serve the war out had a contrary effect, and the terms of the law, which
required the independent action of the state governments, caused delay
in some instances. The First Pennsylvania reached New Orleans Dec. 29
and 30, and at that time the Mississippi regiment was expected to arrive
there by Jan. 10. The South Carolina regiment was ready on Dec. 22.
Special efforts were made at the same time to bring the regular army up
to 15,000 men. The authorized maximum was at this time 16,998 (including
780 commissioned officers), but in spite of energetic recruiting only
10,381 were actually serving in the two regiments of dragoons, one of
Mounted Riflemen, four of "artillery," eight of infantry, and a co.
of engineer soldiers (Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 62-3). Nov. 3 the recruiting
officers were authorized to pay a citizen, non-commissioned officer,
or soldier $2.00 for each accepted man brought to the rendezvous
(=65=gen. orders 48). The minimum height was reduced to five feet
and three inches (=65=gen. orders 51). Men desiring to enlist had
probably felt more drawn to the briefer volunteer service, and had
waited for a second call. Besides, the widows and orphans of volunteers
(but not of regulars) were to be pensioned, and the prevailing high
wages for labor deterred many from wishing to enlist. The lack of
officers in the regular army still continued serious. On July 30, 1846,
less than one third of the regimental field officers were available. The
regiments in Mexico did not average one field officer apiece.
According to the report of the adjutant general dated Dec. 5, 1846,
Taylor had (including the garrison at Tampico and troops en route,
but subject to some deductions) 7406 regulars and 10,926 volunteers,
besides 621 and 2039 respectively under Wool. Adding to these 446 and
3546 respectively under Kearny, and the New York regiment en route
to California, one finds that the land forces amounted to 25,750 men
before the November calls were issued; but subtractions of an unknown
magnitude needed to be made from these figures so far as availability
was concerned. These and further details may be found in Sen. 1; 29, 2.
See also the following. =62=Marcy to govs., Nov. 16. Sen. 1; 29, 2,
p. 46 (Marcy, report). =61=Bowman to Jones, Dec. 4; to Polk, Dec.
29. =61=Brooke to Jones, Dec. 29. Wash. _Union_, Nov. 30, 1846;
May 28, 1847. =61=Jones to Scott, Dec. 17. Polk, Diary, Nov. 7,
10, 14-16. =62=Marcy to gov. Fla., Dec. 27. =63=Marcy to gov.
Mass., Nov. 16; to gov. Tex., Nov. 20; to gov. Iowa, Nov. 25. _Niles_,
Nov. 21, 1846, p. 179; Jan. 16, 1847, p. 308. =29=Brown to Marcy,
Oct. 6. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 62. =13=Pakenham, no. 132, Nov. 23.
_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 428 (Cabell). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 478 (Freeman),
873 (Marcy). West Va. dept. arch. and hist., report, 1910, p. 186.
18.4. _Genesis of the Vera Cruz expedition._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45
(Marcy, report). =52=Black, Oct. 29. Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 63.
=13=Pakenham, nos. 119, 130, 132, 140, 150. =228=G. Flagg to
A. Flagg, Dec. 17. _Picayune_, Apr. 30; Oct. 5; Dec. 11, 1846; Feb. 2,
1847 (Taylor to Gaines). (Calhoun) _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 323.
Polk, Diary, July 2; Aug. 29; Oct. 10, 17-22; Nov. 7-17; Dec. 1, 2,
1846; Jan. 2, 1847. Meigs, Benton, 361. =108=Bancroft to Polk, Dec.
3. Benton; View, ii, 693-4. =108=Buchanan to Bancroft, priv., Dec.
29. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 273. =335=Letter from P. F. Smith (with
Trist's letter to Buchanan, Sept. 28, 1847, private). Wash. _Union_,
Sept. 29; Oct. 2. _Niles_, Mar. 13, 1847, p. 20. =206=James Graham
to Gov. Graham, Jan. 10, 1847. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Nov. 1.
Scott, Mems., ii, 404. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, 134. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
333, 355, 363, 1231 (Marcy); 1268-1270, 1273-4 (Scott); 351 (Taylor).
=297=Benton, memo., July 4. =297=Mackenzie to Buchanan, July
7. =47=Conner, June 11; July 22; Oct. 4. Meade, Letters, i, 148.
=52=Campbell, June 9. Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 155. =58=Jobson,
Feb. 14, 1847. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 170. Bancroft to Conner, May 30.
Conner, Castle of Ulloa. =256=Totten to Marcy, Nov. 23, 1847.
=180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 16. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept.
1. =13=Doyle, no. 79, 1843. =69=P. F. Smith, memoir, Oct. 14.
=354=Welles papers. =152=Mason to Conner, Nov. 29, priv. and
confid. _Journal des Débats_, Nov. 4. Boston _Atlas_, Dec. 17. Buchanan,
Works, viii, 365. Diccionario Universal (_Ulúa_). _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2,
app., 191. (Ulúa) See chaps. xxii, p. 21, xxx.
18.5. It is believed that the preceding text and notes afford ample
support for this sentence. Note 27 contains additional references;
and see Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 361-2. Taylor seems never to have
perceived that Polk could have superseded him with a Democrat by
merely sending Jesup or Wool to the army with reinforcements before
brevetting him major general and ordering him to serve with his
brevet rank. Nov. 10 Polk asserted in his diary that he had known no
politics with reference to Taylor. The diary shows that he was aware
how Taylor felt about him. This was not at all surprising. Pillow's
letters indicate plainly that he understood the matter and he was in
confidential correspondence with the President. Pillow wrote to his
wife that Taylor systematically proscribed Polk's friends, and this may
offset some of Taylor's assertions that he himself was persecuted by the
administration.
18.6. Dec. 10 (Bixby) Taylor wrote to his son-in-law that he would
not say he would refuse to serve, if elected President. This meant
of course that he was a candidate. His formal announcement came the
following month.
18.7. It is probable that the administration knew how Taylor felt
about the Vera Cruz expedition, for he was outspoken, and Polk had more
than one correspondent in his camp.
18.8. Scott, like nearly all the Whigs, disapproved of a war
made by a Democratic administration for (as the Whigs generally
alleged) party reasons, but was ready to do his duty as a soldier
(=13=Pakenham, separate and confidential, Sept. 28).
18.9. _The selection of the commander._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
363, 367, 369, 373 (Marcy); 372, 1268-70 (Scott); 383 (Bliss); 384
(Patterson). =169=Scott to Taylor, Sept. 26 ("I never, for a
moment, ceased to watch over your fame and interests with the liveliest
solicitude"). Polk, Diary, Sept. 5, 15; Oct. 22; Nov. 10, 14, 17-19,
21, 1846; May 6, 1847; Jan. 4, 1848. Scott, Mems., ii, 386, 399.
London _Times_, June 30, 1847. =132=Slidell to Buchanan, Nov. 5.
=169=Scott to Crittenden, Sept. 17. =169=Taylor to Crittenden,
Jan. 26; Mar. 25, 1847. =354=Welles papers. Note particularly
Taylor's political exchanges with. =169=Crittenden and Wood (Bixby
coll.) during the summer and autumn. =180=Pillow to wife, Oct.
27; Dec. 8. =330=Taylor to brother, Dec. 12, 1846; Jan. 19, 1848.
_Id._, Letters (Bixby), June 3; Aug. 23; Nov. 26; Dec. 10, 13, 1846;
Jan. 26; Feb. 9; May 9; Aug. 29, 1847. =345=Blair to Van Buren,
July 7. Coleman, Crittenden, i, 243-4. =169=Scott to Marcy, Sept.
12. =62=Marcy to Scott, Sept. 14. =256=_Id._ to Wetmore, June
28. Watson, In Memoriam, 115. Grant, Mems., i, 120. Meade, Letters, i,
175. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Aug. 29. Garrison, Extension, 242. Bancroft,
Pacific States, viii, 375. _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, xiv, 564. Slidell to
Buchanan, Nov. 5, 1846, private: "The fate of the Administration depends
on the successful conduct of the war" (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 601).
18.10. Scott's figures were slightly below the adjutant general's.
Possibly the latter used returns of later dates. Taylor did not have
so many available troops, and accused Scott of stating what he knew or
should have known to be false (Bixby coll., 181); but if the adjutant
general was incorrectly informed as to the strength of the forces, the
fault was Taylor's. See note 3.
18.11. Scott was severely criticised by Marcy (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
1239) and others for ordering so many boats, guns and shells, and it was
triumphantly proclaimed that, as the result proved, he did not need so
large an outfit. But this argument was not sound. He had to reckon on a
failure to produce and deliver at the point of shipment in season all
that he specified, on a heavy loss through wreckage and other accidents,
on the probability that his landing would be opposed, and on the
expected necessity of reducing Ulúa; nor did he know that naval guns (to
which he actually was compelled to have recourse) would be available.
It has been said, too, that the army could have landed in the boats of
the blockading squadron, but Scott found on inquiry that only about 500
could go ashore in them at a single trip (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1274). Scott
on the other hand was unreasonably bitter in charging the war department
with negligence. More could have been done by the government, and
errors were committed, but shortcomings and mistakes were inevitable.
Marcy's reply to Scott's charges (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1218, 1227) needs
to be scrutinized carefully. Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 14) ridicules
Scott (for asking for a pontoon train) on the ground that every stream
between Vera Cruz and Mexico was fordable. But (1) Scott could not be
sure his operations would be confined to that line; (2) he operated in
fact on the lower Alvarado River, where it was not fordable; (3) had the
national bridge been blown up, pontoons might have been useful there for
wagons and heavy guns. Río del Plan was a small stream, but the enemy
caused the Americans much trouble by destroying the bridge at Plan del
Río. See Ripley, _op. cit._, ii, 165.
18.12. The proof that Scott and the administration intended that
Taylor should not be placed in jeopardy is superabundant: Ho. 60; 30, 1,
pp. 357, 366, 389 (Marcy); 844, 1272, 1276 (Scott). Scott even intended
to give Taylor his personal aid, should the Mexicans attack him in
force; and this was one of his reasons for going to Camargo (_ibid._,
844; =61=Scott to Brooke, Dec. 28).
18.13. As late as Jan. 2, 1847, every member of the Cabinet except
Clifford was opposed to Scott's marching against the city of Mexico,
though Polk favored taking that step should it be necessary in order to
obtain peace (Polk, Diary).
18.14. Taylor alleged bitterly (Bixby, 182) that discourtesy
and injury were done him by the failure to notify him promptly of
the expedition, but Polk's precaution was wise. Some despatches were
intercepted or lost, and soon a most important letter from Scott to
Taylor, marked "confidential" both outside and within, was opened by a
subordinate at Monterey and publicly discussed (Scott, Mems., ii, 402).
See note 15.
18.15. Nov. 25 Marcy wrote guardedly to Taylor with reference to
the new expedition, but the despatch went astray (=62=adj. gen.
to Taylor, May 5, 1847). It is surprising that cipher was not used. It
seems as if a ciphered letter giving the necessary explanations and
ordering Taylor to place the required forces at specified points by
specified dates should have been sent to Taylor in triplicate by trusty
messengers not later than Nov. 30.
18.16. _Scott's operations, etc., up to Dec. 27._ Ho. 60; 30,
1, pp. 373, 838-41, 1218, 1268, 1270, 1273-5 (Scott); 369, 372, 873,
1231 (Marcy); 1253 (Jesup); 1100 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby),
95, 181. Senex, Myth. Wise, Seven Decades, 235. Polk, Diary, Nov.
10, 20, 1846; Jan. 2, 1847. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 727-8. _Journ.
of Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 442. =234=A. Johnson to ----,
Dec. 2. =191=Fairfield to wife, Dec. 13. Scott, Mems., ii, 402.
=256=_Id._ to Marcy, Dec. 27, private. =61=H. L. Scott, Nov.
24. =61=W. Scott, memo., Nov. 29. =62=Jones to Taylor, May 5,
1847. =164=Scott to Conner, Dec. 26 (P. S. Dec. 27). _Picayune_,
Dec. 24. "The Brazos" signified loosely a region comprising Brazos
_Id._, Pt. Isabel, and sometimes the mouth of the Rio Grande.
Scott blamed Marcy for permitting him to spend only four days at
Washington in preparatory work (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1218). Marcy replied
that Scott passed twenty-six days in going from the capital to New
Orleans _via_ New York when he might have reached that place in seven
(_ibid._, 1228). The reply looks effective but does not cover the
ground. Marcy said Scott was not needed at the war department, where the
initial work had to be done; and hence the General did well to fortify
himself for the campaign and gain time for reflection by choosing the
sea route. The voyage took nineteen days instead of twelve on account of
head winds.
While he was at New Orleans a newspaper published there stated that the
expedition (which Scott intimated was bound for San Luis Potosí) would
strike at Vera Cruz, and Polk showed what he meant in promising Scott
his full confidence by charging that he had betrayed the secret (Diary,
Jan. 14; Feb. 27). The secret was out at New Orleans in reality about
two weeks before Scott arrived there, and the newspaper stated later
that its information did not come from any person connected with the
army (_Niles_, Feb. 13, 1847, p. 370). (See =256=Scott to Marcy,
Jan. 27, priv.) Polk also complained--another mark of confidence--that
Scott's vanity was causing him to make "extravagant preparations," as
if Taylor had not shown at Monterey the consequences of failing to
prepare adequately. In fact Scott, instead of insisting upon extravagant
preparations, wrote Dec. 23 that he would move against Vera Cruz if he
could land even 5000 men there early in February (=374=to Conner).
18.17. The new First Division included Harney's (Third) Brigade,
now consisting of Co. C (Bragg's light battery) of the Third Artillery,
companies B, C, D and E of the Second Dragoons, the Second Infantry and
the Third Infantry; and P. F. Smith's (Fourth) Brigade, now consisting
of Co. E (Sherman's light battery) of the Third Artillery, two companies
of the Mounted Riflemen (without horses), the First and the Seventh
Infantry. The rest of the Second Dragoons were to be assigned whenever
they should join. Five companies of the Second Infantry had been for
some weeks at Montemorelos; the rest, like the Second Tennessee, marched
to that point from Camargo. The Fourth Infantry and two companies of the
First Artillery were to occupy the citadel. The Washington and Baltimore
battalion, which had belonged to the First Division, was now attached
to Quitman's brigade. It will be noted that Taylor, who was incorrectly
said to have been exposed with inadequate forces to Mexican attack, now
treated Worth in precisely that way, exposing also Saltillo, which he
himself called "our most important point" in that region (Ho. 60; 30, 1,
p. 381). Taylor overtook Quitman Dec. 16. Nearly 2000 wagons were now
under Taylor's orders, yet pack-mules were used mainly for the train. By
the railroad Victoria is 284 kilometers from Monterey.
18.18. As the Americans had no positive information regarding Santa
Anna's intentions and movements, Worth was blamed for giving a false
alarm. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 304) says S. Anna was unable to
leave S. L. Potosí. Worth really did expect the Mexicans to reach him
considerably sooner than they could have done. Major Gaines with three
companies of Kentucky cavalry, previously ordered to Saltillo, seems to
have arrived there on Dec. 17. Butler was now ordered to take command at
that point.
18.19. In one letter Taylor stated that he received Scott's note
when two days from Monterey, but this must mean "second day." Dec. 20
Scott had written to him from New Orleans, explaining his plans more
fully, but this letter did not reach him until January 16 (Ho. 60; 30,
1, 1101).