satiric weekly, announced: It is proposed that all give, that all lend,
that all rise, that all go to the field; but "few give, few lend, few
get in motion, few take up arms." The states, restored to a measure of
sovereignty by the adoption of the federal system, became conscious of
their powers. Durango would not help, because threatened by the Indians,
and even denounced the Hero of Tampico. Michoacán held aloof because
Ocampo, her brilliant governor, who could voice his opinions in five
languages, hated Santa Anna even more than he did the Americans. The
great state of Jalisco promised much and did little; and Zacatecas,
which Santa Anna had crushed and robbed in 1835 because it dared to
oppose his ambition,[19.5] not only withheld all aid, but attempted
to form a combination of states against him. A multitude of officials
preferred the triumph of a foreign invader to that of a native tyrant,
and their constituents endorsed their course.[19.7]
The decree taking the National Guards from state control had to be
substantially qualified. Members of that organization could not be
impressed. The law pardoning--that is to say, authorizing--desertion
from the regular army was extended for three months. A secret society
called The Red Comet, which sprang up among the military men at San
Luis, took for motto, "Nobody is bound to obey one that has no right
to command," and annoyed the General constantly. Requena, one of
the best qualified officers, who entertained little respect for the
Liberator's professional ability or plans, made so much trouble that he
was sent away; and General Valencia, a member of the Red Comet society,
who had been refused permission to attack the Americans at Victoria
and was believed now to covet Santa Anna's place, openly defied the
commander-in-chief and left the army.[19.7]
[SANTA ANNA'S EMBARRASSMENTS]
Still more serious were financial difficulties, for the Executive did
not supply the promised funds. The reason was obvious. "Our treasury is
as poor in money as it is rich in obligations," explained the minister.
Santa Anna did not spare the government, however. "I do not consider
myself nor should I be considered by the gentlemen who compose the
provisional administration of the Country as a mere General, commanding
a corps of the army, but as the one leader of the Nation, to whom the
direction of its destinies has been entrusted," he wrote; and in this
tone he conducted the financial correspondence--demanding, reproaching,
protesting, threatening; yet the needful remittances did not arrive.
Popular support was equally unfruitful. "Santa Anna lacks three
things--to wit, money, money and money," announced _Don Simplicio_;
"Very well, let us have a public meeting. What is the result? Nothing."
But somehow, through remittances from the capital and the states, forced
loans, arbitrary seizures and the use of his personal credit, the
General worried along, and built up an army of some 25,000 men.[19.6]
Extensive shops were established for the manufacture of clothing and the
repair of arms; and energetic measures were taken to provide muskets,
ammunition and cannon.[19.7]
Santa Anna's operations were not, however, entirely sagacious. As was
usual in Mexican armies, number outweighed quality. Consisting mostly
of impressed men and to a considerable extent of criminals, the troops
were unreliable. They were drilled in no larger bodies than brigades;
many had no practice in firing; and most of them were very imperfectly
disciplined. The artillery did no manoeuvring. There was no school
for officers. Persons of a notoriously bad reputation as soldiers
occupied high posts. Santa Anna showed marked favoritism toward certain
regiments and certain men. Never visiting the drill-ground, he could not
estimate the relative qualities of the various corps, and he was too
much engrossed in politics and personal interests to concentrate his
attention upon the work in hand. All of the generals who tried to do
their duty gave too much time to the details, and studied the plans of
campaign too little. What was hardly less important, Santa Anna, instead
of instructing the troops regarding the national issues at stake,
talked much about the booty to be stripped from the Americans, and in
particular about an alleged blue wagon containing their military chest.
Still, the army took shape, and the General looked hopefully toward
spring.[19.7]
But now came one of those whirls of fortune that always hover about
leaders of dubious antecedents. November 26 an influential newspaper
of the capital, _El Republicano_, copied from the New York _Herald_ a
letter of September 22, written from Mexico City, which stated that
Santa Anna, acting in collusion with the United States, would abandon
the invaded provinces, resist the enemy feebly, satisfy the nation of
its impotence, bring about a peace agreeable to the United States, and
become the dictator of Mexico.[19.8] Already there had been suspicions,
and now they crystallized instantly round this definite accusation. Why
had the Americans allowed the ablest citizen of Mexico to pass through
their fleet? Why had Tampico and Saltillo been evacuated? Why had not
the passes of the Sierra Madre been fortified? And why had Valencia been
forbidden to attack the enemy at Victoria? The government denounced
the story as a scheme to create discord and break down the national
champion. Santa Anna does not need to become a traitor in order to be
the first Mexican, it was said. Had he made such a bargain, the United
States would have kept it secret in order that he might be able to do
his work. Has he not shed his blood for the country? Has he not recently
declined the supreme power? The defence was plausible, but the facts
looked more than plausible.[19.10]
And the situation had other aspects, too. As Governor Olaguíbel of
México state informed Santa Anna, more things were said against him than
even a long letter could specify. San Luis was described as changing
under his influence into a new Capua, where he was wasting the funds of
the country on his vices--not only gambling, but inducing the officers
to gamble with him. His political attitude was viewed with distrust,
and familiar signs indicating an intention to overthrow the government
were believed to be discernible. Even the correspondent of the London
_Times_ described his policy as "dark and tortuous," and the British
minister deemed it an "enigma." Many said his troops were more dangerous
to Mexico than to the United States. The wide extent of his military
jurisdiction was described in the press as alarming. By January each day
brought fresh rumors of an approaching dictatorship. Olaguíbel's letter
spoke the word frankly. Then came news that the troops at Mazatlán had
pronounced for it, and Santa Anna's repudiation of their course only
convinced the public that he preferred to wait for a time.[19.10]
The military phase of the situation gave equal offence. "Where now,"
it was demanded, "are those great generals of ours, who--covered with
ribbons and crosses from the crown of the head to the sole of the
foot--insulted with their luxuriant splendor the misery of the people?"
"Predictions for 1847," announced _Don Simplicio_: "The officers of
our army will be divided into fugacious and permanent;" and the same
journalistic scorpion asked why the commander-in-chief did not, while
calling for money, "eliminate the superfluous, useless, burdensome,
incapable and cowardly." At the beginning of December Salas had promised
with a flourish that Santa Anna would "very soon" meet the odious
Yankee, and before long the people were inquiring why he did not. "We
are invaded, time presses, and what has Santa Anna done?" demanded a
pamphleteer; "Ah, the silly fellow is waiting for the Americans to
come and hunt him up." At the General's demand, three newspapers were
established to defend him; but the scorpion disposed of them all with
one sting: "Napoleon answered his detractors with victories."[19.10]
[SANTA ANA FORCED TO MOVE]
Under these attacks the army shivered with rage and mortification
from top to bottom. The soldiers deserted in astonishing numbers.
The officers and their infuriated commander felt they must either do
something or sink to perdition in a burning lake of distrust, hatred and
contempt; and therefore Santa Anna decided precipitately to hurl himself
against the Americans.[19.9] Scott's intercepted letter of January
3, which probably found its way to the Mexican headquarters, showed
how Taylor's army had been depleted, and Taylor's volunteers, it was
believed by Santa Anna, would hardly resist a single onslaught; while
their inferiority in numbers, their distance from heavy reinforcements,
their scattered condition, and their isolation in the midst of a hostile
people were other factors offsetting the great difficulty of crossing
deserts to reach them.[19.10]
January 23 Santa Anna ordered the mint of San Luis to work night and
day on ninety-eight bars of silver forcibly appropriated by him. A few
days later, after issuing a manifesto in self-defence, he addressed
the army in eloquent language, pointing out the hardships, the plunder
and the glory that awaited it. On the twenty-eighth, to the plaintive
strains of a popular air called the _Adios_, the troops began to leave
the dust-brown city. The rear guard set out three days later; and on
February 2 headquarters moved.[19.11] Only useless remnants of the
army stayed behind; but on the other hand a great number of adventurers
of both sexes, drawn forward by various motives but especially by the
prospect of booty, accompanied the march.[19.15]
[SANTA ANNA'S MARCH NORTH]
For about thirty miles the route lay through a cultivated region; but
after it bade farewell to the heavy old Spanish church that crowned the
hill of Las Bocas, the country became sterile, and between mountains
now lumpy, now conical, usually rich in silver and always poor in
vegetation, each division rolled on in a billowy cloud of dust, at
one time chilled with icy blasts, and at another melting under an
insupportable sun; cheered only by the prickly cactus, the crooked
mesquite and an occasional group of dwarfish palms. Reckless from
fatigue and unaccustomed to such a burden, the soldiers threw away
thousands of sacks containing food.[19.15]
To Matehuala the distance was about 140 miles, and beyond that point lay
a broad flinty desert. Here provisions and good water began to fail;
and many, though well enough supplied with the poor meat and water
that now composed the rations, grew sick and weak.[19.12] Weather of
unusual severity set in. For several days a storm of snow or chilling
rain buffeted the struggling troops; and at night, destitute of all
shelter, they could only huddle and shiver at a few small fires. Many
died from exposure, and a great number, though expressly warned that
death would be the punishment, risked all the chances of deserting. But
the army as a whole pressed forward, and on February 17-21 arrived at
La Encarnación, nearly 200 miles from San Luis.[19.13] Several thousand
men had been lost from death, sickness or desertion on the way. Others
had been detached at various points, and Miñón had now placed himself at
Potosí hacienda behind the mountains on Taylor's left; but on February
19 the figures for the army were 15,142 officers and men[19.14]--in
general the strongest and most determined that had set out--and a
brilliant review, held the next day, showed no lack of confidence and
enthusiasm. A triumph was considered certain.[19.15]
[Illustration: MEXICO TO AGUA NUEVA]
Santa Anna had supposed that a part of the American army occupied La
Vaquería, some eight or ten miles west of Taylor's actual position, and
his intention had been to surprise it; but by February 11 he learned
that all had concentrated at Agua Nueva. He now had the choice of three
routes. One was the direct road to that point; the second would have
taken him _via_ La Hedionda to the rear of Buena Vista; and the third
ran by the way of La Vaquería to the north of Agua Nueva.[19.16] Santa
Anna desired, he said later, to pursue one of the lateral routes, and
place himself between Taylor and Saltillo; but both of these routes were
said to be circuitous, difficult if not impracticable for artillery,
and perhaps inadequately supplied with water and provisions. He decided
therefore to surprise Agua Nueva, believing that should his forces be
seen, they would be regarded as a part of Miñón's brigade.[19.17]
That general was ordered to proceed _via_ La Hedionda to the American
rear, and a little after noon on February 21--every soldier having been
ordered to drink his fill, carry all the water he could, and take
rations for the next two days--Santa Anna advanced. Agua Nueva was only
some thirty-five miles away, and he expected to overwhelm it early
the next morning. The march continued well into the night. At Carnero
Pass, five or six miles from Taylor, the troops lay down by columns as
they arrived--the cavalry still holding their reins. It was too cold
for sleep, but they rested; and at six in the morning they rose in the
deepest possible silence, and resumed their march.[19.17]
[Illustration: MONTEREY TO LA ENCARNACIÓN]
The Americans had at last awakened, however. By February 19 Santa Anna
was expected "hourly," wrote Lieutenant Posey, and the next day Major
McCulloch with his party of Texan scouts was despatched in the direction
of La Encarnación, while Brevet Lieutenant Colonel May with about 400
dragoons and some field pieces proceeded toward La Hedionda.[19.18]
The latter saw a cloud of dust in the direction of Potosí, fell in with
a Mexican deserter[19.19]--who said Miñón was near and Santa Anna at
La Encarnación--and reported at Agua Nueva before sunrise, February
21. At first his party were taken for Mexicans; and when the alarm
subsided, it was followed by a solemn stillness, amidst which groups
of officers could be seen talking eagerly in low tones with mysterious
gestures.[19.22]
[TAYLOR DRAWS BACK]
Suddenly at about noon a solitary horseman on a jaded steed came down
from the mountain, and made straight for the General's tent, bringing
word that a great Mexican army had been seen at La Encarnación. The
combination of this report and May's was understood to mean that Santa
Anna intended to turn Agua Nueva, and before two o'clock the Americans
took flight--that is the polite phrase--for Buena Vista.[19.20]
Colonel Yell with his mounted Arkansas regiment was left behind to
guard the stores, should Santa Anna permit this, until they could be
removed;[19.21] the Second Kentucky and some guns were detached at La
Encantada to support him; and the First Illinois under Colonel Hardin
was posted at La Angostura. About midnight Yell's pickets at Carnero
Pass were driven in. Upon this, firing the buildings and the last of
the stores, and abandoning some wagons, the troops hurried off, lighted
on their way by roaring flames that filled the air with piles of lurid
smoke and the mountains with fantastic shadows; and by morning all
except Hardin's command and the advanced pickets were at Buena Vista.
Taylor, meanwhile, entrusting to Wool the disposition of the troops,
marched with a strong escort of the three arms for Saltillo, to provide
at this late day for the defence of that city against Miñón.[19.22]
XX
BUENA VISTA
February, 1847
[THE MEXICANS NEAR BUENA VISTA]
Early the next morning (February 22) Santa Anna, hurrying down from
Carnero Pass, learned that Agua Nueva had been evacuated, but on
arriving there he discovered signs, as he justly believed, of a
precipitate flight. Miñón, he thought, was already between Buena Vista
and Saltillo, in a position to hinder the American retreat; the state of
the Mexican supplies, in his opinion, did not allow time for strategic
operations; and therefore, hardly permitting the troops to drink,[20.1]
he dashed ahead with some 2500 horse and a few light battalions of
infantry, swept away the American pickets at La Encantada, and thundered
on down the valley.[20.8]
By this time Wool knew the enemy were at hand; the long roll sounded;
the soldiers leaped to their work; the camp was cleared; and a section
of Captain Washington's battery hurried down the slope toward La
Angostura. It was a beautiful morning; the mountains on the east flung
long shadows across the valley; a gentle breeze languidly stirred
the flags. What was more to the point, this was the twenty-second of
February. The bands struck up Hail Columbia. The watchword, "Honor of
Washington," passed among the men; and they shouted for joy to see the
great cloud of dust, full of galloping Mexicans, approach. None the less
they were unprepared for combat. Had Santa Anna risked a daring charge,
he would probably have triumphed in short order.[20.8]
But he found the American position and the guns at La Angostura
impressive. His bugler sounded "Halt!" just beyond range; and after
reconnoitring a long time he decided to wait for infantry. In fact there
seemed to be danger that his van might be attacked and overpowered;
and hence at about eleven o'clock he sent Dr. Vanderlinden, his chief
medical officer, to General Taylor, who had now returned from Saltillo,
with a note inviting him, on the ground that he was now surrounded
by more than 20,000 Mexicans, to lay down his arms, and probably
with secret instructions to amuse the American commander as long as
possible.[20.2] Very likely, as he intimated later, he would have been
glad to retire from what he called a Pass of Thermopylæ, and operate
strategically; but the American retreat had in effect lured him on, his
provisions were scant, and at this point therefore the issue had to be
decided at once.[20.8]
With good reason Santa Anna disliked the field of battle selected by
Wool,[20.3] for it strongly favored the defence. Running north along the
western side of the road there was a creek, which had excavated near
La Angostura an amazing network of gullies with almost vertical banks
twenty feet or so high, that practically vetoed the passage of troops;
and west of this obstruction the ground rose more and more steeply until
it became a line of high hills, parallel to the creek, which resembled
a huge wave ready to break. On the other side, between the road and
the sierra, there was a space varying from three quarters of a mile
to a mile in width, and this was roughly divided by two east-and-west
ravines--the more northern of which may be called the long and the more
southern the broad ravine--into three parts: the north field, as we may
name it, extending to Buena Vista, the middle field or plateau, and the
south field extending to La Encantada.[20.8]
Of these divisions the plateau was the most distinctive. Along the
base of the sierra there were two or three benches, presumably made of
débris from the mountain; and lighter débris had been washed almost
down to the road, forming a stony plain seamed by a number of minor
ravines--torrents during the rainy season--which grew deeper as they
progressed, until at the western edge of the plateau they descended to
the floor of the valley as ragged gulches, leaving between them several
tongues or spurs, extremely steep and about forty or fifty feet high.
The longest, highest and bluntest of the spurs, which may be called the
first of them, was at La Angostura; and a space of only some forty feet,
through which passed the road, intervened between its point and the
network of gullies. The plateau, some 400 yards wide, north-and-south,
at the base of the mountains, had perhaps twice that width at the
opposite end, toward which it very gradually sloped. Both of the two
main ravines, the long and the broad, were extremely difficult for
cavalry and still more difficult for artillery. Obviously in such a
spot large numbers--and especially large numbers of horse--lost a great
percentage of their value.[20.8]
[THE BUENA VISTA BATTLEFIELD]
The centre of the American position was the first spur, on which
Hardin's men threw up a slight breastwork during the night, with Captain
Washington's battery on the road below, protected now with a ditch and
a parapet, that ran from the gullies nearly to the spur;[20.4] and at
this point, or in reserve just north of it, Wool gathered most of the
Americans, who numbered 4759 officers and men, placing near the mountain
under Colonel Marshall the Kentucky and Arkansas horse and Major
Gorman's rifle battalion (four companies) of the Indiana foot.[20.5]
Over against these forces, the principal body of the Mexicans formed two
lines with heavy reserves behind them and cavalry in the rear, while
Mexican artillery was planted on the road and also on the high ground
east of it; and Miñón's brigade, the duty of which was to cut off the
American retreat, showed itself early in the day at the rear of Buena
Vista.[20.6] On each side the engineers reconnoitred actively, and both
Taylor and Wool visited and addressed the various American corps.[20.8]
Apparently there was an opportunity to outflank our left, and without
waiting for all his tired troops to come up, Santa Anna despatched
Ampudia with a considerable force of light infantry, well supported,
to seize a promising bench at the foot of the mountain. To defeat this
movement the Americans attempted to occupy the point first, but they
blundered and failed. Colonel Marshall then had a part of his force
ascend a spur of the mountain which joined near the summit a spur
leading down to the Mexican position, hoping in this way to outflank the
enemy; but the Mexicans, who were gradually reinforced, adopted the same
tactics.[20.8]
[Illustration: BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA
A _La Angostura, Washington's Battery and two companies
1st Illinois Vols._
B _Six companies 1st Illinois Regt._
C _3rd Indiana Regt._
D _2nd Kentucky Regt. and Sherman's Battery_ (_later
position_)
E _2nd Illinois Regt. and 1st Section Bragg's Battery_
F _2nd Indiana Regt. and three pieces Washington's
Battery_
G _Kentucky Horse Regt. and one squadron 2nd Dragoons_
H _Arkansas Horse Regt. and one squadron 1st Dragoons_
K _Dismounted Cavalry_, etc.
L _2nd Kentucky Regt., Bragg's Artillery and detachment
of Horse_ (_early position_)
M _2nd Indiana partly rallied here after retreating_
N _Heaviest Mexican cannon_
O _Blanco's Column_
P _Column to force American left_
Q _Battery_
R _Light Troops_
S _Reserve_
T _Columns turning American left_
V _Mexican Battery_
X _Cavalry from head of Column T, attacking Buena
Vista_
Y _Taylor and Staff_]
At about three o'clock a shell from a Mexican howitzer planted on the
road gave the signal for combat; and the troops on the mountain opened
fire, climbing higher and higher until finally the Mexicans, getting
the better of Marshall, reached the crest. Meanwhile Captain O'Brien,
with three of Washington's eight guns and the Second Indiana under
Colonel Bowles for support, was posted well forward on the plateau, and
a movement on the left wing of the Mexican army led Taylor to place
the Second Kentucky under Colonel McKee, two guns under Bragg and a
detachment of horse on the opposite side of the valley; but after a
time, concluding that Santa Anna would attempt nothing more that day, he
returned to Saltillo,[20.7] escorted by the Mississippi regiment and a
body of the Second Dragoons.[20.8]