the men who undertook it. Doniphan was a frontier lawyer, entirely
unacquainted with military science, but a born leader. When in
Washington during the civil war he stood back to back with Abraham
Lincoln, it is said, and overtopped that son of Anak by half an
inch. The only distinguished man he had ever met that "came up to
the advertisement," was the President's comment. High cheek bones, a
prominent chin, thinnish and tightly closed lips, a mop of carroty hair
parted well down on the left, a beard of the same hue under his chin,
small, deep-set eyes, a strongly built nose, spare cheeks and a ruddy
complexion told of enterprise, daring, endurance, wary judgment and
kind, sincere impulses. In council he was shrewd and in danger fearless,
with always a twinkle in his eye, a smile on his lips, and a cheering,
well-timed pleasantry on his tongue.[15.6]
His men, recruited from the rural districts, had felt they were scorned
a little by the St. Louis contingent, and had vowed to show them what
"country boys" were made of; but they proposed to do it in their own
way. While the city men had uniforms and military discipline, the
riflemen neither had nor wanted such embarrassments. As every officer
was a man of their own choice, they felt at liberty to choose also how
far to respect and obey him. Doniphan, who loved his "boys" like a
father, was loved in return, and they were ready to do anything for him;
but a minor authority who meddled with their reserved rights, whatever
these might happen to be, was likely to hear some vigorous cursing.
Any form of manly dissipation was to their taste, as a rule; and they
despised all carefulness, all order, all restraint. Yet they were "good
fellows" at heart, and as full of fight as gamecocks; and now--on half
rations, no salt and no pay[15.2]--they felt ready for whatever Mexico
could offer.[15.6]
At Valverde Doniphan heard that forces were coming from Chihuahua to
defend El Paso, some two hundred miles from Socorro, and sent an order
to Santa Fe that Major Clark with six guns and one hundred men should
march as soon as possible to his assistance; but without waiting for
him the command advanced in three sections on the fourteenth, sixteenth
and eighteenth of December. Below Valverde the Rio Grande makes a great
bend towards the west, and runs through a wild, mountainous region; and
hence travellers bound for the south left it on the right. Adopting
this course, the Americans now marched for ninety or ninety-five
miles through the dreaded Jornada del Muerto (_Dead Man's Journey_),
where they found no settlements except some prairie-dog towns, little
vegetation except sage brush, and no water at all. At the coldest season
of the year, when sentries at Santa Fe were having their feet frozen,
to make such a march at an elevation of more than a mile and a quarter
without fuel or tents[15.3] was clearly a good beginning. At Dona Ana,
the only settlement between El Paso--sixty or sixty-five miles farther
on--and Valverde, the straggling command was supposed to concentrate;
but the concentration seemed rather nominal. Dirty, unshaven and ragged,
the troops marched almost as they pleased. They were determined to
survive, go ahead and fight, but little else appeared to them requisite.
It was now reported that seven hundred soldiers and six guns were
awaiting them at El Paso; but on December 23 the command moved on.[15.6]
The likelihood of invasion from the north had long been foreseen by the
authorities of Chihuahua, and the expediency of making a stand at the
threshold was obvious. But the citizens of El Paso, the border town,
who were practical, industrious and thrifty people, had been greatly
influenced, like those of New Mexico, by interest in the caravan
business, contact with American traders and wagoners, and acquaintance
with the ideas and methods of the United States. Almost openly, men
said the town would thrive more under American rule, argued that it was
the intention of the government at Mexico to sacrifice the people for
the aggrandizement of its partisans and the privileged classes, pointed
out that no substantial forces had come north, and asserted that what
soldiers had arrived were under orders to withdraw without fighting, and
leave the citizens to be punished for their loyalty.[15.6]
Public spirit fell to a low ebb, and there it remained. No one thought
it endangered health to shout "_Viva México!_" But it was believed by
many that in a community so honeycombed with treason, active, determined
efforts in her cause would be liable to bring on an attack of cold steel
or lead in some dorsal area; and when the governor of Chihuahua sent the
prefect instructions on September 19 to retire, on the approach of the
enemy, with all the armed forces, cattle and provisions, collect the
resources of the district, and fight stubbornly on the guerilla system,
no intention of obeying this order could be observed. October 12 an
expedition designed to forestall invasion set out for the north; but at
Dona Ana some of the troops--covertly stimulated by officers--became
insubordinate; the commander understood public sentiment well enough to
take their side; the whole body returned at full speed to El Paso; and
the prefect dared not, or did not wish, to discipline anybody.[15.6]
There were now on the scene and in arms about four hundred and fifty
troops and apparently about seven hundred National Guards with four
guns.[15.4] In general two accepted schools of thought divided the
soldiery. Some were for not fighting hard, and some--including most
of the Presidials and National Guards--for not fighting at all; while
the few and unpopular zealots felt paralyzed by a want of confidence.
Colonel Cuylti, the commander, belonged to the second school of
thought; and on the evening before he was to move against Doniphan,
whose march had been reported about a week before, he fell sick with a
subjective disability officially diagnosed as brain fever, and set out
for Chihuahua with his accommodating surgeon. Lieutenant Colonel Vidal
succeeded to the command and also, it would seem, to the disability,
for after proclaiming martial law and pitching his camp some three
miles from El Paso, he concluded to halt. The American van, described
as consisting of about three hundred straggling countrymen in tatters
without artillery, could be surrounded and lanced like so many rabbits,
he said; but he was not personally in the mood for sport, and hence
conceded this pleasure to the second in command, Brevet Lieutenant
Colonel Ponce de León, assigning to him at least five hundred men[15.5]
and a 2-pound howitzer.[15.6]
[SKIRMISH AT EL BRAZITO]
At about three o'clock on Christmas afternoon Doniphan, with less than
five hundred of his careless, confident volunteers, reached a level spot
on the eastern bank of the Rio Grande named Temascalitos, though often
called El Brazito, approximately thirty miles from El Paso. Pickets and
sentries--but not supper--being superfluous, the men scattered in search
of water, fuel and other conveniences. Mexican scouts were observing
their operations; but, strong in conscious rectitude, the Missourians
neither knew nor cared what the enemy were about. Suddenly armed men
could be seen in fine order on a hill about half a mile distant. The
rally was sounded. The volunteers rushed for their arms, and with all
speed they were loosely formed as a line of infantry, bent back at the
extremities toward the river, and resting at the left on the wagons of
the caravan.[15.6]
With graceful consideration Ponce gave them time by sending a lieutenant
with a black flag to demand that Doniphan should present himself.
Otherwise, added the messenger, we shall charge and take him, neither
giving nor asking quarter. "Charge and be damned!" was of course the
reply; and the Mexicans then advanced, opening fire at about four
hundred yards from our line. Several volleys were delivered while the
Americans, either lying down or standing firmly with cocked rifles,
withheld their fire. But the powder of the Mexicans was mostly bad, they
shot high, and their little gun was mismanaged.[15.6]
By this time they had come within easy range. At command the American
volunteers now fired with great effect, and a flanking movement against
the wagons was received with equal spirit by the traders and their men.
Evidently there was a mistake. These fellows were not rabbits; and the
Presidials and El Paso militia, candidly recognizing Vidal's blunder,
retired in disorder, compelling the rest of the body to do the same.
Speed now compensated for any possible want of courage; and a party of
fifteen or twenty mounted Americans, who pursued the enemy for miles,
could not bring any of them to a stand. Doniphan's loss amounted to
seven men slightly wounded; that of the Mexicans to a howitzer captured
and perhaps a hundred men killed or wounded; and this farcical brush,
lasting thirty or forty minutes in all, has figured in American annals
as the "battle" of Brazito.[15.6]
[EL PASO OCCUPIED]
The Mexican troops now evacuated the district; the National Guards
disbanded; and presently a humble deputation from El Paso was explaining
to Doniphan that arms had been taken up by the citizens under
compulsion. Two days after the skirmish, therefore, amid a general
appearance of satisfaction, he and his rough troopers concluded they had
reached paradise. Along the Rio Grande, mostly on the southern side, ten
or twelve thousand people occupied settlements extending downstream for
many miles. Above, there was a dam; and artificial streams from that
point not only irrigated the rich fields and vineyards, but watered the
orchards, in which many of the houses were buried, and freshened the
long and regular streets, which not only were shaded by lines of trees
full of lively and tuneful birds, but were kept neat by daily sweeping.
To drill, practice twice a day at the targets, and feast on the abundant
fruits in such a place was a most agreeable change from the Jornada del
Muerto.[15.11]
El Paso did not prove, however, to be exactly a paradise. Unlimited
self-indulgence led to considerable sickness, and several men died.
It led also to disorders and to outrages on the people, and before
long two lieutenants, both intoxicated, fought with dirks. Moreover it
was now learned that Wool had not gone to Chihuahua,[15.7] that great
preparations for resistance were making there, and that a serious
insurrection--purposely exaggerated by the Mexican reports--had occurred
in the rear.[15.8] The boldest appeared therefore to be the wisest
course--to push forward, and conquer or die.[15.9] But without cannon
only the second alternative was possible, and the artillery did not
arrive. Price was in fact extremely unwilling to part with it, and owing
to this and other difficulties Clark was unable to set out for El Paso
until January 10. Then his men encountered even more painful hardships
than Doniphan's had undergone, for they had to struggle with snow--to
say nothing of almost perishing with hunger, and being nearly buried in
a sandstorm; and it was not until February 5 that men, guns and wagons
joined the impatient command.[15.11]
Three days afterwards the belated expedition set out on its march for
Chihuahua--nearly three hundred miles distant--with 924 effective
soldiers, besides about three hundred traders and teamsters, who were
sworn into the service by Doniphan and elected a merchant named Owens
as their major. About seven hundred of the troops belonged to the First
Missouri regiment, about one hundred to Clark's artillery, and about
one hundred to a body named the Chihuahua Rangers, made up at Santa
Fe.[15.10] There were four 6-pounders, two 12-pound howitzers, and about
315 goods-wagons besides the wagons belonging to the companies and the
commissary department, each with its quota of attendants; and as the
column, with every banner unfurled, wound into the distance as far as
the eye could see, it made a gallant and picturesque sight. It was
exposed to a rear attack from Sonora; but that state, while alive to the
opportunity, had not the means to take advantage of it.[15.11]
Troubles enough presented themselves, however. The country was bare
and monotonous, producing little except the crooked mezquite and an
occasional willow. A desert sixty-five miles wide and another nearly
as large had to be crossed. Heat alternated with cold, and one day it
was necessary to kindle fires repeatedly to warm benumbed limbs. Tents
were blown down by storms. More than once no fuel and no water could
be had for days. Antelopes and hares could frequently be seen; but the
tarantulas, rattlesnakes and copperheads were far more numerous, and far
more willing to be intimate. One day, when the army was in camp at a
lake, the grass took fire, and in an instant a small flame went scudding
off, burning a narrow trail. Soon this was driven by a whirlwind up the
mountain side, spreading into a vast blaze; and then, gathering force,
it rolled back upon the camp like a tidal wave. By arts known to the
plainsman almost everything was saved; but with a fearful roaring and
crackling a surge of fire swept over the encampment, proving how great
the danger had been.[15.11]
The state of things in the country farther south could not easily
be ascertained, for the authorities at Chihuahua had cut off all
communication with the north; but there were hostile spies, and some of
them, taken prisoners, had to give instead of obtaining information.
About seven hundred Mexican cavalry--said to be twice as many--were
discovered in front looking for a favorable opening, which they did
not find. At length, crossing a handsome plain on February 27, the
expedition came at nightfall to the hacienda of El Sauz, and learned
that strong fortifications had been erected at the Sacramento River,
fifteen miles farther on. That was the next watering-place, and
evidently it would have to be fought for; so a halt was made and a plan
devised. "Cheer up, boys," said Doniphan with a twinkle; "To-morrow
evening I intend to have supper with the Mexicans on the banks of a
beautiful spring."[15.11]
[THE SITUATION AT CHIHUAHUA]
As early as August, 1846, Chihuahua had expected this visit; and the
governor, saying that Kearny's army had occupied New Mexico "as easily
as it would have pitched its tents in the desert," seemed ready to
let the operation be repeated in his own state. Perhaps he was merely
weak, but the same pro-American influences of a commercial nature that
we have observed at El Paso and Santa Fe were rife about him, and there
was also much sentiment in favor of establishing the northern provinces
as an independent republic under the protection of the United States.
Over against these ideas, however, and possibly because of them, existed
a peculiarly intense hatred of us, exasperated now by the loss of New
Mexico and the fear of American outrages.[15.13]
[Illustration: EL PASO TO ROSALES]
Near the end of August the governor was forced out, and Angel Trias, an
active, ambitious man, rich, and most unfriendly to the Americans, took
his place; and the great body of the citizens, either anxious to defend
themselves against invasion or dreading to be thought disloyal, rallied
about him. The central government became interested, ordered several
northern states to aid Chihuahua, and instructed Reyes, comandante
general of Zacatecas, to assume the defence of New Mexico, Chihuahua and
Durango. But embarrassments then arose; delays ensued; and Santa Anna,
according to his policy of concentrating the military strength of the
country under his own command and disregarding non-essential territory,
frowned upon all national efforts to defend the northern frontier. It
was now November; and the government, appointing the unpopular Heredia
comandante general at Chihuahua, yielded to Santa Anna's views.[15.13]
Trias, however, did not abandon hope. The resources of the state were
scanty indeed. The effective colonial method of protecting the border
had long since been given up, and Indian raids, beginning about 1831,
had fast impoverished the haciendas. During the past year, perhaps
because the savages believed the Mexican troops would be required for
the war, these incursions had been worse than ever before. A single
party of Comanches had numbered more than eight hundred. It was
indispensable, therefore, to employ some of the military forces in the
protection of the settlements; but more than 10,000 men were enrolled
in the National Guard, and Trias felt sure that Chihuahua state was
inherently strong enough to defeat Doniphan, whose approach was duly
reported.[15.13]
The chief needs were money and armament. Artillery had been practically
unknown in that region, but it was found possible to cast and mount a
number of pieces, and infantry soldiers learned to use them. Arms were
gathered and repaired; ammunition and clothing were manufactured; and by
dint of local borrowing the expenses were met. Santa Anna finally had
255 men sent from Durango; and in the end nearly 1200 mounted troops
(many of them Presidials), some 1500 infantry including about seventy
regulars of the Seventh Regiment, 119 artillery, probably more than
1000 rancheros armed with long knives (_machetes_) and rude lances, ten
brass cannon ranging from 4-pounders to 9-pounders, and nine musketoons
on carriages appear to have been assembled.[15.12] The men were
enthusiastic and eagerly obedient, and the leaders--Heredia for chief
and Trias as second in command--felt proud of their army. As for the
Brazito affair, which had caused much discouragement, it seemed now like
a bad dream.[15.13]
[THE SACRAMENTO POSITION]
[Illustration: BATTLE OF SACRAMENTO
Feb. 28, 1847]
February 10 a portly, handsome officer arrived at Chihuahua. This was
General García Conde, and the next day he and the other chiefs, after
reconnoitring the pass at the Sacramento River, fifteen or eighteen
miles to the north, decided to make a stand at that point. It was a wise
decision. The stream, running here toward the east, was crossed at a
ford by the route from El Paso, which had a north and south direction.
Rather more than two miles north of the river and approximately
parallel with it, there was a broad watercourse, now dry and sandy,
known as the Arroyo Seco, which after crossing the El Paso highway
continued in its easterly course about a mile and a half, turned then
toward the south, and joined the river about a mile and a half below the
ford. Along the northern bank of the Arroyo lay a road, which extended
on the eastern side of the highway to the junction of this watercourse
with the Sacramento, while on the western side, bending toward the
south, it crossed that river three miles or so above the ford, passed
the hacienda of El Torreón, penetrated a defile in the steep and rocky
foothills thrust out here by the western cordillera, and rejoined the
highway about six miles farther on toward Chihuahua. A triangular block
of rugged hills lay thus between this road, the highway and the river,
the northeastern corner of which (called Sacramento Hill) almost reached
the solid adobe buildings of Sacramento hacienda near the ford.[15.13]
Between the river and the Arroyo lay elevated ground cut straight across
by the highway. The portion west of the highway was a fairly smooth
plateau ascending very gently toward the western cordillera, but the
other part rose immediately east of the highway about fifty feet, and
formed--roughly speaking--a square one and a half miles on a side, with
a broad, smooth hollow in the middle that debouched at the southeastern
corner toward the Sacramento, and a dominating hill called the Cerro
Frijoles at the northeastern corner, toward which the square sloped
up. On the north and west edges of the square the Mexicans constructed
a series of well-planned and well-executed redoubts alternating with
breastworks--which extended from Cerro Frijoles at the northeast to
what we may call Fort N at the southwest--supplemented near the ford
with fortifications on both banks of the river, and finally with a
redoubt halfway up Sacramento Hill; and these works commanded perfectly
the highway, the Arroyo road and the valley of the river. The Torreón
route seemed impracticable for the American wagons, but even here
fortifications were erected; and still others guarded the Arroyo near
its junction with the Sacramento. The principal camp lay in the hollow
of the square, which not only protected the troops but concealed both
their numbers and their movements.[15.13]
In a word, the position consisted essentially of a tongue of land
crossed near its elevated tip by the El Paso highway, with the
Sacramento River and the Arroyo Seco on its edges, a series of
fortifications round its tip, and an answering fortification beyond the
river on a hill. It seemed to bar the way of the Americans completely.
The Mexicans felt sure that it did so, and on the evening of February
27, jubilant and boastful, they even talked of recovering New Mexico.
Anyhow these presumptuous and contemptible Yankees were to be cut up,
and the booty would include a caravan worth a million. Yet influential
Chihuahuans had a financial interest in that caravan,[15.13] and one may
be sure they were not asleep.[15.14]
[THE BATTLE OF SACRAMENTO]
Next morning the Americans awoke early. Already the horses had been
carefully inured to explosions of powder. Now swords were filed, rifles
loaded afresh, straps tested, and even the linch-pins of the wagons
inspected; and by daybreak the command set out. To make it compact,
ready for attack from any quarter and perplexing to hostile observers,
the wagons were formed in four well-separated columns of about one
hundred each; the artillery and most of the troops marched between
these columns, and the companies of Reid, Parsons and Hudson--regarded
as proper cavalry and not simply mounted men--rode in front as advance
guard and screen; and in this formation, with banners and guidons
flaunting to impress the enemy, it rolled forward through a valley
about four miles wide, bounded on each hand by a massive, barren
cordillera,[15.15] until at about half-past one the troops, coming in
sight of the Mexican works, noticed a quick, sharp flash there: the
Mexican cavalry drawing their sabres.[15.17]
Doniphan and his principal officers now galloped ahead, and at a
distance of two or three miles reconnoitred most carefully with glasses
the Mexican position. It looked impregnable; and when the command was
about a mile and a half distant from it, the Colonel--first ordering his
cavalry screen to keep on advancing--turned the main body sharply to
the right, intending to cross the Arroyo Seco higher up, and gain the
plateau there. It was a brilliant scheme but perilous. Good troops, not
encumbered with artillery or baggage, might undertake such a manoeuvre
even in the face of the enemy, but with four hundred wagons, most of
them extremely heavy, it seemed impossible for untrained volunteers to
cross the Arroyo, and mount the high bank of the plateau; yet not only
was it a chief part of the soldiers' business to protect the wagons, but
it looked as if the wagons might soon be needed to protect the soldiers.
Hence this desperate attempt had to be made. Heredia observed it
immediately; and, concluding that the Americans were aiming, as a last
hope, to avoid his works and follow the Torreón route, he instructed
García Conde, the chief cavalry officer, to hold them in check until the
artillery and infantry could arrive and finish them.[15.17]