[TAMPICO IN VIEW]
The other lateral expedition moved against the city of Tampico. This
place, the principal town in the state of Tamaulipas, and after Vera
Cruz the chief port of Mexico on the Gulf coast, was physically
remarkable. Land and water are perhaps nowhere more freakishly
intermingled. But for practical purposes one may describe it adequately
as on a low ridge--with the immense lagoon of Carpintero on the one
hand and the deep, wide, heavy, greenish-brown Pánuco on the other--a
little more than five miles from the Gulf, as the river flows. For ten
years beginning in 1835 political upheavals and vexatious commercial
regulations had militated against its prosperity; but the port was
highly prized by the government, and in April, 1846, was taken into its
particular care.[13.38]
All the old fortifications having been demolished lest they should
be turned to account by insurgents, Parrodi, the comandante general,
was ordered to prepare the town for defence, and a number of badly
planned and badly constructed works--particularly a redoubt equipped
with two 8-pounders on the north side of the Pánuco at the bar--gave
a semblance of security. Some twenty-five light or fortress guns were
placed; but efforts to obtain additional heavy ordnance from Vera Cruz
were frustrated by the blockade, and when Ampudia, going north in the
summer, was directed to give his first attention to reinforcing the
garrison, circumstances again intervened. The people were spirited,
however; and the daily Eco voiced their sentiments by exclaiming, "With
such officers, with such troops, with such citizens let the Yankees come
whenever they please!"[13.38]
As a matter of fact the Yankees had thoughts of coming quite soon.
Possession of the town seemed to be desirable, in the first place,
because for some time it was supposed to be the starting-point of a
carriage-road to San Luis Potosí, and apparently could be made a more
convenient base than the Rio Grande for a deep advance into Mexico; but
the war department found before long that wagons and artillery could
not cross the mountains by that route. In the second place occupation
of Tampico appeared to be a logical feature of the Tamaulipas movement,
in which Patterson was expected to play a leading rôle;[13.27] and
moreover, Santa Anna himself had explained to Mackenzie that it would be
advantageous as well as easy to make this conquest.[13.38]
Conner had his eye upon the place, of course; but, aside from the
question of overcoming its defenders, he felt considerable hesitation.
It was regarded as the most dangerous port on the coast, and vessels
could not ride out a gale at anchor off the shore. The bar, on which
eight feet of water stood normally, had only a fathom in August, 1846;
and as the fleet would have to rendezvous and prepare for battle in the
open roadstead, he was afraid that one of the frequent northers would
assail him before he could assail the town. September 22, however,
when deciding upon the Tamaulipas expedition, Polk and his Cabinet
agreed that Conner should attack Tampico, and the order was issued that
day.[13.38]
Santa Anna seems to have remembered the advice given to Mackenzie, and
while at Mexico he instructed Parrodi to retire, if attacked, unless
he could be sure of resisting successfully. On his way to San Luis he
evidently received Marcy's intercepted letter of September 2, which
announced that a movement upon Tampico was contemplated.[13.28] Hence
on October 3, with a view to the confirmation of those instructions, he
directed the war office to notify Parrodi of the American plan. Two days
later the comandante general reported to Santa Anna that he could not
defend the town victoriously, and explained in detail why. His garrison,
including some 200 sick, consisted of less than 1200 men besides 200
available National Guards, ignorant of the use of arms. Only 870 of
these men could be employed, according to a later statement of his, at
the town and the bar, and having but 150 regular gunners he could not
man the numerous and widely separated positions. Indeed he would not be
able to subsist the garrison more than eleven days longer.[13.29] The
enemy, on the other hand, it was said, included a shore party of 3000,
and could attack by water and by land at the same time.[13.38]
[TAMPICO EVACUATED BY THE MEXICANS]
In response, Parrodi received from Santa Anna on October 14 an order,
confirmed three days later, that all the heavy guns, the stores, and
his three gunboats, light but effective craft, should be sent up the
river, and that he himself with his troops and what field pieces could
be taken along, should withdraw to Tula, a place behind the mountains.
Parrodi, who did not believe in the war, liked these instructions, and
proceeded to execute them. The government, however, seemed unwilling
to abandon Tampico, and the comandante general, perplexed by this
difference of sentiment and by the protests of the governor, troops,
people and foreign consuls, offered to Santa Anna some arguments
against his instructions: but the latter, annulling without ceremony
the government's action, impatiently ordered immediate evacuation.
His reasons were, in brief, that he could not reinforce the garrison
adequately without dividing the army in a manner incompatible with
his plans; that, even should he undertake to do so, this aid could
not arrive in time; and that, since a victorious defence could not be
expected, it was important not only to save the men and material, but
especially to avoid the moral effect of another American triumph; and no
doubt, on the assumption that Conner was prepared to make a strenuous,
unflinching attack with such forces as Parrodi described, these reasons
were sound.[13.38]
Excited by the urgency of his instructions, which were received on the
twenty-second, the comandante general now endeavored to atone for the
time lost, and executed a flight instead of an evacuation.[13.30] The
redoubt at the bar was destroyed; large quantities of war material were
thrown into the river; with the aid of the British consul a pretended
sale of the gunboats was effected; and on October 27 and 28 the troops
hastily withdrew.[13.38]
While these events were taking place, timely notice of them was
forwarded to Conner. Chase, the American consul, had been expelled
and had taken refuge on a blockading vessel; but his wife, who was a
British subject, remained in Tampico, and on October 20 she wrote to
the Commodore that Parrodi would evacuate the town on the following
day, and that no resistance would be made against an American attack.
By November 5 Conner received this news, but a lack of provisions made
it impossible for him to set out the next day, as he desired to do. On
the tenth, eleventh and twelfth, however, eleven vessels made sail from
Antón Lizardo with orders to rendezvous fifteen miles from the shore on
a certain east and west line a little south of Tampico. The frigates
_Raritan_ and _Potomac_ did not appear there; but as the weather was
fine, Conner decided to proceed, and at break of day, November 14, the
_Mississippi_, _Princeton_, _St. Mary's_, three small steamers--the
_Spitfire_, _Vixen_ and _Petrel_--and three schooner-gunboats joined the
blockading vessel off Tampico bar. By this time the Commodore knew that
Parrodi had not evacuated the city on the twenty-first, and, supposing
the garrison was still there, expected some hard work;[13.31] but the
weather looked favorable, and he prepared at once to attack.[13.38]
Lieutenant Commanding Hunt, the blockading officer, had examined the
bar; and piloted by him the three small steamers towed the gunboats
across it. By ten o'clock the river was entered successfully, and
the Commodore advanced immediately toward the city. The low shores
were covered with rich vegetation; the huts, thatched with palmetto
leaves, appeared cosey if not grand; broad-leaved bananas and loaded
orange-trees grew beside them; tall cocoanut palms languidly waved their
graceful fronds above; and the long line of steamers and schooners,
followed by nine boats from the frigates packed with officers, marines
and sailors, made an impressive spectacle as they moved slowly up the
smooth but rapid Pánuco under an azure sky.[13.38]
Conner himself was on the _Spitfire_. As he approached the town, he
was met by a deputation from the _ayuntamiento_ (city council), who
stated that having neither the means nor the disposition to resist, they
desired to capitulate. Perry and two other officers then went ashore
with the deputation to arrange terms; but after a long conference,
finding this impossible--though of course the expediency of surrendering
was not in debate--all returned to the _Spitfire_, and at length an
informal agreement was reached. Next morning the chief points of this
were embodied in the following declaration:[13.32]
"United States Steamer Spitfire. Off the City of Tampico,
November 15, 1846. Commodore Conner declines a Capitulation with
the Authorities of Tampico as he considers it unnecessary. He
accepts the surrender of the City, and takes military possession
of it. He assures the Inhabitants, at the same time, that he will
not interfere with their Municipal Regulations, or their Religion;
and that private property shall be respected, provided that the
public property of all kinds, be delivered up at once, and in good
faith. Should an assault be made by the Inhabitants of the City,
on the American Forces, the Inhabitants will be held responsible
for the consequences. Commodore Conner, so long as the Authorities
and Inhabitants of the City observe good faith towards him, will
consider them under his protection;--a different course will expose
them to serious evils."[13.38]
The danger of an assault was not imminent, for the National Guards could
find but one hundred serviceable muskets, and all the people of the
town, who usually numbered about 15,000 but were now perhaps half as
many, lined the streets and gazed at the Americans as mere spectators.
All the public property that was movable had been carried away, but the
public buildings were now occupied; and, as the fraudulent sale of the
gunboats was detected, three much needed vessels, built at New York,
were added to our navy.[13.33] Steps were then taken to recover what
Parrodi had transported up the river.[13.34] November 18 Tattnall set
out with the _Spitfire_ and _Petrel_, and the next forenoon he reached
Pánuco town, the head of navigation, some eighty miles from Tampico,
where it was known that heavy guns had been left. Everything had been
concealed but the concealment proved ineffectual. He disabled nine
18-pounders, threw into the river a quantity of balls, and burned some
camp equipage; and a 24-pounder was taken aboard.[13.38]
[TAMPICO GARRISONED]
In ordering the capture of Tampico, the American government had intended
that Patterson should be at hand to occupy the town, and as this
calculation had been upset by Taylor, it now became a question how to
retain the prize. The place of the squadron was at sea; without the help
of every man it looked almost impossible to manage the vessels in bad
weather; and officers of nearly all grades were actually wanting. So
Perry in the steamer _Mississippi_ sailed from Tampico on the evening
of November 15 for Brazos Island, and the next day left an officer
there to explain the situation. Without delay the news was forwarded
to Patterson at Camargo, and he directed that men and cannon should
go "forthwith" to the captured city. His instructions were not waited
for, however. Lieutenant Colonel Belton, who occupied Camp Belknap with
six companies of the so-called artillery, embarked for the mouth of
the river on hearing from Perry; and on November 21 Colonel Gates and
about 500 men sailed from the Brazos in the _Neptune_, leaving two more
companies to follow the next day in the _Sea_.[13.35] Both vessels
were driven ashore, but fortunately the troops were saved in both cases.
By the twenty-third Tampico had therefore a garrison of about 650 good
regulars. Some ordnance also arrived; and Conner, besides landing a
pair of carronades, remained in the harbor with four or five gunboats.
Fortunately the only land approaches were by a neck at each end of the
town between Carpintero Lake and the river; and the work of fortifying
these, begun at once, was prosecuted night and day.[13.38]
Perry, meanwhile, kept at work. November 21 the _Mississippi_, bearing
the red pennant of a vice commodore at the masthead, appeared at New
Orleans.[13.36] Announcing the capture of Tampico, Perry conferred
with General Brooke and the governor of the state, and obtained sixteen
cannon--half of them borrowed from the Louisiana arsenal--and with
these, an engineer officer, 110 regular recruits and a quantity of
ammunition, he arrived off Tampico on the twenty-ninth.[13.37] Before
long the Alabama regiment came from the Rio Grande, and the government,
which heard of the capture of Tampico on November 28, ordered about
460 additional regulars to be sent from the United States. There was
great anxiety at Washington to make the port secure, for, as will soon
be discovered, a particular reason for holding it had now arisen.
Gates issued stringent regulations to govern the citizens in case of
a Mexican attack; and by December 19 Brigadier General Shields was in
command there with an adequate and fairly well-protected garrison. Yet
the Mexicans endeavored to feel cheerful. No battle had been lost, for
none had been fought, said the government with convincing logic; and the
Americans had not triumphed, for they had merely taken what had been
abandoned; but the governor of Tamaulipas recalled bitterly that "in
former times Tampico, almost by herself, had repulsed more than 4000
veterans."[13.38]
[TAYLOR'S POLICY]
Substantially all of northeastern Mexico was now in American hands,
and the question of Taylor's future operations, which had long been
under consideration, became urgent. On that matter the General himself
entertained a definite opinion. He was for adopting a boundary line that
would include enough territory to pay all just American claims, and
standing there on the defensive. As already drawn, the line ran from
Parras, where he expected Wool to remain, and Patos, a rich hacienda
on the Parras route about thirty-five miles from Saltillo, to Saltillo
itself, to Camp Butler, six miles north of that city toward Rinconada
Pass, and to Monterey. Between Monterey and Tampico lay a wide gap,
but the General proposed to fill this now by occupying certain points
in Tamaulipas. Victoria, the capital of that state, was exposed to
attacks proceeding from Tula, and there he planned to have a large
force.[13.41]
How many troops were available is not precisely known; but according to
Meade, who seems to have been in rather close touch with headquarters,
Worth was to have some 2500 at Saltillo and eight guns, Butler 1500 at
Monterey, Taylor and Patterson about 5000, to be divided between the
posts in Tamaulipas and a new position in advance of Saltillo, and the
commanders on the lines of communication about 2000; which meant that
some 14,500 men, including Wool's 2400 or 2500 and about 1000 occupying
Tampico, were to hold lines approximately 800 miles long in an enemy's
country.[13.39] Over against them stood the Mexicans under Santa
Anna, who in Taylor's opinion were potentially, if not actually, more
than 50,000 in number, and were occupying before Christmas a position
only about sixty miles from the Americans;[13.40] and in addition
to these it was necessary to consider the large bands of irregulars,
like those of Colonel Blanco, who were liable to gather suddenly almost
anywhere.[13.41]
When Taylor reported his plan to the war department, a good deal of
anxiety and perhaps distress was felt there. To be sure, he pointed
out that artillery could be moved north by way of Saltillo only, and
that water and provisions were scanty on that road, while doubtless he
as well as others considered the Mexicans too deficient in vigor and
enterprise to be feared. How just were these calculations will appear in
the sequel, and they failed now to satisfy the government. Though not
informed by Taylor precisely how many posts he intended to establish
in Tamaulipas, Marcy was afraid that widely separated forces and lines
of communication would be assailed, and it was clear that a small
Mexican success, doing us no actual harm but diminishing our prestige
materially, might rouse the people against us. Even the line to Monterey
was long, the Secretary feared. Taylor evidently had no thorough
knowledge of the passes, for he was now preparing to take a very hasty
look at a few of them. Besides, it had been Marcy's expectation of
late that Wool's column would be drawn back to Monterey; and at the
end of the year, as well as earlier, he said he did not wish to occupy
territory in advance of that city. Polk appealed in his diary to the
General's own opinion that he could not safely advance beyond it. Scott,
as well as Marcy and the President, believed the troops were being
scattered too much. Officers on the ground also held that view; but such
was Taylor's deliberate policy.[13.41]
XIV
SANTA FE
June-September, 1846
[THE STATE OF THINGS IN NEW MEXICO]
Not only Tamaulipas and Chihuahua but New Mexico lay within the scope of
the government's war policy, and certain features of the situation made
the outlook in that quarter peculiarly inviting.
The province was cut into an eastern and a western section by the Rio
Grande, which ran approximately north and south; and usage divided
the best settled part of it into the Río Arriba (Upstream) district
near Santa Fe, the capital, which lay some twenty miles east of the
great river, and the Río Abajo (Downstream) district, which had for
its metropolis Albuquerque, a small town on the Rio Grande about
seventy-five miles to the southwest. According to a recent census the
population was 100,000, of which the greater part belonged in the lower
district; and more than half the wealth also was attributed to that
section. The caravan trade, which made its way from Independence,[14.1]
Missouri, to Santa Fe, Chihuahua, Lagos and even Mexico City, gilded
the name of the province, for it had advanced rapidly from the humble
beginnings of 1821, and now employed 1200 men, involved a capital of
some two millions, and usually paid a net profit of thirty or forty per
cent on the goods transported. The favorable climate believed to prevail
in New Mexico was an additional source of interest.[14.2]
The political situation appeared singularly promising. In March, 1845,
the war department of Mexico admitted publicly that the northern
sections of the country were "abandoned and more than abandoned" by
the general government. Sensible Mexicans held that the connection of
the province with their miserable system involved injury instead of
benefit. The people received no protection against the ravages of the
Indians. The national troops were a constant menace to the citizens. If
a man desired to give his note for $3000, he was compelled to pay eight
dollars for stamped paper. The duties and extortions levied upon the
caravan merchants increased the price of their goods; and of late the
central government had been trying to deprive the provincial authorities
of money and the people of comforts by stopping that business
entirely.[14.2]
The citizens appeared weary of oppression. They would not pay the
taxes. It was found necessary in 1845 to excuse them from one of
the most profitable but most annoying imposts. Indifference toward
the general government--a natural return for its neglect and its
vexations--prevailed, and the continual changes in that government
aggravated the lack of patriotism. Indeed, there was more than
indifference. A move to follow the example of Texas had been made in
1837, and the idea of joining the United States, which had existed
in that year, became so strong by the early months of 1846 that
representatives of the province in the national Congress openly avowed
it. Finally, a revolution against misgovernment, that had recently
occurred in the neighboring state of Sonora, appeared to offer a strong
hint.[14.2]
All power, civil and military, lay in the hands of Manuel Armijo,
governor and comandante general; and that of itself was an ample
ground for insurrection. Born of disreputable parents, this precious
adventurer had achieved a career still more disreputable. A man of
unusual energy, though now a mountain of flesh, he could assume at will
an air of ingenuous affability; could threaten, bluster, brag, intrigue
or coax; and when dressed up in his blue frock coat, with blue striped
pantaloons, shoulder straps, a red sash, and plenty of gold lace, could
look--although at heart only a cunning and cowardly robber--quite
impressive. His personal habits were said to be grossly immoral; his
only principle was to succeed; and his type of mind, shrewd though
low, was indicated by one of his favorite sayings, "It is better to be
thought brave than to be so." Such force, cleverness and lack of scruple
had naturally made him rich. His family now owned Albuquerque and the
neighboring estates. His position and close relations with the priests
gave him a firm hold on the ecclesiastical arm; it was believed that
an understanding with the savages enabled him to use them against his
enemies; and he engaged rather deeply in the American trade. Yet his
ambition was not yet satisfied; and he entertained the idea, it would
seem, of making the province an independent country.[14.2]
At St. Louis, Missouri, the New Mexican situation was doubtless fairly
well understood, and a deep interest in the caravan business existed.
The merchants, it was felt when the war became probable, deserved to be
protected, and many urged the prompt despatch of an expedition for that
purpose. Other arguments for such a step were, that it would forestall
Indian troubles on the border, would incline the enemy--by laying open
their weak side--to make terms, would encourage the people of New
Mexico to rise in our favor, and would secure the key to Chihuahua and
California; and in all probability influential men brought these ideas
to the President's notice.[14.4]
The occupation of Santa Fe was in fact decided upon as one of the very
earliest war measures--primarily for the sake of the traders, but also
with a view to the permanent retention of the province. The move was
intended to be pacific, however. Polk doubtless expected that no serious
opposition, if any at all, would be offered by the people; and there
seem to have been hopes that Chihuahua and her sister states could be
persuaded by arguments backed with force to let the caravan trade go on
despite the war. In that case the burdensome duties imposed at Santa Fe
would no longer have had to be paid, and the discrimination in favor of
Mexican competitors, that had prevailed there, would have ceased. On
May 13, therefore, the governor of Missouri was directed to raise eight
companies of mounted troops and two of light artillery for an expedition
to New Mexico, and Colonel S. W. Kearny of the First Dragoons was
directed to command them.[14.4]
[KEARNY'S MARCH]
[Illustration: GENERAL KEARNY'S MARCH]