mistakes and waste. Lieutenant D. H. Hill, afterwards General Hill of
the Confederate army, wrote in his journal on learning the details: "It
seems that every sort of folly was committed." To pitch handfuls of
infantry into an unknown maze of obstacles, fortifications and cannon as
if they had been fighting Indians in a Florida swamp, and to send field
batteries into narrow streets--in the suburb crooked, too--against heavy
stone works and roofs filled with protected marksmen was extraordinary.
And, it was credibly reported, Taylor did more. He ordered Ridgely out
into the open to try conclusions with El Diablo. Ridgely was absolutely
fearless. To satisfy the General he went out himself and reconnoitred,
but he would not lead his battery to destruction. The Tennessee regiment
was needlessly taken back and forth six times within range of the
citadel.[12.10]
Now--to get shelter, food, ammunition--the troops had to march
separately or in groups all the way to camp, exposed for a long distance
not only to the citadel guns but also to the lancers, who nearly caused
a disaster and might have done so, had all, instead of but a part of
them, obeyed the order to charge. A howitzer, aided by the captured
guns, still exchanged compliments now and then with El Diablo, but
the battle of the day was over. A redoubt had been won, and Worth's
operations against the Federation Ridge redoubts had been assisted; but
these advantages might have been gained far more cheaply.[12.10]
The Tenería position was garrisoned for the night by Garland's exhausted
command, the Kentucky regiment (Louisville Legion), which had been on
guard at the mortar, and Ridgely's battery. This was not an agreeable
task. The rain fell in torrents, and the interior of the fort was so
thoroughly searched by the guns of El Diablo, that a part of the men had
to lie on their backs in the mud. Some defences were thrown up, however;
Tuesday morning Quitman's brigade relieved the garrison; and Taylor's
men, cheered now by the sight of their comrades taking Independence
Hill, were given a necessary rest. Both sides used their artillery to
some extent, and in spite of the Mexican fire our position was further
strengthened; but on this day nothing was done at the eastern end to
assist Worth.[12.10]
During Tuesday night the enemy seemed to be in motion. They should
have made an attack; and the Americans--without blankets, overcoats
or food, soaked with rain, and chilled by a north wind--passed the
hours reconnoitring or standing in water behind their breastwork. Far,
however, from Ampudia's mind was the thought of a vigorous offensive.
Dismayed by the cutting of his communications and by the stubborn valor
of the Americans, and weakened by the cowardice of certain officers, he
ordered all the outworks abandoned, and concentrated his forces in and
near the grand plaza. Such a change could not be made at night without
much confusion. Many of the troops, too, were indignant; some refused to
leave their posts; all felt disheartened, and a few broke out in riotous
disorder. The work of fortifying the inner line went on, but the loss of
morale far more than offset this advantage.[12.10]
At daybreak Wednesday, suspecting that the Mexicans had left or were
leaving El Diablo, Quitman advanced, and found that both men and guns
had been withdrawn; but other works not far distant were still held too
strongly to be captured. Attempts were made to gain ground in various
directions; and finally, an hour or two before noon, with assistance
from the Second Texas regiment, dismounted, and the Third and the
Fourth Infantry, extensive and well-supported operations began to be
undertaken. In particular, a systematic plan of breaking through the
continuous line of houses and firing from the roofs was adopted. At
each cross-street vigorous fighting had to be done, for the Mexicans,
though inferior as marksmen, resisted obstinately at every favorable
point; and the musketry and artillery behind their barricades swept
the approaches fiercely. Five out of the twelve commissioned officers
of the Third Infantry were killed, says General Grant. Two sections of
field artillery came up, but the gunners were shot down rapidly in spite
of all precautions; and at length, finding the pieces too light for
effective service, Taylor ordered them to retire. A gun at the Tenería
redoubt was tried, but after a time the advance of the Americans made it
dangerous to fire toward the plaza.[12.10]
The infantry pushed on, however, and by three o'clock were only one
square from the grand plaza. Here ammunition began to fail, and
Lieutenant Grant, hanging over the side of his horse by an arm and a
foot, dashed across the streets too swiftly to be fired at, and went in
search of it. With a view to preparing for a general assault, however,
or for some other reason Taylor ordered the troops, now working safely
inside the houses, to withdraw--under fire, of course. Reluctantly,
though many of them had not eaten for thirty-six hours, they marched
back to the redoubts and thence after dark to Walnut Grove; and the Ohio
and Kentucky regiments went on duty at the captured redoubts.[12.10]
Strangely enough, Taylor seems to have made no effort, after the
storming of the Bishop's Palace, to arrange with General Worth for
concerted action or to give him fresh orders, although he could easily
have done so, and knew that all the work assigned to that division had
been completed. Wednesday morning, therefore, after the long, deep
slumber of exhaustion, Worth's men found themselves mostly in idleness,
and a large part of them, concentrated near the Palace, gazed upon the
city at their leisure as the dissolving mists revealed it. Not far away
in the suburb were General Arista's gardens, full of orange, lemon,
pomegranate and fig trees, bananas, grapes and flowers, watered by
canals that sparkled in the sun. Once in a while a blue-frocked monk,
girded with a white cord and tassel, could be seen; and flashes from
the streams that ran through almost every street were caught here and
there. Beyond lay the white or lightly tinted houses with leafy squares
here and there, dominated by the cathedral spires. At due intervals the
clock bell peacefully tolled the hour or the quarter. On the left the
dark citadel belched occasionally a cloud of white smoke. On the right
the Santa Catarina hurried along between the city and the picturesque
villas on its opposite bank. Farther away, but still near, the twisted
strata and the vast, splintered buttresses, battlements and pinnacles
of the Sierra Madre, thinly draped with soft clouds, towered aloft;
and overhead great birds that seemed to be eagles travelled like dark
planets round their orbits in the blue.[12.10]
But though they gazed with deep interest, these haggard fellows with
bloodshot eyes were not in a mood to enjoy the scene. No orders came
from Taylor. Hardly a shot had been heard this morning from the lower
town. Mexicans boasted of gaining a victory on that side, and "Your turn
will come next," our men were told. Heavy reinforcements from Saltillo,
it was rumored, would soon arrive by the pass. Worth, nervous and
anxious, climbed to the Palace tower with his glass, and searched every
quarter for news. Meantime the cannon were planted at more commanding
points. A howitzer opened on the town. Preparations to make an assault
were continued; and, as Mexicans from the south were now said to be
approaching, a detachment went about three miles up the Saltillo highway
to a strong position. An hour or two before noon, however, the roar of
battle began to come from the lower town; and Worth, judging that it
meant a serious attack, ordered a column forward by each of the two main
streets.[12.10]
[WORTH ADVANCES AGAIN]
With a cheer that sounded like a roar the troops hurried down the slope,
and burst into the suburb. For some time the work was easy, for in fear
of the Libertad guns all the western section had been evacuated; and
raising a fierce cry that afterwards came to be known as the "rebel
yell," which began with a growl and rose to a falsetto scream, the
Americans dashed on at a run. Beyond the cemetery, however, Mexican
troops opened fire, and until some of Duncan's and Mackall's guns came
up, fought like demons. Barricaded streets and garrisoned roofs were
next encountered, and again the Americans dived into the houses. Making
a small hole in the wall that divided two dwellings they would drop
through it a six-inch shell with a three-seconds fuse lighted, and
throw themselves flat. Results followed promptly. The aperture was then
enlarged; and crawling through, they repeated the operation, while the
best marksmen fought from the roof.[12.10]
Taylor's withdrawal from the city, however, supplied the Mexicans with
reinforcements. The enemy fairly seemed to swarm, and their courage
seemed to rise. "Cannons and small arms flashed, crashed and roared like
one mighty storm of wind, rain, hail, thunder and lightning," wrote a
soldier; while the thud of planks against heavy doors and the blows of
pickaxes on walls of stone swelled the uproar. Once the advance was
halted. But Colonel Hays, a shy man with a broad forehead, a Roman nose,
brilliant, restless hazel eyes, and the courage of twenty lions packed
in his delicate frame, had been a prisoner in the Monterey post-office
once, and had sworn a great oath to sleep this night in the post-office
or in hell, and nothing could stop him. By dark the Americans were
only a square from the market-place, and the Colonel had the postal
accommodations at his command.[12.10]
Ampudia's case was by no means desperate even now. His losses had been
small--twenty-nine officers and 338 men killed and wounded, according
to his report. There were provisions, ammunition and artillery enough;
the strong buildings round the plaza and market-place, defended with
resolution by a large garrison, could not easily have been taken; and
the division of the Americans into widely separated commands invited a
sortie.[12.10]
The situation was, however, by no means agreeable. After nightfall the
Americans planted two howitzers and a 6-pounder on the top of a high
building close to the western side of the plaza. Taylor's mortar had
been carried to Worth during the day, and after sunset it began to fire
now and then on the cathedral, where tons of gunpowder were stored. The
citadel undertook to reply, but the mortar, planted behind the stone
wall of the cemetery, was not likely to be struck, and a single one of
its bombs might conceivably have blown the Mexican army to pieces. In
fact so might a shot from Taylor's 24-pound howitzers, which delivered
two shells effectively after dark. On the southern side of the river,
opposite the town, the Fifth Infantry had planted one of the El Soldado
guns at the third work on Federation ridge, where it could at least have
proved annoying. The horses of the cavalry were in the way. The garrison
of the citadel could not promptly coöperate with the troops in town, for
it had sealed up the exit. Ampudia's defensive policy discouraged the
soldiers, for even though some of them flanked the retiring Americans
on Wednesday afternoon, they were not permitted to reoccupy the houses
abandoned by Taylor, and still less to attack the redoubts. Despondency
was general; some of the leading officers urged surrender; and Ampudia,
it was reported, keeping the choicest corps near his person, shut
himself up in the cathedral until a shell dropped near it, and then fled
to a private house.[12.10]
[NEGOTIATIONS]
Naturally, then, early on Thursday morning one of his aides carried
to the American general a proposition to give up the city, and retire
with the troops and military material. Taylor replied with a demand for
unconditional surrender, and insisted upon having an answer by noon.
Instead of complying Ampudia sent a request for a personal interview.
The result was a joint commission. Vexatious negotiations followed. The
tedious and wily methods of Mexican diplomacy were thoroughly tried; but
at length an ultimatum from Taylor's representatives ended the affair,
and the terms of capitulation were signed. These provided that the
citadel should be given up immediately, that within a week the Mexican
troops with their arms, accoutrements and six field pieces should
retire--without giving their parole not to fight again--beyond the line
of Rinconada Pass, Linares and San Fernando de Presas, that before this
evacuation of Monterey the town should be occupied by the Americans
for hospital and storage purposes only, and that for eight weeks--"or
until the orders or instructions of the respective governments can be
received"--the Americans would not cross the specified line.[12.11]
As Polk asserted and the General himself admitted, Taylor violated
his orders in granting such terms, and his excuses for doing so
were signally unconvincing, while some of them involved perhaps the
virtual assumption on his part of a political authority superior to
the President's. But substantial reasons for the terms did exist.
"Considering our situation," explained the General privately, they were
not over-liberal; and that was true. Being very short of ammunition
and provisions, he could only negotiate, assault or retreat. According
to his spokesmen in the Senate, his effectives numbered only some 5000
and probably they did not reach those figures. About one third of them
had no bayonets. The First Division of regulars had been crippled; the
Second was tired out; and the volunteers had been so far demoralized,
that in Meade's opinion they could no longer be depended upon. Worth,
chief American representative on the joint commission, had not "the
slightest confidence" left in Taylor's leadership, and wrote privately
that "many others" shared his opinion, while a still greater number felt
doubtful.[12.12]
With such troops, feeble artillery and scant ammunition, to attack an
enemy of proved fighting quality, now at bay in stone houses, fully
supplied with guns and munitions, and comparatively fresh, was not an
inviting proposition. In short, as Crittenden and Clayton stated in
defence of Taylor on the floor of the Senate, it was not feasible to
storm the city; and to retreat with sick and wounded over such a route,
pursued by mobile infantry and sleepless mounted men, and harried by
an exultant population, would have meant ruin. It was a wise course
to escape from this dilemma as he did, and the truth could not be
told.[12.12]
[MONTEREY OCCUPIED]
September 25 the citadel was evacuated, and the next day with drums
beating and banners flying the first brigade of Mexicans left the
city--all noting with curious interest the difference between their trim
uniforms and freshly pipe-clayed belts and the unkempt appearance of
the victors, who, as an American said, were as dirty as they could be
without becoming real estate. The second brigade followed on the next
day, and the rest of the troops on the twenty-eighth. Monterey, with
a quantity of indifferent gunpowder and a number of cannon, many of
them bad, was ours, and soon the people of the United States, whom a
costly but valorous battle impressed far more than orderly, scientific
operations could have done, were again acclaiming Taylor. By distance,
by his courage, by his picturesque individuality, and by his very
position as commander of the one American army fighting the Mexicans,
he was idealized. His excellent reports--the work of Bliss--confirmed
every favorable impression; and the writers of the day, fully aware that
he was already a popular hero and anxious to suit the prevailing taste,
colored the facts until these could hardly be recognized. Men on the
ground, in contact with the crude realities, felt otherwise. Taylor's
want of prevision and of generalship was in fact bitterly censured
there. Worth "is the high comb cock of the army," wrote one officer.
He has won all the laurels, though Taylor will have the glory at home,
remarked a surgeon.[12.13]
As for the conduct of the troops in general, however, there could be
only one opinion. "Three glorious days," was General Scott's description
of the struggle. War is--war. Dreadful things were done, splendid
men were cut down. Yet if there be glory in fidelity and courage, in
meeting extraordinary hardships, and in triumphing over extraordinary
difficulties, then Scott's description was correct.[12.13]
XIII
SALTILLO, PARRAS, TAMPICO
August-December, 1846
For men supposed to have won a splendid victory, Taylor and his army
seem to have been rather low in their spirits after the capture of
Monterey. Taylor admitted that his forces had been "greatly reduced."
Learning that a part of the Second Infantry had arrived on the Rio
Grande, he described this trifling reinforcement as "most welcome." The
Texas troops wished to go home and were discharged. To replace them
he counted on the Tennessee and Kentucky horse; but these regiments,
having been ordered to San Antonio, were long in reaching the front.
October 15 he estimated his aggregate effective strength as less than
12,000.[13.1] Chills and fever, a depressing malady, was extremely
prevalent; and a strong tendency to desert appeared to indicate a
generally unsatisfactory state of things.[13.2] Not only priests but
Mexican officers remaining at Monterey to convalesce or to care for
the sick, stimulated this tendency; and about the middle of November
all such officers, not indispensably needed by the sick and wounded,
received peremptory orders to go south. A little later, it was reported,
the alcalde was imprisoned for the same offence. Moreover bands of
Mexicans, not dismayed by the American triumphs, hung upon Taylor's
lines to rob and kill.[13.6]
[TAYLOR AND THE GOVERNMENT]
The General had other troubles also. There was a plan at Washington,
promoted by reports of his inefficiency and by letters from certain
ambitious officers left in the rear, to put in his place one of the new
brigadier generals. Scott, however, protected his interests, and by
having him assigned to duty with his brevet rank, threw a great obstacle
before the schemers. They encountered other difficulties as well, and
finally Polk sent him word confidentially that he need have no fear of
displacement. This, however, did not prevent a serious clash between
him and the administration over another matter. Perceiving that Mexico
could not defend effectively the remote and disaffected provinces
of the north against even our volunteer forces, realizing that the
possession of territory would be an advantage in making a treaty, and
wishing particularly to impress the Mexican Congress, which was to meet
on December 6, Polk felt extremely anxious to extend our occupation as
much as possible at once, and with all this in view it was proposed to
Taylor on September 22 that, should he see fit, he should have General
Patterson,[13.3] who was now the commanding officer at Camargo, occupy
the chief points in Tamaulipas.[13.6]
As Taylor had bitterly complained of receiving hordes of volunteers for
whom there was nothing to do, it was naturally presumed at Washington
that such an expedition could be organized without interference with his
plans; and, supposing also that Patterson was at Matamoros, far from
Monterey, Marcy instructed that general to begin his preparations while
awaiting definitive orders from Taylor on the subject. Such a movement,
however, not being permissible under the terms of the armistice, a
plan in which the government felt deeply interested came to nothing;
and Taylor, perhaps to divert attention from this aspect of the case,
not only vetoed the expedition, but protested violently against the
course of the government in addressing one of his officers.[13.4]
Polk was naturally and properly incensed, but he believed Taylor was
now in the field for the Whig Presidential nomination, and wanted to
force a quarrel upon the administration; and hence Marcy replied mildly
to the General that the right of the commander-in-chief to offer mere
"suggestions" could hardly be denied.[13.6]
On another point also there was a clash. Polk and his Cabinet condemned
at once and unanimously the Monterey armistice; but, shrewdly or
charitably suspecting that undisclosed reasons for it might have
existed, they decided to end it in such a manner as to express neither
approval nor censure. Marcy therefore directed on October 13 that it
should be terminated, explaining that it stood in the way of prosecuting
the war vigorously and forcing Mexico to seek peace. As by its terms the
agreement was subject to the approval of the respective governments, no
difficulty stood in the way of cancelling it; and on November 5 Taylor
notified Santa Anna, that since the Washington authorities disapproved
of the armistice, he should consider himself at liberty to resume
offensive operations on the fifteenth, since by that date he reckoned
that his despatch would reach San Luis Potosí.[13.6]
In reply the wily Mexican attempted to convey an insinuation of bad
faith on the part of the American government. This Taylor properly
noticed in his rejoinder, expressing at the same time a hope that
Mexico would accept the offer of the United States to negotiate, and
that permanent friendly relations between the two republics might
ensue. Santa Anna had now a better opening; and he protested that his
country would do all she could to justify her title to sovereignty and
independence, and would never listen to any proposal of peace, until the
American army should evacuate her soil, and the American vessels lay
aside their hostile attitude.[13.5] The correspondence was published
of course in the _Diario_, and obviously tended to unite the nation, as
well as to enhance the prestige of its leader.[13.6]
[MOVEMENT AGAINST SALTILLO]
The termination of the armistice enabled Taylor to occupy Saltillo,
upon which his eye had long been fixed. For several reasons he deemed
the town, a place of some 18,000 souls, important. It was the capital
of the state of Coahuila, a support for Monterey and the chief pass
through the Sierra Madre, a station on the high road to the south,
and the dominating point in a region full of corn, wheat, cattle and
other supplies. At this time the city was entirely without protection.
Mejía had been ordered in May to fortify it, but had not been able to
do so; and Santa Anna's first thought, on learning that Monterey had
capitulated, was to bring Ampudia back to San Luis Potosí with his
demoralized soldiers.[13.10]
Accordingly General Worth received orders on November 8 to march for
that place four days later with Lieutenant Colonel Duncan's battery,
the Artillery Battalion (eight companies), the Fifth and the Eighth
Infantry, and Blanchard's Company--in all about 1000 men;[13.7] and
Taylor with two squadrons of the Second Dragoons under Lieutenant
Colonel May determined to accompany him. The morning of the twelfth
brought a despatch from Marcy dated October 22, expressing the wish of
the government that, in view of Santa Anna's threatening posture and
the increasing unfriendliness of the people, no attempt should be made
to hold territory beyond Monterey, or at most beyond the mountains;
but the decision was confided to the General, and he set out the next
day.[13.10]