_Mr. President, and you, my Fellow-Americans_:
It is a peculiar pleasure to me to be with you this evening; and in
greeting my hosts of the Hungarian Republican Club, I give utterance
to the thought of my fellow-guest, Congressman Sulzer, when I say that
whatever our differences before election, when once the election has
taken place, all of us in public life or in private life, President,
Congressmen, judges, legislators, alike are American citizens and
nothing else.
It is nearly ten years ago that I first took dinner here in the
immediate neighborhood of where I am dining now, and at that time, I
remember perfectly, when I was first brought up here, it was by Mr.
Jacob Riis and Mr. Jim Reynolds, and I was told that I would get a
very good dinner and hear some very good music, and both prophecies
proved true. It was about that time that I grew to be acquainted with
so many of my hosts and fellow-guests of this evening. Others I had
known before. With one of my fellow-guests, General Grant, I was then
working, and at different times I spoke at meetings presided over
or held in the clubhouses of various of the gentlemen here present,
sometimes on political subjects, much more often on matters of good
citizenship affecting us all as good citizens.
I grew in those years, gentlemen, to have a very close feeling of
sympathy and affection and regard for the men and women of the great
East Side of this city. I needed no urging when I was invited to come
and be a guest at a club of the East Side this evening. President Braun
has described how the preliminary invitation took place. It was six
years ago that this club gave me a dinner after I had been elected
Governor, and they then said that they “intended to elect me President
and that I must then come and take dinner with them again.” I told them
that if they would carry out their part of the contract I would carry
out my part. I am not perfectly certain that they anticipated that
their offer would be closed with so soon, but you see, gentlemen, I
have closed with it.
To-night I wish to greet you most warmly and to say that I doubt if
we could find a more typically American gathering than this, for
Americanism is not a matter of birthplace, of ancestry, of creed, of
occupation. Americanism is a matter of the spirit that is within, of a
man’s soul. From the time when we first became an independent Nation
to the present moment there has never been a generation in which some
of our most distinguished and most useful men were not born on the
other side of the Atlantic. It is peculiarly appropriate, and to me
peculiarly pleasant that, in addressing this club of the men upon whose
efforts so much of the future welfare of this city, of this State, of
this Nation, depends, I should be addressing men who show by their
actions that they know no difference between Jew and Gentile, Catholic
and Protestant, native-born and foreign-born, provided only that the
man, whatever his creed, whatever his birthplace, strives to live so as
to do his full duty by his neighbor and by the community as a whole.
We can not keep too clearly before our minds the fact that for the
success of our civilization what is needed is, not so much brilliant
ability, not so much unusual genius, as the possession by the average
man of the plain homely workaday virtues that make that man a good
father, a good husband, a good friend and neighbor, a decent man
with whom to deal in all relations of life. We need good laws. We
need honest administration of the laws. And we can not afford to be
contented with less. But more than all else we need that the average
man shall have in him the root of righteous living; that the average
man shall have in him the feeling that will make him ashamed to do
wrong or to submit to wrong, and that will make him feel his bounden
duty to help those that are weaker, to help those especially that are
in any way dependent upon him, and while not in any way losing his
power of individual initiative, to cultivate the further power of
acting in combination with his fellows for the common end of social
uplifting and good government.
I shall not keep you very long this evening. I have come here not to
make you a set speech, but if you will allow me to say so to speak as
an old friend among his old friends. I have seen a good deal of your
lives. I know the effort, the toil, the sorrow, the happiness, and the
success. I have endeavored when I have been brought in contact with the
East Side in the course of any work in which I have been engaged so to
handle myself that the East Side might be a little better for it. I do
not know whether I succeeded or not, but I do know that I have always
been better myself for contact with it.
In closing I want to say one word upon success in life, upon the
success that each of us should strive for. It is a great mistake, oh,
such a great mistake, to measure success merely by that which glitters
from without, or to speak of it in terms which will mislead those about
us, and especially the younger people about us, as to what success
really is. There must, of course, be for success a certain material
basis. I should think ill of any man here who did not wish to leave his
children a little better off and not a little worse off materially than
he was. I should not feel that he was doing his duty by them; and if he
can not do his duty by his own children he is not going to do his duty
by any one else. But after that certain amount of material prosperity
has been gained then the things that really count most are the things
of the soul rather than the things of the body, and I am sure that
each of you here, if he will really think of what it is that has made
him most happy, of what it is that has made him most respect his
neighbors, will agree with me. Look back in your own lives; see what
the things are that you are proudest of as you look back, and you will
in almost every case find that those memories of pride are associated
not with days of ease but with days of effort, with the day when you
had to do all that was in you for some worthy end, and the worthiest of
all worthy ends is to make those that are closest and nearest to you,
your wife and children and those near you, happy and not sorry that
you are alive; and after that has been done to be able so to handle
yourself that you can feel when the end comes that on the whole your
country, your fellow-men are a little better off and not a little worse
off because you have lived. This kind of success is open to every one
of us. The great prizes come more or less by accident, and no human
being knows that better than the man who has won any of them. The great
prizes come more or less by accident, but to each man there comes
normally the chance so to lead his life that at the end of his days his
children, his wife, those that are dear to him, shall rise up and call
him blessed, and so that his neighbors and those brought into intimate
association with him may feel that he has done his part as a man in a
world which sadly needs that each man should play his part well.
Now, gentlemen, I have to say good-night. This has been such a
delightful dinner that I already find I am staying pretty nearly as
late as I can stay and catch the train that is to take me back to
my regular work at Washington. I thank you for your greeting, and I
assure you that not one meeting which I have attended since I have been
President has given me greater pleasure to attend than this dinner.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING A
PROTOCOL OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC, PROVIDING FOR THE COLLECTION AND DISBURSEMENT BY THE UNITED
STATES OF THE CUSTOMS REVENUES OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SIGNED ON
FEBRUARY 4, 1905
_To the Senate_:
I submit herewith a protocol concluded between the Dominican Republic
and the United States.
The conditions in the Republic of Santo Domingo have been growing
steadily worse for many years. There have been many disturbances and
revolutions, and debts have been contracted beyond the power of the
Republic to pay. Some of these debts were properly contracted and are
held by those who have a legitimate right to their money. Others are
without question improper or exorbitant, constituting claims which
should never be paid in full and perhaps only to the extent of a very
small portion of their nominal value.
Certain foreign countries have long felt themselves aggrieved
because of the non-payment of debts due their citizens. The only
way by which foreign creditors could ever obtain from the Republic
itself any guaranty of payment would be either by the acquisition of
territory outright or temporarily, or else by taking possession of the
custom-houses, which would of course in itself, in effect, be taking
possession of a certain amount of territory.
It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe
Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights
which it confers; and that the same statement applies to those who
uphold the doctrine. It can not be too often and too emphatically
asserted that the United States has not the slightest desire for
territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any of its southern
neighbors, and will not treat the Monroe Doctrine as an excuse for
such aggrandizement on its part. We do not propose to take any part
of Santo Domingo, or exercise any other control over the island save
what is necessary to its financial rehabilitation in connection with
the collection of revenue, part of which will be turned over to the
Government to meet the necessary expense of running it, and part of
which will be distributed pro rata among the creditors of the Republic
upon a basis of absolute equity. The justification for the United
States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be
found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity
for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only
means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors
and yet to refuse, itself, to take any such steps.
An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine
take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with
American States, provided that action does not take the shape of
interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of
their territory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the
question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally,
to collect it is a blockade, or bombardment, or the seizure of the
custom-houses, and this means, as has been said above, what is in
effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession, of
territory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because
under the Monroe Doctrine it can not see any European power seize and
permanently occupy the territory of one of these Republics; and yet
such seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually
offer the only way in which the power in question can collect any
debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States.
One of the difficult and increasingly complicated problems, which often
arise in Santo Domingo, grows out of the violations of contracts and
concessions, sometimes improvidently granted, with valuable privileges
and exemptions stipulated for upon grossly inadequate considerations
which were burdensome to the State, and which are not infrequently
disregarded and violated by the governing authorities. Citizens of the
United States and of other Governments holding these concessions and
contracts appeal to their respective Governments for active protection
and intervention. Except for arbitrary wrong, done or sanctioned by
superior authority, to persons or to vested property rights, the United
States Government, following its traditional usage in such cases, aims
to go no further than the mere use of its good offices, a measure
which frequently proves ineffective. On the other hand, there are
Governments which do sometimes take energetic action for the protection
of their subjects in the enforcement of merely contractual claims, and
thereupon American concessionaries, supported by powerful influences,
make loud appeal to the United States Government in similar cases for
similar action. They complain that in the actual posture of affairs
their valuable properties are practically confiscated, that American
enterprise is paralyzed, and that unless they are fully protected even
by the enforcement of their merely contractual rights, it means the
abandonment to the subjects of other Governments of the interests of
American trade and commerce through the sacrifice of their investments
by excessive taxes imposed in violation of contract, and by other
devices, and the sacrifice of the output of their mines and other
industries, and even of their railway and shipping interests, which
they have established in connection with the exploitation of their
concessions. Thus the attempted solution of the complex problem by
the ordinary methods of diplomacy reacts injuriously upon the United
States Government itself, and in a measure paralyzes the action of the
Executive in the direction of a sound and consistent policy. The United
States Government is embarrassed in its efforts to foster American
enterprise and the growth of our commerce through the cultivation of
friendly relations with Santo Domingo, by the irritating effects on
those relations, and the consequent injurious influence upon that
commerce, of frequent interventions. As a method of solution of the
complicated problem arbitration has become nugatory, inasmuch as,
in the condition of its finances, an award against the Republic is
worthless unless its payment is secured by the pledge of at least some
portion of the customs revenues. This pledge is ineffectual without
actual delivery over of the custom-houses to secure the appropriation
of the pledged revenues to the payment of the award. This situation
again reacts injuriously upon the relations of the United States with
other nations. For when an award and such security are thus obtained,
as in the case of the Santo Domingo Improvement Company, some foreign
Government complains that the award conflicts with its rights, as a
creditor, to some portion of these revenues under an alleged prior
pledge; and still other Governments complain that an award in any
considerable sum, secured by pledges of the customs revenues, is
prejudicial to the payment of their equally meritorious claims out of
the ordinary revenues; and thus controversies are begotten between
the United States and other creditor nations because of the apparent
sacrifice of some of their claims, which may be just or may be grossly
exaggerated, but which the United States Government can not inquire
into without giving grounds of offence to other friendly creditor
nations. Still further illustrations might easily be furnished of
the hopelessness of the present situation growing out of the social
disorders and the bankrupt finances of the Dominican Republic, where
for considerable periods during recent years the bonds of civil society
have been practically dissolved.
Under the accepted law of nations foreign Governments are within
their right, if they choose to exercise it, when they actively
intervene in support of the contractual claims of their subjects.
They sometimes exercise this power, and on account of commercial
rivalries there is a growing tendency on the part of other Governments
more and more to aid diplomatically in the enforcement of the claims
of their subjects. In view of the dilemma in which the Government
of the United States is thus placed, it must either adhere to its
usual attitude of non-intervention in such cases—an attitude proper
under normal conditions, but one which in this particular kind of
case results to the disadvantage of its citizens in comparison with
those of other States—or else it must, in order to be consistent
in its policy, actively intervene to protect the contracts and con
cessions of its citizens engaged in agriculture, commerce, and
transportation in competition with the subjects and citizens of other
States. This course would render the United States the insurer of all
the speculative risks of its citizens in the public securities and
franchises of Santo Domingo.
Under the plan in the protocol herewith submitted to the Senate,
ensuring a faithful collection and application of the revenues to the
specified objects, we are well assured that this difficult task can be
accomplished with the friendly co-operation and goodwill of all the
parties concerned, and to the great relief of the Dominican Republic.
The conditions in the Dominican Republic not only constitute a menace
to our relations with other foreign nations, but they also concern
the prosperity of the people of the island, as well as the security
of American interests, and they are intimately associated with the
interests of the South Atlantic and Gulf States, the normal expansion
of whose commerce lies in that direction. At one time, and that only a
year ago, three revolutions were in progress in the island at the same
time.
It is impossible to state with anything like approximate accuracy the
present population of the Dominican Republic. In the report of the
Commission appointed by President Grant in 1871, the population was
estimated at not over 150,000 souls, but according to the Statesman’s
Yearbook for 1904, the estimated population in 1888 is given as
610,000. The Bureau of the American Republics considers this the
best estimate of the present population of the Republic. As shown by
the unanimous report of the Grant Commission the public debt of the
Dominican Republic, including claims, was $1,565,831.59¼. The total
revenues were $772,684.75¼. The public indebtedness of the Dominican
Republic, not including all claims, was on September 12 last, as the
Department of State is advised, $32,280,000; the estimated revenues
under Dominican management of custom-houses were $1,850,000; the
proposed budget for current administration was $1,300,000, leaving
only $550,000 to pay foreign and liquidated obligations, and payments
on these latter will amount during the ensuing year to $1,700,000,
besides $900,000 of arrearages of payments overdue, amounting in all to
$2,600,000. It is therefore impossible under existing conditions, which
are chronic, and with the estimated yearly revenues of the Republic,
which during the last decade have averaged approximately $1,600,000,
to defray the ordinary expenses of the Government and to meet its
obligations.
The Dominican debt owed to European creditors is about $22,000,000, and
of this sum over $18,000,000 is more or less formally recognized. The
representatives of European Governments have several times approached
the Secretary of State setting forth the wrongs and intolerable delays
to which they have been subjected at the hands of the successive
Governments of Santo Domingo in the collection of their just claims,
and intimating that unless the Dominican Government should receive
some assistance from the United States in the way of regulating its
finances, the creditor Governments in Europe would be forced to resort
to more effective measures of compulsion to secure the satisfaction of
their claims.
If the United States Government declines to take action and other
foreign Governments resort to action to secure payment of their claims,
the latter would be entitled, according to the decision of The Hague
tribunal in the Venezuelan cases, to the preferential payment of
their claims; and this would absorb all the Dominican revenues and
would be a virtual sacrifice of American claims and interests in the
island. If moreover, any such action should be taken by them, the only
method to enable them to secure the payment of their claims would be
to take possession of the custom-houses, and considering the state of
the Dominican finances this would mean a definite and very possibly
permanent occupation of Dominican territory, for no period could be
set to the time which would be necessarily required for the payment of
their obligations and unliquidated claims. The United States Government
could not interfere to prevent such seizure and occupation of Dominican
territory without either itself proposing some feasible alternative in
the way of action, or else virtually saying to European Governments
that they would not be allowed to collect their claims. This would be
an unfortunate attitude for the Government of the United States to be
forced to maintain at present. It can not with propriety say that it
will protect its own citizens and interests, on the one hand, and yet
on the other hand refuse to allow other Governments to protect their
citizens and interests.
The actual situation in the Dominican Republic can not, perhaps, be
more forcibly stated than by giving a brief account of the case of the
Santo Domingo Improvement Company.
From 1869 to 1897 the Dominican Government issued successive series of
bonds, the majority of which were in the hands of European holders.
Successive issues bore interest at rates ranging from 2¾ to 6 per cent,
and what with commissions and other deductions and the heavy discount
in the market the Government probably did not receive over 50 to 75 per
cent of their nominal value. Other portions of the debt were created by
loans, for which the Government received only one-half of the amount
it was nominally to repay, and these obligations bore interest at the
rate of 1 to 2 per cent a month on their face, some of them compounded
monthly.
The improvidence of the Government in its financial management was due
to its weakness, to its impaired credit, and to its pecuniary needs
occasioned by frequent insurrections and revolutionary changes, and by
its inability to collect its revenues.
In 1888 the Government, in order to secure the payment of an issue
of bonds, placed the custom-houses and the collection of its customs
duties, which are substantially the only revenues of the Republic, in
the hands of the Westendorps, bankers of Amsterdam, Holland. But the
national debt continued to grow and the Government finally intrusted
the collection of its revenues to an American corporation, the Santo
Domingo Improvement Company, which was to take over the bonds of the
Westendorps. The Dominican Government finally became dissatisfied
with this arrangement, and, in 1901, ousted the Improvement Company
from its custom-houses and took into its own hands the collection of
its revenues. The company thereupon appealed to the United States
Government to maintain them in their position, but their request was
refused. The Dominican Government then sent its minister of foreign
affairs to Washington to negotiate a settlement. He admitted that the
Improvement Company had equities which ought not to be disregarded,
and the Department of State suggested that the Dominican Government
and the Improvement Company should effect, by private negotiation, a
satisfactory settlement between them. They accordingly entered into an
arrangement for a settlement, which was mutually satisfactory to the
parties. A similar arrangement was likewise made between the Dominican
Government and the European bondholders. The latter arrangement was
carried into execution by the Dominican Government and payments made
toward the liquidation of the bonds held by the European holders. The
Dominican Congress refused to ratify the similar arrangement made with
the Improvement Company, and the Government refused to provide for the
payment of the American claimants. In this state of the case it was
evident that a continuance of this treatment of the American creditors,
and its repetition in other cases, would, if allowed to run its course,
result in handing over the island to European creditors, and in time
would ripen into serious controversies between the United States and
other Governments, unless the United States should deliberately and
finally abandon its interests in the island.
The Improvement Company and its allied companies held, besides bonds,
certain banking and railway interests in the island. The Dominican
Government, desirous to own and possess these properties, agreed
with the companies that the value of their bonds and properties was
$4,500,000, and they submitted to arbitration the question as to the
instalments in which this sum should be paid and the security that
should be given. The Hon. George Gray, judge of the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Hon. Manuel de J. Galvan, both named
by the Dominican Republic, and the Hon. John G. Carlisle, named by
the United States, were the arbitrators, and rendered their award
on July 14, 1904. By its terms the Dominican Government was to pay
the above-mentioned sum of $4,500,000, with 4 per cent interest per
annum, in monthly instalments of $37,500 each during two years and
of $41,666.66 each month thereafter, beginning with the month of
September, 1904, said award to be secured by the customs revenues and
port dues of all the ports on the northern coast of Santo Domingo.
The award further provides for the appointment of a financial agent
of the United States, who was authorized, in case of failure during
any month to receive the sum then due, to enter into possession of
the custom-house at Puerto Plata in the first instance and assume
charge of the collection of customs duties and port dues, and to fix
and determine these duties and dues and secure their payment; in case
the sums collected at Puerto Plata should at any time be insufficient
for the payment of the amounts due under the award, or in case of any
other manifest necessity, or in case the Dominican Government should
so request, the financial agent of the United States was authorized to
have and exercise at any and all of the other ports above described
all the rights and powers vested in him by the award in respect of
Puerto Plata. Under the award the financial agent could only apply
the revenues collected toward its payment after he had first paid the
expenses of collection and certain other obligations styled “aparods,”
which constituted prior charges on the revenues assigned. These prior
charges are specified in the award. The Dominican Government defaulted
in their payments; and in virtue of the award and the authority
conferred by the Dominican Government, and at its request, possession
was delivered of the custom-house of Puerto Plata to the fiscal agent
appointed by the United States to collect the revenues assigned by the
arbitrators for the payment of the award; and in virtue of the same
authority possession of the custom-house of Monte Cristi has also
been handed over. I submit herewith a report of Mr. John B. Moore,
agent of the United States in this case, and a copy of the award of the
arbitrators.
During the past two years the European claimants except the English,
whose interests were embraced in those of the American companies, have,
with the support of their respective Governments, been growing more and
more importunate in pressing their unsatisfied demands. The French and
the Belgians, in 1901, had entered into a contract with the Dominican
Government, but, after a few payments were made on account, it fell
into neglect. Other Governments also obliged the Dominican Government
to enter into arrangements of various kinds by which the revenues of
the Republic were in large part sequestrated, and under one of the
agreements, which was concluded with Italy in 1903, the minister of
that Government was empowered directly to collect from the importers
and exporters that portion of the customs revenues assigned to him as
security. As the result of chronic disorders attended with a constant
increase of debt, the state of things in Santo Domingo has become
hopeless, unless the United States or some other strong Government
shall interpose to bring order out of the chaos. The custom-houses,
with the exception of the two in the possession of the financial
agent appointed by the United States, have become unproductive for
the discharge of indebtedness, except as to persons making emergency
loans to the Government or to its enemies for the purpose of carrying
on political contests by force. They have, in fact, become the nuclei
of the various revolutions. The first effort of revolutionists is to
take possession of a custom-house so as to obtain funds, which are then
disposed of at the absolute discretion of those who are collecting
them. The chronic disorders prevailing in Santo Domingo have, moreover,
become exceedingly dangerous to the interests of Americans holding
property in that country. Constant complaints have been received of
the injuries and inconveniences to which they have been subjected. As
an evidence of the increasing aggravation of conditions, the fact may
be mentioned that about a year ago the American railway, which had
previously been exempt from such attacks, was seized, its tracks torn
up, and a station destroyed by revolutionary bands.
The ordinary resources of diplomacy and international arbitration are
absolutely impotent to deal wisely and effectively with the situation
in the Dominican Republic, which can only be met by organizing its
finances on a sound basis and by placing the custom-houses beyond the
temptation of insurgent chieftains. Either we must abandon our duty
under our traditional policy toward the Dominican people, who aspire to
a republican form of government while they are actually drifting into a
condition of permanent anarchy, in which case we must permit some other
Government to adopt its own measures in order to safeguard its own
interests, or else we must ourselves take seasonable and appropriate
action.
Again and again has the Dominican Government invoked on its own behalf
the aid of the United States. It has repeatedly done so of recent
years. In 1899 it sought to enter into treaty relations by which it
would be placed under the protection of the United States Government.
The request was refused. Again in January, 1904, its minister of
foreign affairs visited Washington and besought the help of the United
States Government to enable it to escape from its financial and social
disorders. Compliance with this request was again declined, for this
Government has been most reluctant to interfere in any way, and has
finally concluded to take action only because it has become evident
that failure to do so may result in a situation fraught with grave
danger to the cause of international peace.
In 1903 a representative of a foreign Government proposed to the
United States the joint fiscal control of the Dominican Republic by
certain creditor nations, and that the latter should take charge of
the custom-houses and revenues and give to the Dominican Government
a certain percentage and apply the residue to the payment ratably of
claims of foreign creditors. The United States Government declined to
approve or to enter into such an arrangement. But it has now become
evident that decided action of some kind can not be much longer
delayed. In view of our past experience and our knowledge of the
actual situation of the Dominican Republic, a definite refusal of the
United States Government to take any effective action looking to the
relief of the Dominican Republic and to the discharge of its own duty
under the Monroe Doctrine can only be considered as an acquiescence in
some such action by another Government.
That most wise measure of international statesmanship, the Platt
amendment, has provided a method for preventing such difficulties from
arising in the new Republic of Cuba. In accordance with the terms of
this amendment the Republic of Cuba can not issue any bonds which can
be collected from Cuba save as a matter of grace, unless with the
consent of the United States, which is at liberty at all times to take
measures to prevent the violation of the letter and spirit of the Platt
amendment. If a similar plan could now be entered upon by the Dominican
Republic, it would undoubtedly be of great advantage to them and to all
other peoples, for under such an arrangement no larger debt would be
incurred than could be honestly paid, and those who took debts not thus
authorized would, by the mere fact of taking them, put themselves in
the category of speculators or gamblers, who deserved no consideration
and who would be permitted to receive none; so that the honest creditor
would on the one hand be safe, while on the other hand the Republic
would be safeguarded against molestation in the interest of mere
speculators.
But no such plan at present exists; and under existing circumstances,
when the condition of affairs becomes such as it has become in Santo
Domingo, either we must submit to the likelihood of infringement of the
Monroe Doctrine or we must ourselves agree to some such arrangement
as that herewith submitted to the Senate. In this case, fortunately,
the prudent and far-seeing statesmanship of the Dominican Government
has relieved us of all trouble. At their request we have entered into
the agreement herewith submitted. Under it the custom-houses will be
administered peacefully, honestly, and economically, 45 per cent of
the proceeds being turned over to the Dominican Government and the
remainder being used by the United States to pay what proportion of the
debts it is possible to pay on an equitable basis. The Republic will
be secured against over-seas aggression. This in reality entails no
new obligation upon us, for the Monroe Doctrine means precisely such a
guarantee on our part.
It is perhaps unnecessary to state that no step of any kind has been
taken by the Administration under the terms of the protocol which is
herewith submitted.
The Republic of Santo Domingo has by this protocol wisely and
patriotically accepted the responsibilities as well as the privileges
of liberty, and is showing with evident good faith its purpose to pay
all that its resources will permit of its obligations. More than this
it can not do, and when it has done this we should not permit it to be
molested. We on our part are simply performing in peaceful manner,
not only with the cordial acquiescence, but in accordance with the
earnest request of the Government concerned, part of that international
duty which is necessarily involved in the assertion of the Monroe
Doctrine. We are bound to show that we perform this duty in good faith
and without any intention of aggrandizing ourselves at the expense of
our weaker neighbors or of conducting ourselves otherwise than so as
to benefit both these weaker neighbors and those European Powers which
may be brought into contact with them. It is in the highest degree
necessary that we should prove by our action that the world may trust
in our good faith and may understand that this international duty will
be performed by us within our own sphere, in the interest not merely
of ourselves, but of all other nations, and with strict justice toward
all. If this is done a general acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine
will in the end surely follow; and this will mean an increase of the
sphere in which peaceful measures for the settlement of international
difficulties gradually displace those of a warlike character.
We can point with just pride to what we have done in Cuba as a guaranty
of our good faith. We stayed in Cuba only so long as to start her
aright on the road to self-government, which she has since trod with
such marked and distinguished success; and upon leaving the island
we exacted no conditions save such as would prevent her from ever
becoming the prey of the stranger. Our purpose in Santo Domingo is as
beneficent. The good that this country got from its action in Cuba was
indirect rather than direct. So it is as regards Santo Domingo. The
chief material advantage that will come from the action proposed to be
taken will be to Santo Domingo itself and to Santo Domingo’s creditors.
The advantages that will come to the United States will be indirect,
but nevertheless great, for it is supremely to our interest that all
the communities immediately south of us should be or become prosperous
and stable, and therefore not merely in name but in fact independent
and self-governing.
I call attention to the urgent need of prompt action on this matter.
We now have a great opportunity to secure peace and stability in the
island, without friction or bloodshed, by acting in accordance with
the cordial invitation of the governmental authorities themselves.
It will be unfortunate from every standpoint if we fail to grasp
this opportunity; for such failure will probably mean increasing
revolutionary violence in Santo Domingo, and very possibly embarrassing
foreign complications in addition. This protocol affords a practical
test of the efficiency of the United States Government in maintaining
the Monroe Doctrine.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
WHITE HOUSE,
_February 15, 1905_.
ADDRESS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPHIA, PA., FEB. 22,
1905
_Mr. Provost, Members of the University, and my Fellow-Citizens_:
As a Nation we have had our full share of great men, but the two men
of pre-eminent greatness who, as the centuries go on, will surely loom
above all others are Washington and Lincoln; and it is peculiarly
fitting that their birthdays should be celebrated every year and the
meaning of their lives brought home close to us.
No other city in the country is so closely identified with Washington’s
career as Philadelphia. He served here in 1775 in the Continental
Congress. He was here as commander of the Army at the time of the
battles of Brandywine and Germantown; and it was near here that with
that army he faced the desolate winter at Valley Forge, the winter
which marked the turning point of the Revolutionary War. Here he came
again as President of the Convention which framed the Constitution,
and then as President of the United States, and finally as
Lieutenant-General of the Army after he had retired from the Presidency.
One hundred and eight years ago, just before he left the Presidency, he
issued his farewell address, and in it he laid down certain principles
which he believed should guide the citizens of this Republic for all
time to come, his own words being “which appear to me all-important to
the permanency of your felicity as a people.”
Washington, though in some ways an even greater man than Lincoln, did
not have Lincoln’s wonderful gift of expression—that gift which makes
certain speeches of the rail-splitter from Illinois read like the
inspired utterances of the great Hebrew seers and prophets. But he had
all of Lincoln’s sound common-sense, farsightedness, and devotion to a
lofty ideal. Like Lincoln he sought after the noblest objects, and like
Lincoln he sought after them by thoroughly practical methods. These two
greatest Americans can fairly be called the best among the great men of
the world, and greatest among the good men of the world. Each showed in
actual practice his capacity to secure under our system the priceless
union of individual liberty with governmental strength. Each was as
free from the vices of the tyrant as from the vices of the demagogue.
To each the empty futility of the mere doctrinaire was as alien as the
baseness of the merely self-seeking politician. Each was incapable
alike of the wickedness which seeks by force of arms to wrong others
and of the no less criminal weakness which fails to provide effectively
against being wronged by others.
Among Washington’s maxims which he bequeathed to his countrymen were
the two following: “Observe good faith and justice toward all nations,”
and “To be prepared for war is the most effective means to promote
peace.” These two principles taken together should form the basis of
our whole foreign policy. Neither is sufficient taken by itself. It is
not merely an idle dream, but a most mischievous dream, to believe that
mere refraining from wrongdoing will ensure us against being wronged.
Yet, on the other hand, a nation prepared for war is a menace to
mankind unless the national purpose is to treat other nations with good
faith and justice. In any community it is neither the conscientious man
who is a craven at heart, nor yet the bold and strong man without the
moral sense, who is of real use to the community; it is the man who to
strength and courage adds a realizing sense of the moral obligation
resting upon him, the man who has not only the desire but the power to
do his full duty by his neighbor and by the State. So, in the world at
large, the nation which is of use in the progress of mankind is that
nation which combines strength of character, force of character, and
insistence upon its own rights, with a full acknowledgment of its own
duties toward others. Just at present the best way in which we can
show that our loyalty to the teachings of Washington is a loyalty of
the heart and not of the lips only is to see to it that the work of
building up our Navy goes steadily on, and that at the same time our
stand for international righteousness is clear and emphatic.
Never since the beginning of our country’s history has the Navy
been used in an unjust war. Never has it failed to render great and
sometimes vital service to the Republic. It has not been too strong
for our good, though often not strong enough to do all the good it
should have done. Our possession of the Philippines, our interest
in the trade of the Orient, our building the Isthmian Canal, our
insistence upon the Monroe Doctrine, all demand that our Navy shall
be of adequate size and for its size of unsurpassed efficiency. If it
is strong enough I believe it will minimize the chance of our being
drawn into foreign war. If we let it run down it is as certain as the
day that sooner or later we shall have to choose between a probably
disastrous foreign war or a peace kept on terms that imply national
humiliation. Our Navy is the surest guaranty of peace and the cheapest
insurance against war, and those who, in whatever capacity, have helped
to build it up during the past twenty years have been in good faith
observing and living up to one of the most important of the principles
which Washington laid down for the guidance of his countrymen. Nor was
Washington the only one of our great Presidents who showed farsighted
patriotism by support of the Navy. When Andrew Jackson was in Congress
he voted for the first warships we ever built as part of our regular
Navy; and he voted against the grant of money to pay our humiliating
tribute to the pirates of the Barbary States. Old Hickory was a patriot
through and through, and there was not an ounce of timidity in his
nature, and of course he felt only indignant contempt for a policy
which purchased an ignoble peace by cowardice instead of exacting
a just peace by showing we were as little willing to submit to as
to inflict aggression. Had a majority of Jackson’s colleagues and
successors felt as he did about the Navy, had it been built up instead
of being brought to a standstill, it would probably never have been
necessary to fight the War of 1812.
Again Washington said: “Give to mankind the example of a people always
guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.” This feeling can be
shown alike by our dealings within and without our own borders. Taft
and Wright in the Philippines and Wood in Cuba have shown us exactly
how to practice this justice and benevolence in dealing with other
peoples—a justice and benevolence which can be shown, not by shirking
our duty and abandoning to self-destruction those unfit to govern
themselves, but by doing our duty by staying with them and teaching
them how to govern themselves, by uplifting them spiritually and
materially. Here at home we are obeying this maxim of Washington’s
just so far as we help in every movement, whether undertaken by the
Government, or as is, and should be, more often the case, by voluntary
action among private citizens, for the betterment of our own people.
Observe that Washington speaks both of justice and benevolence, and
that he puts justice first. We must be generous, we must help our
poorer brother, but above all, we must remember to be just; and the
first step toward securing justice is to treat every man on his worth
as a man, showing him no special favor, but so far as may be holding
open for him the door of opportunity so that reward may wait upon
honest and intelligent endeavor.
Again Washington said: “Cherish public credit.” Just at the moment
there is no attack on public credit, but if ever the temptation arises
again let our people at the outset remember that the worst because the
most insidious form of the appeal that would make a man a dishonest
debtor is that which would persuade him that it is anything but
dishonest for him to repudiate his debts.
Finally, it is peculiarly appropriate, when I have come to this city
as the guest of the University of Pennsylvania, to quote another of
Washington’s maxims: “Promote, as an object of primary importance,
institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as
the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is
essential that public opinion should be enlightened.” Education may
not make a man a good citizen, but most certainly ignorance tends to
prevent his being a good citizen. Washington was far too much of a
patriot, had far too much love for his fellow-citizens, to try to teach
them that they could govern themselves unless they could develop a
sound and enlightened public opinion. No nation can permanently retain
free government unless it can retain a high average of citizenship;
and there can be no such high average of citizenship without a high
average of education, using the word in its broadest and truest
sense to include the things of the soul as well as the things of
the mind. School education can never supplant or take the place of
self-education, still less can it in any way take the place of those
rugged and manly qualities which we group together under the name
of character; but it can be of enormous use in supplementing both.
It is a source of just pride to every American that our people have
so consistently acted in accordance with Washington’s principle of
promoting institutions for the diffusion of knowledge. There is nothing
dearer to our hearts than our public school system, by which free
primary education is provided for every one within our borders. The
higher education, such as is provided by the University of Pennsylvania
and kindred bodies, not only confers great benefits to those able to
take advantage of it, but entails upon them corresponding duties.
The men who founded this Nation had to deal with theories of government
and the fundamental principles of free institutions. We are now
concerned with a different set of questions, for the Republic has
been firmly established, its principles thoroughly tested and fully
approved. To merely political issues have succeeded those of grave
social and economic importance, the solution of which demands the best
efforts of the best men. We have a right to expect that a wise and
leading part in the effort to attain this solution will be taken by
those who have been exceptionally blessed in the matter of obtaining an
education. That college graduate is but a poor creature who does not
feel when he has left college that he has received something for which
he owes a return. What he thus owes he can, as a rule, only pay by the
way he bears himself throughout life. It is but occasionally that a
college graduate can do much outright for his alma mater; he can best
repay her by living a life that will reflect credit upon her, by so
carrying himself as a citizen that men shall see that the years spent
in training him have not been wasted. The educated man is entitled
to no special privilege, save the inestimable privilege of trying to
show that his education enables him to take the lead in striving to
guide his fellows aright in the difficult task which is set to us of
the twentieth century. The problems before us to-day are very complex,
and are widely different from those which the men of Washington’s
generation had to face; but we can overcome them surely, and we can
overcome them only, if we approach them in the spirit which Washington
and Washington’s great supporters brought to bear upon the problems
of their day—the spirit of sanity and of courage, the spirit which
combines hard common-sense with the loftiest idealism.