THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND.
§ 8. Leaving now the obviously untenable arguments, we next come to those
which, in my opinion, may properly be termed scientific.
It will be convenient to classify those as three in number; and under one
or other of these heads nearly all the more intelligent advocates of Theism
will be found to range themselves.
§ 9. We have first the argument drawn from the existence of the human mind.
This is an argument which, for at least the last three centuries, and
especially during the present one, has been more relied upon than any other
by philosophical thinkers. It consists in the reflection that the being of
our own subjective intelligence is the most certain fact which our
experience supplies, that this fact demands an adequate cause for its
explanation, and that the only adequate cause of our intelligence must be
some other intelligence. Granting the existence of a conditioned
intelligence (and no one could reasonably suppose his own intelligence to
be otherwise), and the existence of an unconditioned intelligence becomes a
logical necessity, unless we deny either the validity of the principle that
every effect must have an adequate cause, or else that the only adequate
cause of Mind is Mind.
It has been a great satisfaction to me to find that my examination of this
argument--an examination which was undertaken and completed several months
before Mr. Mill's essay appeared--has been minutely corroborated by that of
our great logician. I mention this circumstance here, as on previous
occasions, not for the petty motive of vindicating my own originality, but
because in matters of this kind the accuracy of the reasoning employed, and
therefore the logical validity of the conclusions attained, are guaranteed
in the best possible manner, if the trains of thought have been
independently pursued by different minds.
§ 10. Seeing that, among the advocates of this argument, Locke went so far
as to maintain that by it alone he could render the existence of a Deity as
certain as any mathematical demonstration, it is only fair, preparatory to
our examining this argument, to present it in the words of this great
thinker.
He says:--"There was a time when there was no knowing (_i.e._, conscious)
being, and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a
knowing being from all eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no
being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all
understanding, I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have
been any knowledge: it being as impossible that things wholly void of
knowledge, and operating blindly, and without perception, should produce a
knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three
angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of
senseless matter, that it should put into itself, sense, perception, and
knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put
into itself greater angles than two right ones."[4]
Now, although this argument has been more fully elaborated by other
writers, the above presentation contains its whole essence. It will be seen
that it has the great advantage of resting _immediately_ upon the
foundation from which all argument concerning this or any other matter,
must necessarily arise, viz.,--upon the very existence of our argumentative
faculty itself. For the sake of a critical examination, it is desirable to
throw the argument before us into the syllogistic form. It will then stand
thus:--
All known minds are caused by an unknown mind. Our mind is a known mind;
therefore, our mind is caused by an unknown mind.
§ 11. Now the major premiss of this syllogism is inadmissible for two
reasons: in the first place, it is assumed that known mind can only be
caused by unknown mind; and, in the second place, even if this assumption
were granted, it would not explain the existence of Mind as Mind. To take
the last of these objections first, in the words of Mr. Mill, "If the mere
existence of Mind is supposed to require, as a necessary antecedent,
another Mind greater and more powerful, the difficulty is not removed by
going one step back: the creating mind stands as much in need of another
mind to be the source of its existence as the created mind. Be it
remembered that we have no direct knowledge (at least apart from
Revelation) of a mind which is even apparently eternal, as Force and Matter
are: an eternal mind is, as far as the present argument is concerned, a
simple hypothesis to account for the minds which we know to exist. Now it
is essential to an hypothesis that, if admitted, it should at least remove
the difficulty and account for the facts. But it does not account for mind
to refer our mind to a prior mind for its origin. The problem remains
unsolved, nay, rather increased."
Nevertheless, I think that it is open to a Theist to answer, "My object is
not to explain the existence of Mind in the abstract, any more than it is
my object to explain Existence itself in the abstract--to either of which
absurd attempts Mr. Mill's reasoning would be equally applicable;--but I
seek for an explanation of _my own individual finite mind_, which I know to
have had a beginning in time, and which, therefore, in accordance with the
widest and most complete analogy that experience supplies, I believe to
have been _caused_. And if there is no other objection to my believing in
Intelligence as the cause of my intelligence, than that I cannot prove my
own intelligence caused, then I am satisfied to let the matter rest here;
for as every argument must have _some_ basis of assumption to stand upon, I
am well pleased to find that the basis in this case is the most solid which
experience can supply, viz.,--the law of causation. Fully admitting that it
does not account for Mind (in the abstract) to refer one mind to a prior
mind for its origin; yet my hypothesis, if admitted, _does_ account for the
fact that _my mind_ exists; and this is all that my hypothesis is intended
to cover. For to endeavour to _explain_ the existence of an _eternal_ mind,
could only be done by those who do not understand the meaning of these
words."
Now, I think that this reply to Mr. Mill, on the part of a theist, would so
far be legitimate; the theistic hypothesis _does_ supply a provisional
explanation of the existence of known minds, and it is, therefore, an
explanation which, in lieu of a better, a theist may be allowed to retain.
But a theist may not be allowed to confuse this provisional explanation of
his own mind's existence with that of the existence of Mind in the
abstract; he must not be allowed to suppose that, by thus hypothetically
explaining the existence of known minds, he is thereby establishing a
probability in favour of that hypothetical cause, an Unknown Mind. Only if
he has some independent reason to infer that such an Unknown Mind exists,
could such a probability be made out, and his hypothetical explanation of
known mind become of more value than a guess. In other words, although the
theistic hypothesis supplies _a possible_ explanation of known mind, we
have no reason to conclude that it is _the true_ explanation, unless other
reasons can be shown to justify, on independent grounds, the validity of
the theistic hypothesis. Hence it is manifestly absurd to adduce this
explanation as evidence of the hypothesis on which it rests--to argue that
Theism must therefore be true; because we assume it to be so, in order to
explain _known_ mind, as distinguished from _Mind_. If it be answered, We
are justified in assuming Theism true, because we are justified in assuming
that known mind can _only_ have been caused by an unknown mind, and hence
that Mind must somewhere be self-existing, then this is to lead us to the
second objection to the above syllogism.
§ 12. And this second objection is of a most serious nature. "Mind can only
be caused by Mind," and, therefore, Mind must either be uncaused, or caused
by a Mind. What is our warrant for ranking this assertion? Where is the
proof that nothing can have caused a mind except another mind? Answer to
this question there is none. For aught that we can ever know to the
contrary, anything within the whole range of the Possible may be competent
to produce a self-conscious intelligence--and to assume that Mind is so far
an entity _sui generis_, that it must either be self-existing, or derived
from another mind which is self-existing, is merely to beg the whole
question as to the being of a God. In other words, if we can prove that the
order of existence to which Mind belongs, is so essentially different from
that order, or those orders, to which all else belongs, as to render it
_abstractedly impossible_ that the latter can produce the former--if we can
prove this, we have likewise proved the existence of a Deity. But this is
just the point in dispute, and to set out with a bare affirmation of it is
merely to beg the question and to abandon the discussion. Doubtless, by the
mere act of consulting their own consciousness, the fact now in dispute
appears to some persons self-evident. But in matters of such high
abstraction as this, even the evidence of self-evidence must not be relied
upon too implicitly. To the country boor it appears self-evident that wood
is annihilated by combustion; and even to the mind of the greatest
philosophers of antiquity it seemed impossible to doubt that the sun moved
over a stationary earth. Much more, therefore, may our broad distinction
between "cogitative and incogitative being"[5] not be a distinction which
is "legitimated by the conditions of external reality."
Doubtless many will fall back upon the position already indicated, "It is
as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into
itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of
a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right
ones." But, granting this, and also that conscious matter is the sole
alternative, and what follows? Not surely that matter cannot perceive, and
feel, and know, merely because it is repugnant to our idea of it that it
should. Granting that there is no other alternative in the whole
possibility of things, than that matter must be conscious, or that
self-conscious Mind must somewhere be self-existing; and granting that it
is quite "impossible for us to conceive" of consciousness as an attribute
of matter; still surely it would be a prodigious leap to conclude that for
this reason matter cannot possess this attribute. Indeed, Locke himself
elsewhere strangely enough insists that thought may be a property of
matter, if only the Deity chose to unite that attribute with that
substance. Why it should be deemed abstractedly impossible for matter to
think if there is no God, and yet abstractedly possible that it should
think if there is a God, I confess myself quite unable to determine; but I
conceive that it is very important clearly to point out this peculiarity in
Locke's views, for he is a favourite authority with theists, and this
peculiarity amounts to nothing less than a suicide of his entire argument.
The mere circumstance that he assumed the Deity capable of endowing matter
with the faculty of thinking, could not have enabled him to _conceive_ of
matter as thinking, any more than he could _conceive_ of this in the
absence of his assumption. Yet in the one case he recognises the
possibility of matter thinking, and in the other case denies such
possibility, _and this on the sole ground of its being inconceivable_!
However, I am not here concerned with Locke's eccentricities:[6] I am
merely engaged with the general principle, that a subjective inability to
establish certain relations in thought is no sufficient warrant for
concluding that corresponding objective relations may not obtain.
§ 13. Hence, an objector to the above syllogism need not be a materialist;
it is not even necessary that he should hold any theory of things at all.
Nevertheless, for the sake of definition, I shall assume that he is a
materialist. As a materialist, then, he would appear to be as much entitled
to his hypothesis as a theist is to his--in respect, I mean, of this
particular argument. For although I think, as before shown, that in strict
reasoning a theist might have taken exception to the last-quoted passage
from Mill in its connection with the law of causation, that passage, if
considered in the present connection, is certainly unanswerable. What is
the state of the present argument as between a materialist and a theist?
The mystery of existence and the inconceivability of matter thinking are
their common data. Upon these data the materialist, justly arguing that he
has no right to make his own conceptive faculty the unconditional test of
objective possibility, is content to merge the mystery of his own mind's
existence into that of Existence in general; while the theist, compelled to
accept without explanation the mystery of Existence in general,
nevertheless has recourse to inventing a wholly gratuitous hypothesis to
explain one mode of existence in particular. If it is said that the latter
hypothesis has the merit of causing the mystery of material existence and
the mystery of mental existence to be united in a thinkable manner--viz.,
in a self-existing Mind,--I reply, It is not so; for in whatever degree it
is unthinkable that Matter should be the cause of Mind, in that precise
degree must it be unthinkable that Mind was ever the cause of Matter, the
correlatives being in each case the same, and experience affording no
evidence of causality in either.
§ 14. The two hypotheses, therefore, are of exactly equivalent value, save
that while the one has a certain basis of fact to rest upon,[7] the other
is wholly arbitrary. But it may still be retorted, 'Is not that which is
_most_ conceivable _most likely_ to be true? and if it is more conceivable
that my intelligence is caused by another Intelligence than that it is
caused by Non-intelligence, may I not regard the more conceivable
hypothesis as also the more probable one? It is somewhat difficult to say
how far this argument is, in this case, valid; only I think it is quite
evident that its validity is open to grave dispute. For nothing can be more
evident to a philosophical thinker than that the substance of Mind must--so
far at least as we can at present see--_necessarily_ be unknowable; so that
if Matter (and Force) be this substance, we should antecedently expect to
find that the actual causal connection should, in this particular case, be
more inconceivable than some imaginary one: it would be more natural for
the mind to infer that something conceivably more akin to itself should be
its cause, than that this cause should be the entity which really gives
rise to the unthinkable connection. But even waiving this reflection, and
granting that the above argument is _valid_, it is still to an indefinite
degree _valueless_, seeing that we are unable to tell _how much it is more
likely_ that the more conceivable should here be true than that the less
conceivable should be so.
§ 15. Returning then to Locke's comparison between the certainty of this
argument and that which proves the sum of the angles of a triangle to be
equal to two right-angles, I should say that there is a _virtual_, though
not a _formal_, fallacy in his presentation. For mathematical science being
confessedly but of relative significance, any comparison between the degree
of certainty attained by reasoning upon so transcendental a subject as the
present, and that of mathematical demonstrations regarding relative truth,
must be misleading. In the present instance, the whole strain of the
argument comes upon the adequacy of the proposed test of truth, viz., our
being able to conceive it if true. Now, will any one undertake to say that
this test of truth is of equivalent value when it is applied to a triangle
and when it is applied to the Deity. In the one case we are dealing with a
geometrical figure of an exceedingly simple type, with which our experience
is well acquainted, and presenting a very limited number of relations for
us to contemplate. In the other case we are endeavouring to deal with the
_summum genus_ of all mystery, with reference to which experience is quite
impossible, and which in its mention contains all the relations that are to
us unknown and unknowable. Here, then, is the oversight. Because men find
conceivability a valid test of truth in the affairs of everyday life--as it
is easy to show _à priori_ that it must be, if our experience has been
formed under a given code of constant and general laws--therefore they
conclude that it must be equally valid _wherever_ it is applied; forgetting
that its validity must perforce decrease in proportion to the distance at
which the test is applied from the sphere of experience.[8]
§ 16. Upon the whole, then, I think it is transparently obvious that the
mere fact of our being unable to conceive, say, how any disposition of
matter and motion could possibly give rise to a self-conscious
intelligence, in no wise warrants us in concluding that for this reason no
such disposition is possible. The only question would appear to be, whether
the test which is here proposed as an unconditional criterion of truth
should be allowed any the smallest degree of credit. Seeing, on the one
hand, how very fallible the test in question is known to have proved itself
in many cases of much less speculative difficulty--seeing, too, that even
now "the philosophy of the condition proves that things there are which
may, nay must, be true, of which nevertheless the mind is unable to
construe to itself the possibility;"[9] and seeing, on the other hand, that
the substance of Mind, whatever it is, must necessarily be
unknowable;--seeing these things, if any question remains as to whether the
test of inconceivability should in this case be regarded as having any
degree of validity at all, there can, I think, be no reasonable doubt that
such degree should be regarded as of the smallest.
§ 17. Let us then turn to the other considerations which have been supposed
to justify the assertion that nothing can have caused our mind save another
Mind. Neglecting the crushing fact that "it does not account for Mind to
refer it to another Mind for its origin," let as see what positive reasons
there are for concluding that no other influence than Intelligence can
possibly have produced our intelligence.
§ 18. First we may notice the argument which is well and tersely presented
by Locke, thus:--"Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily
contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can
ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it
hath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree; it necessarily
follows that the first eternal being cannot be Matter." Now, as this
presentation is strictly formal, I shall first meet it with a formal reply,
and this reply consists in a direct contradiction. It is simply untrue that
"whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and
actually have, at least, all the perfections that can after exist;" or that
it can never "give to another any perfection that it hath not actually in
itself." In a sense, no doubt, a cause contains all that is contained in
its effects; the latter content being _potentially_ present in the former.
But to say that a cause already contains _actually_ all that its effects
may afterwards so contain, is a statement which logic and common sense
alike condemn as absurd.
Nevertheless, although the argument now before us thus admits of a
childishly easy refutation on strictly formal grounds, I suspect that in
substance the argument in a general way is often relied upon as one of very
considerable weight. Even though it is clearly illogical to say that causes
cannot give to their effects any perfection which they themselves do not
actually present, yet it seems in a general way incredible that gross
matter could contain, even potentially, the faculty of thinking.
Nevertheless, this is but to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability;
to do which, even were it here legitimate, would, as we have seen, be
unavailing. But to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability in this
case would _not_ be legitimate; for we are in possession of an abundant
analogy to render the supposition in question, not only conceivable, but
credible. In the words of Mr. Mill, "Apart from experience, and arguing on
what is called reason, that is, on supposed self-evidence, the notion seems
to be that no causes can give rise to products of a more precious or
elevated kind than themselves. But this is at variance with the known
analogies of nature. How vastly nobler and more precious, for instance, are
the vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of which, and by
the properties of which, they are raised up! The tendency of all recent
speculation is towards the opinion that the development of inferior orders
of existence into superior, the substitution of greater elaboration, and
higher organisation for lower, is the general rule of nature. Whether this
is so or not, there are at least in nature a multitude of facts bearing
that character, and this is sufficient for the argument."
§ 19. We now come to the last of the arguments which, so far as I know,
have ever been adduced in support of the assertion that there can be no
other cause of our intelligence than another and superior Intelligence. The
argument is chiefly remarkable for the very great prominence which was
given to it by Sir W. Hamilton.
This learned and able author says:--"The Deity is not an object of
immediate contemplation; as existing and in himself, he is beyond our
reach; we can know him only mediately through his works, and are only
warranted in assuming his existence as a certain kind of cause necessary to
account for a certain state of things, of whose reality our faculties are
supposed to inform us. The affirmation of a God being thus a regressive
inference from the existence of a special class of effects to the existence
of a special character of cause, it is evident that the whole argument
hinges on the fact,--Does a state of things really exist such as is only
possible through the agency of a Divine Cause? For if it can be shown that
such a state of things does not really exist, then our inference to the
kind of cause requisite to account for it is necessarily null.
"This being understood, I now proceed to show you that the class of
phænomena which requires that kind of cause we denominate a Deity is
exclusively given in the phænomena of mind,--that the phænomena of matter
taken by themselves, (you will observe the qualification taken by
themselves) so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God,
would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation.
"If, in man, intelligence be a free power,--in so far as its liberty
extends, intelligence must be independent of necessity and matter; and a
power independent of matter necessarily implies the existence of an
immaterial subject,--that is, a spirit. If, then, the original independence
of intelligence on matter in the human constitution, in other words, if the
spirituality of mind in man be supposed a datum of observation, in this
datum is also given both the condition and the proof of a God. For we have
only to infer, what analogy entitles us to do, that intelligence holds the
same relative supremacy in the universe which it holds in us, and the first
positive condition of a Deity is established in the establishment of the
absolute priority of a free creative intelligence."[10]
§ 20. Thus, according to Sir W. Hamilton, the whole question as to the
being of a God depends upon that as to whether our "intelligence be a free
power,"--or, as he elsewhere states it himself, "Theology is wholly
dependent upon Psychology, for with the proof of the moral nature of man
stands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity." It will be observed
that I am not at present engaged with the legitimacy of this author's
decision upon the comparative merits of the different arguments in favour
of Theism: I am merely showing the high opinion he entertained of the
particular argument before us. He positively affirms that, unless the
freedom of the human will be a matter of experience, Atheism is the sole
alternative. Doubtless most well-informed readers will feel that the
solitary basis thus provided for Theism is a very insecure one, while many
such readers will at once conclude that if this is the only basis which
reason can provide for Theism to stand upon, Theism is without any rational
basis to stand upon at all. I have no hesitation in saying that the
last-mentioned opinion is the one to which I myself subscribe, for I am
quite unable to understand how any one at the present day, and with the
most moderate powers of abstract thinking, can possibly bring himself to
embrace the theory of Free-will. I may add that I cannot but believe that
those who do embrace this theory with an honest conviction, must have
failed to understand the issue to which modern thought has reduced the
question. Here, however, is not the place to discuss this question. It will
be sufficient for my purpose to show that even Sir W. Hamilton himself
considered it a very difficult one; and although he thought upon the whole
that the will must be free, he nevertheless allowed--nay, insisted--that he
was unable to conceive how it could be so. Such inability in itself does
not of course show the Free-will theory to be untrue; and I merely point
out the circumstance that Hamilton allowed the supposed fact unthinkable,
in order to show how very precarious, even in his eyes, the argument which
we are considering must have appeared. Let us then, for this purpose,
contemplate his attitude with regard to it a little more closely. He says,
"It would have been better to show articulately that Liberty and Necessity
are both incomprehensible, as beyond the limits of legitimate thought; but
that though the Free-agency of Man cannot be speculatively proved, so
neither can it be speculatively disproved; while we may claim for it as a
fact of real actuality, though of inconceivable possibility, the testimony
of consciousness, that we are morally free, as we are morally accountable
for our actions. In this manner the whole question of free- and bond-will
is in theory abolished, leaving, however, practically our Liberty, and all
the moral instincts of Man entire."[11]
From this passage it is clear that Sir W. Hamilton regarded these two
counter-theories as of precisely equivalent value in everything save "the
testimony of consciousness;" or, as he elsewhere states it, "as equally
unthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus
theoretically balanced. But, practically, our consciousness of the moral
law ... gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the
doctrine of fate."
But the whole question concerning the freedom of the will has now come to
be as to whether or not consciousness _does_ give its verdict on the side
of freedom. Supposing we grant that "we are warranted to rely on a
deliverance of consciousness, when that deliverance is _that_ a thing is,
although we may be unable to think _how_ it can be,"[12] in this case the
question still remains, whether our opponents have rightly interpreted the
deliverance of their consciousness. I, for one, am quite persuaded that I
never perform any action without some appropriate motive, or set of
motives, having induced me to perform it. However, I am not discussing this
question, and I have merely made the above quotations for the purpose of
showing that Sir W. Hamilton appears to identify the _theory_ of Free-will
with the _fact_ that we possess a moral sense. He argues throughout as
though the theory he advocates were the only one that can explain a given
"fact of real actuality." But no one with whom we have to deal questions
the fact of our having a moral sense; and to identify this "deliverance of
consciousness" with belief in the theory that volitions are uncaused, is,
or would now be, merely to abandon the only questions in dispute.
It is very instructive, from this point of view, to observe the dilemma
into which Hamilton found himself driven by this identification of genuine
fact with spurious theory. He believed that the fact of man possessing an
ethical faculty could only be explained by the theory that man's will was
not determined by motives; for otherwise man could not be the author of his
own actions. But when he considered the matter in its other aspect, he
found that his theory of Free-will was as little compatible with moral
responsibility as was the opposing theory of "Bond-will;" for not only did
he candidly confess that he could not conceive of will as acting without
motives, but he further allowed the unquestionable truth "that, though
inconceivable, a motiveless volition would, if conceived, be conceived as
morally worthless."[13] I say this is very instructive, because it shows
that in Hamilton's view each theory was alike irreconcilable with "the
deliverance of consciousness," and that he only chose the one in preference
to the other, because, although not any more conceivable a solution, it
seemed to him a more possible one.[14]
§ 21. Such, then, is the speculative basis on which, according to Sir W.
Hamilton, our belief in a Deity can alone be grounded.
Those who at the present day are still confused enough in their notions
regarding the Free-will question to suppose that any further rational
question remains, may here be left to ruminate over this _bolus_, and to
draw from it such nourishment as they can in support of their belief in a
God; but to those who can see as plainly as daylight that the doctrine of
Determinism not only harmonises with all the facts of observation, but
alone affords a possible condition for, and a satisfactory explanation of,
the existence of our ethical faculty,--to such persons the question will
naturally arise:--"Although Hamilton was wrong in identifying a known fact
with a false theory, yet may he not have been right in the deductions which
he drew from the fact?" In other words, granting that his theory of
Free-will was wrong, does not his argument from the existence of a moral
sense in man to the existence of a moral Governor of the Universe remain as
intact as ever? Now, it is quite true that whatever degree of cogency the
argument from the presence of the moral sense may at any time have had,
this degree remains unaffected by the explosion of erroneous theories to
account for such presence. We have, therefore, still to face the fact that
the moral sense of man undoubtedly exists.
§ 22. The question we have to determine is, What evidence have we to show
that the moral part of man was created in the image of God; and if there is
any such evidence, what counter-existence is there to show that the moral
existence of man may be due to natural causes? In deciding this question,
just as in deciding any other question of a purely scientific character, we
must be guided in our examination by the Law of Parcimony; we must not
assume the agency of supernatural causes if we can discover the agency of
natural causes; neither must we merge the supposed mystery directly into
the highest mystery, until we are quite sure that it does not admit of
being proximately explained by the action of proximate influences.
Now, whether or not Mr. Darwin's theory as to the origin and development of
the moral sense be considered satisfactory, there can, I think, be very
little doubt in any impartial mind which duly considers the subject, that
in _some way or other_ the moral sense has been evolved. The body of
scientific evidence which has now been collected in favour of the general
theory of evolution is simply overwhelming; and in the presence of so large
an analogy, it would require a vast amount of contradictory evidence to
remove the presumption that human conscience, like everything else, has
been evolved. Now, for my own part, I am quite unable to distinguish any
such evidence, while, on the other hand, in support of the _à priori_
presumption that conscience has been evolved, I cannot conceal from myself
that there is a large amount of _à posteriori_ confirmation. I am quite
unable to distinguish anything in my sense of right and wrong which I
cannot easily conceive to have been brought about during the evolution of
my intelligence from lower forms of psychical life. On the contrary,
everything that I can find in my sense of right and wrong is precisely what
I should expect to find on the supposition of this sense having been
moulded by the progressive requirements of social development. Read in the
light of evolution, Conscience, in its every detail, is deductively
explained.
And, as though there were not sufficient evidence of this kind to justify
the conclusion drawn from the theory of evolution, the doctrine of
utilitarianism--separately conceived and separately worked out on
altogether independent grounds--the doctrine of utilitarianism comes in
with irresistible force to confirm that _à priori_ conclusion by the widest
and most unexceptionable of inductions.[15]
In the supernatural interpretation of the facts, the whole stress of the
argument comes upon the character of conscience as a _spontaneously
admonishing influence which acts independently of our own volition_. For it
is from this character alone that the inference can arise that conscience
is the delegate of the will of another. Thus, to render the whole argument
in the singularly beautiful words of Dr. Newman:--"If, as is the case, we
feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened at transgressing the voice
of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible,
before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing
wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us
on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same seeming serenity
of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight, which follows on one
receiving praise from a father,--we certainly have within us the image of
some person to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find
our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in
whose anger we waste away. These feelings in us are such as require for
their exciting cause an intelligent being; we are not affectionate towards
a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse
or compunction in breaking mere human law. Yet so it is; conscience emits
all these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and,
on the other hand, it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a
resignation, and a hope which there is no sensible, no earthly object to
elicit. 'The wicked flees when no one pursueth;' then why does he flee?
whence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, in the
hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does not
belong to this visible world, the Object to which his perception is
directed must be supernatural and divine; and thus the phenomena of
conscience as a dictate avail to impress the imagination with the picture
of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing,
retributive."[16]
Now I have quoted this passage because it seems to me to convey in a
concise form the whole of the argument from Conscience. But how tremendous
are the inferences which are drawn from the facts! As the first step in our
criticism, it is necessary to point out that two very different orders of
feelings are here treated by Dr. Newman. There is first the pure or
uncompounded ethical feelings, which spring directly from the moral sense
alone, and which all men experience in varying degrees. And next there are
what we may term the _ethico-theological_ feelings, which can only spring
from a blending of the moral sense with a belief in a personal God, or
other supernatural agents. The former class of feelings, or the
uncompounded ethical class, have exclusive reference to the moral
obligations that subsist between ourselves and other human beings, or
sentient organisms. The latter class of feelings, or the ethico-theological
class, have reference to the moral obligations that are believed to subsist
between ourselves and the Deity, or other supernatural beings. Now, in
order not to lose sight of this all-important distinction, I shall
criticise Dr. Newman's rendering of the ordinary argument from Conscience
in each of these two points of views separately. To begin, then, with the
uncompounded ethical feelings.
Such emotions as attend the operation of conscience in those who follow its
light alone without any theories as to its supernatural origin, are all of
the character of _reasonable_ or _explicable_ emotions. Granting that
fellow-feeling has been for the benefit of the race, and therefore that it
has been developed by natural causes, certainly there is nothing
_mysterious_ in the emotions that attend the violating or the following of
the dictates of conscience. For conscience is, by this naturalistic
supposition, nothing more than an organised body of certain psychological
elements, which, by long inheritance, have come to inform us, by way of
intuitive feeling, how we should act for the interests of society; so that,
if this hypothesis is correct, there cannot be anything more mysterious or
supernatural in the working of conscience than there is in the working of
any of our other faculties. That the disagreeable feeling of
_self-reproach_, as distinguished from _religious_ feeling, should follow
upon a violation of such an organized body of psychological elements,
cannot be thought surprising, if it is remembered that one of these
elements is natural fellow-feeling, and the others the elements which lead
us to know directly that we have violated the interests of other persons.
And as regards the mere fact that the working of conscience is independent
of the will, surely this is not more than we find, in varying degrees, to
be true of all our emotions; and conscience, according to the evolution
theory, has its root in the emotions. Hence, it is no more an argument to
say that the irrepressible character of conscience refers us to a God of
morality, than it would be to say that the sometimes resistless force of
the ludicrous refers us to a god of laughter. Love, again, is an emotion
which cannot be subdued by volition, and in its tendency to persist bears
just such a striking resemblance to the feelings of morality as we should
expect to find on the supposition of the former having played an important
part in the genesis of the latter. The _dictating_ character of conscience,
therefore, is clearly in itself of no avail as pointing to a superhuman
Dictator. Thus, for example, to take Dr. Newman's own illustration, why
should we feel such tearful, broken-hearted sorrow on intentionally or
carelessly hurting a mother? We see no shadow of a reason for resorting to
any supernatural hypothesis to explain the fact--love between mother and
offspring being an essential condition to the existence of higher animals.
Yet this is a simple case of truly conscientious feeling, where the thought
of any _personal_ cause of conscience _need_ not be entertained, and is
certainly not necessary to explain the effects. And similarly with _all_
cases of conscientious feeling, _except in cases where it refers directly
to its supposed author_. But these latter cases, or the ethico-theological
class of feelings, are in no way surprising. If the moral sense has had a
natural genesis in the actual relations between man and man, as soon as an
ideal "image" of "a holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive" God is
firmly believed to have an objective existence, as a matter of course moral
feelings must become transferred to the relations which are believed to
obtain between ourselves and this most holy God. Indeed, it is these very
feelings which, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, must be
concluded, in accordance with the law of parcimony, to have _generated_
this idea of God as "holy, just," and good. And the mere fact that, when
the complex system of religious belief has once been built up, conscience
is strongly wrought upon by that belief and its accompanying emotions, is
surely a fact the very reverse of mysterious. Suppose, for the sake of
argument, that the moral sense has been evolved from the social feelings,
and should we not certainly expect that, when the belief in a moral and
all-seeing God is superadded, conscience should be distracted at the
thought of offending him, and experience a "soothing, satisfactory delight"
in the belief that we are pleasing him? And as to the argument, "Why does
the wicked flee when none pursueth? whence his terror?" the question admits
of only too easy an answer. Indeed, the form into which the question is
thrown would almost seem--were it not written by Dr. Newman--to imply a
sarcastic reference to the power of superstition. "Who is it that," not
only Dr. Newman, but the haunted savage, the mediæval sorcerer, or the
frightened child, "sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers of
his heart?" Who but the "image" of his own thought? "If the cause of these
emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his
perception is directed must be supernatural and divine." Assuredly; but
what an inference from what an assumption! Whether or not the moral sense
has been developed by natural causes, "these emotions" of terror at the
thought of offending beings "supernatural and divine" are not of such
unique occurrence "in the visible world" as to give Dr. Newman the monopoly
of his particular "Object." With a deeper meaning, therefore, than he
intends may we repeat, "The phenomena of conscience as a dictate _avail_ to
impress the _imagination_ with the _picture_ of a Supreme Governor." But
criticism here is positively painful. Let it be enough to say that those of
us who do not already believe in any such particular "Object"--be it ghost,
shape, demon, or deity--are strangers, utter and complete, to any such
supernatural pursuers. The fact, therefore, of these various religious
emotions being associated with conscience in the minds of theists, can in
itself be no proof of Theism, seeing that it is the theory of Theism which
itself _engenders_ these emotions; those who do not believe in this theory
experiencing none of these feelings of personal dread, responsibility to an
unknown God, and the feelings of doing injury to, or of receiving praise
from, a parent. To such of us the violation of conscience is its own
punishment, as the pursuit of virtue is its own reward. For we know that
not more certainly than fire will burn, any violation of the deeply-rooted
feelings of our humanity will leave a gaping wound which even time may not
always heal. And when it is shown us that our natural dread of fire is due
to a supernatural cause, we may be prepared to entertain the argument that
our natural dread of sin, as distinguished from our dread of God, is
likewise due to such a cause. But until this can be done we must, as
reasonable men, _whose minds have been trained in the school of nature_,
forbear to allow that the one fact is of any greater cogency than the
other, so far as the question of a supernatural cause of either is
concerned. For, as we have already seen, the law of parcimony forbids us to
ascribe "the phenomena of conscience as a dictate" to a supernatural cause,
until the science of psychology shall have proved that they cannot have
been due to natural causes. But, as we have also seen, the science of
psychology is now beginning, as quick and thoroughly as can be expected, to
prove the very converse; so that the probability is now overwhelming that
our moral sense, like all our other faculties, has been evolved. Therefore,
while the burden of proof really lies on the side of Theism--or with those
who account for the natural phenomena of conscience by the hypothesis of a
supernatural origin--this burden is now being rapidly discharged by the
opposite side. That is to say, while the proofs which are now beginning to
substantiate the naturalistic hypothesis are all in full accord with the
ordinary lines of scientific explanations, the vague and feeble reflections
of those who still maintain that Conscience is evidence of Deity, are all
such as run counter to the very truisms of scientific method.
In the face of all the facts, therefore, I find it impossible to recognise
as valid any inference which is drawn from the existence of our moral sense
to the existence of a God; although, of course, all inferences drawn from
the existence of our moral sense to the _character_ of a God already
believed to exist remain unaffected by the foregoing considerations.[17]
* * * * *