of other men. But what is this respect? It is not a mere barren
feeling in the mind of another man, regarded as wholly unconnected
with his actions. It is regarded as a sentiment in his breast, from
which actions favourable to us may proceed. It derives its whole
value to us from the actions which it is likely to produce.
For the present purpose, therefore, we consider the word Dignity, as
expressing all that, in, and about, a man, which is calculated to
procure him the services of others, without the immediate
application either of reward, or of fear.
Wealth, and Power, are the grand constituents of Dignity; and
procure a man services beyond the immediate sphere, either of the
good, or the evil, he can dispense. This is a remarkable case of
association; and a source of very important consequences in human
life.
Our proneness to sympathize with the Rich and Great, has often been
taken notice of, as a remarkable phenomenon in human nature. This
has been described {210} as a readiness to go along with them in
their affections; to desire the accomplishment of their ends; and to
lend ourselves for the attainment of them.
I believe it will be sufficient, if I barely indicate the mode of
analysing the complicated sentiment, which is thus described. With
command over the means of all sorts of pleasures, we associate
strongly the idea of happiness; the idea of happiness, is an
agreeable idea; and the idea of whatever disturbs it, painful. The
first idea is a desire; the second, an aversion.
Beside this; with the Power of dispensing a great deal of good, or
evil, we associate strongly the idea of the actual dispensation;
that is, the idea of a great number of individuals benefited, or
hurt. But no association of good or evil to individuals is so
constant and inseparable with the causes of them, as that of good or
evil to ourselves. This association takes place in the case which we
are now considering. It may have been but momentary. It may have
been instantly overpowered by other associations, by association of
the circumstances which exclude the Belief. Still it had a momentary
existence; and, in its consequences, presents a remarkable instance
of those two very important facts, first pointed out distinctly to
the attention of philosophers by Professor Stewart; First, that
feelings, so momentary as not to be recognised the moment after they
have passed, may not only have existed, but have given its whole
character to some important phenomenon of the human mind; and,
Secondly, that there is no conception, that is, idea, without the
momentary belief of the existence {211} of its object.[42] The
momentary conception and belief of good and evil to ourselves, in
the association constituting the idea of a man of wealth and power,
has a great share in the character which that association bears.
[Editor's footnote 42: This is the place where the author most
clearly enunciates the doctrine which is the indispensable basis of
his theory of Belief, viz. that there is no idea "without the
momentary belief of the existence of its object." This opinion, as
the author observes, is maintained also by Dugald Stewart; but I
have never seen any positive evidence in its favour. All which has
been established is, that the belief _may_ have momentarily existed,
although immediately afterwards forgotten, and replaced by
disbelief. But no proof of this momentary existence has been given,
except that it is supposed that what is not believed to be real
cannot cause strong emotion (terror, for instance), nor prompt to
outward action. Yet nothing can be more certain than that a mere
idea can exercise direct power over our nerves of motion, and
through them, over the muscles; as the author shows by examples
further on. It is true that, as Mr. Bain has pointed out, this power
of an idea over the active energies is the only germ of belief which
exists originally, and the foundation of the power of Belief in
after life; but it is not the less true that the power of Belief as
it exists in after life, stands broadly distinguished from the power
of the Fixed Idea, and that this last may operate not only without,
but in defiance of, a positive Belief. That a contrary belief has
momentarily intervened is a mere conjecture, which can neither be
refuted nor proved.--_Ed._]
The Power of doing good or evil, though the foundation of our idea
of Dignity, is not the only ingredient in it; the Disposition to
make use of it enters for a great share. The disposition to make use
of it only for evil, if carried, to a certain pitch, would {212}
sink the idea of dignity, and leave dread and abhorrence in its
place.
Beside the disposition to make a good use of wealth and power, which
is virtue; Knowledge, and Wisdom enter as an important ingredient in
Dignity. In the possessor of wealth and power, they are necessary to
give effect to his good disposition; in all men they are an
instrument of power; and they are intimately associated, in
well-educated minds, with the idea of the great benefits to mankind,
which have been, and will be, derived from them. In such minds,
they, therefore, inspire a very lively sympathy.
I do not think it necessary to lengthen this exposition, by offering
any analysis of the corresponding causes of pain,--Poverty,
Weakness, and Contemptibility. The reader, after what he has
learned, will, without difficulty, perform it for himself
What we have now to consider, is the affection or state of mind,
which is formed, when we contemplate each of those causes, first, as
the past cause of past sensations, and secondly, as the future cause
of future sensations.
We are singularly ill-provided with names, to mark those several
states of our consciousness. It is very obvious, that we ought to
have two names for each cause; for example, one, to mark the state
of mind, when Wealth is contemplated as the _past_ cause, of _past_
sensations, and one to mark the state of mind, when it is
contemplated as the _future_ cause of _future_ sensations. We have
but one name for both. We call by the single name, "Love of Wealth,"
both the pleasurable state when we associate with the idea of our
past wealth the past pleasures we have derived from it, and {213}
when we anticipate the future, and associate with the idea of future
wealth, the idea of the pleasures to be derived from it. There is no
wonder that the two states should be confounded; and that the love
of wealth should be a vague, indefinite term.
The imperfection of our language is the same in regard to the two
other causes of our pleasures. The Love of Power, and the Love of
Dignity, are names for both states of mind, both the contemplation
of the past, and the contemplation of the future. The indistinctness
of our language here, too, prevents the distinctness of our ideas.
The word Hatred, renders the same service in regard to the causes of
evil. Hatred of poverty, is the name for both states of mind, both
that in which the future, and that in which the past, is the object
of contemplation. Hatred of imbecility, hatred of contemptibility,
are not common expressions, but we have for the states in question
no other names.
It is to be observed, that Wealth, Power, and Dignity, derive a
great portion of their efficacy, from their comparative amount; that
is, from their being possessed in greater quantity than most other
people possess them. In contemplating them with the satisfaction
with which powerful causes of pleasure are contemplated, we seldom
fail to include the comparison. And the state of consciousness,
formed by the contemplation and comparison taken together, is called
Pride.
We are said to be proud of our Wealth, proud of our Power, proud of
our Dignity; and also, of any of the ingredients of which our powder
or dignity is {214} composed; of our knowledge, of our eloquence, of
our family, of our personal beauty.
Of course the name has a very different meaning in each of these
applications; a difference, however, which in ordinary minds, the
use of the same term, almost completely confounds.
It is obvious, that, in the contemplation of our own Wealth, Power,
and Dignity, as greater, we include the contemplation of another
man's Wealth, Power, and Dignity, as less. As the state of
consciousness, thus formed, is called Pride when the reference is to
ourselves, it is called Contempt when the reference is to others.
When the case is reversed, and a man contemplates his Wealth, Power,
and Dignity as less than those of other men, the state of
consciousness is called Humility. As towards the other member of the
comparison, the men who possess the greater amount of those
advantages, it has the name of Respect, or Admiration.
* * * * *
SUB-SECTION II.
_Our Fellow-Creatures contemplated as Causes of our Pleasures and
Pains_.
Wealth, Power, and Dignity, being the origin of such powerful
affections as we find them to be, though the causes of Pleasure to
us only by being the causes of the actions of our Fellow-creatures;
it would be wonderful, if our Fellow-creatures themselves, the {215}
more immediate causes of those actions, should not be the origin of
affections.
This is not the case. Our Fellow-creatures are the origin of
affections of the greatest influence in human life; to the
examination of which it is now our business to proceed. It is, in
the first place, however, to be observed, that Wealth, Power, and
Dignity, afford perhaps the most remarkable of all examples of that
extraordinary case of association, where the means to an end, means
valuable to us solely on account of their end, not only engross more
of our attention than the end itself, but actually supplant it in
our affections. What the associating process is by which this effect
is produced, we need not stay to inquire. That it is produced, to a
remarkable degree, in the case of Wealth, Power, and Dignity, is
familiar to every man's observation. How few men seem to be at all
concerned about their fellow-creatures! How completely are the lives
of most men absorbed, in the pursuits of wealth, and ambition! With
how many men does the love of Family, of Friend, of Country, of
Mankind, appear completely impotent, when opposed to their love of
Wealth, or of Power! This is an effect of misguided association,
which requires the greatest attention in Education, and Morals.
We contemplate our Fellow-creatures as causes of our Pleasures,
either Individually, or in Groups. We shall consider the several
cases, which have attracted sufficient attention to be distinguished
by names: 1st, That of Friendship; 2dly, That of Kindness; 3dly,
That of Family; 4thly, That of Country; 5thly, That of Party; and
6thly, That of Mankind.
{216} 1.--_Friendship_.
In what manner the associations are formed constituting that feeling
towards another man which we call friendship, it seems not very
difficult to trace. The states of circumstances in which the Feeling
originates are very numerous. But they are all, without exception,
of one kind. They are all states of circumstances, in which a
greater proportion than usual of our own pleasures, come to be
associated with the idea of the Individual. It often originates in
companionship, between men who for some time have indulged their
Tastes, and prosecuted their pleasures in company. It is perfectly
obvious how the idea of such men will occur to one another, not
simply as the idea of a man, but so enveloped by the trains of
pleasurable ideas associated with the man, that the idea of him is
upon the whole a highly pleasurable idea. When to this is added, the
expectation of future pleasures, not merely the continuation of the
companionship, but services of importance; when the wisdom of the
man promises light and guidance from his counsels; when his fidelity
makes it safe to trust him; when his benevolence towards us makes us
count upon his services, whenever they are required, and his
reputation and influence in the world are such as to give weight to
his endeavours, there is a sufficient accumulation of pleasurable
ideas with that of the individual to account for the affection
denominated Friendship.
2.--_Kindness_.
There is nothing which more instantly associates with itself the
ideas of our own Pleasures, and Pains, {217} than the idea of the
Pleasures and Pains of another of our Fellow-creatures. The
expositions already afforded sufficiently indicate the source of
this association, which exerts a powerful and salutary influence in
human life.
The idea of a man enjoying a train of pleasures, or happiness, is
felt by every body to be a pleasurable idea. The idea of a man under
a train of sufferings or pains, is equally felt to be a painful
idea. This can arise from nothing but the association of our own
pleasures with the first idea, and of our own pains with the second.
We never feel any pains and pleasures but our own. The fact, indeed,
is, that our very idea of the pains or pleasures of another man is
only the idea of our own pains, or our own pleasures, associated
with the idea of another man. This is one not of the least
important, and curious, of all cases of association, and instantly
shews how powerfully associated trains of ideas of our pains and
pleasures must be with a feeling so compounded.[43]
[Editor's footnote 43: That the pleasures or pains of another person
can only be pleasurable or painful to us through the association of
our own pleasures or pains with them, is true in one sense, which is
probably that intended by the author, but not true in another,
against which he has not sufficiently guarded his mode of
expression. It is evident, that the only pleasures or pains of which
we have direct experience being those felt by ourselves, it is from
them that our very notions of pleasure and pain are derived. It is
also obvious that the pleasure or pain with which we contemplate the
pleasure or pain felt by somebody else, is itself a pleasure or pain
of our own. But if it be meant that in such cases the pleasure or
pain is consciously referred to self, I take this to be a mistake.
By the acts or other signs exhibited by another person, the idea of
a pleasure (which is a pleasurable idea) or the idea of a pain
(which is a painful idea) are recalled, sometimes with considerable
intensity, but in association with the other person as feeling them,
not with one's self as feeling them. The idea of one's Self is, no
doubt, closely associated with all our experiences, pleasurable,
painful, or indifferent; but this association does not necessarily
act in all cases because it exists in all cases. If the mind, when
pleasurably or painfully affected by the evidences of pleasure or
pain in another person, goes off on a different thread of
association, as for instance, to the idea of the means of giving the
pleasure or relieving the pain, or even if it dismisses the subject
and relapses into the ordinary course of its thoughts, the
association with its own self may be, at the time, defeated, or
reduced to something so evanescent that we cannot tell whether it
was momentarily present or not.--_Ed._]
{218} The Pleasurable association composed of the ideas of a man and
his pleasures, and the painful association composed of the ideas of
a man and his pains, are both Affections, which have so much of the
same tendency that they are included under one name, Kindness;
though the latter affection has a name appropriate to itself,
Compassion.
3.--_Family_.
The Group, which consists of a Father, Mother, and Children, is
called a Family. The associations which each member of this group
has of his pains and pleasures, with the pains and pleasures of the
other members, constitute some of the most interesting states of
human consciousness.
The affection of the husband and wife is, in its origin, that of two
persons of different sex, and need {219} not be further analysed. To
this source of pleasurable association is added, when the union is
happy, all those other associations, just enumerated, which
constitute the affection of Friendship. To this another addition is
made by the union of interests; or that necessity, under which both
are placed, of receiving pain and pleasure from the same causes. As,
in too many instances, these pleasurable associations are
extinguished, by the generation of others of an opposite
description; in other cases, they are carried to such a height, as
to afford an exemplification of that remarkable state of mind, in
which a greater value is set upon the means, than upon the end.
Persons have been found, the one of whom could not endure to live
without the other.
The Parental affection requires to be somewhat more minutely
analysed.
First of all, there can be no doubt, that all that power of exciting
trains of ideas of our own pains and pleasures, which belongs to the
pains and pleasures of any of our fellow-creatures, is possessed by
the pains and pleasures of a man's child.
In the next place, it is well known that the pains and pleasures of
another person affect us; that is, associate with themselves the
ideas of our own pains and pleasures, with more or less intensity,
according to the attention which we bestow upon his pains or
pleasures. A parent is commonly either led or impelled to bestow an
unusual degree of attention upon the pains and pleasures of his
child; and hence a habit is contracted of sympathizing with him, as
it is commonly, and not insignificantly named; in other words, a
facility of associating the ideas of {220} his own pains and
pleasures, with those of the child.
Again, a man looks upon his child as a cause to him of future pains
or pleasures, much more certain, than any other person. The father
regards the son somewhat in the light of another self, a great
proportion of the effects of whose acts, whether good or evil, will
redound to himself. An object regarded as a great future cause to us
of future pains or pleasures, we call an object of intense interest;
in other words, a train of interesting ideas, that is, of ideas of
pains or pleasures, is associated with it.
The vivacity and simplicity of the expressions of the pains and
pleasures of children, in their looks, and tones, and attitudes, as
well as words, give them a peculiar power of exciting sympathy, that
is, of associating with them trains of the analogous feelings of
ourselves. The frequency with which a parent is called upon to
attend to those expressions in his child, gives him a habit of
forming the associations to which they lead.
The perfect dependence of the child upon the parent is a source of
deep interest. The whole of its pleasures being the fruit of his
acts, he more easily associates with them the trains of his own
pleasures, than with those of any person not so connected with him.
His acts, too, being required to save it from the worst of pains,
and from destruction, the idea of its pains, arising from any
relaxation of his care, calls up, in strong association, both the
analogous pains of himself, and also the opposite pleasurable
feelings arising from the continuance of the acts by which the
pleasures of the child are produced. And to all these {221} sources
of association is added, that which is always agreeable, the train
making up the idea of our own power; no case of power being so
perfect as that of the parent over his helpless offspring.
Another important source of agreeable association is yet to be
mentioned. Man becomes fond (it is a matter of daily observation) of
that on which he has frequently conferred benefits. This is a fact
of considerable importance in human nature; for, under the little
care which hitherto has been bestowed in generating, by education,
the associations on which Beneficence depends, a considerable part
of the beneficence existing in the world has been produced by this
cause. It is also a case of association, which strongly illustrates
the fact, that pleasures, produced by our own acts, have a peculiar
power in associating with them trains of the ideas of our own
pleasures. Not only a Fellow-creature, but even one of the lower
animals, by having been the object of repeated acts of kindness,
becomes an object of affection. Trains of our own pleasures are so
often united with the idea of such an object of our kindness, that
the idea of the object becomes at last an idea made up of the
original idea of the individual and of trains of our own pleasures:
a compound idea, made up, in great part, of pleasurable ideas; that
is, an Affection.
That the whole of the parental affection is derived from these and
similar associations, is proved by some decisive facts.
Whenever it happens that a man is placed in circumstances which
produce those associations, he feels the parental affection, without
parentage. Facts of this description are so frequent, and so
notorious, that {222} it is hardly necessary to produce an instance
of them. How else does it happen, that a man who does not suspect
the infidelity of his wife, rears as his own, and without any
difference of affection, the offspring of the man who has injured
him? Cases, for the credit of our nature, are not wanting, and when
education is better, they will be less rare, in which a family of
orphans is taken under the protection of a man of virtue. By acting
towards them the part of a parent, he never fails to acquire for
them the affection of a parent.
There are equally notorious and decisive facts to prove, that
whenever the parent is placed in circumstances which either wholly,
or to a great degree, prevent the formation of the associations with
the child to which we ascribe the parental affection, there is a
corresponding want of the affection. The case of illegitimate
children is pregnant with evidence to this point. In the great
majority of cases of this description, no affection exists. The
parent may feel the obligation of maintaining the child, because
public opinion, or perhaps the law, requires it: but this is the
extent of the bond.
The circumstances of Families, in the two opposite states, of great
poverty, and great opulence, are unfavourable to the formation of
those associations of which the parental affection consists.
In cases of extreme poverty, which alone are the cases here
understood; because, in the more moderate cases of poverty, the
parental affection exists in considerable strength; the
circumstances which lead to the formation of agreeable associations
with the child, are either wanting, or counteracted by circumstances
{223} of an opposite tendency. The parent has little the means of
bestowing pleasures on his child; he has not the means of saving it
from an almost constant series of pains. The means which he employs
in saving the child from pains, are taken from the means of saving
himself from pains. Constantly occupied in the labours which yield
him a scanty means of subsistence, he spends but little time in the
company of his child, and has therefore little opportunity of
attending to the engaging expressions of its pains and pleasures. It
is needless to carry the enumeration of particulars farther. The
circumstances which tend to generate agreeable associations with the
child are few. The circumstances which tend to generate painful
associations with it are many.
In Families of great opulence, the attention of the parent, averted
either by the calls of pleasure, or the avocations which his
position in society creates, is but little bestowed upon his
children. Where the pains and pleasures of others are not attended
to, no association with those pains and pleasures exists; where
there is not a habit of forming the associations, the Affection does
not exist.
The mode in which the child of the man of opulence is maintained and
educated, proceeds so remotely from the acts of the parent, that the
agreeable associations, which we have with our own acts of
beneficence, are, in the case of such a parent, very imperfectly
formed.
The man of opulence naturally regards his children as part of his
state; as the inheritors of his fortune; or as belonging to the same
line of ancestors with himself; and with both those constituents of
his {224} dignity he has many agreeable associations. But these are
an imperfect substitute for the habits of agreeable association
which are generated in more favourable circumstances.
Hitherto, we have considered only the parental affection of the
Father. The parental affection of the Mother differs from that of
the Father in the associations which she forms with her child in her
own peculiar situations of gestation and nursing. That these are
such as to create intense associations every one will admit. Every
movement of the child during the period of gestation is to her a
sensation. Every thought of it is connected with that flood of hopes
and fears attached to the awful hour, never absent from her
thoughts, which, through a series of cruel pains, will either
stretch her a lifeless corpse, or render her a rejoicing mother. As
a nurse, the child is to her a source, both of agreeable sensations,
and agreeable ideas. On the sensations we need not dilate. They are
known only to those who have experienced them. But it is not
possible to conceive a case more calculated to associate strongly
the ideas of our own pleasures, with the ideas of the pleasures we
bestow, than that of the mother, when she presses her infant to her
bosom, and communicates to him the means of life, and the only
pleasures he is capable of enjoying, not only by her own acts, but
from her own substance; and when she perceives how soon in the mind
of the child, the idea of herself is associated with the existence
of all his pleasures, and the removal of all his pains; in other
words, how quickly she becomes not only the object of his
affections, but the one and only object.
{225} Having explained at so much length the grand case of the
Domestic Affections, we may pass over the rest with a very cursory
notice.
Even the Filial affection has in it nothing peculiar. In the child,
the idea of his parent, as a being with power almost unlimited over
him, creates the associations which constitute reverence, and
respect; and the perpetual use of that power on the part of the
parent to give him pleasures, or the command of pleasures, to remove
from him pains, or give him the means of removing them, naturally
creates the associations which constitute affection.
The affection which exists among Brothers and Sisters, has in it
most of the ingredients which go to the formation of Friendship.
There is first of all Companionship; the habit of enjoying
pleasures, in common, and also of suffering pains: hence a great
readiness in sympathizing with one another; that is, in associating
trains of their own pains and pleasures, with the pains and
pleasures of one another. There is next, when the Education is good,
a constant reciprocation, to the extent of their power, of
beneficent acts. And lastly there is their common relation to the
grand source of all their pleasures, the Parent.
When the affections of the domestic class exist in perfection (in
such a state of Education and Morals as ours this rarely can
happen), they afford so constant a succession of agreeable trains,
that they form, perhaps, the most valuable portion of human
happiness. Acts of beneficence to larger masses of mankind, afford
still more interesting trains to those who perform them. But they
are the small number. The happiness of the Domestic affections is
open to all.
{226} 4.--_Country_.
The word country is the name of an idea of great complexity. In that
idea are included all the multitudes of persons, and all the
multitudes of things, and all the multitudes of positions, in a
certain portion of the Globe of the Earth. Nor are these present
existences alone included in that idea: the HISTORY of the country
is included, that is, the whole series of prior existences; and not
the PAST HISTORY only, but the FUTURE HISTORY also, or series of
future existences, as far as our power of anticipation reaches. This
is a remarkable example of the power of association, to unite ideas
without number in such closeness, that their individuality is
unperceived, and the cluster, however large, resembles a single
uncompounded idea.
This cluster is not wholly made up of indifferent ideas. There is
included in it the sources of all our pleasures, and almost all the
objects with which we have been accustomed to associate trains of
agreeable ideas. The plains, the mountains, the valleys, the rivers,
with which we have formed agreeable associations, are all there; the
individual objects with which we have formed similar associations,
the trees, the houses; the house, for example, in which we were
born, the tree under which we have sat to enjoy the affections of
our parents, or indulge our sympathies with other objects of our
love, the paths in which we have strayed, the fields through which
we have roamed, the riches wherewith we have seen them periodically
clothed, the labours of those fields, the labourers, their manners,
appearance, and character, {227} the flocks and herds, the cities
and towns, with all their inhabitants, and all their operations, the
wonderful proceedings of the manufacturers, the arrival and
departure of ships, loaded with the precious commodities of the
different regions of the Earth.
To these sources of Interest is to be added, all that portion of our
fellow-creatures with whom we have been accustomed to associate our
Pains and Pleasures. Here are our Parents, our Brothers and Sisters,
our Sons and Daughters. Here are the men, and here the women, who
have engaged our affections. Here are our Benefactors, here are our
Instructors, here are the manners which alone from habit are
agreeable to us. And here are the Institutions from which we have
derived Protection, and to which, in their usual state of
imperfection, we are apt to lend a reverence, such is the strength
of the association, far beyond the measure of their worth.
Sufficient sources have now been pointed out, to shew whence it is
that the Idea of country, as it involves a great number of agreeable
associations, becomes, or more properly speaking is, an Affection,
5.--_Party; Class_.
That which constitutes a Party, or class, is always some community
of Interest: in other words, some thing or things, to be obtained,
secured, or augmented, by the common endeavours of the class, and
operating as a cause of pleasure to all of them.
The People, that is, the Mass of the community, are sometimes called
a class; but that is only to distinguish them, like the term Lower
Orders, from the {228} Aristocratical class. In the proper meaning
of the term class, it is not applicable to the People. No interest
is in common to them, which is not in common to the rest of the
community. There is nothing which can operate as a cause of benefit
to them exclusively. Whatever operates as a cause of benefit to them
in common, operates equally as a cause of benefit to every part of
the community, saving and excepting those who are in possession of
some mischievous power over a portion, greater or less, of the
community. It may no doubt very easily happen, that what is a
benefit to the rest of the community, is an evil to the possessors
of such power; as what is an evil, and the greatest of all Evils, to
the Community, is a Benefit to them.
There is no Love of Class, therefore, but in a Privileged Order. The
Patricians, in ancient Rome, were a Class of this sort. And in
modern Europe there are two such classes: the Nobility, in each
Country: and the Incorporated Clergy; calling themselves the Church,
in Catholic countries, the Established Church, in Non-catholic
countries.
The associations which the members of a governing class have with
one another, individually, as fathers, sons, companions, friends,
are not here to be taken into account. The associations connected
with the privileges which constitute any body of men a class, are
alone concerned in forming the states of mind which we now are
explaining.
Such privileges consist of Wealth, Power, Dignity, one, or all,
conferred by Legislative act: that is, not the result of natural
acquisition, but of a sort of force, or compulsion, put upon other
people.
{229} We need not again enter into an explanation of the agreeable
associations which every man has with his own Wealth, Power, and
dignity, and with the causes, either of their existence, or of their
increase, or of their security. When these causes to one man, are
causes also to a circle of other men, the whole Body has both
individually and collectively the associations with those causes,
which constitute Affection.
6.--_Mankind_.
The word Mankind is the name of another of those remarkable
associations, by which countless ideas are so combined, that their
individuality is sunk, and the aggregate is, to appearance, one
idea.
The Idea Mankind, like the Idea Country, is not made up wholly of
indifferent ideas. It has in it all the trains of pleasurable ideas
which we associate, either with individuals, or with subdivisions,
of the whole mass.
We have interesting associations with the idea of a man, as a man.
The idea of his pains, and his pleasures, call up, unavoidably,
trains of the ideas of our own pains and pleasures. The Idea of a
man, therefore, naturally includes, the love of his pleasures,
hatred of his pains.
From our earliest Infancy, we have had experience of nothing more
constantly than this; that a great proportion of our pleasures
proceeded from a certain disposition towards us, on the part of
those of our fellow-creatures who were near us; and a great
proportion of our Pains from a certain other disposition on their
part. Those Dispositions, taken in the most {230} general sense, are
Kindness, which we have already explained; and its opposite,
Unkindness. We have, therefore, very intense associations of
Pleasure, with the idea of the Disposition towards us, called
Kindness, in other men; and very intense associations of Pain with
that of the Disposition in them called Unkindness towards us.
In our Idea of each individual man, therefore, is included not only
the Love of his Pleasures and Aversion to his Pains; but, in
addition to this, the Love of his Disposition of Kindness towards
us, and Aversion to his Disposition of Unkindness towards us.
Now, as our complex Idea of Mankind, is made up of the aggregate of
the ideas of Individuals, including the interesting trains called
Love of their Pleasures, Hatred of their Pains; Love of their
Kindness, Aversion to their Unkindness; the generation of the
affection, called Love of Mankind, is, for our present purpose,
sufficiently shewn.[44] [45]
[Bain's footnote 44: As carrying out the principle of association,
in the domain of the Feelings, the foregoing chapters, from XIX.
onwards, are unexceptionable and cogent. As furnishing the complete
account of the Benevolent and Malevolent Affections, and of the
Sympathies or disinterested impulses, they are defective. Indeed,
the whole subject of the Emotions is placed by the author upon a too
narrow basis. Any theory that looks solely to the circumstance of
pleasure and pain, (important as that is) fails to grapple with all
the facts. For example, there is no account rendered of the very
familiar emotion of Wonder.
That the Emotions are all compounded of elements of Sense (in the
widest comprehension, that is, with Muscularity included) may be
maintained on good grounds. Nevertheless, in order to a satisfactory
analysis of even the commoner emotions, such as Tenderness, there is
wanted a more exhaustive detail of the pleasures and pains of sense
than is furnished in the present work.
A few remarks on the generic example of the Tender Feeling, on which
the author has expended the greatest part of his illustration, will
show the method to be pursued. It is a case where certain primary
sensibilities, correctly ranked under Sensation, together with the
associating principle, seem to account for the whole of the
phenomenon. In such a case as Wonder, the explanation involves an
additional element.
The pleasures of Tender Feeling, or Love and the Affections, are no
doubt, as remarked in the text, in a considerable part associations
with other pleasures, such as nourishment. An animal and a child
would contract a pleasurable association with the person that brings
them their food, or ministers to their bodily wants. Still, there is
something different from this in Tenderness or Love. The fact
essential to the state is the gratification from the acts of
caressing, fondling, and embracing; a pleasure that has its
independent sources in the human and animal sensibilities, and does
not need the association with being fed and cared for, although
enhanced and stimulated by that association. Even apart from the
powerful element of sexuality, there is a great mass of pleasurable
animal feeling awakened in the loving embrace of two individuals of
the warm-blooded species. We may instance, among these, the
pleasures of Touch in the soft warm contact; the muscular pleasures
co-operating; the organic feelings connected with secretions
stimulated in the act, of which the lachrymal is the prominent but
not the solitary case; the peculiar sensibility of the pharynx,
which is probably the sign of a less acute but more extended
influence in the alimentary canal generally; to all which, is to be
added, in women, the genial secretion of the breasts, going on
incessantly, although more profuse in nursing mothers. The coalition
of these tactile, muscular, and organic sensibilities, is the
pleasure of love by itself, or as it might be felt between two
living sentient creatures, in no other way the givers or receivers
of benefits. Nor does this exhaust the circle. The eye, and the ear,
and even the smell, may be also included. The visible aspects of
living beings are often highly agreeable from the first, and become
so to a farther extent by association with the tactile and organic
pleasures. Similarly, the ear may be charmed with the sounds emitted
by another human being or animal, and may also form associations
with the still more potent pleasures above named. Once more, the
odour of one animal may be intrinsically sweet to another animal;
while here too, associations may be added.
The pleasure of Tender feeling must therefore be pronounced to have
an independent standing in the sentient framework, although
susceptible of being analysed into the primary pleasures of the
senses, together with the influence of association. All the
affections derive the chief part of their strength from this complex
source. For, although the acts of fondling and caressing are not
universally practised between every two persons that have a mutual
affection, or are so only in the very limited form of the shake of
the hand, yet there is an echo of these, and a stimulus to the
organic accompaniments, in the sight of each other, in the sounds of
the voice, and in the more intellectual forms of indicating
attachment. It can be proved that the two higher senses enter deeply
into the tender emotion, (as they do into the Beautiful). The
well-known Dr. Kitto, who was stone-deaf, in describing his
experience, states that, as regarded his pleasures, the loss that
affected him most was his inability to hear the voices of his
children. It is evident that the same remark, as to the mutilation
of an organ of tender feeling, is applicable to the blind. The
pathos of the lines in Paradise Lost contains this
implication.--_B._]
[Editor's footnote 45: The two preceding subsections are almost
perfect as expositions and exemplifications of the mode in which, by
the natural course of life, we acquire attachments to persons,
things, and positions, which are the causes or habitual concomitants
of pleasurable sensations to us, or of relief from pains: in other
words, those persons, things, and positions become in themselves
pleasant to us by association; and, through the multitude and
variety of the pleasurable ideas associated with them, become
pleasures of greater constancy and even intensity, and altogether
more valuable to us, than any of the primitive pleasures of our
constitution. This portion of the laws of human nature is the more
important to psychology, as they show how it is possible that the
moral sentiments, the feelings of duty, and of moral approbation and
disapprobation, may be no original elements of our nature, and may
yet be capable of being not only more intense and powerful than any
of the elements out of which they may have been formed, but may
also, in their maturity, be perfectly disinterested: nothing more
being necessary for this, than that the acquired pleasure and pain
should have become as independent of the native elements from which
they are formed, as the love of wealth and of power not only often
but generally become, of the bodily pleasures, and relief from
bodily pains, for the sake of which, and of which alone, power and
wealth must have been originally valued. No one thinks it necessary
to suppose an original and inherent love of money or of power; yet
these are the objects of two of the strongest, most general, and
most persistent passions of human nature; passions which often have
quite as little reference to pleasure or pain, beyond the mere
consciousness of possession, and are in that sense of the word quite
as disinterested, as the moral feelings of the most virtuous human
being.
The author, then, has furnished a most satisfactory and most
valuable explanation of certain of the laws of our affections and
passions, and has traced the origin and generation of a great number
of them. But it must be remarked of the whole exposition, that it
accounts truly, but only partially, for this part of human nature.
It affords a sufficient theory of what we may call the mental, or
intellectual element of the feelings in question. But it does not
furnish, nor does the author anywhere furnish, any theory of what
may be called the animal element in them. Yet this is no unimportant
ingredient in the emotional and active part of human nature: and it
is one greatly demanding analysis. Let us take the case of any of
the passions: and as one of the simplest as well as one of the most
powerful of them, let us take the emotion of Fear. The author gives
no account of Fear but that it is the idea of a painful sensation,
associated with the idea of its being (more or less uncertainly)
future. Undoubtedly these elements are present in it; but do they
account for the peculiar emotional character of the passion, and for
its physiological effect, such as pallor, trembling, faltering of
the voice, coldness of the skin, loss of control over the
secretions, and general depression of the vital powers? The case
would be simpler if these great disturbances of the animal functions
by the expectation of a pain were the same in kind as the smaller
modifications produced by the mere idea. This, however, is by no
means the case; Ideas do produce effects on the animal economy, but
not those particular effects. The idea of a pain, if it acts on the
bodily functions at all, has an action the same in kind (though much
less in degree) as the pain itself would have. But the passion of
fear has a totally different action. Suppose the fear to be that of
a flogging. The flogging itself, if it produced any physical
demonstrations, would produce cries, shrinkings, possibly muscular
struggles, and might by its remoter effects disturb the action of
the brain or of the circulation; and if the fear of a flogging
produced these same effects, in a mitigated degree, the power of
fear might be merely the power of the idea of the pain. But none of
these are at all like the characteristic symptoms of fear: while
those characteristic symptoms are much the same whatever be the
particular pain apprehended, and whether it be a bodily or a purely
mental pain, provided it be sufficiently intense and sufficiently
proximate. No one has ever accounted for this remarkable difference,
and the author of the Analysis does not even mention it. The
explanation of it is one of those problems, partly psychological and
partly physiological, which our knowledge of the laws of animal
sensibility does not yet enable us to resolve. In whatever manner
the phenomena are produced, they are a case of the quasi-chemistry
of the nervous functions, whereby the junction of certain elements
generates a compound whose properties are very different from the
sum of the properties of the elements themselves.
This is the point which the author's explanations of the emotional
part of human nature do not reach, and, it may even be said, do not
attempt to reach. Until, however, it is reached, there is no
guarantee for the completeness of his analysis of even the mental
element in the passions: for when the effect exhibits so much which
has not, in the known properties of the assigned cause, anything to
account for it, there is always room for a doubt whether some part
of the cause has not been left out of the reckoning. This doubt,
however, does not seriously affect the most important of the
author's analyses, viz. those which, without resolving the emotions
themselves into anything more elementary, expound their transfer by
association from their natural objects to others; with the great
increase of intensity and persistency which so often accompanies the
transfer, and which is in general quite sufficiently accounted for
by the causes to which the author refers it.--_Ed._]
* * * * *
SUB-SECTION III.
_The Objects called Sublime and Beautiful, and their Contraries,
contemplated as Causes of our Pleasures and Pains_.
These objects have received much of the attention of Philosophers;
and great progress has been made in {231} analysing the associations
which form the complicated feelings, ranged under the name of
Emotions of the Sublime and Beautiful.
{232} It does not belong to the present purpose to go into the
details of this subject, which, for obvious reasons, have been
pursued to great length. It is necessary, {233} however, for that
purpose, to shew, into what general laws the phenomena are capable
of being resolved.
The feelings which are marked under the name of {234} Emotions of
the Sublime and Beautiful, are so much alike, that the distinction
of them into two species is somewhat arbitrary. Though the Romans
did apply {235} the word _sublimis_, and its abstract, _sublimitas_,
in a certain rhetorical way, to objects of Taste, their word
_Pulchrum_, properly denoted all that is expressed by {236} our
Sublime and Beautiful, taken together. The Greek word, [Greek:
kalo/n], also clearly included every thing which we rank under the
name of Sublime. Longinus, indeed, who lived at a very late and
degenerate period of Grecian literature, wrote a treatise to which
he gave the affected Title, [Greek: Pe/ri U(psou=s], or "About
Height;" and as that has been a very popular treatise in modern
times, it is not improbable, that the use of the word Sublime, which
has become so prevalent in the discourse of the moderns, derives its
origin from no higher source.
Mr. Alison, who wrote a very pleasing, and, to a certain degree, a
Philosophical Book, on the Emotions of Taste, has shewn by an
abundance of well-chosen illustrations, that it is not the immediate
sensations, received by us from the objects of Taste, which
constitute them a cause of our pleasures. The immediate sensations
are commonly indifferent, or approaching the indifferent. It is only
when they introduce, by association, a train of pleasurable ideas,
that the feelings called the pleasures of Taste, are ever enjoyed.
I believe that I may assume this as an established {237} fact in our
nature; and I shall only adduce as much of the evidence as may teach
those of my readers, to whom these inquiries may be new, the mode in
which the truth of the proposition becomes apparent. I also think it
useful to avail myself, not only of the illustrations, but as much
as possible of the words, of Mr. Alison, as exhibiting the clear
conviction of the wonderful effects of association, in one instance,
on the part of a writer, who seems to have had no idea of its
affording an equally satisfactory solution of the other complex
phenomena of mind.
What are called the external objects of Taste, are mostly objects of
Hearing, objects of Sight, or objects of that Muscular Sense, from
which we derive the idea of extension.
That the feelings we have by these senses are generically distinct
from the emotions of Sublimity and Beauty, might, I imagine, be
trusted to an appeal to each man's consciousness. There are
innumerable cases, however, which may be regarded as decisive
experiments upon the subject.
Of the sounds which can be adduced as Sublime or Beautiful, there
is, perhaps, not one, which is not often heard in circumstances,
wherein no tendency to Emotion is felt. The circumstances in which
the Emotion is felt, and those in which it is not felt, are those in
which a train of pleasurable ideas is, or is not, introduced by
association.
"All sounds," says Mr. Alison, "are in general SUBLIME, which are
associated with Ideas of great Power or Might: the Noise of a
Torrent,--the Fall of a Cataract,--the Uproar of a Tempest,--the
Explosion of Gunpowder,--the Dashing of the Waves, &c.
{238} "All sounds, in the same manner, are sublime, which are
associated with Ideas of Majesty, or Solemnity, or deep Melancholy,
or any other strong Emotion: the Sound of the Trumpet, and all other
warlike instruments,--the Note of the Organ,--the Sound of the
Curfew,--the Tolling of the Passing bell, &c.
"There is a great variety of sounds also, that occur in the scenes
of Nature, which are productive of the Emotion of BEAUTY: the Sound
of a Waterfall,--the Murmuring of a Rivulet,--the Whispering of the
Wind,--the Sheepfold-bell,--the sound of the Curfew, &c.
"That the Notes or Cries of some Animals, are Sublime, every one
knows: the Roar of the Lion, the Growling of Bears, the Howling of
Wolves, the Scream of the Eagle, &c. In all those cases, those are
the notes of animals remarkable for their strength, and formidable
for their ferocity. It would seem very natural, therefore, that the
sublimity of such sounds should arise from the qualities of which
they are expressive.
"The Bleating of a Lamb, is beautiful in a fine day in spring: the
Lowing of a Cow at a distance, amid the scenery of a pastoral
landscape in summer. The Call of a Goat among rocks is strikingly
beautiful, as expressing wildness and independence. The Hum of the
Beetle is beautiful in a fine summer evening, as appearing to suit
the stillness and repose of that pleasing season. The Twitter of the
Swallow is beautiful in the morning, and seems to be expressive of
the cheerfulness of that time."
This enumeration of cases, which is only a selection from those of
Mr. Alison, is far more than {239} sufficient for the purpose, as
indeed it is one defect of his book that his propositions are
overlaid with evidence.
That these sounds, as sensations, do not constitute the pleasures
enjoyed, he demonstrates, by shewing that on many occasions, on
which the sensations exist as perfectly as on any other occasion, no
pleasure is felt. He also shews, that when the pleasures are felt,
a train of pleasurable ideas is introduced by association.
"The sound of Thunder, he says, is perhaps of all others in Nature,
the most Sublime." Yet the rolling of stones from a cart, produces a
sound so exactly the same, that it is often mistaken for thunder.
While the mistake lasts, the feeling of sublimity lasts. When the
mistake is corrected, it instantly vanishes; that is, the
association is dissolved.
"There is scarcely in nature," says Mr. Alison, "a more trifling
sound than the buzz of Flies; yet, I believe, there is no man of
common Taste, who, in the deep silence of a summer's noon, has not
found something strikingly sublime, in this inconsiderable sound.
The falling of a drop of water, produces in general a very
insignificant and unexpressive sound; yet sometimes in Vaults, and
in large Cathedrals, a single drop is heard to fall, at distant
intervals, from the roof; than which, I know not if there is a
single sound more strikingly sublime."
Mr. Alison further remarks, that to those who have no trains of
pleasurable ideas associated with sounds, "or who consider them
simply as sounds, they have no beauty. It is long before children
shew any sensibility to the beauty of sounds. To the greater {240}
number of the sounds which we denominate beautiful, the common
people, in the same manner, are altogether indifferent. To the
peasant, the Curfew is only the mark of the hour of the
evening,--the Sheep-bell, the sign of the neighbourhood of the
flock,--the sound of a Cascade, the sign of the falling of water,
&c. Give him the associations which men of cultivated imagination
have with such sounds, and he will infallibly feel their beauty."
Mr. Alison shews, that when the notes or cries of animals are
stripped of certain associations, they are unproductive of Emotions
of sublimity or beauty. "There is not one of these sounds," he says,
"which may not be imitated in some manner or other; and which, while
we are ignorant of the deception, does not produce the same Emotion
with the real sound: when we are undeceived, however, we are
conscious of no other Emotion, but that, perhaps, of simple pain
from its loudness. The howl of the Wolf is little distinguished from
the howl of the Dog, either in its tone or in its strength, but
there is no comparison between their sublimity. Few, if any, of the
sounds felt as sublime are so loud as the most common of all sounds,
the lowing of a Cow; yet this is the very reverse of sublimity.
Imagine this sound, on the contrary, expressive of Fierceness and
Strength, and there can be no doubt, that it would become sublime.
The scream of the Eagle is simply disagreeable, when the bird is
either tamed or confined; it is Sublime, only when it is heard amid
Rocks and Deserts, and when it is expressive to us, of Liberty and
Independence, and savage Majesty. The noise of the Rattlesnake (that
most dangerous animal of all his tribe) {241} is very little
different from the noise of a child's play-thing; yet who will deny
its sublimity? The growl of the Tiger, resembles the purring of a
Cat; the one is sublime, the other insignificant."
Mr. Alison, with great propriety, adds, "Upon the principle of the
absolute and independent Sublimity or Beauty of Sounds, it is very
difficult to account for the different sounds which have been
mentioned as productive of these Emotions. There is certainly no
resemblance, as sounds, between the noise of Thunder, and the
hissing of a Serpent,--between the growling of a Tiger, and the
explosion of Gunpowder,--between the scream of an Eagle, and the
shouting of a multitude; yet all of these are sublime. In the same
manner, there is as little resemblance, between the tinkling of the
Sheepfold-bell, and the murmuring of the Breeze; between the hum of
the Beetle and the song of the Lark; between the twitter of the
Swallow, and the sound of the Curfew; yet all of these are
beautiful. Upon the principle of association, they are all perfectly
accountable."
I shall not follow Mr. Alison in his illustrations of the beauty and
sublimity felt in the tones of the human voice, or in the
composition of sounds, called Music; because I have no doubt but it
will be allowed that they derive the whole of what is called their
expression,--in other words, their power of pleasing,--from the
associations connected with them.[46] I {242} shall also produce a
very few specimens of the illustrations which he adduces to show
that what is called the Beauty and Sublimity of objects of sight, is
derived wholly from association.
[Editor's footnote 46: What the author thinks himself dispensed from
either proving or illustrating because he has no doubt that it will
be allowed, is, on the contrary, one of the most disputable parts of
his theory. That very much of the pleasure afforded by Music is the
effect of its expression, i.e. of the associations connected with
sound, most people will admit: but it can scarcely be doubted that
there is also an element of direct physical and sensual pleasure. In
the first place, the quality of some single sounds is physically
agreeable, as that of others is disagreeable. Next, the concord or
harmony of pleasant sounds adds a further element of purely physical
enjoyment. And thirdly, certain successions of sounds, constituting
melody or tune, are delightful, as it seems to me, to the mere
sense. With these pleasures those of the associated ideas and
feelings are intimately blended, but may, to a certain extent, be
discriminated by a critical ear. It is possible to say, of different
composers, that one (as Beethoven) excels most in that part of the
effect of music which depends on expression, and another (as Mozart)
in the physical part.
That the full physical pleasure of tune is often not experienced at
the first hearing, is a consequence of the fact, that the pleasure
depends on succession, and therefore on the coexistence of each note
with the remembrance of a sufficient number of the previous notes to
constitute melody: a remembrance which, of course, is not possessed
in perfection, until after a number of repetitions proportioned to
the complexity and to the unfamiliar character of the
combination.--_Ed._]
The following observations are general, and very instructive.
"The greatest part of colours are connected with a kind of
established Imagery in our minds, and are considered as expressive
of many very pleasing and affecting Qualities.
"These Associations may perhaps be included in the following
Enumeration: 1st, Such as arise from {243} the nature of the objects
thus permanently coloured: 2ndly, Such as arise from some analogy
between certain Colours, and certain Dispositions of mind: and,
3rdly, Such as arise from accidental connexions, whether national or
particular.
"1. When we have been accustomed to see any object capable of
exciting Emotion, distinguished by some fixed or permanent colour,
we are apt to extend to the Colour the Qualities of the object thus
coloured, and to feel from it, when separated, some degree of the
same emotion which is properly excited by the object itself.
Instances of this kind are within every person's observation. White,
as it is the colour of Day, is expressive to us of the cheerfulness
or gaiety which the return of day brings. Black, as the colour of
Darkness, is expressive of gloom and melancholy. The colour of the
heavens, in serene weather, is Blue: Blue, is therefore expressive
to us of somewhat of the same pleasing and temperate character.
Green, is the colour of the Earth, in Spring: it is, consequently,
expressive to us of some of those delightful Images which we
associate with that season. The expressions of those colours, which
are the signs of particular passions in the Human countenance, and
which, from this connexion, derive their effect, every one is
acquainted with.
"2. There are many colours which derive expression from some analogy
we discover between them and certain affections of the Human Mind.
Soft or Strong, Mild or Bold, Gay or Gloomy, Cheerful or Solemn,
&c., are terms, in all languages, applied to colours; terms
obviously metaphorical, and the use of which indicates their
connexion with particular {244} qualities of Mind. In the same
manner, different degrees or shades of the same colour have similar
characters, as Strong, or Temperate, or Gentle, &c. In consequence
of this Association,--which is, in truth, so strong, that it is to
be found in all mankind,--such colours derive a character from this
resemblance, and produce in our mind some faint degree of the same
Emotion, which the qualities they express are fitted to produce.
"3. Many colours acquire character from accidental Association.
Purple, for instance, has acquired a character of Dignity, from its
accidental connexion with the Dress of Kings. The colours of Ermine
have a similar character, from the same cause. The colours, in every
country, which distinguish the Dress of Magistrates, &c., acquire
dignity in the same manner. Every person will, in the same manner,
probably, recollect the particular colours which are pleasing to
him, from their having been worn by people whom he loved, or from
some other accidental association."
That it is not from the sensation, but from those trains of
associated Ideas, that the feeling of Beauty in colours, whenever we
have it, is derived, he demonstrates, by adducing some well-chosen
instances to shew that the sensation may exist as well without the
association as with it; and that, as often as it is unaccompanied
with the association, it is unaccompanied with any feeling of
Beauty. When it has the association. Beauty is felt: when it has not
the association, Beauty is not felt. The association, therefore, is
the cause of the Beauty.
{245} "Black," says Mr. Alison, "is to us an unpleasant colour,
because it is the colour appropriated to mourning. In Venice and
Spain, it is agreeable, because it is the colour which distinguishes
the dress of the Great. White is beautiful to us, in a supreme
degree, as emblematical both of Innocence and Cheerfulness. In
China, on the other hand, it is the colour appropriated to
Mourning, and, consequently, very far from being generally
beautiful.
"The common colours of the indifferent things which surround us,--of
the Earth, of Stone, of Wood, &c.,--have no kind of Beauty. The
things themselves are so indifferent to us, that they excite no kind
of emotion; and, of consequence, their colours produce no greater
emotion as the signs of such qualities, than the qualities
themselves. The colours, in the same manner, which distinguish the
ordinary Dress of the Common People, are never considered as
beautiful. It is the colours only of the Dress of the Great, of the
Opulent, or of Distinguished Professions, which are ever considered
in this light.
"No new colour is ever beautiful, until we have acquired some
pleasing associations with it. This is peculiarly observable in the
article of Dress; and indeed it is the best instance of it, because
no other circumstance intervenes by which the experiment can be
influenced. Every man must have observed, that, in the great variety
of new colours, which the caprice of Fashion is perpetually
introducing, no new colour appears at first sight as beautiful.
A few weeks, even a few days alter our opinion; as soon as it is
generally adopted by those who lead {246} the public Taste, and has
become in consequence the mark of Rank and Elegance, it immediately
becomes beautiful.
"When the particular associations we have with such colours, are
destroyed, their beauty is destroyed at the same time.
"The different machines, instruments, &c., which minister to the
convenience of Life, have, in general, from the materials of which
they are composed, or from the uses to which they are applied, a
fixed and determinate colour. This colour becomes accordingly in
some degree beautiful, from its being the sign of such qualities;
change the accustomed colour of such objects, and every man feels a
kind of disappointment. This is so strong, that, even if a colour
more generally beautiful is substituted, yet still our
dissatisfaction is the same; and the new colour, instead of being
beautiful, becomes the reverse. Rose-colour, for instance, is a more
beautiful colour than that of Mahogany: yet, if any man were to
paint his doors and windows with Rose-colour, he would certainly not
add to their beauty. The colour of a polished steel grate is
agreeable, but is not in itself very beautiful. Suppose it painted
green, or violet, or crimson, all of them colours much more
beautiful, and the beauty of it is altogether destroyed. Instances
of this kind are innumerable."[47]
[Editor's footnote 47: The elements contributed by association are
certainly more predominant in the pleasure of colours than in that
of musical sounds; yet I am convinced that there is a direct element
of physical pleasure in colours, anterior to association. My own
memory recals to me the intense and mysterious delight which in
early childhood I had in the colours of certain flowers; a delight
far exceeding any I am now capable of receiving from colour of any
description, with all its acquired associations. And this was the
case at far too early an age, and with habits of observation far too
little developed, to make any of the subtler combinations of form
and proportion a source of much pleasure to me. This last pleasure
was acquired very gradually, and did not, until after the
commencement of manhood, attain any considerable height. The
examples quoted from Alison do not prove that there is no original
beauty in colours, but only that the feeling of it is capable, as no
one doubts that it is capable, of being overpowered by extraneous
associations.
Whether there is any similar organic basis of the pleasure derived
from form, so far at least as this depends on proportion, I would
not undertake to decide.
The susceptibility to the physical pleasures produced by colours and
musical sounds, (and by forms if any part of the pleasure they
afford is physical), is probably extremely different in different
organisations. In natures in which any one of these susceptibilities
is originally faint, more will depend on association. The extreme
sensibility of this part of our constitution to small and unobvious
influences, makes it certain that the sources of the feelings of
beauty and deformity must be, to a material extent, different in
different individuals.--_Ed._]
{247} Mr. Alison produces a very long line of illustrations to show
that the Beauty of FORMS is not the mere sensation of Form, but
consists, as in the case of sounds and colours, in the train of
pleasurable ideas associated with the sensation. Mr. Alison is less
happy, and more tedious, in the illustration of this than the
preceding parts of his subject. We shall make little use of his
proofs; because we can arrive, by a short process, at a very
satisfactory conclusion.
Mr. Alison seems not to have been aware of the {248} origin of our
ideas of Form; and thence in expounding them has found many
difficulties which do not in reality belong to the subject. He
supposes that Form is altogether a sensation of sight. In a former
part of this Inquiry, we ascertained the sensations: we saw that
Form, in all its cases, is merely a modification of extension; that
it is made known to us, by those feelings, which accompany the
motion of certain of our members, as that of a finger, or a hand.
Those feelings are in no danger of being confounded with the emotion
of Beauty. They are feelings so completely indifferent, that in most
of the associations into which the ideas of them enter as essential
ingredients they are overlooked, and the very existence of them is
commonly unknown.
If the sensation is no cause of the Pleasure derived from Forms, it
will not be questioned that association is the cause.
Forms are either Animate or Inanimate. The associations with the
Animate only differ from those with the Inanimate, in holding some
additional ingredients. Some Forms affect us, by their magnitude,
naturally associated with the idea of Power; some, by the uses to
which they are applied, as the more powerful instruments of war;
some, by the extent of their duration, with which we have obvious
associations; some, by the splendour or magnificence, with the ideas
of which they are associated,--the Throne, the Diadem, the Triumphal
Car.
The natural movements of the arm, from its turning in its socket as
round a centre, are all waving; circles, or portions of circles,
running into one another. All other movements are forced upon it,
{249} and the effect of constraint. Hence the beauty of waving
lines, because associated with the agreeable ideas of Ease, and
absence of Restraint.
As nothing is more agreeable to us than to trace the operation of
design, of successful contrivance, some Forms affect us strongly by
the idea of their Fitness, of their adaptation to an End.
Others affect us not only by the idea of their adaptation to an end,
but by the value which we attach to the end. In this case it is by
their utility that they are said to please us.
We associate with the idea of certain states of the Human Body, or
at least of the Bodies of Animals in general, certain inward
Dispositions; with great strength we associate great Wilfulness, and
little regard of others; with frailness, we associate Delicacy, the
ideas of gentleness, compliance, and regard for others. The forms of
inanimate objects sometimes bear such an analogy to the Delicate and
Frail in human Forms, that the ideas associated with the animate,
are called up by the inanimate, and produce the emotion of Beauty.
This emotion, however, is altogether prevented, when the more potent
idea of Fitness intervenes. Any thing analogous to the slender form,
which is so exquisitely beautiful in the more elegant grasses, would
be a real deformity in the oak.
More than one of those sources of agreeable association are often
united in the same subject, and increase the emotion produced by it.
Mr. Alison goes on to the exposition of the associations which
constitute the Beauty of Motion, and the Beauty of the Human Form
and Countenance. {250} But after what has been said, these
associations are not difficult to trace; and I have already carried
the illustration of this subject farther than I should have done, if
I had not regarded this case of Association as affording most
important aid toward the developement of all the more mysterious
phenomena of the Human Mind.
We have here a class of Pleasures; the Feeling of Beauty, the
Feeling of Sublimity; exercising a great influence over all
cultivated minds. These Feelings, when taken as objects of general
contemplation, appear perfectly simple. To such a degree have they
assumed the appearance of simple and original feelings of our
nature, even to Philosophers of eminence, that a particular sense
has been supposed necessary to account for their existence. Yet all
this apparent simplicity is only an exemplification of that
association, by which a multitude of ideas are so intimately, and
instantaneously blended together, that they appear to be not many
ideas, but one idea.
Of this highly important fact, we have had occasion to take notice
of various leading cases, before. In the present case, however,
there is a peculiarity; which it has in common with the various
cases called Affection, which we have recently been engaged in
considering. In the cases which occurred for examination, in the
earlier part of this Inquiry, where we found long trains of Ideas so
blended together, by association, as to appear not many ideas, but
one; that of Motion, that of Space, that of Time, that of Personal
Identity; the ideas associated were those of _indifferent_
sensations. The ideas, on the other hand, which are associated under
the terms {251} Beauty and Sublimity, are ideas of _pleasurable_
sensations. The difference is that which is testified by every man's
consciousness.
That there should be a remarkable difference between a train
composed of ideas of the indifferent class, and a train composed of
ideas of the pleasurable class, can be easily supposed. It is
necessary further to observe, that between two trains, both of the
pleasurable class, there are such important differences, as to have
suggested the use of marking them by different names. Thus, even in
the class which we have been now considering, one train is composed
of pleasurable ideas, of such a kind, that we call it sublime;
another, of pleasurable ideas of such a kind, that we call it
Beautiful. From the train of ideas associated with the form of the
statue called the Venus de Medicis, we call it beautiful. We have a
train of ideas, also pleasurable, associated with the bust of
Socrates. But this is a train not reckoned to belong to the class
either of the beautiful or the sublime; it is a train including all
the grand associations connected with the ideas of intellectual, and
moral, worth.
A particular description of the sort of ideas which constitute each
of the more remarkable cases of our pleasurable trains (that they
are of one kind in one train, of another kind in another train,--of
one kind, for example, in the trains called Sublimity, another in
the trains called Beauty, another in the trains for which we have no
better name than moral approbation, no one can doubt) would be
highly necessary in a detailed account of Human Nature. It is not
necessary for the Analysis which is the object of this {252} Work;
and would engage us in too tedious an exposition.[48]
[Editor's footnote 48: The objection commonly made to the
psychological analyses which resolve Beauty into association, is
that they confound the Beautiful with the merely agreeable. This
objection is urged, for example, by Coleridge, in his Biographia
Literaria. He admits, with every one else, that things not in
themselves agreeable, are often made agreeable by association; that
is, the pleasantness which belongs to the ideas with which they are
associated, adheres to themselves: but this cannot, it is asserted,
be the cause of their producing the particular emotion to which we
attach the name of Beauty; because, as no feeling of beauty belongs
to the ideas that are supposed to generate the emotion, no such
feeling can be transferred from them to what they are associated
with.
Any one who has studied the Analysis up to this point, is aware of
the inconclusiveness of this last argument. That a complex feeling
generated out of a number of single ones, should be as unlike to any
of those from which it is generated, as the sensation of white is
unlike the sensations of the seven prismatic colours, is no
unexampled or rare fact in our sensitive nature.
But it will also, I think, be found, in the case of our feelings of
Beauty, and still more, of Sublimity, that the theory which refers
their origin mainly to association, is not only not contradictory to
facts, but is not even paradoxical. For if our perceptions of beauty
and sublimity are of a more imposing character than the feelings
ordinarily excited in us by the contemplation of objects, it will be
found that the associations which form those impressions are
themselves of a peculiarly imposing nature. This is apparent even
from Alison; and if the Author of the Analysis had written later, he
might have referred to a deeper thinker than Alison, and a more
valuable because an unconscious witness to the truth of the
Association theory. Mr. Ruskin, with profounder and more thoughtful
views respecting the beauties both of Nature and of Art than any
{253} psychologist I could name, undertakes, in the second volume of
"Modern Painters," to investigate the conditions of Beauty. The
result he brings out is, that every thing which gives us the emotion
of the Beautiful, is expressive and emblematic of one or other of
certain lofty or lovely ideas, which are, in his apprehension,
embodied in the universe, and correspond to the various perfections
of its Creator. He holds these ideas to be, Infinity, Unity, Repose,
Symmetry, Purity, Moderation, and Adaptation to Ends. And he is, in
my judgment, to a very considerable degree successful in making out
his case. Mr. Ruskin, it is true, never thinks of inferring that our
feelings of Beauty are the actual consequence of our having those
elevating or cheering ideas recalled to us through manifold channels
of association. He deems the emotion to be arbitrarily attached to
these ideas by a pre-established harmony. But the evidence which he
adduces goes far to prove the other point. If he succeeds, as I
think he does, in showing that the things which excite the emotions
of beauty or sublimity are always things which have a natural
association with certain highly impressive and affecting ideas
(whether the catalogue which he has made of those ideas is correct
and complete or not), we need no other mode of accounting for the
peculiar character of the emotions, than by the actual, though vague
and confused, recal of the ideas. It cannot be deemed surprising
that a state of consciousness made up of reminiscences of such ideas
as Mr. Ruskin specifies, and of the grand and interesting objects
and thoughts connected with ideas like those, must be of a more
elevated character, and must stir our nature to a greater depth,
than those associations of commonplace and every-day pleasures,
which often combine with them as parts of the mass of pleasurable
feeling set up in us by the objects of Nature and Art. In a windy
country, a screen of trees so placed as to be a barrier against the
prevailing winds, excites ideas of warmth, comfort, and shelter,
which belong to the "agreeable," as distinguished by Coleridge from
the Beautiful; and these enter largely into the pleasurable feeling
with which we contemplate the trees, without contributing to give
{254} them the peculiar character distinctive of æsthetic feelings.
But besides these there are other elements constituting the beauty,
properly speaking, of the trees, which appeal to other, and what we
are accustomed, not without meaning, to call higher, parts of our
nature; which give a stronger stimulus and a deeper delight to the
imagination, because the ideas they call up are such as in
themselves act on the imagination with greater force.
As is observed by the author of the Analysis, the exposition in
detail of the associations which enter into our various feelings of
the sublime and beautiful, would require the examination of the
subject on a scale not suited to the character nor proportioned to
the dimensions of this Treatise. Of all our feelings, our acquired
pleasures and pains, especially our pleasures, are the most complex;
resulting from the whole of our nature and of our past lives, and
involving, consequently, a greater multitude and variety of
associations than almost any other phenomena of the mind. And among
our various pleasures, the æsthetic are without doubt the most
complex. It may also be remarked, and is a considerable confirmation
of the association theory, that the feelings of beauty or sublimity
with which different people are affected by the contemplation of the
same object, are evidently as different, as the pleasurable
associations of different persons with the same object are likely to
be. But there are some ingredients which are universally, or almost
universally, present, when the emotions have their characteristic
peculiarity; and to which they seem to be mainly indebted for the
extraordinary power with which they act on the minds which have the
greatest susceptibility to them. These ingredients are probably more
numerous and various than is commonly suspected; but some of the
most important and powerful of them are undoubtedly pointed to, and
illustrated with great force, in the discussion which I have
mentioned, by Mr. Ruskin; to whose work I willingly refer the
psychological student, as a copious source of at least far-reaching
suggestions, and often of much more.
Supposing that all Beauty had been successfully analysed {255} into
a lively suggestion of one or more of the ideas to which it is
referred by Mr. Ruskin, the question would still remain for
psychologists, why the suggestion of those ideas is so impressive
and so delightful. But this question may, in general, be answered
with little difficulty. It is no mystery, for example, why anything
which suggests vividly the idea of infinity, that is, of magnitude
or power without limit, acquires an otherwise strange impressiveness
to the feelings and imagination. The remaining ideas in Mr. Ruskin's
list (at least if we except those which, like Moderation, are
chiefly ancillary to the others, by excluding what would jar with
their effect) all represent to us some valuable or delightful
attribute, in a completeness and perfection of which our experience
presents us with no example, and which therefore stimulates the
active power of the imagination to rise above known reality, into a
more attractive or a more majestic world. This does not happen with
what we call our lower pleasures. To them there is a fixed limit at
which they stop: or if, in any particular case, they do acquire, by
association, a power of stirring up ideas greater than themselves,
and stimulate the imagination to enlarge its conceptions to the
dimensions of those ideas, we then feel that the lower pleasure has,
exceptionally, risen into the region of the æsthetic, and has
superadded to itself an element of pleasure of a character and
quality not belonging to its own nature.--_Ed._]
{256} CHAPTER XXII.
MOTIVES.
SECTION I.
PLEASURABLE OR PAINFUL STATES, CONTEMPLATED AS CONSEQUENTS OF OUR
OWN ACTS.
IN contemplating pains and pleasures as future; in other words,
anticipating them, or believing in their future existence; we
observe, that, in certain cases, they are independent of our
actions; in other cases, that they are consequent upon something
which may be done, or left undone by us.
Thus, in certain cases, we foresee that a painful sensation or
sensations will be given us, but that something may be done by us
which will prevent it: Again, that a pleasurable sensation, or
sensations will be given us, but not unless something be done by us,
of which the sensations are the consequence.
It is necessary that those two cases, a pain to be prevented, and a
pleasure to be obtained, by our own actions, should be distinguished
from one another; but as they both rank under the title of a good,
and, as it will shorten our phraseology to name them {257} together,
we shall speak of the removal of pain, in the present section, at
least, under the denominations of a pleasure.
We have seen what is the state of consciousness, produced by the
contemplation of a pleasurable sensation as future; that it is
called Joy, if the pleasure is contemplated as certainly future, in
other words, believed; that it is called Hope, if the sensation is
contemplated as not certainly future, that is, if the anticipation
does not amount to belief.
We have also seen what is our state of consciousness, when we
contemplate the cause of a future pleasure, and the pleasure,
together. It is a mixture of Love, and Joy; Love as regards the
cause; Joy as regards the sensation.
The association which constitutes those States of Mind (AFFECTIONS,
as they are commonly called) it is hardly necessary to repeat. The
anticipation of a future sensation, is merely the association, the
result of prior sensations, of a certain number of antecedents and
consequents. I anticipate, for example, the pleasing sensation of
light, at a certain hour to-morrow morning. The meaning is, that
with my sensations of the present moment, are associated those of
the next; with those of the next those of the following; and so on,
till sleep; after sleep, waking, and then the anticipated sensation.
When the cause is contemplated along with the sensation, the
association which constitutes the process of anticipation is the
same, till we arrive at the link which immediately precedes the
sensation. Thus, if instead of the pleasurable sensation of light,
the pleasure of breakfast, is my anticipation of to-morrow {258}
morning; in that case, the idea of the pleasure of eating is
associated with the idea of the food, not as with an ordinary
antecedent, but that peculiar antecedent which is called a cause.
When the idea of the Pleasure is associated with an action of our
own as its cause; that is, contemplated as the consequent of a
certain action of ours, and incapable of otherwise existing; or when
the cause of a Pleasure is contemplated as the consequent of an
action of ours, and not capable of otherwise existing; a peculiar
state of mind is generated which, as it is a tendency to action, is
properly denominated MOTIVE.
The word MOTIVE is by no means steadily applied to its proper
object. The pleasure, for example, which is the consequent of the
act, is apt to be regarded as alone the impelling principle, and
properly entitled to the name of _Motive_. It is obvious, however,
that the idea of the pleasure does not constitute the motive to
action without the idea of the action as the cause; that it is the
association, therefore, to which alone the name belongs.
As every pleasure is worth having; for otherwise it would not be a
pleasure; the idea of every pleasure associated with that of an
action of ours as the cause, is a motive; that is, leads to the
action. But every motive does not produce the action. The reason is,
the existence of other motives which prevent it. A man is tempted to
commit adultery with the wife of his friend; the composition of the
motive obvious. He does not obey the motive. Why? He obeys other
motives which are stronger. Though pleasures are associated with the
immoral act, pains are {259} associated with it also; the pains of
the injured husband; the pains of the injured wife; the moral
indignation of mankind; the future reproaches of his own mind. Some
men obey the first, rather than the second motive. The reason is
obvious. In them, the association of the act with the pleasure, is,
from habit, unduly strong; the association of the act with the
pains, is, from want of habit, unduly weak. This is a case of bad
Education; and one highly unfortunate, for the value of the
pleasures in question is infinitely outweighed by the value of the
pains. The business of a good education is to make the associations
and the values correspond.
In the preceding paragraph, I have spoken of the abstaining from an
act, as an act. Though this language is not rigidly correct, yet as
it will lead to no confusion, and will often permit the use of
abridged expressions, I shall not scruple, as often as I find
occasion, to adopt it.
In the cases adduced above, of one man who obeys the motive to
commit a crime, of another who obeys the motive to abstain from it,
we have an example of an important fact; that, among the different
classes of motives, there are men who are more easily and strongly
operated upon by some, others by others. We have also seen, that
this is entirely owing to habits of association. This facility of
being acted upon, by motives of a particular description, is that
which we call DISPOSITION. And it is necessary to take notice of the
name and its meaning here; because we shall find that many of the
names of _Motives_ are names also of the corresponding
_Dispositions_; and we should not, therefore, be able to exhibit
distinctly the {260} marking power of such names, without an
accurate conception of what it is which, in this mode of using them,
they are employed to mark.
Each of the senses affords sensations, which, associated with the
act which is its proper antecedent, may be considered as forming a
class of motives.
In most of its cases, this association, taking place uniformly and
habitually, is, like the motion of the eyelids, unnoticed, and not
provided with a name.
Two cases, however; one, the pleasures of the palate; the other,
those of sex; act so important a part in human life, that the
motives they constitute by association with their antecedents, have
not been left without names; though very defective ones have been
applied to them.
Thus, for the motive of Eating, we have the name Gluttony: but
gluttony is applied to it only when it is unduly strong. In like
manner, we have the name Lust for the motive of sex; but that, too,
only when the motive is unduly strong, or in some other respect
faulty.
We have here an instance of that confusion of names which was
noticed above; the same word employed as the mark of two different
things; first, the Motive; secondly, the readiness to be acted upon,
and strongly acted upon, by it. The name Gluttony is not only the
name of a certain _Motive_; it is also the name of the corresponding
_Disposition_; a readiness to obey that motive. The name Lust is not
only the name of the _Motive_; but also of the _Disposition_, or a
readiness to obey the motive.
Drunkenness is a name used in the same way exactly as the preceding
two. It is the name of a motive, {261} only in the case of excess.
And it is a name with a double meaning, being applied both to the
Motive, and the Disposition.
For these several motives, in the cases which are not considered as
in excess, we have none but circumlocutory names; as, love of
eating; love of drinking; love of sex. It is to be observed, also,
that the circumlocutory names have the same double meaning, as the
preceding single name; they are the names both of the _Motive_, and
the _Disposition_.
The motives, arising from the pleasures of the palate, and from the
pleasures of sex, are sometimes spoken of as two species of one
genus. To this the name _Sensuality_ is applied. The fact, however,
rather is, that the cases of excess, named Gluttony, Drunkenness,
Lust, are considered as the species of a certain genus. Sensuality
is rather a generical name of the cases of excess, than of those of
moderation.
_Sensuality_ has the same duplicity of meaning, with all the other
names, just enumerated; it is the name, both of the _Motive_ and of
the _Disposition_.
_Temperance_, and _Intemperance_, are names of Dispositions, which
have a reference to pleasures generally.
We have seen, from a previous illustration, that when the motive
resulting from the association of a pleasure is not obeyed, it is
owing to the association of a pain. When the association of the pain
resulting from any act so balances that of the pleasure, that when
the value of the pain exceeds that of the pleasure, the pleasure
never prevails,--the {262} Disposition called _Temperance_ exists;
that is, an equal facility of associating with any act both its
pleasures and its pains.
When the association in the two cases is not in this manner equally
balanced; that is, when the association of the pleasures is an
overmatch for the pains, the Disposition called _Intemperance_
exists.[49]
[Editor's footnote 49: A Motive is that which influences the will;
and the Will is a subject we have not yet arrived at the
consideration of. Meanwhile, it is here shewn that a motive to an
act consists in the association of pleasure with the act; that a
motive to abstain from an act, is the association of pain with it;
and we are prepared to admit the truth deduced therefrom, that the
one or the other motive will prevail, according as the pleasurable
or the painful association is the more powerful. What makes the one
or the other more powerful, is (conformably to the general laws of
association) partly the intensity of the pleasurable or painful
ideas in themselves, and partly the frequency of repetition of their
past conjunction with the act, either in experience or in thought.
In the latter of these two consists the efficacy of education in
giving a good or a bad direction to the active powers.
In further elucidation of Motives, I cite the following passages
from the First Appendix to the author's "Fragment on Mackintosh"
(pp. 389, 390):--
"A motive is something which moves--moves to what? To action. But
all action, as Aristotle says, (and all mankind agree with him) is
for an end. Actions are essentially means. The question, then, is,
what is the end of action? Actions, taken in detail, have ends in
detail. But actions, taken in classes, have ends which may be taken
in classes. Thus the ends of the actions which are subservient to
the pleasures of sense, are combined in a class, to which, in
abstract, we give the name sensuality. The class of actions which
tend to the {263} increase of power, have a class of ends to which
we give the name ambition, and so on. When we put all these classes
together, and make a _genus_; that is, actions in general; can we in
like manner make a genus of the ends; and name ends in general?
"If we could find what the several classes of ends; sensuality for
example; ambition; avarice; glory; sociality, &c.; have in common,
we could.
"Now, they have certainly this in common, that they are all
agreeable to the agents. A man acts for the sake of something
agreeable to him, either proximately or remotely. But agreeable to,
and pleasant to; agreeableness, and pleasantness, are only different
names for the same thing; the pleasantness of a thing is the
pleasure it gives. So that pleasure, in a general way, or speaking
generically; that is, in a way to include all the species of
pleasures, and also the abatement of pains; is the end of action.
"A motive is that which moves to action. But that which moves to
action is the end of the action, that which is sought by it; that
for the sake of which it is performed. Now that, generically
speaking, is the pleasure of the agent. Motive, then, taken
generically is pleasure. The pleasure may be in company or
connection with things infinite in variety. But these are the
accessaries; the essence, is the pleasure. Thus, in one case, the
pleasure may be connected with the form, and other qualities of a
particular woman; in another, with a certain arrangement of colours
in a picture; in another, with the circumstances of some
fellow-creature. But in all these cases, what is generical, that is
the essence, is the pleasure, or relief from pain.
"A motive, then, is the idea of a pleasure; a particular motive, is
the idea of a particular pleasure; and these are infinite in
variety.
"Another question is, in what circumstances does the idea of a
pleasure become a motive? For it is evident, that it does not so in
all. It is only necessary here to illustrate, not to resolve the
question. First, the pleasure must be {264} regarded as attainable.
No man wills an act, which he knows he cannot perform, or which he
knows cannot effect the end. In the next place, the idea of the
particular pleasure must be more present to the mind, than any other
of equal potency. That which makes the idea of one pleasure more
potent than another; or that which makes one idea more present to
the mind than another, is the proximate cause of the motive, and a
remote cause of the volition. The cause of that superior potency, or
of that presence to the mind, is a cause of the volition, still more
remote, and so on.--_Ed._]
{265} SECTION II.
CAUSES OF OUR PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL STATES, CONTEMPLATED AS THE
CONSEQUENTS OF OUR OWN ACTS.
The motives which are formed by the association of our actions, not
with our pleasures immediately, but the causes of them, are much
more numerous than those which are formed by the association of them
with the pleasures themselves; and give birth to a much greater
number of actions.
The cause of this we have already explained, and need not explain it
again.
The causes of our Pleasures, including as well the remote as the
proximate, are so numerous, that it is necessary to speak of them in
classes.
We have surveyed them under the following Heads; Wealth, Power,
Dignity, our Fellow-creatures, the objects called Sublime and
Beautiful; and having fully explained the associations by which they
become AFFECTIONS, we have now only to shew, by what additament
these Affections are converted into MOTIVES.
It is not difficult to trace the course of association. The idea of
the pleasure carries us to the idea of the cause; the idea of that
cause, to the idea of its cause; and so on till we arrive at that
action of ours which is the commencing cause, and gives birth to all
the {266} rest. This association forms a complex state of
consciousness, which receives the name of MOTIVE.
It is also to be observed, that when a grand cause of pleasures has
been associated with a great many pleasures, and a great many times,
the association acquires a peculiar character and strength. The idea
of the cause, as cause, is so lost among the innumerable ideas of
the pleasures combined with it, that it seems to become the idea of
pleasure itself. An instance commonly adduced to illustrate the
important class of associations to which this belongs, is that of
_Money_; and a remarkable instance it is. Many are the instances in
which the association of pleasures with money constitutes so
vehement an affection that it is an overmatch for all others.
In those cases the association which constitutes the motive seems to
consist of a single link. The money is the passion; the idea of the
action which is to add to it, or prevent its diminution, associated
with the passion, constitutes the Motive.
The Motive which leads to the acquisition of wealth, great as is the
part which it plays in human life, has no appropriate name. Avarice,
Rapacity, like the words Gluttony, and Lust, are only names for
cases of excess. It is observable, however, that they have the
above-noticed duplicity of meaning; that they are names both of the
Motive, and of the Disposition.
We have noticed three states of consciousness into which the idea of
a cause of our pleasures enters as a main ingredient: 1. The mere
contemplation of it as a cause, past or future; which is called the
AFFECTION: 2. The association of an act of ours, as the {267} cause
of the cause; which is called the MOTIVE: 3. A readiness to obey
this motive, which is called the DISPOSITION.
We have seen, that in regard to Wealth, we had no other name for the
first of those states of Consciousness, or the AFFECTION, than the
term "Love of Wealth." It is here of importance to observe, that for
the Motive also, or the second of those states, unless in its cases
of excess, we have no other name than the name of the affection. We
call the _Motive_ also, "love of wealth." Nor have we any other name
for the _Disposition_. This, therefore, is a case of great
confusion. We have but one name for the _Affection_, for the
_Motive_, and for the _Disposition_. They are states of
consciousness, therefore, perpetually confounded.
Power, as a cause of pleasure, is rather a less distinct and
definite idea, than Wealth. The associations formed with it partake
of this indistinctness. The _Motive_ which is formed by association
of the idea of Power, with that of an act of ours, which is to add
to it, is a more vague idea than that formed of the idea of Wealth
associated with the ideas of the acts which are to add to it. Our
present purpose, however, does not require a minute analysis. The
acts by which, in the different degrees in which it is possessed,
men are commonly enabled to add to their power, are vulgarly known.
Power, like wealth, becomes itself a sort of primary affection. The
association with it of acts of ours as causes of its increase,
constitutes the state of mind called the Motive.
This Motive receives the name of Ambition; and that name is so
applied pretty generally; though its {268} original and more
appropriate application seems to be, to great acquisitions of power,
or additions made to great acquisitions.
The same duplicity of meaning, which we have so often remarked,
meets us here. In whatever sense Ambition is the name of the
_Motive_, it is also a name of the _Disposition_.
The term "Love of Power," which we have found to be the name of the
_Affection_, is also applied to the two other states of mind, the
_Motive_, and the _Disposition_. The three, therefore, _Affection_,
_Motive_, _Disposition_, are commonly confounded.
Dignity is a more vague term than even Power; including a still
greater number of undefined particulars. But to understand
sufficiently the three states of mind which it contributes to form,
no further enumeration of those particulars is necessary. The idea
of Dignity, as cause, associated with the idea of pleasures as
effect, constitutes the state of mind called _Affection_. The state
of mind called affection associated with the idea of an act of ours
as cause of the cause, is the state of mind called the _Motive_. And
a facility of being acted upon by the motive, is the _Disposition_.
We have only one name, "Love of Dignity," for all the three.
We have seen that the value of Wealth, Power, and Dignity, is
greatly enhanced, by their comparative amount; that is, the degree
in which they are possessed by us, compared with the degree in which
they are possessed by others.
We have seen in what manner this comparison generates certain
affections, which have received the {269} names of Pride, on the one
hand, Contempt, on the other; Humility, on the one hand, Respect,
Admiration, on the other. We have now to shew in what manner this
comparison generates both _Motives_, and _Dispositions_.
As it is not only of value to me to have more Wealth, Power, and
Dignity; but of additional value to have more than other men; the
surpassing of other men becomes, thus, a cause of Pleasure; and
hence the idea of this surpassing, associated with the ideas of my
own acts, as the cause, becomes a _Motive_.
We may endeavour to surpass other men, by either of two ways; by
adding to our own Wealth, Power, Dignity; or, by abstracting from
theirs.
When only the acts which add to our advantages enter into the
Motive, it is called Emulation. When those which abstract from the
advantages of another enter into it, it is called Envy.
Emulation is sometimes the name of the _Disposition_, as well as of
the _Motive_. Ambition, however, is very often used as the name of
the Disposition corresponding to the _Motive_, Emulation.
Envy, is the name both of the _Disposition_ and the _Motive_. It has
the appearance also of being the name of the corresponding
_Affection_; or of the state of consciousness arising from the
comparison of another man's greater, with our own less advantages.
This, however, is only Humility. It is never Envy, but when the
Motive to reduce them is felt. It may be a Motive without effect,
being counteracted by other motives. And it is this state in which
it assumes the appearance of an _Affection_.
In these instances, the same end is attainable by {270} two sets of
means; the one virtuous; the other vicious. The man who takes the
virtuous course, that is, obeys the virtuous motive, is the man who
has formed the habit of associating his idea of the good to be
derived from surpassing others, with the acts which lead to the
increase of his own advantages. The man who takes the vicious
course, is the man who has formed the habit of associating with his
idea of the benefit of surpassing others, the acts, by which their
advantages are diminished.
This a case of the greatest importance, in Education, and Ethics.
We now come to the explanation of that important class of Motives
which arise from the contemplation of our FELLOW-CREATURES, as the
cause of our Pleasures, and Pains.
With respect to our Fellow-creatures, a distinction must be
carefully observed. They are sources to us of Pleasure or Pain, in
two ways; either by their STATES; or, by their Actions. Their
ACTIONS give birth to a set of Associations of the greatest
importance, which remain to be considered under a Head by
themselves. What the _Affections_ are, which are generated by the
association of our pains and pleasures, with the STATES of our
Fellow-creatures, taken individually, or in groups, we have recently
examined. We have now only to shew, and for this a few words will
suffice, what are the _Motives_, generated by the association of
acts of ours with those STATES; acts contemplated as causes of such
alterations in the States as render them to a greater or less degree
causes of our pleasures or pains.
1. What the state of my _Friend_ is, as respects both {271} his
outward circumstances and his inward disposition, which renders him,
more or less, a source, to me, of pleasure on the one hand, or pain
on the other, it is not necessary, after what has been said, any
further to illustrate. When alterations can be effected in that
state by my actions, of a kind to render my Friend more a cause of
Pleasure to me, or less a cause of Pain, the association takes place
of my pleasures as effect with such alterations as cause of those
pleasures, and with my own acts, as cause of those alterations.
The MOTIVE, therefore, exists. And when a facility of forming this
association, in other words, a readiness of obeying the MOTIVE, is
contracted, the Disposition exists.
It is important to observe, that the word, _Friendship_, has all
that equivocation, or variety of meaning, which we have detected in
other words expressing our states of mind towards the causes of our
pleasures or pains. It is, at once, the name of the AFFECTION, the
name of the MOTIVE, and the name of the DISPOSITION.
2. We have seen what the State of any one of our fellow-creatures
is, which so associates with it the ideas of our own pains and
pleasures, as to make him an object of _Kindness_. It is easy to see
in what manner the ideas of our own acts are so joined to those
associations, as to constitute _Motives_. When the idea of additions
to the pleasures of a man, calls up the idea of additions to our
pleasures; the idea of a diminution of his pains, the idea of a
diminution of our pains; and when to this is added the idea of our
own acts as cause of those additions and diminutions, the
association exists which we call MOTIVE.
{272} The motive, which we are now considering, though in most men,
owing to a bad education, in which so important an association has
been neglected, it is too feeble, not to give way to any of the
stronger propensities of our nature, is, nevertheless, from the
constancy of its action, a powerful agent in human life, and the
cause of no small portion of all the happiness which exists in the
world.
A readiness to be acted upon by this MOTIVE; a main object of good
Education; constitutes the DISPOSITION.
The AFFECTION, the MOTIVE, the DISPOSITION, have all but one name.
Each is denominated _Kindness_. When the more immediate effect is
the removal of pain, we use the term _Compassion_; which is, in like
manner, a name of the affection, the motive, and the disposition.
3. The State of the group, denominated a Family, is a copious source
of pain, or pleasure, to the members of it. We have explained,
above, the associations which constitute the Family _Affections_.
The formation of the _Motives_ it is now easy to trace.
To take the principal case, that of the Parent; The pleasurable
associations which he has with the pleasures, and removal of the
pains, of his child, joined with the idea of his own acts, as cause
of those pleasures and removals, constitute a MOTIVE, the importance
of which we daily observe. Notwithstanding the defects of the
parental associations, under such a state of Education and Morals as
ours, no other source of generosity in Human Nature produces
uniformly so large a portion of its proper effects.
It is not necessary to explain in what manner the affections, either
of the child towards the parent, or of {273} brothers and sisters
towards each other, become motives. That such motives often exist,
and in great strength; and that no small portion of human happiness
is derived from them, is matter of experience.
We have no appropriate name for either the AFFECTION, or the MOTIVE,
or the DISPOSITION, in the case, either of the parent toward the
child, or of the child toward the Parent, or of the children among
themselves. We are under the necessity of forming circumlocutory
names, by aid of the general term Love. We say the Love of Family;
the Love of a Parent toward his offspring; the Love to one another
of brothers and sisters. And these are names, at once, of the
AFFECTION, the MOTIVE, and the DISPOSITION. So imperfectly have some
of the most interesting and important of our states of consciousness
been distinguished.
4. The idea of our _Country_ is associated, as in some sort their
cause, with a great portion of all the pleasures which we enjoy. And
the difference of the states, in which it may be placed, makes a
prodigious difference in the amount of pleasures, which we derive
from it. When actions of ours, therefore, can influence the state of
our country, we associate the idea of those acts as causes, with the
pleasurable results as effects, and hence the MOTIVE exists.
To individuals of the great body of the people, wholly in most
countries deprived of power, their country can seldom present itself
in the light of a motive, because with few acts of theirs as cause,
can they associate a benefit to their country as the Effect. Their
exertions in repelling from it the invasion of a destructive enemy,
or freeing it from the power of a {274} mischievous government, are
the principal exceptions to this general rule.
The way in which the idea of Country becomes a _Motive_ to a man
whose actions are more widely operative, may thus be conceived. In
the prosperity of his country, is included a portion of his own
prosperity, and of that of all the individuals who are objects of
his affection. Such actions of his, therefore, as are calculated to
add to the prosperity of his country, are associated with all the
agreeable trains, which additions to the prosperity of himself, and
of all those with whom he has any sympathies, imply.
There are cases, though rare, in which this motive has existed in
extraordinary force; in which men have been found capable of
sacrificing every thing for their country. This happens most readily
in times of great excitement; that is, when public opinion holds out
a great reward; and when the object rather is, to ward off some
great calamity, than to obtain an accession of good.[50]
[Editor's footnote 50: It is too limited a view of the effect of
"times of great excitement" in intensifying the patriotic feelings,
to identify it with the influence of a more than usual reward held
out by public opinion. That fact often contributes its share, but
there are other causes fully as effectual. In times of excitement,
the idea of Country, the ideas of all the interests involved in it,
and of the manner in which those interests will be affected by our
action or by our forbearance to act, exist in the mind in greater
intensity, and are recalled with far greater frequency, than in
ordinary times. Moreover, the fact that a feeling is shared by all
or many of those with whom we are in frequent intercourse,
strengthens, by an obvious consequence, all the associations, both
of resemblance and of contiguity, which give that feeling its force.
This is the well-known influence of sympathy, so strikingly evinced
by the vehement feelings of a crowd. To these might be added another
influence, belonging rather to physiology than to psychology. When
the nervous system has been highly strung up by the influence of any
strong feeling, it seems to become more acutely sensible to feeling
of any sort, those feelings excepted which jar with, and are
counteracted by, the prevailing tone of the system.--_Ed._]
{275} It is important to observe, that this motive tends different
ways, according to the different positions of the individual. Where
the inhabitants of a country are divided into classes, a Ruling
Class, and a Subject Class, the members of the Ruling Class have
hardly any sympathies, except with one another; in other words, have
agreeable associations with the pleasures, and removal of the pains,
of hardly any persons, but those who belong to the same class. In
this class are contained, their Parents, their Brothers and Sisters,
their Sons and Daughters, their Companions, whether Male or Female,
and their Friends: the manners of this class, are to them the only
agreeable manners; the morals of this class the only virtue. It
hence appears, that the principal part of the associations, which
make the idea of country an AFFECTION, are, in their case, connected
exclusively with the good of their own class. When their own acts,
as causes, are associated with accessions to this good, as effects,
the _Motive_ created is that of benefit to the class. Patriotism, in
their case, means, literally, 1st, Affection for their own class;
2ndly, The Motive to benefit that class; and 3rdly, A readiness to
obey that Motive.
It is to be observed, that Patriotism is the only {276} name
provided for all the three states of the agreeable trains connected
with the idea of country, the AFFECTION, the MOTIVE, and the
DISPOSITION,--and that it is commonly used in a laudatory sense; to
mark an unusual degree of the Affection, the Motive, or the
Disposition.
It follows, from what has been said, that there can be no real
Patriotism, no pointing of the _Affection_, the _Motive_, and
_Disposition_, steadily to the good of the whole, without preference
of any particular part; except, either in men of elevated minds and
affections, in whom the larger associations, generated by a good
Education, control the narrow associations, growing out of a
particular position; or, in men whose position is such as to give
them pleasurable associations chiefly with individuals of the
general mass, whose good has this happy quality, that it is always
identified with that of the community at large.