Nidampore--Christmas-day--Munsorepore--Kotla
Mullair--Phurawallee--Bussean--Surrender of Wudnee--Cession of
Ferozepore--Bhaga Poorana--False Alarms--Roree Bukkur--Sir John
Littler--Sir H.M. Wheeler--Ferozeshah--Aliwal--Sikh Forces--British
Forces--Sikh Entrenchment--Returns of Killed and Wounded--Sir H.
Hardinge--Battle of Ferozeshah--Sudden Attack by Tej Singh--His
Blunder--Appearance of a field of Battle--Fate of the Wounded.
TO resume our route. On December the 24th, Colonel Campbell's force
marched to Nidampore, a small village; a distance of nine miles. Here
we halted, with the prospect of spending a quiet Christmas Day. On
this day, however, we received intelligence, in camp, of the battle of
Ferozeshah, which had taken place on the 22nd of December; and that
the Sikhs, driven from the field, had retired across the Sutlej. This
day, therefore, instead of breathing peace and love, was employed in
preparations for war with our determined foes: unlike the Romans at the
siege of Jerusalem, when no operations were undertaken against the Jews
on their Sabbaths and Holy days. In Europe, however, and indeed all
over the world in the present age, all days are alike in regard to war.
The heathen Sikhs, who keep sacred no day in the week, might attack us
on any day, and at any hour; so that it was necessary in self-defence
that we should be prepared for the enemy. Accordingly the services of
the armourer-sergeant and his men were put in requisition to sharpen
swords and lances, and all was ready for starting the next morning.
On the 26th, our troops began their march to the village of
Munsorepore, a distance of ten miles, through a country abounding in
jungle, which rendered it necessary to observe great caution on the
march; and flanking parties were sent out to prevent a surprise. Our
route lay through two villages, which appeared to be thinly peopled:
the walls of the houses were in a state of decay, and altogether they
presented a desolate and deserted appearance. This, however, was not
extraordinary; for as the Sikhs had been located on the south side of
the Sutlej for fourteen days, it was to be expected that the people
would abandon their homes and fly to the desert.
On the 27th of December, our troops marched to Kotla Mullair, a
distance of sixteen miles. This town is very long and densely built;
the main street being peculiarly narrow.
On the 28th we marched to Phurawallee, the country of the Nabah Rajah,
twelve miles over a flat country, and by an unmade road, but by no
means bad. This was Sunday; and still no public service. Last night, a
private of the Lancers shot himself dead; such an event is happily of
rare occurrence, and it produced a deep impression upon both men and
officers.
There was a report abroad in the bazaar to-day, that another battle had
taken place; but there was no foundation for the rumour. The Sikhs, it
will be seen, did not meditate fighting again so soon.
On the 29th, we proceeded to Bussean, a long twelve miles' march
through a flat and open country. The detachment had under its charge
4,300,000 rounds of ball (musketry) cartridges. This would give for
20,000 infantry, 215 rounds per man; and, as it is said that one shot
in 100 kills, there were rounds sufficient to destroy 43,000 of the
enemy. Independently of this, we had round-shot, shrapnell, canister
and grape.
Our next march was to Wudnee or Budnee, fifteen miles and a half, by a
very sandy route, which was consequently quite unfit for hackeries.
On the road, the commanding officer received an Express from the
Governor-General, ordering us to take the fort of Wudnee, should we
find it occupied by Sikh troops. Captain Rose, of the Lancers, was
accordingly sent in advance of our force, to surround the Avails with
his troop. To his great regret, the garrison offered no resistance, and
about 5,000 rupees, and a few half-starved horses were given up to us.
Two companies of the 59th Regt. of Native Infantry were left in charge
of the fort.
Only a few days before, the whole of this district had been under
the sway of the Maharajah of Lahore; but by the proclamation of the
Governor-General it was now incorporated with the British dominions.
About ten years previous to these events, the demise of the female
chief of Ferozepore without issue, gave us possession of that place;
the rule in such cases being, that the estates of those chiefs who die
without heirs become escheats. Thus this city fell to the East India
Company. Runjeet Singh had previously objected to cede to us any of the
ferries; but we had now for some time past been permitted to make use
of them, both here and along the course of the river. On the cession
of Ferozepore, however, his jealousy was aroused anew, and studiously
fostered by his officers, at our occupation of a territory so near his
own capital; and his chiefs constantly urged upon him the necessity of
excluding us. Thus, with the possession of Ferozepore, we had gained
the ferry at that place, and subsequently also secured one opposite to
Loodianna.
This was an important point, for by it we obtained the right to cross
whenever we chose. The Sikhs, however, as we have seen, were not
prevented from crossing over to us. It was a very anomalous position
for the British rule to be placed in, for, while we were protectors
of the estates of four Sikh Rajahs, the estates of other chiefs were
under the government of the Lahore Durbar. It is obvious that the
circumstance of the Sikhs having a right to visit the estates of those
chiefs who owed allegiance to the Durbar, and none to the British
government, must have been a source of considerable inconvenience and
annoyance, to say the least of it. Hence there is no doubt, that they
sent over guns and ammunition to the left or south bank of the Sutlej,
long before they crossed themselves, and when they did venture over, we
confiscated the said estates.
To return to our narrative. On the 31st of December, the detachment
under Colonel Campbell marched twelve miles to Bhaga Poorana, a small
native village in the possession of the Alloo-walla Rajah, who held
lands on both sides of the Sutlej. Here the Colonel received an order
from the Commander-in-Chief to proceed to Loodianna, instead of to
Ferozepore, the object of which change we could not in the least
understand. In the evening, while we were at mess, we were suddenly
disturbed by the report that some thousands of Sikhs were approaching
our camp, and indeed had actually entered it. Our dessert was left
untouched upon the table; the whole regiment was soon mounted, and
drawn up at the head of their lines. After waiting about half an hour,
and seeing no enemy, all retired to bed. In less than half an hour
after, we had a second false alarm, from the firing of some sentries,
belonging to the picquets of the Native Infantry corps. Such mistakes,
with all their concomitant annoyances, are by no means unfrequent. An
alarm has been occasioned by a few bullocks crossing a nullah near a
camp during a dark night. In such a case, a Sepoy sentry receiving no
answer to his challenge, "Who come dare?" (who goes there?), fires
his piece, and the whole camp taking this as a signal of danger, is
instantly in motion.
A false alarm of this kind occurred at Roree Bukkur, in Scinde, when
the Bengal column under Major-general Sir Willoughby Cotton, was
_en route_ to Candahar, in February, 1839. The musket of one of the
sentries went off by accident; the others immediately fired, whereupon
the whole of the troops turned out.
Looking at the map, it would seem as if the recent "Express" to move
on Loodianna had in view to command the road from Delhi, though just
then no convoy was, it is believed, on the road from that city. Again,
troops had been marched from Loodianna, and Runjoor Singh had not
then crossed. The sudden appearance of the Sikhs in the neighbourhood
of our frontier, threatened the two advanced posts at Ferozepore and
Loodianna, both on the south bank of the Sutlej, and distant from
each other about seventy miles. Major-General, now Sir John Littler,
commanded at the former place; and, when summoned on the 23rd of
December, 1845, to join the Commander-in-Chief, had about 10,000
troops. He left a small force at that post, and joined head-quarters
at about 1 o'clock, P.M. At Loodianna, Colonel, now Sir Hugh Massy
Wheeler, K.C.B., commanded. At Subathoo, fourteen miles up the hills,
the Honourable Company's 1st European regiment was stationed. Loodianna
is about equi-distant from Subathoo and Moodkee.
The battle of Ferozeshah, on the 21st and 22nd of December, 1845,
has been the subject of discussion both as to the time and form of
making; the attack. In regard to time, it is the opinion of the French
marshal, Marmont, in his "L'Esprit des Instructions Militaires," p.
151, that "it is best to begin a battle early in the morning if certain
of success; but if uncertain, in the middle of the day." Some assert
that it was not necessary to commence the attack on the 21st, and that
it would have been far better to have deferred it till early the next
morning. Then again it is maintained, that had the attack been deferred
till the morning of the 22nd, Tej Singh would have joined the main
body of the Sikhs. However, early next morning the attack was renewed,
and the rest of the entrenchments soon taken. It also appears that Tej
Singh did actually come up before Ferozeshah at nine o'clock in the
morning--at an hour when the British had possession of the place--and
Major-General Littler was ordered to hold it at all risks.
I have before said that the cavalry were taken off in the direction of
Ferozepore, with the exception of the 3rd Dragoons. Here, again, I may
remark on the absence of the 9th Lancers, which was a general subject
of regret among the officers present in the battle; a regret which I
have heard repeatedly expressed both at the time and since. It is not
possible to calculate the value of the services which this strong corps
might have rendered in the hour of need; instead of which they were
marching backwards and forwards between Ferozepore and Loodianna. Yet
it is very probable that Tej Singh may have been aware that the 9th
and 16th Lancers, and other corps, were on their march to join the main
army, and hence have hastened his retreat.
Another objection to delay was the great scarcity of water; there
being, it is said, no water at Ferozeshah, except in the village held
by the enemy, and but little in the villages near it. Others, again,
assert, that had the troops fallen back a little they would have found
a supply of water, and that the Sikhs, moreover, would then most
probably have come out of their entrenchments, and attacked the English
on even ground.
At the battle of Aliwal, which took place subsequently, namely, on the
28th of January, 1846, the Sikhs did leave the little entrenchment
which they had thrown up, and took up a position, their right resting
on a village of the same name; their left on a circular entrenchment;
and their centre on some heights. Again, it is whispered that the
Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were desirous of making
an immediate attack, in order to prevent the Sikhs from marching upon
Ferozepore or Loodianna. Of Loodianna, however, there was no danger,
because they would naturally attack that place by crossing at Philoor;
there was far more reason to have expected an attack upon Ferozepore,
for three good reasons.
1st. Because the Sikhs had fallen back to Ferozeshah, only a few miles
from Ferozepore.
2ndly. Because, as has been before stated, Runjeet Singh's Chiefs were
very averse to the English having possession of Ferozepore, from which
there is a direct road to Lahore, their capital; and
3rdly. Because, by their retrograde movements from Moodkee, the Sikhs
joined the other infantry.
The object in not attacking till the next morning, would have been to
gain information respecting the nature and strength of the enemy's
entrenched position at Ferozeshah. The late Captain P. Nicolson, the
assistant political agent, is said strongly to have recommended an
attack on the rear of the enemy's entrenchment. Major Broadfoot, when
he reached the spot, where Major-General Littler joined about noon,
exclaimed, "We will now drive them out of that entrenchment."
It is said that there was a great deal of jungle about Ferozeshah, but
that the ground immediately around was open. By a brief delay, it
might have been ascertained that the rear was undefended by guns. It
is not to be supposed that the Sikhs would have thought of an advance
beyond their then position, until they had gained a victory.
Again, it is broadly asserted that the Sikhs would never have left
their entrenchments, and might have strengthened them, had any delay
taken place.
The Sikh force is said to have been as follows:
Battalions. Corps. Guns.
French Brigade Infantry, 4 Regular Cavalry, 2 26
Buhadoor Singh's do. 4 do. 1 16
Mertab Singh's do. 4 do. 1 18
-- -- --
12 4 60
The Infantry were 7,200 men.
Irregular Cavalry.
Charaganee Horse 4,500
Orderly do. 3,500
Lall Singh's do. 1,800
Heera Singh's do. 3,500
Moolraj's do. 550
Bala Singh's do. 200
Nehing's do. 1,000
Utter Singh's do. 700
Pindeewalas 900
Dogras[14] 200
-----
16,850
4 Corps of Regular Cavalry, about 2,000
Irregular Horse, " 16,850
------
18,850
Infantry 7,200
------
Total 26,050
------
Artillery Field Guns 60
Heavy Guns 28
---
88
---
Zumbooruks (Camel Guns) 250
---
The above force, with 3,000 detached Infantry, and the greater part of
the Irregular Horse, marched to Ferozeshah, for the purpose of holding
Moodkee; reaching this place in the evening, they fought the battle of
the 18th of December, with a force of 17,000 or 18,000 men.
The British force at Moodkee was about 13,000 men, and 48 guns, 36 of
which were horse artillery: the action was sudden, and there was no
regularity; the corps moved off in echelon, but owing to the dust,
confusion, and lateness of the day, some infantry corps fired into each
other. I have heard that a native infantry corps fired by mistake into
H.M. 50th foot. Many of the officers, and all those of the staff who
were killed, were shot by Sikh soldiers from the branches of trees,
where they had stationed themselves. The Horse Artillery and Cavalry
opened the encounter; but the dust which these troops raised, caused
the Infantry, which came up last, to grope as it were in the dark, and
to make serious mistakes.
The Sikhs having been defeated at Moodkee, called upon the troops
before Ferozepore, and the Nuggur Ghât to join them, which made their
force as under:
Battalions. Infantry. Cavalry. Guns.
10 Additional, 6,000 Additional, 500 Additional, 55
12 Before 7,200 Before 2,000 Before 60
----- ----- Heavy Guns 28
13,200 2,500 ---
------ ----- 143
---
This, including the 16,850 Irregular Cavalry, gives 32,550 men, of whom
the Regular troops were 15,700 men; and, deducting the seventeen guns
taken at Moodkee, the enemy ought to have had 126 guns at Ferozeshah,
besides the 250 Zumbooruks. These were not very great odds against the
British as to numbers.
The number of British killed and wounded was 2,419; namely, 2,269
non-commissioned officers and privates, and 150 officers, which gives
one officer to every fifteen men; and as the usual proportion is one to
twenty, or twenty-five, this was the greatest proportional loss in the
four battles.
At Ferozeshah, including the Sikh force detached to Moodkee, there
were 13,200 infantry; deducting, say 1,200 killed and wounded at
Moodkee, there remained, say 12,000 men; to these add an additional
reinforcement of 6,000 men and we have 18,000 infantry, which appears
to have been the amount of the Sikh forces in the entrenchments at
Ferozeshah on the 21st of December 1845; also 126 guns, of which
twenty-eight were heavy guns, which likewise agrees with the returns;
the enemy's cavalry could scarcely have exceeded 8,000 or 10,000
men. The entrenchment was about a mile in length, and half a mile in
breadth, but as there was a village within those limits, the space for
the troops was of course greatly diminished by it.
It will be for the military reader to form his own judgment, as my
experience does not warrant me in giving an opinion of the motives
and actions of my superiors. I have trusted a great deal throughout
my accounts, to officers who were actually present in this remarkable
campaign. It is curious to note the opinions of others. One thing
however seems tolerably clear, that the only mode by which a really
true account of any battle can be given, is to obtain a statement from
some competent officer of each corps, troop, or company of artillery,
etc., actually present in the field.
The practice, in this respect in the Indian army is this: each
brigadier reports to the major-general commanding his division,
upon the efficiency and prominent services of each regiment in his
brigade, noting also the disposition of each corps; the major-general
in a similar manner makes a report to the Adjutant-General for the
information of the Commander-in-Chief, of the state of each of his
brigades, and the particular services rendered. It is from these
divisional reports that the Commander-in-Chief draws up his despatches.
It is obvious, that after a great battle, particularly if there be a
pursuit of the enemy, no correct return of the killed and wounded can
be given for two, three, or four days; for those who are killed lie on
the field, and those who are wounded will get into a village, if near,
and remain concealed there.
The Sikhs having thus, as we have stated, drawn their various forces
from Moodkee, Ferozepore, and Nuggur Ghât, concentrated them at
Ferozeshah, and formed their entrenchments, which in several places
they threw up breast high.
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, who was
second in command, shared all the fatigues and dangers of the army
with the Commander-in-Chief. Orders had been despatched to Sir John
Littler to join head-quarters immediately. He accordingly left only
a small garrison at Ferozepore, and, with a body of about 5,000 men
and twenty-one guns, effected the junction, about noon on the 21st of
December. Measures for a general attack were at once planned; but a
considerable delay occurred, and much time was lost, as we have stated,
in consequence of the conflicting views of competent officers, as to
whether it was desirable to make an immediate attack, or to defer it
till the following morning. The former was ultimately resolved upon.
The British marched in even ranks, and commenced the action with
a brisk fire of artillery at a distance of about a mile from the
enemy. The Sikhs made a gallant defence. The British artillery
advanced steadily till they were within a few hundred yards of the
entrenchment; but the Sikhs kept up an incessant fire from their heavy
guns; in consequence of which our infantry were ordered to advance,
and, in the face of a murderous fire, to take the batteries. Night
put a stop to the carnage, but not to the awful state of confusion
which prevailed in the British camp, which arose partly from the
severe losses and the scattering of the different regiments, with the
uncertainty as to whether any advantage had been gained, and partly
from the incessant firing kept up during the whole night by the Sikhs
upon the wretched soldiers who were lying wounded upon the field of
battle, or who were cowering around their scanty fires, worn out with
cold, fatigue and excruciating thirst.
Sir Henry Hardinge, finding that a large Sikh gun occasioned much
annoyance to our troops, brought up the 80th Foot, who soon took it. He
then passed among the different European corps, which greatly cheered
and reanimated them under their intense sufferings. It was a night of
terrific suspense and anxiety to the two British Chiefs, both of whom
nobly resolved to fight and conquer, or perish in the attempt. The
British lion was roused, and his vast strength was all centred in one
final attempt. The die was cast. The Governor-General gave the word,
and Britons struck home the death-blow.
The village of Ferozeshah appears to have been held during the night
of the 21st of December, partly by the British and partly by the
Sikhs. One of our divisions under the gallant Major-General, Sir Harry
Smith, kept up a fire during the greater part of the night. The other
divisions bivouacked at some distance, no one knows where. Had a
concerted movement been necessary, it would have been quite out of the
question; for, by some mistake or oversight, no place of rendezvous
had been fixed on. I am told that the men belonging to two or three of
the European corps got clubbed together, and were so found the next
morning; nay, even the whereabouts of the Commander-in-Chief himself
could not be found. A certain Major-General was anxious to communicate
with him, and an engineer officer, who had just been with Sir Hugh
Gough, offered to shew him the road; but, to his surprise, he could not
find it: either His Excellency had moved his position, or the night was
too dark to enable the officer to trace his way back.
The morning light revealed the fact that the Sikhs were still masters
of a large portion of their entrenchments; the British retaining only
that part where they had bivouacked during the night.
The Commander-in-Chief now drew up his forces; the Infantry forming
into a line supported on either side by the horse artillery. His
Excellency took the command of the left wing, the Governor-General
of the right. The engagement opened with a brisk cannonade from the
centre. The Sikhs renewed the deadly fire from their heavy guns,
screened by their masked batteries, scattering death and destruction
among the British troops. Both the left and right wings of infantry
advancing under their able commanders, charged the Sikhs at the point
of the bayonet, and took possession of the village of Ferozeshah.
At this juncture, when victory seemed to be decided for the British,
Tej Singh, the commander-in-chief of the Sikh army, suddenly appeared
on the field with his army of reserve, consisting of 30,000 men, and
a large park of light guns. He charged into the midst of the British
troops, and attempted to recover the entrenchment, but without
success. He then opened a fire upon us from his guns, but, unhappily,
all our shot were expended. It was one of those unexpected cases which
demand the greatest promptitude and judgment; and our artillery are
said to have fired blank ammunition.[15]
The British cavalry had been ordered by a certain staff officer, in
the Adjutant-General's department, to move off to Ferozepore. This, I
suppose, must have been before Tej Singh came up. It is also reported
that Tej Singh conceived that this move was made in connection with
some deeply concerted plan, with the intention of getting into his
rear. Whatever may have been his opinion, he contented himself with
firing a few shots from his light guns--none other had he--by which a
few of the British were killed and wounded. Had the cavalry not been
ordered off, the whole of which, I understand, moved away, with the
exception of that noble regiment the 3rd Light Dragoons, who had
previously, in this same action, performed prodigies of valour in
charging batteries and entrenchments,--acts unparalleled in cavalry
tactics,--Tej Singh might have been attacked to advantage. Thus much
is certain; that the officer above alluded to was allowed to retire
from the service. The whole affair of the morning of the 22nd cannot
be either unravelled or explained; and I have discussed the matter
with many officers who were present on that occasion, but have never
met with one who could solve its mysteries. It savours more of romance
than of reality. "Truth is strange--stranger than fiction." Goolab
Singh, now Maharajah of Cashmere, speaking to a European officer, of
Tej Singh's advance, as above described, observed that: "Tej Singh
committed a great blunder; he should never have gone near you, but
should have marched at once upon Delhi!"
Many, however, are of opinion, that the sudden attack of Tej Singh,
with his 30,000 troops, was a mere feint. It was well known that he
was in correspondence with Captain Nicolson; and it is even affirmed,
that he had privately furnished an officer with a plan of the intended
operations of the Sikh army. It was his object to ingratiate himself
with both parties. His position as leader of the army demanded that
he should make the attack; while at the same time he foresaw that the
British would ultimately triumph in the Punjaub, and that it would be
for his interest to make friends of them. Therefore, after firing a
few shots, the Commander-in-Chief of the Sikhs fled from the field of
battle, at the very moment when the failure of the enemy's ammunition,
and the departure of their cavalry to Ferozepore, gave him an advantage
which might have turned the tide of victory in his favour. After
the desertion of their general, the Sikhs made several ineffectual
attempts, to recover the entrenchment, but before night-fall, were
compelled to retreat across the Sutlej.
The view of a field of battle awakens the noblest sympathies of our
nature. Even the stern Napoleon has had his cold heart touched by such
a scene. The first survey is overwhelming; and the heart of even the
stoutest soldier shrinks within him, and sickens at the sight. On a
nearer inspection, we find the dead and the dying, friend and foe,
lying side by side; their furious contest suddenly cut short by the
cold hand of death--while the cries and moans of the wounded till our
ears with sounds of lamentation and woe, and our hearts with pity and
commiseration.
We lament the fate of the slain, and grieve that his career is ended;
yet it is the death of the brave soldier who has gloriously discharged
his duty to his country, and whose fame remains imperishable, that
calls forth our deepest grief, admiration and gratitude. "_Dulce et
decorum est pro patria mori._" Well did Lord Hutchinson, in reporting
the death of the brave and lamented Abercrombie, express the feelings
of a soldier, when he said: "His name shall be embalmed in the memory
of a grateful country."
Thoughts of a future state are powerfully impressed upon the mind, as
the eye wanders over the battle-field of the slain. As we gaze upon
those who have distinguished themselves, not only as the liege soldiers
of their king, but as the faithful soldiers of the King of kings, our
heart insensibly finds relief. While the spark of life yet flickers in
the mortal tenement, we watch by the side of our wounded comrade, and,
like king David, we fast and weep, and say: "Who can tell whether God
will be gracious to me that he may live;" but when the dread fiat has
gone forth, and the spirit no longer dwells within its house of clay,
like David we restrain our grief, and looking beyond the grave, exclaim
in faith: "Wherefore should I weep? Can I bring him back again? I shall
go to him, but he shall not return to me."
Before quitting the field of slaughter, I would make a few remarks
respecting the wounded. The fate of the private soldier is often
very hard: by the loss of limbs he is rendered useless for life as a
soldier, his means of subsistence are curtailed, and what is yet dearer
to him, his military career is blighted for ever. The officer may do
duty again if he lose an arm, or what is almost the same thing, if he
be wounded and unable to have the ball extracted. This was the case
with my father, who, having been hit in both shoulders at the battle
of Waterloo, did duty in his most gallant regiment the old 95th, now
the Rifle Brigade, for nearly three years after, although, as the ball
remained in the shoulder, the left arm was rendered useless.[16] Some
officers even continue in the service after they have lost a leg,
and receive a good pension. This is the case with Field-Marshal the
Marquis of Anglesey.
The disabled rank and file are what is styled "invalided," that is
to say, they are sent to England and elsewhere, where they obtain a
pension, fixed and determined by a board of officers.
The late Queen's Inspector-General of Hospitals in Bengal, states a
fact which ought to be generally known, "The number of those who are
wounded and die in consequence, cannot be ascertained fully under the
lapse of a year, because there are cases in which a gun-shot through
the lungs has superinduced affections of the brain, fevers, etc." It is
likewise worthy of remark that gun-shot wounds are more dangerous than
sabre cuts.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 14: The Jummoo Chief is called Dogra.]
[Footnote 15: When Sir Archibald Campbell, who commanded the expedition
against Ava, in 1824-26, headed a Portuguese brigade of infantry in
the Peninsular war, he was informed upon one occasion, that only a few
rounds of shot were left. He immediately ordered a charge in line, his
object being to conceal his want of ammunition.]
[Footnote 16: See Appendix IX.]