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[Illustration: Route Map from Calcutta to the North West Provinces]
JOURNAL OF A CAVALRY OFFICER;
Including the Memorable Sikh Campaign of 1845-1846.
by
W.W.W. HUMBLEY, M.A.
Trinity College, Cambridge;
Fellow of the Cambridge Philosophical Society;
Captain, 9th Queen's Royal Lancers.
London:
Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans.
1854.
London:
Printed by Wertheimer and Co.
Finsbury Circus.
TO
LORD STANLEY, M.P.
THIS VOLUME
IS
BY PERMISSION DEDICATED
AS A
SMALL TOKEN OF ADMIRATION AND REGARD,
BY HIS
FRIEND AND SERVANT,
THE AUTHOR.
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION. 1
CHAPTER I.
Voyage to India--Advantages of Sailing with Troops on
Board--Regulations at Sea--March from Cawnpore to
Meerut--Return from Nougawa Ghât to Meerut--March
to Ferozepore--Cantonments at Kurnaul--Colonel
Campbell's Force--Number of Cattle required
on a March--Sunday--Rev. W.J. Whiting, M.A.--Distribution
of Prize-Money--Advanced Guard--Governor-General--Major
Broadfoot and Captain
Nicolson--Suspicions of the Sikhs--Sir David Ochterlony--The
Sikh Army--The Battle of Moodkee--Tej
Singh. 18
CHAPTER II.
Colonel Campbell's Advance--Provisions required--Camp
Followers--Samana--The Doabs--Gooroo Govind--The
Akalees, their Quoits--Sikhs attack Ahmed Shah--Maha
Singh--Maharattas--General Thomas--Runjeet
Singh--Holcar--Sir Charles Metcalfe--Ochterlony's
Proclamation--The Akalees routed--Generals Allard
and Ventura--Treaty with Runjeet--Runjeet's Army--Runjeet's
Death--Shere Singh Murdered--Dhuleep
Singh--Ajean Khan--Battle of Moodkee. 46
CHAPTER III.
Nidampore--Christmas-day--Munsorepore--Kotla Mullair--Phurawallee
--Bussean--Surrender of Wudnee--Cession of Ferozepore--Bhaga
Poorana--False Alarms--Roree Bukkur--Sir John Littler--Sir H.M.
Wheeler--Ferozeshah--Aliwal--Sikh Forces--British Forces--Sikh
Entrenchment--Returns of Killed and Wounded--Sir H. Hardinge--Battle
of Ferozeshah--Sudden Attack by Tej Singh--His Blunder--Appearance
of a Field of Battle--Fate of the Wounded. 83
CHAPTER IV.
Return to Bussean--Sir John Grey's Detachment--Battle of
Assaye--Sindiah's Troops--Generals Allard and Ventura--General
Lloyd's Observations on the Art of War--Tactics of the
Sikhs--Runjeet Singh's Discipline--Sikh Artillery--Goojerat
--Moodkee--Sir Joseph Thackwell--Bootawalla--Pontoons--Their
Value to an Army--Great Rise in the Price of Food. 109
CHAPTER V.
Hurrekee Ghât--Chain Bridles--Sir Thomas Dallas--Victory
of Sir Harry Smith at Aliwal--Umballa--Preparations
of the Sikhs--Capture of Dhurmkote--Loodianna--Runjoor
Singh--Buddiwal--Sirdar Ajeet Singh--Invalids at Loodianna--The
Pattiala Rajah--Alarm at Loodianna--Siege-train in Danger--Convoy
inadequately protected--Sikh Artillery at Aliwal--Major
Lawrenson--Singular Formation of the Sikh Infantry at Aliwal--16th
Lancers--Desperation of the Sikhs--Colonel Cureton--Charge of
Lancers--Marshal Marmont's Opinion--Sikhs evacuate Buddiwal--Rapid
Movements of the Sikhs--Brigadiers Godby and Hicks. 131
CHAPTER VI.
Richard Bond, the Messman--Sikh Grass-cutters--Choice
of Camps--General Lloyd's Opinions--Lieut.-Colonel
Irvine and Sir H. Maddock--Position at Sobraon--Brigadier
E. Smith's Plan--Colonel Irvine's Plan--Goolab
Singh's Policy--Sir Robert Dick's Division--Major-General
Gilbert's Division--Sir Harry Smith's Division--Brigadier A.
Campbell--Sir Joseph Thackwell--Brigadier Scott--British
Batteries--Rockets--Sikh Batteries--Assault on the Sikh
Entrenchments--Brigadier Stacey--Captain Cunningham's Account--The
10th Foot--Lieut.-Colonel Franks--Sikh Entrenchments stormed--Sirdar
Sham Singh destroys the Pontoon--Sikh Retreat cut off--Great Loss of
the Sikhs--Peace Principles inapplicable to India--Sikhs driven
across the Sutlej--Tej Singh. 151
CHAPTER VII.
The Advanced-guard cross the Sutlej--Burial of Sir Robert
Dick--Bridge of Boats--Kussoor--Surrender of the Sikhs--Dhuleep
Singh--Lulleanee--Lahore--Runjeet Singh's Monument--The Summer
Palace--The Governor-General's Address. 181
CHAPTER VIII.
Review of the Army--Eastern Mode of Adoption--Cashmere
assigned to Goolab Singh--Defeat of Affghan Cavalry--Major
John Cameron Campbell--Security of the North-west Frontier--Fertility
of the Punjaub--Infantry introduced into the East--Hyder Ali's
Notion of English Power--Runjeet's Craftiness--Improvement in
the Punjaub--Dhuleep Singh professes Christianity--Dr. Login--Dhuleep
Singh baptized by the Rev. W.J. Jay--Dhuleep Singh's Sincerity. 197
CHAPTER IX.
The Army of the Sutlej broken up--Set out on a Tour--Dhool
--Ferozepore--Grandeur of the Himalayas--Misri-Wala--Ferozeshah
--Moodkee--Bhaga Poorana--Bussean--Phurewallee--Kotla Mullair
--Munsorepore--Samana--Goelah--The River Cuggur--Pehoah--Khol
--Kurnaul--Military Stations--Transport of Artillery--Ali
Merdan's Canal--English Church--Malaria--Sir David
Ochterlony--Gurounda--Minarets--Somalka--Paniput--Battles
of Paniput--Baber--Ibrahim Lodi--Ahmed Shah--Defeat of the
Maharattas--Nadir Shah--Capture of Delhi--Mahomed Shah--Troops
engaged--Native Armies--Sunput--Change in the Weather. 218
CHAPTER X.
Delhi--Mahmood of Ghuznee--Shah Jehan--Gates of Delhi--Mosques--The
Palace--Hall of Audience--Chapel of Aurungzebe--The Gardens--The
Jumma Musjeed--Khoonee Durwaza--Protestant Church--The
Observatory--Tomb of Zufder Jung--The Cootub Minar--Allah-ud-Deen
--Gheias-ud-Deen--Mahomed Togluk--Humayoon--Nizam-ud-Deen--The
Cantonments--Mahomedan College--Delhi--Produce of Delhi--Shah
Allum II.--Lord Lake--Monsieur Louis Bourgion--Sir David
Ochterlony--Holcar.--Lieut.-Colonel W. Burn--Mr. E. Thornton
--Allahabad--Marquis Wellesley--Defence of Delhi--Mahomedan
Population--Colonel Ochterlony's good Generalship. 260
CHAPTER XI.
Ghazenuggur--Secundra--Allyghur--The Fort--The Church--Monuments--The
Gaol--Akbarabad---Meerun-ke-Serai--Kanoge--Tombs--Ancient
Coins--Language of Kanoge--Supposed Site of Palibothra--Population of
Benares--Streets of Benares--Singers and Musicians--Productions
of Kanoge--Poorah--Cawnpore--Court Etiquette at Lucknow--Nawab of
Oude--His Regal Rank--Military Depôt at Cawnpore--Saddlery--Sirsole
--Dâk Bungalows--Arapore--Lohunga--Allahabad. 281
CHAPTER XII.
Allahabad--Pilgrimages--The River Jumna--Hurdwar--Akbar--Allum
II.--Fortifications--Inscriptions on Column--Military Depôt
--Lieut.-Colonel A. Abbott, C.B.--Colonel Kyd discovers a
Cave--Ancient Palibothra--Arrian's Account--Megasthenes--Dr.
Adams--Heeren--Chundragupta--Patna--The Sacred Rivers--Bhaugulpore
--The Mandara Hill--The Chundun--Palibothra--Rajmahal--Antiquity
of Kanoge--Allahabad--Extent of Asiatic Cities--Mahomedan
Invasion--Extent of Hindoostan. 300
CHAPTER XIII.
Steamers on the Ganges--Native Pilots--Course of the
River--Mr. Sims proposes Shields to the Banks--Shoals--Tributary
Streams--Rapids--The Jumna--Mirzapore--Benares--Trimbuckjee
Danglia--Chunar--Sultanpore. 333
CHAPTER XIV.
Benares--Bathing in the Ganges--Water-carrying by Women--Extent
and Population of Benares--Attempted Tax--Mosque of
Aurungzebe--Observatory of Rajah Jey Singh--Bazaars--Jewellery
--Cultivation of Sugar--Secrole--Murder of Mr. Cherry--State
Prisoners--The Maharannee of Lahore. 353
CHAPTER XV.
Ghazepore--The Opium Trade--Marquis Cornwallis's
Mausoleum--Sand-banks--Buxar--Cossim Ali Khan--Sir
Hector Munro--Battle of Buxar--Nawab of Oude--Emperor
of Delhi--Revelgunge--The Sonus--The Ganges and Jumna--The
Indus--The Berhampooter--Arrian--Dr. Alexander
Adam--Dinapore--Captain Strachan--Bankipore--H.M. 16th
Lancers--Deegah--Grain Golah--Earl of Munster--Patna--Buildings
of Patna--Population of Benares--Magistrates--E.I. Company's
Charter--Products of Patna--Walter Reinhard--Snowy
Mountains--Tirhoot--Juggernauth--Gyah Proper--Cave of Nugur-jenee--Sir
Charles Wilkins--Futwa--Phoolbarea--Bar--Beggars. 373
CHAPTER XVI.
Monghyr--Wells of Seetacoond--The Fort of Monghyr--Storms
on the Ganges--Cossim Ali Khan--Monghyr
the Birmingham of India--Employment of Women--The
Gaol--A Sacred Bathing-place--Bhaugulpore--Its
Population--Hill Rangers--The Bheels--Mr. Cleveland--Lieut.-Colonel
Tod--Colonel Francklin--Colgong--The
Jungheera Rocks--The Fakeers--The Rajmahal
Hills--Sickreegullee--Boatmen of the Ganges--Rajmahal--Ruins
of Gour--The Bhauguretty--Soottee--The
Sunderbunds--Bogwangola--Jungepore. 402
CHAPTER XVII.
Moorshedabad--Cossimbazar--"Eina Mahal"--The Nawab
Cowar Krishnath Roy--"Snake-boats"--Population of
Moorshedabad--Berhampore--Ivory and Silk Manufactures--Kulna--The
Tidal-bore--English Factory at Kulna--Hoogly--Chinsurah
--Chandernagore--Ishapore--Barrackpore--Serampore--Dum-Dum
--Garden Reach--Calcutta. 430
CHAPTER XVIII.
Project of a Railway to Calcutta--Calcutta a Six Months'
Trip from England--The Strand Road--The Mint--Professor
Weidemann--The Strand Mills--The General Post Office--Custom
House--Auditor General's Office--Military Board--The
Commissariat--The Ice House--Metcalfe Hall--The Public
Library--Bank of Bengal--The Oriental Bank--Indian
Failures--Chandpaul Ghât--Baboo Ghât--Docks of Howrah--Prinsep's
Ghât--Kidderpore Ghât--Fort William--Mir Jaffier--Arsenal
--Chowringhee Road--Ochterlony Monument--Government
House--Entertainments at Government House--Policy
of Marquis Wellesley--Hotels at Calcutta--Theatricals--The
Town Hall--Concerts--Fancy Fairs--The Mayor's
Court--Newspapers--Merchants--Agency Business--Railways--Asiatic
Society--Martinière Charity--College of Fort William--Haileybury
College--Military Seminary at Addiscombe--College--Schools--Mesmeric
Hospital--Chloroform--Sailors' Home--Alms Houses--Masonic
Lodges--Botanical Garden--Charter of 1834--Lunatic Asylums--Law
Courts--Police Office--Provident Funds. 450
APPENDIX.
I. The Treaty with Lahore of 1809. 539
II. Sir David Ochterlony's Proclamation of 1809. 540
III. General Thomas's Opinion of Artillery. 542
IV. The Treaty with Lahore of 1806. 542
V. Proclamation of Protection to Cis Sutlej States against
Lahore of 1809. 544
VI. Proclamation of Protection to Cis Sutlej States
against one another of 1811. 546
VII. Indus Navigation Treaty of 1832. 548
VIII. Declaration of War of 1845. 555
IX. Services of Captain Humbley, Rifle Brigade. 558
X. Inscription on Colonel Cureton's Monument. 559
XI. Official Despatches. 560
XII. The late Major-General Sir Robert Henry Dick. 590
XIII. Proclamation of Peace. 591
XIV. First Treaty with Lahore of 1846. 593
Supplementary Articles to the First Treaty with
Lahore of 1846. 598
XV. Punchees or Punchayets. 601
XVI. Treaty with Goolab Singh of 1846. 601
XVII. Second Treaty with Lahore of 1846. 604
XVIII. Notification. 609
XIX. Supply of Horses in India. 612
XX. Revenue of the Emperor of Delhi. 613
XXI. Notice of Dr. James, Bishop of Calcutta. 613
XXII. Ancient Scriptural Customs. 614
JOURNAL
OF
A CAVALRY OFFICER IN INDIA.
INTRODUCTION.
THE remark has often been made, that India is but little known to
persons in England and on the continent of Europe. That there is ample
ground for such a remark none can deny. For, whether we consider its
vast territorial extent, covering an area of upwards of a million
of square miles, with a population of more than 150 millions; its
commercial wealth and enterprise, from the remotest ages of antiquity,
and its immense natural resources; or, whether we regard India in a
more intimate point of view, as forming an integral part of our own
dominions, owing allegiance to one sovereign ruler, bound up with us by
social relations and family ties, and consider what an El Dorado it has
proved to the British empire for upwards of two centuries and a half;
it is indeed a matter of no small surprise, that India should be so
little, and so imperfectly, known by us.
We can scarcely comprehend how, until recently, the Emperor of China
and his subjects should have looked upon the celestial empire as the
most important in the world; but it is yet more astonishing that we,
to whom the whole world lies open, should be contented to remain in
ignorance of what it is so obviously our interest to understand.
Nearly six centuries have elapsed since that enterprising Venetian,
Marco Polo, first visited India, and revealed to Europe the treasures
of the Eastern Hemisphere; nay, they are familiar to us from the
earliest records of the sacred writers; and, in later ages, Herodotus
and other Greek authors dwelt upon the wonders of the East, its
history, its resources, and its races. It is true that Marco Polo
gained little credit for the marvels he related; but, we must bear in
mind that he did not always speak from personal observation: he not
only noted down what he saw, but eagerly collected all the information
which he could obtain respecting those regions which he was unable
to visit himself. His "Maraviglie del Mondo da lui descritte" were
sneered at and discredited by many, in former times, as the visions
of an enthusiast. People, indeed, believed in the existence of such
cities as Agra and Delhi, because it was corroborated by the Chinese
and Arabic maps which he brought home; while the fact of there being
such an individual as the Great Mogul, was demonstrated by the painted
representation of his Sublime Majesty on the royal court cards,
which are supposed to have been then first introduced. More accurate
investigations, however, have proved his veracity; and the researches
of Klaproth, and other distinguished travellers, of modern times, have
amply verified the truth of his statements.
The discredit at first thrown upon Marco Polo's narratives, may, in
a great measure, be attributed to the Jesuit missionaries in India
and China, who followed in his track, and who, while they availed
themselves of the valuable information which he had supplied, scrupled
not to add the most unblushing and incredible falsehoods. These
Jesuits, though the most learned men of their time, composed a class
of writers whose object it was to appear to surpass all other European
travellers in information; and who sought to acquire an ascendancy in
Asiatic countries, for the benefit of their master, the Pope, and the
sovereigns of the European States.
The maps brought home by Marco Polo, and the information which he
communicated, proved invaluable to the Pope's missionaries, and to
the Venetian and Portuguese traders and navigators who succeeded him,
and aided the gallant Vasco di Gama in discovering the passage to
India by the Cape of Good Hope. The Jesuits, however, did not make
full use of the advantages which they possessed; for, while employed
in constructing their excellent map of the Empire of China, which
gained them free access to every part, they lost an opportunity for
investigating and describing its natural productions, which might
never have occurred again, but for the present movement in China. In
the reign of Kang-hi they obtained permission to establish a college
for the promotion of Christianity; but his successor regarded the
institution with different feelings; and, being jealous of the
influence which it was calculated to produce, ordered it to be broken
up, and thus deprived us of the means of obtaining much valuable
information.
Among the few Oriental works which modern scholars have been able to
obtain, the only one that has as yet been translated into English,
from the Sanscrit, is, a History of the Kings of Cashmere, down to the
Mahomedan conquest, entitled, "Raja Tarengini," published in 1835.
It was not till about seventy years ago, during the war with Hyder
Ali, and the subsequent hostilities between the sovereigns of Mysore,
from 1792 to 1799, that the English became acquainted with the state
of Southern India; when (to our shame be it spoken) the capture at
Seringapatam of the Sultan's library, revealed the fact of an extensive
political correspondence with Napoleon Bonaparte, the Directory, and
the French governor of the Isle of France; also with the Shah of
Persia, with Shah Zeman of Affghanistan, the Maharattas, and many other
native princes of India.
With so many salient points of tangible danger to defend, it might have
been expected that the Government of India would have employed--as
Russia does, and as France has ever done--competent officers in their
service to travel in Persia, Afghanistan, and, in fact, in all the
countries from whence the danger of an invasion was to be apprehended:
especially as it was well known that Zeman Shah of Affghanistan had, in
1796, '97, and '98, made attempts to invade India.
Foreigners have asked the question: "How is it that you English, who
have so long possessed a considerable portion of India, know so little
of that country, that, in our day, Baron Humboldt, a foreigner, should
contemplate a visit to India, to explore the Himalaya mountains?" It
is true, that nearly forty years ago, Lieutenant Webb and others had
ascertained that the highest peak was about 27,000 feet above the level
of the sea, and that it was the loftiest in the world; but doubts
were expressed as to the amount of scientific knowledge possessed by
a Bengal subaltern. Captain Fraser and other Englishmen have since
visited those snowy regions; but it still remains to be seen what
enterprising nation will equip an expedition to explore the character
and resources of India.
That the English, as a commercial nation, have not as yet ascertained
all the products of India, is a matter of yet greater astonishment
to all foreign travellers. It is a fact, that the existence of that
useful article, coal, has only been known within the last few years;
and the same may be said in regard to other natural productions.
The truth is, that, till the year 1814, the East India Company, who
possessed the exclusive right of trade within the limits prescribed by
their Charter of 1660, were the chief merchants of India; and their
investments were almost wholly confined to the exportation of silk, and
the usual cargoes of tea from China. It is to private enterprise that
we are indebted for the commerce in indigo, sugar, and other articles
of modern exportation; till the free trade with China, since the year
1834, opened up a more extended commerce.
Since that period, both India and China have become better known to us;
and the wars in the latter country have naturally made us acquainted
with the eastern portions of its vast dominions.
It cannot, however, be expected that persons pursuing commercial
speculations should have leisure or inclination to write on Indian
subjects, beyond the facts relating to their own traffic. Some men
will not even take the pains to learn the language of the people, but
trust to such natives as speak English. Though some of these gentlemen
have certainly acquired a colloquial knowledge of the language, and
made themselves acquainted with the localities in their immediate
vicinity--yet, as they have never travelled much in India, their
statements are of course imperfect and superficial. It is from the pen
of the civil, military, and other servants of the East India Company,
and from officers in Her Majesty's service, that we must look for
accounts descriptive of different parts of India, and of the various
tribes and races of its inhabitants.
The removal of the army from place to place, affords an observant
officer not only an opportunity of investigating the geological
formation, natural history, and productions of the country, but
also gives him great facilities for studying the history, religion,
and civilization of the people, from the various monuments and
inscriptions, both ancient and modern, which lie on his route.
The rapid extension of our Eastern empire since our first occupation
of Hindoostan may, in some measure, account for our imperfect
acquaintance with the productions and natural resources of the several
great Presidencies under our jurisdiction at the present day. Great
Britain, in self-defence, rather than from choice, or from a policy
of self-aggrandizement, such as she might reasonably be excused in
adopting, has been forced to extend her sway, and to annex numerous
native territories; for a long time, indeed, she only assumed a
passive military tenure of dominions thus acquired, while her natural
reluctance to obtrude or infringe upon the rights and prerogatives
of others has not only influenced her general policy, but even led
her subjects invariably to observe the same caution in indulging
their natural bent for investigation and discovery. This, coupled
with an apprehension for personal safety, and a want of confidence in
native integrity and honour, has greatly impeded a free and frequent
intercourse, and damped the ardour of enterprising and scientific
enquiry.
The well-known faithlessness of the native character, and the internal
disaffection existing among various tribes, have also tended to
interrupt or preclude the possibility of travelling about among the
people, for the purpose of investigating their manners and customs,
and the general state of the country.
The wars with the Sikhs afforded many opportunities of becoming
practically acquainted with the perfidy and duplicity of the natives.
The treachery of Tej Singh at the battle of Ferozeshah, the artful and
wily conduct of Goolab Singh, in his negotiations with the Maharannee
and the British, and the subsequent perfidy of our professed friend
and ally, Shere Singh, at the siege of Mooltan, where he caused the
defection of the Sikh army from the British to Moolraj, and thereby
prevented our taking the fortress, are indisputable proofs of this
trait. It is a painful peculiarity in the Oriental character, which
will ever stamp it in the eyes of a European with an indelible stigma.
This inherent vice, and our cognizance of it, have hitherto checked,
and will continue to check, the ardour of all enquiry and enterprise,
even where pecuniary gain, and still more, scientific information, are
the objects in view.
We may also refer to the history of Moolraj, his confederates, and
their diabolical schemes; but, thanks to an over-ruling Providence,
the arch-traitor and his base accomplices were defeated; their
designs were marred, and fell upon themselves. Truly it is said, "Man
proposes, but God disposes." Who could have foreseen or anticipated the
results of the deliberations within the walls of Mooltan? Who could
have foretold that Moolraj would be dethroned and immured in a British
prison, and his rich and extensive territories revert to a British
Queen? His treachery, however, led to the wanton murder of two of our
officers, and to an immense sacrifice of the lives, both of natives and
Europeans.
Our unwillingness to invade, or to annex to the British dominions, even
partial portions of frontier countries, virtually in our possession
before, has proved, as we have seen, a great barrier to enterprising
researches; and our officers, generally speaking, had more work upon
their hands, than allowed of much leisure or inclination for scientific
expeditions into adjacent, and still less into more distant localities.
We feel justified in offering this explanation, in order to do away
with the reproaches to which the civil and military officers in India,
have been subjected in regard to this question.
With respect to the Punjaub, our Government was perfectly justified
in its annexation; and the act was quite consistent with wise policy,
and compatible with our previous and general mode of dealing with
Indian rulers. No other power except Great Britain would so long have
abstained from punishing a local authority, which had so shamefully
and recklessly disregarded and violated its own solemn pledges and
engagements, upon the faith of which, and which only, the rule of the
Sikhs rested and eventually depended. Great Britain ought to have
annexed this country long before, even as early as 1845. She relied on
the gratitude and fidelity of the Sikh rulers, and was betrayed and
disappointed.
What is applicable in one case, as in that of the Punjaub, may apply
equally to all or any of our Indian acquisitions, and account, in a
great measure, for our still imperfect knowledge of the products and
vast resources of India.
We will not conceal from ourselves, nor leave the public in ignorance
of the fact, that while all classes at home are unanimous as to the
benefit and vast importance of steam communication, the case is far
otherwise in India. The imperative necessity for improvement in
facilitating the means of communication in the interior of India, by
means of roads, bridges, canals, railways and river navigation, has not
obtained that fair share of attention and support which the past and
future wants of India, her products, resources, and trade demand. These
reforms are only in their infancy. India, strange to say, is still as
backward as Turkey in these respects. It is extraordinary that in a
country like India, and under such a rule as the British, no line of
railway should have been laid down till the year 1851, when the attempt
was made in the short line from Bombay.
Any contributions, however scanty, respecting India will be better
appreciated now that a more judicious system has been adopted with
regard to the qualification of candidates for Indian affairs. There are
few families who have not friends and relations in some part of India,
and these are now beginning to give their attention to subjects bearing
upon its history, its people, products, institutions, and religion.
If we have been remiss in the past, and of this there is no question,
we must endeavour, in the future, to regain our credit as a nation by
progressive reform, and the promotion of civilization. India and her
riches, her mountains of light and her hills of gold, must not blind
us to our duties, nor cause us to forget the true though trite saying,
that, "Property and its possession have their duties as well as their
rights." We must not lose sight of the well-being of the country and
her people, in the pursuit of personal aggrandizement, and thus expose
ourselves to the world's obloquy, our children's detriment, and our
disgrace as a nation whose glorious destiny it was to elevate India to
a high and proud position, compared with that state in which we found
her.
It must not be supposed, from the foregoing remarks, that the author
of these pages intends to write a history of India; all he presumes
to do is to give information respecting that part of the country in
which his regiment was on active service, and which is perhaps the
most imperfectly known, namely, the vast district in the north west
of India, where the Sikh battles were fought. Moreover they are not
written for the scrutinizing eye of the public, but only for the
amusement of his friends, and of those who have a personal interest in
the war.
The author left England in the year 1836, and served with H.M.'s 4th
(Queen's own) Light Dragoons for seven years. He studied both the
Oordoo and Maharatta languages, passed his examination, and became
Interpreter to the regiment, and was therefore able to converse with
the natives. Returning to England in 1842, he joined the 9th Queen's
Royal Lancers, and was engaged in the Sikh campaign in 1845-46, which
prostrated the power of that people, and exhibits a series of the most
triumphant successes ever recorded in the military history of India.
The author has endeavoured to delineate scenes presented in a time of
war, which could not be familiar to the general traveller, because the
presence of two hostile armies exhibits the people in their native
character, calling forth their hopes and fears as to the issue of the
combat. In times of peace, the minds of the inhabitants repose upon the
prospects of a good harvest and a fruitful season. The grand features
of an Indian life are comprehended in the expressive phrase: "āb aur
hawa humaree bustee kee achchha huen; mi khoob khata aur khoob sota
hon:" _i.e._; "The climate (air and water) of our village is good;
I eat well and sleep well." If the Indian has plenty of good water
and food, his family share it with him, and he is content; he is no
politician, but when war rages between hostile parties close to
his own door, he can be no longer indifferent, and all his energies
are aroused in estimating the issue. In losing his old masters, the
English, he would fall under the iron rule of the Sikhs; or should the
Sikhs suddenly attack his village and carry off his grain, he would
have reason to apprehend that this act might be construed into "aiding
the enemy," while a refusal to give up his corn to the Sikhs would
involve the burning of his village.
In this way I shall, therefore, endeavour to represent the character
of these people as I myself observed them in peace and in war, that
the reader may judge whether there exists among the natives of her
north-western provinces any peculiarity of character, or whether we
have any reason to conclude that the actions of human nature there are
much the same as in similar countries in the East; for we must not
judge them by those of the West.
It is to be hoped that better days are in store for the East; and, in
that comprehensive term, I would include China, and countries nearer
home, Asiatic Turkey, Persia, etc. I am sanguine that the bright
dawning of a happy future is awaiting these interesting countries.
If the British people have conquered India, it is their imperative
obligation to promote the welfare of their possessions; and we are glad
to notice a laudable spirit in recent legislative measures to promote
many desirable improvements. India, under an improved system, and
with greater facilities of intercourse, will more than recompense any
effort, or application of capital, on our part. Its internal resources
are beyond our conception, and its people will unquestionably advance
and improve in proportion to its elevation as an empire. Schools,
industry, and commerce, if based on a solid foundation, will be the
quick harbingers of peace, good-will, and prosperity to the people and
their rulers, both native and European.
May this happy era be expedited in the good Providence of God!
_Eynesbury, St. Neots,
Huntingdonshire,
May, 1, 1854._
CHAPTER I.
Voyage to India--Advantages of Sailing with Troops on
Board--Regulations at Sea--March from Cawnpore to Meerut--Return
from Nougawa Ghât to Meerut--March to Ferozepore--Cantonments
at Kurnaul--Colonel Campbell's Force--Number of Cattle required
on a March--Sunday--Rev. W.J. Whiting, M.A.--Distribution of
Prize-Money--Advanced Guard--Governor-General--Major Broadfoot and
Captain Nicolson--Suspicions of the Sikhs--Sir David Ochterlony--The
Sikh Army--The Battle of Moodkee--Tej Singh.
THE circumstances of a voyage to or from India are so well known, from
their frequent occurrence, that I will not even allude to them. Our
voyage, however, offered some variety to the usual monotony of a mere
passenger ship, from our having troops on board. This naturally gave
rise to numerous incidents which afford topics of interest, especially
to military men. We, of course, had regular parades both for the sake
of discipline, and to ascertain that the men were sober and clean. The
men had, too, specific duties assigned to them--keeping watch, etc.
The object of placing the troops in watches, in time of peace, is, that
they may assist in pulling and easing the ropes. They are confined
to duties on deck only. If there should be an old sailor among them
he may, of course, occasionally reef and unfurl sail. It is obvious
that the addition of some fifty or sixty men to the crew of a merchant
vessel of 600 or 700 tons burthen, is a great advantage in bad weather,
as it enables almost the whole of the ship's crew to be employed aloft.
In case of necessity a soldier or two will also assist the man at the
wheel, or those at the pumps, by order of the quarter-master, or of the
officer on duty, or of the captain himself.
Another advantage from having soldiers on board is in the case where
the crew might be inclined to mutiny; when they would be restrained
by the military. The troops being told off in watches, those on the
morning watch assist in cleaning, or, what is called _swabbing_, the
quarter-deck; but the rules for merchant ships are very imperfect in
this respect.
Having troops on board necessarily adds much to the safety of the
vessel.
It will probably be in the recollection of many of my readers, that
two ships taken up in Australia as transports, were wrecked on the
Great Andamans, islands on the east side of the Bay of Bengal, in the
year 1844. These vessels would have been totally lost, but for the
assistance rendered by the officers and men of the 80th Foot, the
regiment which so nobly distinguished itself, the following year, at
the battle of Ferozeshah, where many of those brave fellows who helped
to save these vessels, yielded up their lives for their country.
To ensure regularity and a perfect understanding between the commanding
officers of troops and captains of ships, a copy of rules for the
guidance of the commanders of merchant-ships, should be given to the
officer commanding the troops; and a copy of the regulations for troops
of Her Majesty's forces, and the East India Company's service, given to
the commander of the ship. The captain of a free-trader is not allowed
to flog his men; but he may stop a sailor's grog and his pay for any
crime of which he has been guilty. He may also put a culprit in irons,
and lose the man's services.
Without stopping to describe my first impressions of India, or the
countries which I traversed, after landing upon its far-famed shores,
I will proceed at once to Cawnpore, where I found that my regiment was
quartered, and where I first joined it.
On the 17th of October, 1845, my regiment, the 9th Queen's Royal
Lancers, set out on its march from Cawnpore to Meerut, a distance of
266 miles. The Artillery received orders, at the same time, to hold
themselves in readiness to proceed to the north-west. We reached Meerut
on the 12th of November, and encamped near the lines of the 16th
Lancers, to await further orders. We stayed only a few days in this
place, which is situated in the province of Delhi. It is a very large
town, of some antiquity, lying about forty miles to the north-east
of the city of Delhi, and is one of our principal civil and military
stations.
On the 23rd, our corps received orders to march the next day to
Umballa, a large military station, a distance of 126 miles. We
accordingly set out on the morning of the 25th, and marched to
Sirdhana, eleven miles. On the 26th we encamped on the right bank of
the river Hindon, at Nougawa Ghât, nineteen miles from Meerut. On
the 27th, just as the corps was about to proceed onwards--for the
trumpet to boot and saddle had already been sounded--we received a
sudden order, by an express camel, to return and encamp on our old
ground at Meerut. On the 28th, the regiment halted; the following day
it re-crossed the river, and encamped at Sirdhana; and on the 30th
returned to Meerut.
Here we were quartered till the 10th of December, when the Queen's
Royal Lancers received an unexpected and peremptory order, at half-past
eight P.M., to march immediately to Umballa. We accordingly again
set out for Sirdhana, which we reached the next morning; and whilst
at Shamlee, four marches from Meerut, and twenty-eight miles from
Kurnaul, we received, between three and four o'clock P.M., an express
direct from the Commander-in-Chief, with the following important
intelligence:--
"That the 9th Lancers were to proceed at once to Ferozepore, agreeably
to an enclosed route; and that the 43rd and 59th regiments of Native
Infantry, which were to leave Meerut the same day as the Lancers, were
to proceed thither also: the whole to be under the command of Colonel
Campbell, of the latter corps."
[Illustration:
SKETCH OF THE
PRINCIPAL ROADS
approaching the
SUTLEJ.
_London, Longman & Co._]
On reaching Kurnaul, we halted on the 18th, in order to make
preparations for forming a depôt at Umballa; to which place all the
superfluous heavy baggage, and the young horses, were immediately
sent, under the charge of Cornet R.W. King, with instructions to
rejoin head-quarters as soon as he had reported himself to the officer
commanding at Umballa.
At this time, it was not yet known at Kurnaul that the Sikhs had
crossed the Sutlej--an event which took place as early as the 13th of
this month.
I may here remark, that the extensive cantonments of Kurnaul had been
abandoned about three years before, by order of Lord Ellenborough,
then Governor-General. The officers' bungalows were now nearly all
roofless, and the neat little church going to decay. In 1852 it was
entirely dismantled, and the materials conveyed to Umballa, to assist
in building a station-church there. The immense parade-ground, large
enough to allow for the exercise of 12,000 men, is about the best in
India.
The route of the 9th here changed; for instead of proceeding to
Umballa, we marched as follows:--
On the 19th of December to Suggah, 10 miles.
" 20th " Khol, 14-1/2 "
" 21st " Pehoah 14 "
These three villages were in the protected Sikh states: the two
former are small and insignificant; the latter is larger, and of more
importance.
The whole tract of country, on either side of our line of march, was
one continued jungle, and as level as a bowling-green.
The force under the personal command of Colonel Campbell, exclusive
of officers, amounted at this time to 2,833 men, with twelve iron
twelve-pounders, each drawn by an elephant. Brass guns of this
description are usually drawn by ten, or even twelve, bullocks; brass
eighteen-pounders by fourteen bullocks; and brass twenty-four-pounders
by eighteen bullocks. An iron twenty-four-pounder is drawn by
twenty-six bullocks; an iron eighteen-pounder by twenty-two bullocks;
and an iron twelve-pounder by eighteen bullocks. Singly, therefore,
that noble animal, the elephant, will draw a gun for which ten or even
more bullocks are allowed.
These and the following remarks regarding cattle, are given for the
purpose of showing the number used in dragging guns and carrying
loads. By the regulations of the service in Bengal, it is directed that
no elephant shall be taken into the service under twelve years of age,
nor under seven feet in height. A committee is appointed to examine and
report whether the animals are fit for service; but it not unfrequently
happens that infantry or cavalry officers, or both, are put upon these
committees, who know nothing at all of the matter. Sometimes, however,
the animals are so palpably inefficient and diseased, that, as one of
the committee-officers exclaimed, "This camel speaks for itself." No
elephant is employed unless the committee can report that he is capable
of carrying at least 20 maunds of 80 sicca weight, or 1,600 pounds = 14
cwt. 32 lbs.
Camels admitted into the service by a committee, must never be under
five, nor more than nine, years old; and capable of carrying a load of
at least 6 maunds, or 480 lbs. Bullocks are admitted into the service
not under five, nor above eight, years of age. Draught-bullocks must
be fifty inches in height; those for carriage, not under forty-eight
inches. The former must be capable of carrying 210 lbs. avoirdupoise
weight, besides the gear. The comparative value of these animals will
be seen by the following scale:--
An elephant carries 1,600 lbs.
A camel " 480 "
A bullock " 210 "
In wet weather a camel, which, in dry weather, carries six maunds of
tents, etc., will carry only four maunds, one-third being allowed for
the difficulty which the camel finds of keeping on his legs in wet
ground.
A six-pounder gun is drawn by six horses, and when bullocks are
used, by six of these animals. This shows the relative value as to
draught. Now a single elephant pulled along by himself one of the
iron twelve-pounder guns, or, as they were more properly styled,
"nine-pounders _reamed_ up to twelves," which may be thus explained.
Knowing that the Sikhs used guns of large calibre, the Government had
ordered that these guns should be sent to the Delhi magazine, to be
re-cast and reamed up for the occasion; and they did good service. They
were a fraction lighter by this process than the nine-pounders were
before.
On the 21st of December our troops halted at Pehoah. It is a large
town, containing a succession of brick-built houses, the high walls of
which, without any apertures, face the back streets, being evidently
intended as a defence against marauders.
It will be seen, by reference to the map, that the original route by
which the troops were ordered to march to Umballa, would have caused
us to make a considerable _détour_, indeed, one of about thirty or
thirty-five miles, for Umballa is nearly direct north of Kurnaul, while
Ferozepore is north-west.
The Sunday at Pehoah was not kept as is customary on the Lord's-day
in cantonments. We had no chaplain with us; and hence divine service
was not performed. It would appear proper that, in the absence of
the chaplain, some officer should take his place. This is the case
in several European regiments, where the commanding or some superior
officer reads the service to the troops. As on board of ship, when
there is no chaplain, the purser reads the service, so I think, in the
army, the paymaster should discharge this duty. A graduate of either
University, if there be one in the corps, would be, from his education
and training, the most desirable person to read a selection of prayers
from the church service. A chaplain accompanied the Bengal and Bombay
columns, which went to Afghanistan in 1838-39.
We have a noble instance of voluntary dedication to the duties of
chaplain to an army on active service, in the case of the Rev. W.J.
Whiting, M.A., during the second Sikh campaign. The arduous and
invaluable services which this excellent clergyman rendered during that
campaign called forth the grateful thanks of the Governor-General, the
Commander-in-Chief, the Bishop of Calcutta, and the Court of Directors.
He has left an indelible impression, on all engaged in that war, of the
importance of his benevolent, as well as spiritual ministrations.
By the warrant for prize-money for the navy, dated 1846, naval
chaplains share in the prize money. There appears to be no positive
regulation for army chaplains; but the analogy between the two services
will point out the propriety of its existing in the latter case; and
the warrant being by royal authority, no doubt ought to exist on the
subject. It is pleasing to hear that the Rev. George Robert Gleig,
M.A., Chaplain-General to the Forces, formerly a subaltern during the
Peninsular war, and author of several entertaining and instructive
military works, has not only received his medal, with two bars, but has
worn it at Court over his canonicals, and does wear it at all times in
the pulpit.
By the navy warrant, passengers on board a man-of-war, if they desire
to join in an action, receive a share of the prize money. The navy
prize rules are fairer than those of the army. The army rules were
made--I am speaking of India--by the Prize Committees, assembled at
Seringapatam, Agra, etc., in 1799 and 1803; and, being composed of
senior officers, they took good care of their own grade, while the
juniors got a very disproportionate share.
I return from this digression to the bellicose signs of the times.
Colonel Campbell's detachment marched, on the 22nd December, to Goelah,
sixteen miles distant. Here, in consequence of rumours that the Sikhs
had crossed the Sutlej, and having heard, in the afternoon, a distant
noise resembling the sound of cannon (which subsequently turned out to
be the explosion of mines), Colonel Campbell ordered all the troops
under his immediate command to join and march together.
On the following morning the advanced guard consisted of a troop of
the Royal Lancers--the light companies of the 43rd and 59th regiments
of Native Infantry--some sappers and miners--and four 12-pounders. The
main body consisted of the 9th Lancers--43rd and 59th regiments of
Native Infantry--and six 12-pounders. The rear-guard consisted of a
troop of the 9th--one company from each of the Infantry regiments--and
two 12-pounders: Captain Spottiswoode, 9th Lancers, an able and most
intelligent officer, acting as major of brigade. Here was a respectable
force of nearly 3,000 men and twelve guns, or four to each thousand
men, being above Napoleon's proportion, which was only three to 1,000.
It will be seen that we began the campaign with an artillery very
inferior to that of the Sikhs. In fact, if calibres are reckoned, we,
probably, were in the minority as one to three. I shall, in the sequel,
prove these facts. But to proceed:
It will appear strange to the European reader when he hears that the
whole tract of country between the Sutlej and the Jumna, including the
protected Sikh states, which were under our control, as well as our
protection, had been in the possession of the East India Company since
the year 1809, or for thirty-six years before this period; and that,
nevertheless, troops marching to join the army, in a direct line, sixty
miles off, were not even aware that the Sikhs had crossed the Sutlej;
and that, moreover, two battles had been fought, that of Moodkee, on
the 18th, and that of Ferozeshah on the 21st and 22nd of December, the
latter being one of the most deadly contested actions ever fought in
India. I have before stated that the 9th Lancers had been ordered from
Meerut, and did march on the 25th of November; that this line corps,
being unfortunately ordered back, did not leave Meerut the second time
until the 11th of December. Here was a loss of sixteen days: hence it
is clear, that, as the regiment heard firing, or sounds arising from
the explosion of powder mines on the 21st of December, it would have
been present in the battles of Moodkee and Ferozeshah, had not its
march been countermanded.
Now the order to return to Meerut was received on the 27th of November.
To what circumstance was this to be attributed? The Sikhs did not
cross the Sutlej until the 13th of December, or sixteen days after
the 27th of November; and, allowing the order for the return to be
dated the 25th of November, there certainly was not any crossing of
the Sikhs at that time. It is positively stated, by a staff officer,
that Lord Hardinge did not send the order. Although a Governor-General
can send such an order direct, yet all military men here know that
the Commander-in-chief is the channel for transmitting such orders.
At the same time it is an established rule in the Indian army that
a Commander-in-chief cannot order any troops on service without the
sanction of the Governor-General, or of the government. Even in the
common biennial or triennial relief the order is prefaced with the
words: "With the sanction of government." The Governor-General being,
in the present instance, on the field, was, _de facto_, the government.
As Louis XIV. said: _L'état? C'est moi._
Great uncertainty if not mystery prevailed in our army as to the
probability of the Sikhs crossing the Sutlej. The Blue Book comes
to our aid in deciding upon such a probability. It was argued that
in 1843 the Sikhs did threaten to cross, but thought better of it
and forebore; and therefore they might do the same now. But all the
politicals knew well enough that the Punts and Punchees were no longer
under the control of the Durbar as they were in 1843, but were more
likely than not, to act in open defiance of it.
There were two officers, however, of great political talent, whose
official position enabled them to know more of the feelings of the
Sikhs, and of the probability of such a step than most others; one was
Major G. Broadfoot of the 34th Madras Native Infantry, who had held
the office of British Agent for Sikh affairs since November 1844, and
who had acted as engineer in the celebrated defence of Jellalabad,
the heroes of which obtained the well merited Roman distinction of a
mural crown; the other was Captain P. Nicolson, 28th Bengal Native
Infantry who had been appointed his assistant. Captain Nicolson was in
Affghanistan in 1838-39, and was deputed to conduct the traitor Dost
Mahomed Khan to Calcutta, and afterwards to Saharunpore. This officer
had had seven years' experience of the politics of the Affghans and the
Sikhs. At this juncture he was with Major General Sir John H. Littler
at Ferozepore. He was in the daily receipt of intelligence from Lahore,
and knew that the Sikhs would cross, for he wrote to Calcutta on the
9th of October, 1845, that "he believed the Sikhs would cross." What!
because Major Broadfoot knew that the Sikhs had made an empty threat to
cross in 1843, was it therefore improbable, that, being encamped for
a long time, on the right bank of the Sutlej, menacing the Durbar at
Lahore, from whence they marched in defiance of their government and of
their chief, whom they compelled to join them, they would execute their
threat under these circumstances?
Major Broadfoot was the Governor-General's agent, and as such was the
officer to whom he looked for intelligence, Captain Nicolson was his
subordinate; the Major doubted the Captain's intelligence, because he
had received no other information to induce him to believe that the
rebellious and infatuated Khalsa (or royal) troops would dare to cross.
If they threatened to cross in 1843 without carrying that threat into
execution, why might they not do the same in 1845? But this was not
good logic; the inference was against him; because in 1843 they were
obedient to the Durbar, and in 1845 they acted in defiance of it.
It would be useless at this distant period to enter into the discussion
which arose in India, and was afterwards taken up with much warmth
in England, as to the correctness of the views entertained by these
officers on the crossing of the Sutlej by the Sikhs. The relative
views of those two officers were then and are still sustained by their
respective friends; but as far as we can individually offer an opinion,
and as it seemed to many at the time, there is great difficulty in
arriving at a decision as to the rights of the question at issue. It is
true that Major Broadfoot, as the superior officer, might be presumed
to be in a position for obtaining access to sources of information from
which his subordinate was debarred. In a military point of view, this
position must always carry its due weight in the scale of probable
authentic intelligence, and should have a preponderating influence in
ultimate proceedings, especially in such a country as India, and among
such a people as we were then dealing with.
On the other hand, it is by no means uncommon for a subordinate in
an important position, to have access directly, and indirectly, to
authentic intelligence from which his superior may be shut out, and
such a subordinate, knowing his duties and his means of intelligence,
can constantly elicit facts in a variety of ways, especially from a
hostile source, from which his superior is excluded.
Now, in reference to the position of Captain Nicolson at this juncture,
and for a long period antecedent, we are decidedly of opinion that
his information and impressions were correct: at the same time we
do not consider that the admission of this circumstance can warrant
any one to seek, or in justice desire, to disparage the opinions of
Major Broadfoot. He, no doubt, had strong grounds for arriving at
the conclusion that he did, as the information upon which he acted
coincided with his own predilections, and for persisting in these
views, even in the face of equally strong opinions on the part of
Captain Nicolson.
Officers will, and must, differ on points like the one at issue; but we
do not hesitate to say, that Major Broadfoot's views have subjected him
to no small share of obloquy and censure. It is, however, important
to bear in mind, that in no country, and among no class of people
in the world, is there so much cause for a difference of opinion as
among military men in India, especially on such a question as that
under consideration. The character of the Sikhs, their former empty
and vacillating tactics, made the crossing of the Sutlej a matter of
uncertainty, even up to a few days of their actual transit; and, to the
very last moment, some of their own people were doubtful on the point.
This has always been a piece of oriental policy.
It cannot be denied, that the Sikhs had considerable cause for
provocation. The sequestration of the two Sikh villages near
Loodianna, by the British government, early in November, was the
culminating point, and left no doubt of our aggressive intentions on
the minds of the Sikhs. Their suspicions had long been awakened by
our proceedings--by the rumours of boats preparing at Bombay, to form
pontoons across the Sutlej--of our equipping troops in Scinde, for a
march on Mooltan--and reinforcing our frontier stations with men and
ammunition. They persuaded themselves that the policy of our government
was territorial aggrandizement, and that war was inevitable. This
feeling was shared by the mass of the Sikh population. The Durbar
sitting at Lahore, however, knew well enough that the British
government would not take the initiative; but it had completely lost
the confidence and allegiance of the army by its internal dissensions,
and the supine weakness and luxurious indolence of the chiefs of the
Punjaub. The Sikh soldiery used to assemble in groups round the tomb of
Runjeet Singh, vowing to defend with their lives all that belonged to
the commonwealth of Govind--that they would never suffer the kingdom
of Lahore to be occupied by the British strangers, but stand ready to
march, or give the invaders battle on their own ground.
Thus, led on from one step to another, the Sikhs declared war on the
17th of November, and by an overt act broke the solemn treaty of
alliance with our government; they crossed the Sutlej on the 13th of
December, and on the 14th took up a position in the immediate vicinity
of Ferozepore.
This treaty of alliance between the British government and the
Maharajah had been concluded in April, 1809; being occasioned by the
aggressions of Runjeet Singh upon the territories of the chiefs of the
Cis-Sutlej provinces, who claimed the British protection.[1]
In Sir David Ochterlony's proclamation,[2] which was issued at the
same time, it was especially stated, "That the force of cavalry and
infantry which may have crossed to this side of the river Sutlej,
must be recalled to the other side, to the country of the Maharajah.
This communication is made solely with the view of publishing the
sentiments of the British, and of ascertaining those of the Maharajah.
The British are confident that the Maharajah will consider the contents
of this precept as redounding to his real advantage, and as affording
a conspicuous proof of their friendship; that with their capacity for
war, they are also intent on peace."
There can be no question, that so long as Runjeet Singh held the
government, this and subsequent treaties would have remained inviolate.
He knew the power and influence of the English well enough to desire
their friendship, rather than their enmity. But this was not the
case with his successors, whose policy was guided by views of
self-aggrandizement, rather than by the weal of their people, by which
they lost their hold over them.
Up to this time, the British had adopted only precautionary measures
for the protection of their frontier states. The Governor-General,
Lord Hardinge, had joined the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough, at
Umballa, early in December; and as soon as the rumour gained ground,
that the Sikh forces were marching towards the Sutlej, the troops in
the upper provinces received marching orders, and all were speedily on
the move. The corps stationed at Umballa, Loodianna, and Ferozepore,
amounted to about 30,000 men, with 70 field-guns; and as Ferozepore,
which was then occupied by Sir John Littler, was the most exposed, the
troops from Umballa were sent to his support, and only a small garrison
was left at Loodianna, in order that as large a body of available men
as possible, should be placed at the disposal of Sir H. Gough to give
battle to the Sikhs, should they carry out their threat of crossing the
Sutlej.
This, as we have seen, they actually did on the 13th; but so great was
the influence which Captain Nicolson exercised over some of their
chiefs, that he prevailed upon Lall Singh to divide his forces; and it
was only a division of the Sikhs which fought at Moodkee on the 18th of
December.
The Sikh army numbered from 35,000 to 40,000 men, with 50 pieces of
heavy artillery, besides a reserve force stationed near Loodianna,
to act according to circumstances. The army of invasion consequently
more than doubled that of the British. Notwithstanding the jealousy,
mistrust, and treachery which prevailed in the Sikh army, in one thing
they were agreed, that they would rid the commonwealth of Govind, of
their hated British allies; and that in order to accomplish this,
it behoved every individual to act as if the result depended upon
himself alone. The Sikhs were commanded by Tej Singh, an officer of
considerable talent. They took up an entrenched position at Ferozeshah,
an inconsiderable village about 10 miles from Ferozepore and the same
distance from Moodkee.
General Sir John Littler was, as we have stated, lying at Ferozepore
with a garrison of about 10,000 men. As the Sikhs appeared to threaten
the town, the gallant general immediately led out his men, and offered
them battle; this they declined, mainly it would appear, from the
double dealing and artful conduct of Lall Singh and Tej Singh, who,
uncertain as to the result of the present movement, were anxious to
remain friends with both parties.
The head-quarters of the Commander-in-Chief were at Umballa about 150
miles from Moodkee. His Excellency[3] broke up his camp on the 11th,
and by forced marches arrived at the village of Moodkee on the 18th.
The Governor-General was a little in advance of his Excellency, and
rode over to Loodianna to inspect the troops. Finding that post secure
from an attack, he dispatched about 5,000 of the garrison to guard the
important grain depôt of Bussean.
On the 18th of December, the Commander-in-Chief, with the Umballa
division of the army arrived at Moodkee, and was immediately joined by
the Loodianna division. On reaching Moodkee there was no longer any
doubt as to the whereabouts of the Sikh forces. Orders were immediately
issued by the deputy adjutant-general to a brigadier, that he should
be ready for duty next day; in other words, that he should command
the advance guard. This was about twelve o'clock in the day, when the
officers were in the mess tent at _tiffin_. Two young officers of the
16th Native Grenadiers overheard the order: "You are brigadier for
to-morrow; the army will march early in the morning to attack the
Sikhs, who are known to be ten miles off." They were still discussing
the glorious prospect of an encounter with the Sikhs, when orders
arrived in camp for "all hands to turn out," Major Broadfoot having
received intelligence that the Sikhs were near. The order had been sent
by Lord Hardinge,--every inch a soldier, but who at that time had not
yet been appointed second in command to the Commander-in-Chief.
The cavalry and horse artillery darted off to the right front; the
infantry followed; it was a short affair. Lord Gough did not at first
credit the report: "The Sikhs are coming!" Like a true Irish soldier,
he would have a view of them before he could make up his mind--but
he was soon convinced of the reality of the rumour. Major Broadfoot,
galloping up to their position, was fired on; both the Governor-General
and the Commander-in-Chief were, it is said, at one time nearly
captured. The Governor-General, on the other hand, promptly put the
troops in motion: being himself an old Peninsular officer, he was an
excellent judge of the matter. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief
could not have done otherwise, but there was not time to send to him:
the urgency of the occasion satisfies the mind of all military men; by
a delay the Sikhs might have attacked the British.
Napoleon and other great generals "always anticipated the attack." They
who attack have the advantage of deciding on the form of attack; those
who await it, have no certainty where it may be made.
The battle of Moodkee was, as we have said, a short affair. The Sikhs
headed by Lall Singh, opened with a heavy cannonade, but were answered
by a brisk fire from the English; the enemy's rear was then attacked by
a brilliant cavalry movement which routed him; and night put a stop to
the carnage. The Sikhs were defeated with a loss of 17 guns. That of
the British was very great; they had 215 killed, and 657 wounded. Among
the killed were Sir Robert Sale and Sir John McCaskill. It is doubtful
whether the addition of the 9th Lancers would have been of service at
the battle of Moodkee, because there was no extended field for cavalry
movements: at Ferozeshah, however, they would have been of eminent use,
for on the the second day (December 22nd,) Tej Singh advanced with a
large force of horse artillery; and I have heard it deeply regretted by
officers present in this action, that we were not at hand to complete
the rout of the brave Sikhs.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: See Appendix I.]
[Footnote 2: See Appendix, II.]
[Footnote 3: The Commander-in-Chief is always so styled; the
Governor-General never.]