CHAPTER XXXV. THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION

The largest island in the Mediterranean, Sicily has been a stepping-stone

between African, Asiatic, and European nations. Freeman[e] has compared

it with Great Britain in its “geographical and historical position.” Its

original inhabitants seem to have been the Sicans who were invaded first

by the Elymians and then by the Sicels. Relations with Sicily were begun

as early as the Mycenæan age, and jars of Ægean ware have been unearthed

in the tombs of Syracuse. The Phœnicians established factories and

trading places in Sicily, and then came the Greeks overflowing the island

and founding many a city and stronghold. As we have seen in a previous

chapter, Sicily became one of the earliest and most important of the

Greek colonies.

SICILIAN HISTORY

The African city of Carthage, which we think of chiefly along with Roman

history, early took up the grievances of the Phœnicians against the

Greeks. In the sixth century B.C., various settlements had fallen by the

ears with one another. About 580 B.C. the Greek adventurer Pentathlus

threatened the Phœnician settlements, but was defeated and slain.

Carthage, however, was awakened to the danger from Greek land-hunger, and

about 560 B.C. sent an expedition under Malchus, who gave a severe check

to Greek encroachment and an encouragement to Carthaginian ambition.

Finally, by 480 B.C., the Carthaginians were ready to combine with the

Persians against Greek prosperity and independence. While Xerxes assailed

the mother-country, Carthage by agreement sent an enormous expedition

against the Sicilian Greeks. Their general was Hamilcar, and the

magnificence of his host has been as splendidly exaggerated as that of

Xerxes. His success was equal to that of the Persian, except that Xerxes

escaped alive, while Hamilcar perished.

[Sidenote: [481-447 B.C.]]

The chief instruments of the Sicilian victory were the tyrants who had

gathered to themselves supreme power in their own cities or groups of

cities as the tyrants of the mother-country had previously done. In

Sicily there were four powerful masters of four chief cities: Anaxilaus

of Rhegium in Italy, who crossing the straits, took possession of

Zancle; his father-in-law Terillus of Himera; Gelo of Syracuse and his

father-in-law, Theron of Acragas. It was a quarrel between Theron and

Terillus that gave the Carthaginians their immediate excuse for invading

Sicily. Terillus being thwarted by Theron played a treacherous part like

that of Hippias, and begged the Persians to attack Acragas. Terillus

called in Carthage to his aid against Theron. There is a tradition that

the defeat of the Carthaginians happened on the same day as the battle of

Salamis. Such traditions are always subject to scepticism, and yet the

coincidence of Vicksburg and Gettysburg in American history is hardly

more incredible.

Theron had called on Gelo to aid him in expelling the Carthaginians,

and Gelo had won the greater glory. He died two years later leaving

his younger brother Hiero to succeed him. It was Hiero’s privilege to

thwart the ambition of the Etruscans as his elder brother had foiled

Carthage. The naval battle of Cyme was the brilliant victory which led

Pindar to write one of his loftiest songs. He and Simonides, Æschylus,

and Bacchylides, were all received with honour at the opulent court of

Hiero. The glitter of court life, however, was small compensation for

the tyranny of the various despots of Sicily. Their ambitions clashed at

the least pretext, always at the cost of the blood of their subjects.

They had a curious way of deporting the inhabitants of an entire city to

some other place to suit their own whims. And gradually time took its

revenge upon them. Theron left as his heir a weak son, Thrasydæus who

went to battle with Hiero, and, losing the battle, lost also his prestige

and his power, for the cities Himera and Acragas formed themselves into

democracies. Five years later, in 467 B.C., Hiero died, and his tyranny

fell to his brother Thrasybulus whose blood-thirsty and tax-hungry

cruelties aroused a revolution. He was besieged in Syracuse, compelled to

surrender and sent into exile.

Life in Sicily is not to this day so quiet as in certain other portions

of the globe, and it was inevitable in the change from despotism to

democracy that there should be much friction and bloodshed, but the

cities lost none of the prosperity they had acquired under the tyrants.

Syracuse continued to be the principal city and power in the island;

Agrigentum, as the Romans named Acragas, being the second in power.

Now a new source of danger appeared, this time not from a foreign

invasion, or from the ambition of such pretenders as had tried to

re-establish the power of Gelo. The new threat came from a racial

jealousy. The old inhabitants, the Sicels, who had been crowded into the

interior, gave birth to a Napoleonic ambition. A young man named Ducetius

who first appeared in 461, having fed upon certain small successes in

acquiring power, showed his ingenuity in 453 by forming a federation of

Sicel towns with himself as prince. He seized an early opportunity to

assail the Greeks, and justified the fidelity of the Sicels by capturing

the towns of Morgantium, Ætna, and the Acragantine stronghold of Motya,

building a new city--Palice. He now became important enough to merit the

anger of Syracuse, and a large force from Syracuse and Agrigentum marched

against him. The toy Napoleon met his little Waterloo. His partisans

deserted him and he found himself alone. A desperate resolve occurred to

him as the only means of saving his life. He rode by night to the gates

of Syracuse, entered the city secretly, and sat himself down before the

altar in the market place. He was soon surrounded by a crowd who had too

keen a sense of the dramatic not to forgive him and let him off with the

easy exile to Corinth. From this Elba this Napoleon soon emerged. He

violated his parole laying the blame on an oracle, and took a body of

colonists to Sicily where he founded the city of Calacta (or Kale Akte).

He began gradually to reach out for more power, but his death in 440

ended his schemes and left his federation as a prize for Syracuse.

[Sidenote: [440-431 B.C.]]

While Syracuse was beginning to plume itself upon its leadership and

to dream of more definite control, the city of Athens was building an

empire, not over one island but many. It was only natural that she

should wish to stand well with the rich cities of Sicily. At first there

could hardly have been any thought of conquest, and Grote[f] points out

that Plutarch is mistaken and is contradicted by Thucydides, when he

implies that even as late as the quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra, the

Athenians had thought of dominion over Sicily. Professor Bury[d] however

sees a distinct desire to have influence, if not conquest, from a very

early day. He says:

“During the fifth century the eyes of Athenian statesmen often wandered

to western Greece beyond the seas. We can surprise some oblique glances,

as early as the days of Themistocles; and we have seen how under Pericles

a western policy definitely began. An alliance was formed with the

Elymian town of Segesta, and subsequently treaties of alliance (the

stone records are still partly preserved) were concluded with Leontini

and Rhegium. One general object of Athens was to support the Ionian

cities against the Dorian, which were predominant in number and power,

and especially against Syracuse, the daughter and friend of Corinth. The

same purpose of counter-acting the Dorian predominance may be detected

in the foundation of Thurii. But Thurii did not effect this purpose. The

colonists were a mixed body; other than Athenian elements gained the

upper hand; and, in the end, Thurii became rather a Dorian centre and

was no support to Athens. It is to be observed that at the time of the

foundation of Thurii, and for nigh thirty years more, Athens is seeking

merely influence in the west, she has no thought of dominion. The growth

of her connection with Italian and Sicilian affairs was forced upon her

by the conditions of commerce and the rivalry of Corinth.” Adolph Holm[b]

is equally positive in accusing the Athenians of an early desire to

obtain a footing in Sicily.

[Sidenote: [431-425 B.C.]]

The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. found Sicily in a

high state of prosperity, political equality, and intellectual health.

According as the various cities had been founded by Dorian or Ionian

colonists their family prejudices inclined them towards Sparta or Athens.

The war in fact, according to Müller,[h] was called by the oracles, the

Doric War. The preponderance in Sicily was largely toward Sparta and

Corinth, for Corinth had been the mother-city to Syracuse. Grote[f] thus

discusses the feelings of the various cities at this time:

“In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern,

nor anything to fear from the ambition of Athens; who, though she had

founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears never to have aimed at any political

ascendency even over that town--much less anywhere else on the coast.

But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own

island, from which it suited the dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude

all foreign interference, were yet connected by sympathy, and one side

even by alliances, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among

the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of

Sicily--Syracuse, Camarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, perhaps Himera

and Messana--together with Locri and Tarentum in Italy; among the allies

of Athens, perhaps, the Chalcidic or Ionic Rhegium in Italy. Whether the

Ionic cities in Sicily--Naxos, Catana, and Leontini--were at this time

united with Athens by any special treaty, is very doubtful. But if we

examine the state of politics prior to the breaking out of the war, it

will be found that the connection of the Sicilian cities on both sides

with central Greece was rather one of sympathy and tendency, than of

pronounced obligation and action. The Dorian Sicilians, though sharing

the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been

called upon for any co-operation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians

yet learned to look to Athens for protection against Syracuse.”

Sparta counted apparently upon the active assistance of Syracuse, and

demanded that the Dorians in Italy and Sicily should contribute to

her both ships and money. She realised no ships, a little money, and

profuse expressions of interest and sympathy. The awakening of the old

Dorio-Ionic blood feud suggested to the Syracusans, however, that while

the Peloponnesian War was remote from them both geographically and

commercially, it yet furnished a good excuse for attacking such cities in

Sicily as were in any way attached to Athens. Naxos, Catana, and Leontini

were looked upon as the first prizes to be seized. These towns were so

far from being able to send aid to Athens that they were compelled to

ask aid of her. They succeeded in forming an alliance with Camarina,

which was a Dorian city but jealous of Syracuse, and with the town of

Rhegium in Italy. The friendship of Rhegium brought over to Syracuse the

Italian city of Locri. With the aid of Locri and practically all the

Dorian cities, Syracuse was so strong that the Ionic allies were soon in

desperate straits. They sent their eloquent orator Gorgias to implore the

Athenians for aid and to advise them to grant it, lest when Syracuse had

conquered all Sicily she should send her troops and ships to the aid of

the Spartans and Corinthians. The Athenians sent twenty triremes under

Laches, who after various minor successes fell under suspicion as to his

honesty and efficiency, and was called home.

[Sidenote: [425-416 B.C.]]

The Ionians sent another appeal to Athens, and received the promise of

forty more triremes. In the spring of 425 this fleet left Athens under

command of Eurymedon and Sophocles. It was this fleet which, almost

accidentally, paused on the Spartan coast at Pylos with the result that

it gained for Athens the renowned victory of Sphacteria, as previously

described. This victory was very profitable to Athens in its immediate

glory, but was of very gloomy purport in the Sicilian matter, for the

fleet having delayed to take part in the victory, and later pausing at

Corcyra, did not reach Sicily before September. This delay had given the

Syracusan allies time to undo what little had been achieved by Laches. He

had won the friendship of the town of Messana, thus giving Athens command

of the straits. The delay however had weakened the friendship of Messana,

and lost its alliance. Furthermore, the cities which Athens had come to

aid were found to be in a decided humour to put an end to the civil war.

A congress of Sicilian cities was called at Gela.

This congress at Gela takes on a decided importance in political history

because of the theories brought forward there by a Syracusan orator,

Hermocrates, whose political creed has been compared to the Monroe

Doctrine of the United States. The creed was not successfully carried

out, and as has often happened in the history of the United States,

the promulgators of the doctrine were by no means consistent in their

actions. Hermocrates pleaded for a policy, which in modern phrase would

be called “Sicily for the Sicilians.” He wished Sicily to regard herself

as an entity, considering all foreigners to be outsiders, and all

interference to be meddling. He was not rash enough or un-Grecian enough

to deny the Sicilian cities the luxury of fighting with one another;

but he called for unity against the invader or the intriguer from other

shores. From his speech, as imagined by Thucydides,[i] the peroration is

worth quoting for its cool common sense:

“And I call on you all, of your own free will, to act in the same manner

as myself, and not to be compelled to do it by your enemies. For there is

no disgrace in connections giving way to connections, whether a Dorian to

a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to those of the same race; in a word, all of us

who are neighbours, and live together in one country, and that an island,

and are called by the one name of Sicilians. For we shall go to war

again, I suppose, when it may so happen, and come to terms again amongst

ourselves by means of general conferences; but to foreign invaders we

shall always, if we are wise, offer united resistance, inasmuch as by

our separate losses we are collectively endangered; and we shall never

in future call in any allies or mediators. For by acting thus we shall

at the present time avoid depriving Sicily of two blessings--riddance

both of the Athenians and of civil war--and shall in future enjoy it by

ourselves in freedom, and less exposed to the machinations of others.”

The Athenian expedition having been coldly received by the cities it

came to rescue, returned to Athens, where Eurymedon was fined and

Sophocles banished on a charge of bribery. And now the reservation made

by Hermocrates as to the right of the Sicilian cities to war upon one

another, was soon justified. And to such an extent that the Ionic cities

began to realise that the Syracusans had been chiefly anxious to expel

the foreign invader, in order that the island might be left entirely to

Syracusan ambition. In the city of Leontini the aristocrats crushed the

democrats, and turned the city into a Syracusan fort after destroying the

greater portion of it. The common people appealed to Athens, and received

in reply two triremes under Phæax in B.C. 422. Before he had accomplished

anything the Peace of Nicias put a temporary close to the war.

In 417 B.C. the two Sicilian cities of Selinus and Segesta (or Egesta)

quarrelled over a bit of territory. Syracuse aided Selinus, and Segesta,

after appealing in vain to Agrigentum and to Carthage, sent envoys to

Athens. The Leontine people also reminded Athens that Syracuse, having

destroyed Leontini and assailed Segesta, was planning and accomplishing

the gradual reduction of all Sicilian cities favourable to Athens, and

thus building up an empire which would give Sparta unlimited aid. The

people of Segesta asked only for men and ships, and promised to provide

ample money for expenses.

[Sidenote: [416-415 B.C.]]

The idea of such an armada delighted the fire-brand Alcibiades, who saw

in it a chance to be a leader and to find an abundance of the things

he most desired--adventure, notoriety, and money. The cautious Nicias

opposed the scheme, and secured a delay until ambassadors could be sent

to Segesta to learn if the city were really wealthy enough to pay as it

promised. And now it was a case of Greek meeting Sicilian. The people

of Segesta had sent secret expeditions to all their friendly towns,

Phœnician or Grecian, to borrow all the treasure they could wheedle out

of their prospective allies. When the Athenian envoys appeared, they

were taken to the temple of Venus and shown a great array of gifts,

“bowls, wine ladles, censers, and other articles of furniture in no

small quantity.” These were all silver or of silver gilt, and made a far

greater showing than they merited. Then the Athenians were put through

a round of entertainments. In each case the host displayed all his own

plate, and in addition a large portion of the common fund, which was

passed from house to house surreptitiously. The gullible Athenians were

overwhelmed by the evident opulence of the private citizens of Segesta,

and when sixty talents of uncoined silver (valued at over £12,000 or

$60,000) were handed over to the Athenians for the first month’s expenses

of the fleet, the embassy was thoroughly duped, and returned to Athens

glowing with enthusiasm for an alliance with such a western Golconda.

Then followed a tug of war between Nicias and Alcibiades. Nicias was

to be one of the commanders of the expedition, and he could well claim

that it was no fear of bodily danger that made him averse to it. He

opposed it purely as a piece of folly. Alcibiades replied in favour of

the expedition, and it was so evident that the people were determined to

send the fleet that Nicias in a last effort tried to alarm the city by

magnifying the difficulties of the task and demanding a tremendous force.

To the Athenians, in their drunkenness for empire, and in that frenzy of

“Westward Ho!” which, in the fifteenth century, attacked all Europe, the

opposition of Nicias was only wind on flame. They rejoiced the more at

the magnificence of the problem.

To decide upon sending a fleet of one hundred triremes instead of the

sixty asked for, was folly enough; but to elect Nicias as the commander

of the expedition, and to ally with him his bitter opponent, Alcibiades,

was pure delirium. Still, Athens had just conquered Melos, and no task

was too gigantic for her hopes.[a]

[Illustration: GREEK DOOR KEYS]

THE MUTILATION OF THE HERMÆ

For the two or three months immediately succeeding the final resolution

taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily, the whole city was elate and

bustling with preparation. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and

other accredited religious advisers, announced generally the favourable

dispositions of the gods, and promised a triumphant result. All classes

in the city, rich and poor,--cultivators, traders, and seamen,--old

and young, all embraced the project with ardour; as requiring a great

effort, yet promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandisement

and individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for

personal service; so that the three generals, Nicias, Alcibiades, and

Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites,

instead of being forced to employ constraint or incur ill-will,

as happened when an expedition was adopted reluctantly with many

dissentients, had only to choose the fittest among a throng of eager

volunteers.

Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact that five years had now

elapsed since the Peace of Nicias, without any considerable warlike

operations. While the treasury had become replenished with fresh

accumulations, and the triremes increased in number, the military

population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had forgotten both

the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic disease. Hence

the fleet now got together, while it surpassed in number all previous

armaments of Athens, except a single one in the second year of the

previous war under Pericles, was incomparably superior even to that, and

still more superior to all the rest in the other ingredients of force,

material as well as moral, in picked men, universal ardour, ships as

well as arms in the best condition, and accessories of every kind in

abundance. Such was the confidence of success, that many Athenians went

prepared for trade as well as for combat; so that the private stock,

thus added to the public outfit and to the sums placed in the hands of

the generals, constituted an unparalleled aggregate of wealth. After

between two and three months of active preparations, the expedition was

almost ready to start, when an event happened which fatally poisoned the

prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was the mutilation of the Hermæ,

one of the most extraordinary events in all Grecian history.

[Sidenote: [415 B.C.]]

The Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermes, were blocks of marble

about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a

head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular

pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the

significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in great

numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous situations.

The religious feeling of the Greeks considered the god to be planted

or domiciliated where his statue stood, so that the companionship,

sympathy, and guardianship of Hermes became associated with most of the

manifestations of conjunct life at Athens, political, social, commercial,

or gymnastic.

About the end of May 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same night,

all these Hermæ, one of the most peculiar marks of the city, were

mutilated by unknown hands. Their characteristic features were knocked

off or levelled, so that nothing was left except a mass of stone with no

resemblance to humanity or deity. All were thus dealt with in the same

way, save and except very few: nay, Andocides affirms that there was but

one which escaped unharmed. If we take that reasonable pains, which is

incumbent on those who study the history of Greece, to realize in our

minds the religious and political associations of the Athenians,--noted

in ancient times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy

and magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling,--we

shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror, and

wrath, which beset the public mind, on the morning after this nocturnal

sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all the ruin

and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian invasion

of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt or so long

remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues and temples of the

gods. If we could imagine the excitement of a Spanish or Italian town,

on finding that all the images of the Virgin had been defaced during the

same night, we should have a parallel, though a very inadequate parallel,

to what was now felt at Athens--where religious associations and persons

were far more intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the

proceedings of every-day life--where, too, the god and his efficiency

were more forcibly localised, as well as identified with the presence

and keeping of the statue. To the Athenians, when they went forth on the

following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway

dishonoured and defaced, and each man gradually coming to know that

the devastation was general,--it would seem that the town had become

as it were godless--that the streets, the market-place, the porticoes,

were robbed of their divine protectors; and what was worse still, that

these protectors, having been grossly insulted, carried away with them

alienated sentiments--wrathful and vindictive instead of tutelary and

sympathising.

Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager and

bustling movement of Athens a few days before the Sicilian expedition

was in condition for starting. In reference to that expedition, it was

taken to heart as a most depressing omen. The mutilation of the Hermæ,

however, was something much more ominous than the worst accident. It

proclaimed itself as the deliberate act of organised conspirators, not

inconsiderable in number, whose names and final purpose were indeed

unknown, but who had begun by committing sacrilege of a character

flagrant and unheard of. For intentional mutilation of a public and

sacred statue, where the material afforded no temptation to plunder,

is a case to which we know no parallel: much more, mutilation by

wholesale--spread by one band and in one night throughout the entire

city. Though neither the parties concerned, nor their purposes, were

ever more than partially made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is

unquestionable.

It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the

conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the

other--to ruin Alcibiades--to frustrate or delay the expedition. Indeed

the two objects were intimately connected with each other; for the

prosecution of the enterprise, while full of prospective conquest to

Athens, was yet more pregnant with future power and wealth to Alcibiades

himself. Such chances would disappear if the expedition could be

prevented; nor was it at all impossible that the Athenians, under the

intense impression of religious terror consequent on the mutilation of

the Hermæ, might throw up the scheme altogether.

Few men in Athens either had, or deserved to have, a greater number of

enemies, political as well as private, than Alcibiades; many of them

being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his insolence,

and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he outshone by his

reckless expenditure. His importance had been already so much increased

and threatened to be so much more increased by the Sicilian enterprise,

that they no longer observed any measures in compassing his ruin. That

which the mutilators of the Hermæ seemed to have deliberately planned,

his other enemies were ready to turn to profit.

While the senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers

of action, Diognetus, Pisander, Charicles, and others, were named

commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries: and public

assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports. The first

informations received, however, did not relate to the grave and recent

mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of older date; to

certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in drunken frolic--and

above all, to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated in various houses, by

parties of revellers caricaturing and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries.

It was under this latter head that the first impeachment was preferred

against Alcibiades.

But Alcibiades saw full well the danger of having such charges hanging

over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived from his

accidental position at the moment. He implored the people to investigate

the charges at once; proclaiming his anxiety to stand trial and even to

suffer death, if found guilty,--accepting the command only in case he

should be acquitted,--and insisting above all things on the mischief to

the city of sending him on such an expedition with the charge undecided,

as well as on the hardship to himself of being aspersed by calumny during

his absence, without power of defence. Such appeals, just and reasonable

in themselves, and urged with all the vehemence of a man who felt that

the question was one of life or death to his future prospects, were very

near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the trick of

putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility to Alcibiades.

These men affected a tone of candour, deprecated the delay which would

be occasioned in the departure of the expedition, if he were put upon

his trial forthwith; and proposed deferring the trial until a certain

number of days after his return. Such was the determination ultimately

adopted: the supporters of Alcibiades probably not fully appreciating its

consequences, and conceiving that the speedy departure of the expedition

was advisable even for his interest, as well as agreeable to their own

feelings. And thus his enemies, though baffled in their first attempt

to bring on his immediate ruin, carried a postponement which insured to

them leisure for thoroughly poisoning the public mind against him, and

choosing their own time for his trial. They took care to keep back all

farther accusation until he and the armament had departed.

THE FLEET SAILS

The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing, and the moment

so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the recollection of

the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not mustered at Athens;

for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied contingents

to rendezvous at once at Corcyra. But the Athenian force alone was

astounding to behold. The condition, the equipment, the pomp both of

wealth and force, visible in the armament, were still more impressive

than the number. At day-break on the day appointed, when all the ships

were ready in Piræus for departure, the military force was marched down

in a body from the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the

whole population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the

appearance was that of a collective emigration like the flight to Salamis

sixty-five years before. While the crowd of foreigners, brought thither

by curiosity, were amazed by the grandeur of the spectacle--the citizens

accompanying were moved by deeper and more stirring anxieties. Their

sons, brothers, relatives, and friends, were just starting on the longest

and largest enterprise which Athens had ever undertaken; against an

island extensive as well as powerful, known to none to them accurately,

and into a sea of undefined possibilities--glory and profit on the one

side, but hazards of unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final

parting, ideas of doubt and danger became far more painfully present

than they had been in any of the preliminary discussions; and in spite

of all the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the

relatives now separating at the water’s edge could not banish the dark

presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the last time.

The moment immediately succeeding this farewell--when all the soldiers

were already on board and the _celeustes_ was on the point of beginning

his chant to put the rowers in motion--was peculiarly solemn and

touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained, by sound of trumpet,

the crews in every ship, and the spectators on shore, followed the voice

of the herald in praying to the gods for success, and in singing the

pæan. On every deck were seen bowls of wine prepared, out of which the

officers and the _epibatæ_ made libations, with goblets of silver and

gold. At length the final signal was given, and the whole fleet quitted

Piræus in single file--displaying the exuberance of their yet untried

force by a race of speed as far as Ægina. Never in Grecian history was an

invocation more unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods;

never was the refusing nod of Zeus more stern or peremptory.[f]

The customary libations were poured out; and, after the triumphant pæan

had been sung, the whole fleet set sail, and contended for the prize of

naval skill and celerity, until they reached the shores of Ægina, from

whence they enjoyed a prosperous voyage to their confederates at Corcyra.

At Corcyra the commanders reviewed the strength of the armament, which

consisted of a hundred and thirty-four ships of war, with a proportional

number of transports and tenders. The heavy-armed troops, exceeding five

thousand, were attended with a sufficient body of slingers and archers.

The army, abundantly provided with every other article, was extremely

deficient in horses, which amounted to no more than thirty. But, at

a moderate computation, we may estimate the whole military and naval

strength, including slaves and servants, at twenty thousand men.[55]

With this powerful host, had the Athenians at once surprised and assailed

the unprepared security of Syracuse, the expedition, however adventurous

and imprudent, might, perhaps, have been crowned with success. But the

timid mariners of Greece would have trembled at the proposal of trusting

such a numerous fleet on the broad expanse of the Ionian Sea. They

determined to cross the narrowest passage between Italy and Sicily, after

coasting along the eastern shores of the former, until they reached the

strait of Messana. That this design might be executed with the greater

safety, they despatched three light vessels to examine the disposition of

the Italian cities, and to solicit admission into their harbours. Neither

the ties of consanguinity, nor the duties acknowledged by colonies

towards their parent state, could prevail on the suspicious Thurians

to open their gates, or even to furnish a market, to their Athenian

ancestors. The towns of Tarentum and Locri prohibited them the use of

their harbours, and refused to supply them with water; and they coasted

the whole extent of the shore, from the promontory of Iapygia to that of

Rhegium, before any one city would allow them to purchase the commodities

for which they had immediate use. The magistrates of Rhegium granted this

favour, but they granted nothing more.

A considerable detachment was sent to examine the preparations and the

strength of Syracuse, and to proclaim liberty, and offer protection, to

all the captives and strangers confined within its walls.

With another detachment Alcibiades sailed to Naxos, and persuaded the

inhabitants to accept the alliance of Athens. The remainder of the

armament proceeded to Catana, which refused to admit the ships into the

harbour, or the troops into the city. But on the arrival of Alcibiades,

the Catanians allowed him to address the assembly, and propose his

demands. The artful Athenian transported the populace, and even the

magistrates themselves, by the charms of his eloquence; the citizens

flocked from every quarter, to hear a discourse which was purposely

protracted for several hours; the soldiers forsook their posts; and the

enemy, who had prepared to avail themselves of this negligence, burst

through the unguarded gates, and became masters of the city. Those of

the Catanians who were most attached to the interests of Syracuse,

fortunately escaped death by the celerity of their flight. The rest

accepted the proffered friendship of the Athenians. This success would

probably have been followed by the surrender of Messana, which Alcibiades

had filled with distrust and sedition. But when the plot was ripe for

execution, the man who had contrived, and who alone could conduct it,

was disqualified from serving his country. The arrival of the Salaminian

galley recalled Alcibiades to Athens, that he might stand trial for his

life.

[Illustration: GREEK CITY SEALS]

ALCIBIADES TAKES FLIGHT

Alcibiades escaped to Thurii, and afterwards to Argos; and when he

understood that the Athenians had set a price on his head, he finally

took refuge in Sparta, where his active genius seized the first

opportunity to advise and promote those fatal measures, which, while they

gratified his private resentment, occasioned the ruin of his country.

The removal of Alcibiades soon appeared in the languid operations of the

Athenian armament. The cautious timidity of Nicias, supported by wealth,

eloquence, and authority, gained an absolute ascendant over the more

warlike and enterprising character of Lamachus, whose poverty exposed him

to contempt. Instead of making a bold impression on Selinus or Syracuse,

Nicias contented himself with taking possession of the inconsiderable

colony of Hyccara. He ravaged, or laid under contribution, some places

of smaller note, and obtained thirty talents from the Segestans, which,

added to the sale of the booty, furnished about thirty thousand pounds

sterling, a sum that might be usefully employed in the prosecution of

an expensive war. But this advantage did not compensate for the courage

inspired into the Syracusans by delay, and for the dishonour sustained

by the Athenian troops, in their unsuccessful attempts against Hybla and

Himera, as well as for their dejection at being confined, during the

greatest part of the summer, in the inactive quarters of Naxos and Catana.

Ancient Syracuse, of which the ruined grandeur still forms an object

of admiration, was situated on a spacious promontory, washed on three

sides by the sea, and defended on the west by abrupt and almost

inaccessible mountains. The town was built in a triangular form, whose

summit may be conceived on the lofty mountain Epipolæ. Adjacent to

these natural fortifications, the western or inland division of the

city was distinguished by the name of Tyche, or Fortune, being adorned

by a magnificent temple of that flattering divinity. The triangle

gradually widening towards the base, comprehended the vast extent of

Achradina, reaching from the northern shore of the promontory to the

southern island, Ortygia. This small island, composing the whole of

modern Syracuse, formed but the third and least extensive division of the

ancient; which was fortified by walls eighteen miles in circuit, enriched

by a triple harbour, and peopled by above two hundred thousand warlike

citizens or industrious slaves.

When the Syracusans heard the first rumours of the Athenian invasion,

they despised, or affected to despise them, as idle lies invented to

amuse the ignorance of the populace. The hostile armament had arrived at

Rhegium before they could be persuaded, by the wisdom of Hermocrates, to

provide against a danger which their presumption painted as imaginary.

But when they received undoubted intelligence that the enemy had reached

the Italian coast, when they beheld their numerous fleet commanding the

sea of Sicily and ready to make a descent on their defenceless island,

they were seized with a degree of just terror and alarm proportional

to their false security. The dilatory operations of the enemy not only

removed the recent terror and trepidation of the Syracusans, but inspired

them with unusual firmness. They requested the generals, whom they had

appointed to the number of fifteen, to lead them to Catana, that they

might attack the hostile camp. Their cavalry harassed the Athenians by

frequent incursions, beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys,

destroyed their advanced posts, and even proceeded so near to the main

body, that they were distinctly heard demanding, with loud insults,

whether those boasted lords of Greece had left their native country, that

they might form a precarious settlement at the foot of Mount Ætna.

NICIAS TRIES STRATEGY

[Sidenote: [415-414 B.C.]]

Provoked by these indignities, and excited by the impatient resentment of

his own troops, Nicias was still restrained from an open attempt against

Syracuse by the difficulties attending that enterprise. He employed

a stratagem. A citizen of Catana, whose subtile and daring genius,

prepared alike to die or to deceive, ought to have preserved his name

from oblivion, appeared in Syracuse as a deserter from his native city;

the unhappy fate of which, in being subjected to the imperious commands,

or licentious disorder of the Athenians, he lamented with perfidious

tears, and with the plaintive accents of well-dissembled sorrow. “The

Athenians,” he said, “spurned the confinement of the military life; their

posts were forsaken, their ships unguarded, they disdained the duties

of the camp, and indulged in the pleasures of the city. On an appointed

day it would be easy for the Syracusans, assisted by the conspirators of

Catana, to attack them unprepared, to mount their undefended ramparts, to

demolish their encampment, and to burn their fleet.” This daring proposal

well corresponded with the keen sentiments of revenge which animated the

inhabitants of Syracuse. The day was named; the plan of the enterprise

was concerted, and the treacherous Catanian returned home to revive the

hopes, and to confirm the resolution, of his pretended associates.

The success of this intrigue gave the utmost satisfaction to Nicias,

whose armament prepared to sail for Syracuse on the day appointed by the

inhabitants of that city for assaulting, with their whole force, the

Athenian camp. Already had they marched, with this view, to the fertile

plain of Leontini, when, after twelve hours’ sail, the Athenian fleet

arrived in the great harbour, disembarked their troops, and fortified a

camp without the western wall, near to a celebrated temple of Olympian

Jupiter, a situation which had been pointed out by some Syracusan exiles,

and which was well adapted to every purpose of accommodation and defence.

Meanwhile the cavalry of Syracuse, having proceeded to the walls of

Catana, had discovered, to their infinite regret, the departure of the

Athenians. The unwelcome intelligence was conveyed, with the utmost

expedition, to the infantry, who immediately marched back to protect

Syracuse. The rapid return of the war-like youth restored the courage of

the aged Syracusans. They were joined by the forces of Gela, Selinus, and

Camarina; and it was determined to attack the hostile encampment.

The attack was begun with fury, and continued with perseverance for

several hours. Both sides were animated by every principle that can

inspire and urge the utmost vigour of exertion, and victory was still

doubtful, when a tempest suddenly arose, accompanied with unusual peals

of thunder. This event, which little affected the Athenians, confounded

the unexperienced credulity of the enemy, who were broken and put to

flight. The Syracusans escaped to their city, and the Athenians returned

to their camp. In such an obstinate conflict the vanquished lost two

hundred and sixty, the victors only fifty men.

The voyage, the encampment, and the battle, employed the dangerous

activity, and gratified the impetuous ardour of the Athenians, but

did not facilitate the conquest of Syracuse. Without more powerful

preparations, Nicias despaired of taking the place, either by assault,

or by a regular siege. Soon after his victory he returned with the whole

armament to Naxos and Catana. Nicias had reason to expect that his

victory over the Syracusans would procure him respect and assistance

from the inferior states of Sicily. His emissaries were diffused over

that island and the neighbouring coast of Italy. Messengers were sent to

Tuscany, where Pisa and other cities had been founded by Greek colonies.

An embassy was despatched to Carthage, the rival and enemy of Syracuse.

Nicias gave orders to collect materials for circumvallation, iron,

bricks, and all necessary stores. He demanded horses from the Segestans;

and required from Athens reinforcements and a large pecuniary supply; and

neglected nothing that might enable him to open the ensuing campaign with

vigour and effect.

While the Athenians thus prepared for the attack of Syracuse, the

citizens of that capital displayed equal activity in providing for

their own defence. By the advice of Hermocrates, they appointed

himself, Heraclides, and Sicanus; three, instead of fifteen generals.

The commanders newly elected, both in civil and military affairs, were

invested with unlimited power, which was usefully employed to purchase or

prepare arms, daily to exercise the troops, and to strengthen and extend

the fortifications of Syracuse. They likewise despatched ambassadors to

the numerous cities and republics with which they had been connected in

peace, or allied in war, to solicit the continuance of their friendship,

and to counteract the dangerous designs of the Athenians.

Meanwhile the expected reinforcements arrived from Athens. In addition to

his original force, Nicias had likewise collected a body of six hundred

cavalry, and the sum of four hundred talents; and, in the eighteenth

summer of the war, the activity of the troops and workmen had completed

all necessary preparations for undertaking the siege of Syracuse.

The plan which Nicias adopted for conquering the city, was to draw a wall

on either side. When these circumvallations had surrounded the place by

land, he expected, by his numerous fleet, to block up the wide extent

of the Syracusan harbours. The whole strength of the Athenian armament

was employed in the former operations; and as all necessary materials

had been provided with due attention, the works rose with a rapidity

which surprised and terrified the besieged. Their former as well as

their recent defeats deterred them from opposing the enemy in a general

engagement; but the advice of Hermocrates persuaded them to raise walls

which might traverse and interrupt those of the Athenians. The imminent

danger urged the activity of the workmen; the hostile bulwarks approached

each other; frequent skirmishes took place, in one of which the brave

Lamachus unfortunately fell a victim to his rash valour; but the Athenian

troops maintained their usual superiority.

Encouraged by success, Nicias pushed the enemy with vigour. The

Syracusans lost hopes of defending their new works, or of preventing the

complete circumvallation of their city. New generals were named in the

room of Hermocrates and his colleagues; and this injudicious alteration

increased the calamities of Syracuse, which at length prepared to

capitulate.

While the assembly deliberated concerning the execution of a measure,

which, however disgraceful, was declared to be necessary, a Corinthian

galley, commanded by Gongylus, entered the central harbour of Ortygia,

which being strongly fortified, and penetrating into the heart of

the city, served as the principal and most secure station for the

Syracusan fleet. Gongylus announced a speedy and effectual relief to

the besieged city. He acquainted the Syracusans, that the embassy, sent

the preceding year to crave the assistance of Peloponnesus, had been

crowned with success. His own countrymen had warmly embraced the cause

of their kinsmen, and most respectable colony. They had fitted out a

considerable fleet, the arrival of which might be expected every hour.

The Lacedæmonians also had sent a small squadron, and the whole armament

was conducted by the Spartan Gylippus, an officer of tried valour and

ability.

While the desponding citizens of Syracuse listened to this intelligence

with pleasing astonishment, a messenger arrived by land from Gylippus

himself. That experienced commander, instead of pursuing a direct course,

which might have been intercepted by the Athenian fleet, had landed with

four galleys on the western coast of the island. The name of a Spartan

general determined the wavering irresolution of the Sicilians. The troops

of Himera, Selinus, and Gela flocked to his standard; and he approached

Syracuse on the side of Epipolæ, where the line of contravallation was

still unfinished, with a body of several thousand men.

[Illustration: GREEK MEDAL]

SPARTAN AID

The most courageous of the citizens sallied forth to meet this generous

and powerful protector. The junction was happily effected; the ardour of

the troops kindled into enthusiasm; and they distinguished that memorable

day by surprising several important Athenian posts. This first success

reanimated the activity of the soldiers and workmen. The traverse wall

was extended with the utmost diligence, and a vigorous sally deprived

the enemy of the strong castle of Labdalum. Nicias, perceiving that

the interest of the Athenians in Sicily would be continually weakened

by delay, wished to bring the fortune of the war to the decision of a

battle. Nor did Gylippus decline the engagement. The first action was

unfavourable to the Syracusans, who had been imprudently posted in the

defiles between their own and the enemy’s walls, which rendered of no

avail their superiority in cavalry and archers. The magnanimity of

Gylippus acknowledged this error, for which he completely atoned by his

judicious conduct in the succeeding engagements.

The Syracusans soon extended their works beyond the line of

circumvallation, so that it was impossible to block up their city,

without forcing their ramparts. The besiegers, while they maintained the

superiority of their arms, had been abundantly supplied with necessaries

from the neighbouring territory; but every place was alike hostile to

them after their defeat. The soldiers who went out in quest of wood and

water, were unexpectedly attacked and cut off by the enemy’s cavalry, or

by the reinforcements which arrived from every quarter to the assistance

of Syracuse; and they were at length reduced to depend for every

necessary supply on the precarious bounty of the Italian shore.

Nicias, whose sensibility deeply felt the public distress, wrote a most

desponding letter to the Athenians. He honestly described, and lamented,

the misfortunes and disorders of his army. The slaves deserted in great

numbers; the mercenary troops, who fought only for pay and subsistence,

preferred the more secure and lucrative service of Syracuse. He therefore

exhorted the assembly either to call them home without delay, or to send

immediately a second armament, not less powerful than the first.

The principal squadrons of Syracuse lay in the harbour of Ortygia,

separated, by an island of the same name, from the station of the

Athenian fleet. While Hermocrates sailed forth with eighty galleys, to

venture a naval engagement, Gylippus attacked the hostile fortifications

at Plemmyrium, a promontory opposite to Ortygia, which confined the

entrance of the Great Harbour. The defeat of the Syracusans at sea,

whereby they lost fourteen vessels, was balanced by their victory on

land, in which they took three fortresses, containing a large quantity

of military and naval stores, and a considerable sum of money. In some

subsequent actions, which scarcely deserve the name of battles, their

fleet was still unsuccessful; but as they engaged with great caution, and

found everywhere a secure retreat on a friendly shore, their loss was

extremely inconsiderable. The want of success, in their first attempt,

did not abate their resolution to gain the command at sea.

By unexampled assiduity the Syracusans at length prevailed in a general

engagement, which was fought in the Great Harbour. Seven Athenian ships

were sunk, many more were disabled, and Nicias saved the remains of

his shattered and dishonoured armament by retiring behind a line of

merchantmen and transports, from the masts of which had been suspended

huge masses of lead, named dolphins from their form, sufficient to

crush by their falling weight the stoutest galleys of antiquity. This

unexpected obstacle arrested the progress of the victors; but the

advantages already obtained elevated them with the highest hopes, and

reduced the enemy to despair.

ALCIBIADES AGAINST ATHENS

[Sidenote: [414-413 B.C.]]

The Athenian misfortunes in Sicily were attended by misfortunes at home

still more dreadful. In the eighteenth year of the war, Alcibiades

accompanied to Sparta the ambassadors of Corinth and Syracuse, who had

solicited and obtained assistance to the besieged city. On that occasion

the Athenian exile first acquired the confidence of the Spartans, by

condemning, in the strongest terms, the injustice and ambition of his

ungrateful countrymen, “whose cruelty towards himself equalled their

inveterate hostility to the Lacedæmonian republic; but that republic

might, by following his advice, disarm their resentment. The town of

Decelea was situated on the Attic frontier, at an equal distance of

fifteen miles from Thebes and Athens. This place, which commanded an

extensive and fertile plain, might be surprised and fortified by the

Spartans, who, instead of harassing their foes by annual incursions,

might thus infest them by a continual war. The wisdom of Sparta had too

long neglected such a salutary and decisive measure, especially as the

existence of a similar design had often been suggested by the fears of

the enemy, who trembled even at the apprehension of seeing a foreign

garrison in their territory.”

This advice first proposed, and often urged, by Alcibiades, was adopted

in the commencement of the ensuing spring, when the warlike Agis led a

powerful army into Attica. The defenceless inhabitants of the frontier

fled before his irresistible arms; but instead of pursuing them, as

usual, into the heart of the country, he stopped short at Decelea. As all

necessary materials had been provided in great abundance, the place was

speedily fortified on every side, and the walls of Decelea, which might

be distinctly seen across the intermediate plain, bid defiance to those

of Athens.

The latter city was kept in continual alarm by the watchful hostility

of a neighbouring garrison. The open country was entirely laid waste,

and the usual communication with the valuable island of Eubœa was

interrupted, from which, in seasons of scarcity, or during the ravages

of war, the Athenians commonly derived their supplies of corn, wine, and

oil, and whatever is most necessary to life. Harassed by the fatigues of

unremitting service, and deprived of daily bread, the slaves murmured,

complained, and revolted to the enemy; and their defection robbed the

state of twenty thousand useful artisans. Since the latter years of

Pericles, the Athenians had not been involved in such distress.

The domestic calamities of the republic did not, however, prevent the

most vigorous exertions abroad. Twenty galleys, stationed at Naupactus,

watched the motions of the Peloponnesian fleet destined to the assistance

of Syracuse; thirty carried on the war in Macedonia, to reduce the

rebellion of Amphipolis; a considerable squadron collected tribute, and

levied soldiers, in the colonies of Asia; another, still more powerful,

ravaged the coast of Peloponnesus. Never did any kingdom or republic

equal the magnanimity of Athens; never in ancient or modern times did

the courage of any state, entertain an ambition so far superior to its

power, or exert efforts so disproportionate to its strength. Amidst

the difficulties and dangers which encompassed them on every side, the

Athenians persisted in the siege of Syracuse, a city little inferior to

their own; and, undaunted by the actual devastation of their country,

unterrified by the menaced assault of their walls, they sent, without

delay, such a reinforcement into Sicily, as afforded the most promising

hopes of success in their expedition against that island.

ATHENIAN REINFORCEMENTS

[Sidenote: [413 B.C.]]

The Syracusans had scarcely time to rejoice at their victory, or Nicias

to bewail his defeat, when a numerous and formidable armament appeared on

the Sicilian coast. The foremost galleys, their prows adorned with gaudy

streamers, pursued a secure course towards the harbour of Syracuse. The

emulation of the rowers was animated by the mingled sounds of trumpet

and clarion; and the regular decoration, the elegant splendour, which

distinguished every part of the equipment, exhibited a pompous spectacle

of naval triumph. Their appearance, even at a distance, announced the

country to which they belonged; and both the joy of the besiegers and the

terror of the besieged, testified that Athens was the only city in the

world capable of sending to the sea such a beautiful and magnificent

contribution. The Syracusans employed not unavailing efforts to check

the progress, or to hinder the approach, of the hostile armament;

which, besides innumerable foreign vessels and transports, consisted of

seventy-three Athenian galleys, commanded by the experienced valour of

Demosthenes and Eurymedon. The pikemen on board exceeded five thousand;

the light-armed troops were nearly as numerous; and, including the

rowers, workmen, and attendants, the whole strength may be reckoned equal

to that originally sent with Nicias, which amounted to above twenty

thousand men.

The misfortunes hitherto attending the operations in Sicily had

lowered the character of the general; and this circumstance, as well

as the superior abilities of Demosthenes, entitled him to assume the

tone of authority in their conjunct deliberations. After ravaging the

banks of the Anapus, and making some ineffectual attempts against the

fortifications on that side, Demosthenes chose the first hour of a

moonlit night, to proceed with the flower of the army to seize the

fortresses in Epipolæ. The march was performed with successful celerity;

the outposts were surprised, the guards put to the sword; and three

separate encampments, of the Syracusans, the Sicilians, the allies,

formed a feeble opposition to the Athenian ardour. As if their victory

had already been complete, the assailants began to pull down the wooden

battlements, or to urge the pursuit with a rapidity which disordered

their ranks.

Meanwhile, the vigilant activity of Gylippus had assembled the whole

force of Syracuse. At the approach of the enemy his vanguard retired.

The Athenians were decoyed within the intricate windings of the walls,

and their irregular fury was first checked by the firmness of a Theban

phalanx. A resistance so sudden and unexpected might alone have been

decisive; but other circumstances were adverse to the Athenians: their

ignorance of the ground, the alternate obscurity of night, and the

deceitful glare of the moon, which, shining in the front of the Thebans,

illumined the splendour of their arms, and multiplied the terror of

their numbers. The foremost ranks of the pursuers were repelled; and,

as they retreated to the main body, encountered the advancing Argives

and Corcyræans, who, singing the pæan in their Doric dialect and accent,

were unfortunately taken for enemies. Fear, and then rage, seized the

Athenians, who, thinking themselves encompassed on all sides, determined

to force their way, and committed much bloodshed among their allies,

before the mistake could be discovered.

To prevent the repetition of this dreadful error, their scattered bands

were obliged at every moment to demand the watchword, which was at length

betrayed to their adversaries. The consequence of this was doubly fatal.

At every rencounter the silent Athenians were slaughtered without mercy,

while the enemy, who knew their watchword, might at pleasure join, or

decline, the battle, and easily oppress their weakness, or elude their

strength. The terror and confusion increased; the rout became general;

Gylippus pursued in good order with his victorious troops. The vanquished

could not descend in a body with the celerity of fear, by the narrow

passages through which they had mounted. Many abandoned their arms, and

explored the unknown paths of the rocky Epipolæ. Others threw themselves

from precipices, rather than await the pursuers. Several thousands

were left dead or wounded on the scene of action; and in the morning

the greater part of the stragglers were intercepted and cut off by the

Syracusan cavalry.

ATHENIAN DISASTER

This dreadful and unexpected disaster suspended the operations of the

siege. The Athenian generals spent the time in fruitless deliberations

concerning their future measures, while the army lay encamped on the

marshy and unhealthy banks of the Anapus. A general sickness broke out in

the camp. Demosthenes urged this calamity as a new reason for hastening

their departure, while it was yet possible to cross the Ionian Sea,

without risking the danger of a winter’s tempest. But Nicias opposed the

design of leaving Sicily until they should be warranted to take this

important step by the positive authority of the republic. The colleagues

of Nicias were confounded with the firmness of an opposition so unlike

the flexible timidity of his ordinary character, but they submitted to

his opinion, an opinion equally fatal to himself and to them, and to the

armament which they commanded.

Meanwhile the prudence of Gylippus profited by the fame of his victory,

to draw a powerful reinforcement from the Sicilian cities; and the

transports, so long expected from Peloponnesus, finally arrived in the

harbour of Ortygia. This squadron formed the last assistance sent to

either of the contending parties, and nothing further was required to

complete the actors in the scene; for by the accession of the Cyrenians,

Syracuse was either attacked or defended by all the various divisions

of the Grecian name, which formed, in that age, the most civilised

portion of the inhabitants of Asia, Africa, and Europe. The arrival of

such powerful auxiliaries to the besieged, and the increasing force of

the malady, totally disconcerted the Athenians. Even Nicias agreed to

set sail. Every necessary preparation was made for this purpose, and

the cover of night was chosen, as most proper for concealing their own

disgrace, and for eluding the vengeance of the enemy. But the night

appointed for their departure was distinguished by an inauspicious

eclipse of the moon. The voyage was deferred till the mystical number of

thrice nine days. But before the expiration of that time it was no longer

practicable; for the design was soon discovered to the Syracusans, and

this discovery, added to the encouragement derived from the circumstances

of which we have already taken notice, increased their eagerness to

attack the enemy by sea and land. Their attempts failed to destroy, by

fire-ships, the Athenian fleet. They were more successful in employing

superior numbers to divide the strength and to weaken the resistance of

an enfeebled and dejected foe. During three days there was a perpetual

succession of military and naval exploits. On the first day fortune hung

in suspense; the second deprived the Athenians of a considerable squadron

commanded by Eurymedon; and this misfortune was embittered on the third

day, by the loss of eighteen galleys, with their crews.

A design, suggested by the wisdom of Hermocrates, was eagerly adopted

by the active zeal of his fellow-citizens, who strove, with unremitting

ardour, to throw a chain of vessels across the mouth of the Great

Harbour, about a mile in breadth. The labour was complete before

Nicias, totally occupied by other objects, attempted to interrupt it.

After repeated defeats, and although he was so miserably tormented by

the stone, that he had frequently solicited his recall, that virtuous

commander, whose courage rose in adversity, used the utmost diligence to

retrieve the affairs of his country. The shattered galleys were speedily

refitted, and again prepared, to the number of a hundred and ten, to

risk the event of a battle. As they had suffered greatly, on former

occasions, by the hardness and massive solidity of the Syracusan prows,

Nicias provided them with grappling-irons, fitted to prevent the recoil

of their opponents, and the repetition of the hostile stroke. The decks

were crowded with armed men, and the contrivance to which the enemy had

hitherto chiefly owed their success, of introducing the firmness and

stability of a military, into a naval engagement, was adopted in its full

extent by the Athenians. When Gylippus and the Syracusan commanders were

apprised of the designs of the enemy, they hastened to the defence of the

bar which had been thrown across the entrance of the harbour. Even the

Athenian grappling-irons had not been overlooked; to elude the dangerous

grasp of these instruments, the prows of the Syracusan vessels were

covered with wet and slippery hides.

The first impression of the Athenians was irresistible; they burst

through the passage of the bar, and repelled the squadrons on either

side. As the entrance widened, the Syracusans, in their turn, rushed

into the harbour, which was more favourable than the open sea to their

mode of fighting. Thither the foremost of the Athenians returned, either

compelled by superior force, or that they might assist their companions.

The engagement became general in the mouth of the harbour; and in this

narrow space two hundred galleys fought, during the greatest part of

the day, with an obstinate and persevering valour. It would require the

expressive energy of Thucydides, and the imitative, though inimitable,

sounds and expressions of the Grecian tongue, to describe the noise, the

tumult, and the ardour of the contending squadrons. The battle was not

long confined to the shock of adverse prows, and to the distant hostility

of darts and arrows. The nearest vessels grappled, and closed with each

other, and their decks were soon converted into a field of blood. While

the heavy-armed troops boarded the enemy’s ships, they left their own

exposed to a similar misfortune; the fleets were divided into massive

clusters of adhering galleys; and the confusion of their mingled shouts

overpowered the voice of authority. The singular and tremendous spectacle

of an engagement more fierce and obstinate than any that had ever been

beheld in the Grecian seas, totally suspended the powers of the numerous

and adverse battalions which encircled the coast.

Hope, fear, the shouts of victory, the shrieks of despair, the anxious

solicitude of doubtful success, animated the countenances, the voice,

and the gestures of the Athenians, whose whole reliance centred in their

fleet. When at length their galleys evidently gave way on every side,

the contrast of alternate, and the rapid tumult of successive passions,

subsided in a melancholy calm. This dreadful pause of astonishment and

terror was followed by the disordered trepidation of flight and fear;

many escaped to the camp; others ran, uncertain whither to direct their

steps; while Nicias, with a small, but undismayed band, remained on

the shore to protect the landing of their unfortunate galleys. But the

retreat of the Athenians could not probably have been effected, had it

not been favoured by the actual circumstances of the enemy, as well as

by the peculiar prejudices of ancient superstition. In this well-fought

battle, the vanquished had lost fifty and the victors forty vessels. It

was incumbent on the latter to employ their immediate and most strenuous

efforts to recover the dead bodies of their friends, that they might be

honoured with the sacred and indispensable rites of funeral. The day

was far spent; the strength of the sailors had been exhausted by a long

continuance of unremitting labour; and both they and their companions

on shore were more desirous to return to Syracuse to enjoy the fruits

of victory, than to irritate the dangerous despair of the vanquished

Athenians.

It is observed by the Roman orator Cicero, with no less truth than

elegance, that not only the navy of Athens, but the glory and the empire

of that republic, suffered shipwreck in the fatal harbour of Syracuse.

The despondent degeneracy which immediately followed this ever memorable

engagement was testified in the neglect of a duty which the Athenians

had never neglected before, and in denying a part of their national

character, which it had hitherto been their greatest glory to maintain.

They abandoned to insult and indignity the bodies of the slain; and when

it was proposed to them by their commanders to prepare next day for a

second engagement, since their vessels were still more numerous than

those of the enemy, they, who had seldom avoided a superior, and who had

never declined the encounter of an equal force, declared, that no motive

could induce them to withstand the weaker armament of Syracuse. Their

only desire was to escape by land, under cover of the night, from a foe

whom they had not courage to oppose, and from a place where every object

was offensive to their sight, and most painful to their reflection.

The behaviour of the Syracusans might have proved extremely favourable

to this design. The coincidence of a festival and a victory demanded an

accumulated profusion of such objects as soothe the senses and please the

fancy. Amidst these giddy transports, the Syracusans lost all remembrance

of an enemy whom they despised; even the soldiers on guard joined the

dissolute or frivolous amusements of their companions; and, during the

greatest part of the night, Syracuse presented a mixed scene of secure

gayety, of thoughtless jollity, and of mad and dangerous disorder.

The firm and vigilant mind of Hermocrates alone withstood, but was

unable to divert, the general current. It was impossible to rouse to

the fatigues of war men buried in wine and pleasure, and intoxicated

with victory; and, as he could not intercept by force, he determined

to retard by stratagem, the intended retreat of the Athenians, whose

numbers and resentment would still render them formidable to whatever

part of Sicily they might remove their camp. A select band of horsemen,

assuming the character of traitors, fearlessly approached the hostile

ramparts, and warned the Athenians of the danger of departing that night,

as many ambuscades lurked in the way, and all the most important passes

were occupied by the enemy. The frequency of treason gained credit to

the perfidious advice; and the Athenians, having changed their first

resolution, were persuaded by Nicias to wait two days longer, that such

measures might be taken as seemed best adapted to promote the safety and

celerity of their march.

The superior rank of Nicias entitled him to a pre-eminence of toil and

of woe; and he deserves the regard of posterity by his character and

sufferings, and still more by the melancholy firmness of his conduct.[j]

Few pages of history are more eloquent than those wherein Thucydides

describes the epic miseries of the defeated host of Athens. They have

furthermore the merit of great accuracy. The rest of this chapter may

therefore be given over to his vivid and tragic picture of the retreat.[a]

THUCYDIDES’ FAMOUS ACCOUNT OF THE FINAL DISASTERS

When Nicias and Demosthenes thought they were sufficiently prepared, the

removal of the army took place, on the third day after the sea-fight.

It was a wretched scene then, not on account of the single circumstance

alone, that they were retreating after having lost all their ships,

and while both themselves and their country were in danger, instead of

being in high hope; but also because, on leaving their camp, every one

had grievous things both to behold with his eyes and to feel in his

heart. For as the dead lay unburied, and any one saw a friend on the

ground, he was struck at once with grief and fear. And the living who

were being left behind, wounded or sick, were to the living a much more

sorrowful spectacle than the dead, and more piteous than those who had

perished. For having recourse to entreaties and wailings, they reduced

them to utter perplexity, begging to be taken away, and appealing to

each individual friend or relative that any of them might anywhere

see; or hanging on their comrades, as they were now going away; or

following as far as they could, and when in any case the strength of

their body failed, not being left behind without many appeals to heaven

and many lamentations. So that the whole army, being filled with tears

and distress of this kind, did not easily get away, although from an

enemy’s country, and although they had both suffered already miseries too

great for tears to express, and were still afraid for the future, lest

they might suffer more. There was also amongst them much dejection and

depreciation of their own strength. For they resembled nothing but a city

starved out and attempting to escape; and no small one too, for of their

whole multitude there were not less than forty thousand on the march.

[Illustration: SEPULCHRAL STRUCTURES AT ATHENS]

Of these, all the rest took whatever each one could that was useful, and

the heavy-armed and cavalry themselves, contrary to custom, carried their

own food under their arms, some for want of servants, others through

distrusting them; for they had for a long time been deserting, and did so

in greatest numbers at that moment. And even what they carried was not

sufficient; for there was no longer any food in the camp. Nor, again, was

their other misery, and their equal participation in sufferings (though

it affords some alleviation to endure with others), considered even on

that account easy to bear at the present time; especially, when they

reflected from what splendour and boasting at first they had been reduced

to such an abject termination. For this was the greatest reverse that

ever befell a Grecian army; since, in contrast to their having come to

enslave others, they had to depart in fear of undergoing that themselves;

and instead of the prayers and hymns, with which they sailed from home,

they had to start on their return with omens the very contrary; going by

land, instead of by sea, and relying on a military rather than a naval

force. But nevertheless, in consequence of the greatness of the danger

still impending, all these things seemed endurable to them.

Nicias, seeing the army dejected, and greatly changed, passed along the

ranks, and encouraged and cheered them, as well as existing circumstances

allowed; speaking still louder than before, as he severally came opposite

to them, in the earnestness of his feeling, and from wishing to be of

service to them by making himself audible to as many as possible. If he

saw them anywhere straggling, and not marching in order, he collected and

brought them to their post; while Demosthenes also did no less to those

who were near him, addressing them in a similar manner. They marched in

the form of a hollow square, the division under Nicias taking the lead,

and that of Demosthenes following; while the baggage bearers and the main

crowd of camp followers were enclosed within the heavy-armed.

When they had come to the river Anapus, they found drawn up a body of the

Syracusans and allies; but having routed these, and secured the passage,

they proceeded onwards; while the Syracusans pressed them with charges

of horse, as their light-armed did with their missiles. On that day the

Athenians advanced about five miles, and then halted for the night on a

hill. The day following, they commenced their march at an early hour,

and having advanced about two and a half miles, descended into a level

district, and there encamped, wishing to procure some eatables from the

houses (for the place was inhabited), and to carry on with them water

from it, since for many miles before them, in the direction they were

to go, it was not plentiful. The Syracusans, in the meantime, had gone

on before, and were blocking up the pass in advance of them. For there

was there a steep hill, with a precipitous ravine on either side of it,

called the Acræum Lepas. The next day the Athenians advanced, and the

horse and dart-men of the Syracusans and allies, each in great numbers,

impeded their progress, hurling their missiles upon them, and annoying

them with cavalry charges. The Athenians fought for a long time, and then

returned again to the same camp, no longer having provisions as they had

before; and it was no more possible to leave their position, because of

the cavalry.

Starting early, they began their march again, and forced their way to the

hill which had been fortified; where they found before them the enemy’s

infantry drawn up for the defence of the wall many spears deep; for the

pass was but narrow. The Athenians charged and assaulted the wall, but

being annoyed with missiles by a large body from the hill, which was

steep (for those on the heights more easily reached their aim), and

not being able to force a passage, they retreated again, and rested.

There happened also to be at the same time some claps of thunder and

rain, as is generally the case when the year is now verging on autumn;

in consequence of which the Athenians were still more dispirited, and

thought that all these things also were conspiring together for their

ruin. While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a part

of their troops to intercept them again with a wall on their rear, where

they had already passed: but they, on their side also, sent some of

their men against them, and prevented their doing it. After this, the

Athenians returned again with all their army into the more level country,

and there halted for the night. The next day they marched forward, while

the Syracusans discharged their weapons on them, surrounding them on

all sides, and disabled many with wounds; retreating if the Athenians

advanced against them, and pressing on them if they gave way; most

especially attacking their extreme rear, in the hope that by routing

them little by little, they might strike terror into the whole army. The

Athenians resisted this mode of attack for a long time, but then, after

advancing five or six furlongs, halted for rest on the plain; while the

Syracusans went to their camp.

During the night, their troops being in a wretched condition, both from

the want of all provisions which was now felt, and from so many men being

disabled by wounds in the numerous attacks that had been made upon them

by the enemy, Nicias and Demosthenes determined to light as many fires as

possible, and then lead off the army, no longer by the same route as they

had intended, but in the opposite direction to where the Syracusans were

watching for them, namely, to the sea. Now the whole of this road would

lead the armament, not towards Catana, but to the other side of Sicily,

to Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in that direction, whether Grecian

or barbarian. They kindled therefore many fires, and began their march in

the night.

And as all armies, especially the largest, are liable to have terrors and

panics amongst them, particularly when marching at night, and through

an enemy’s country, and with the enemy not far off; so they also were

thrown into alarm; and the division of Nicias, taking the lead as it did,

kept together and got a long way in advance; while that of Demosthenes,

containing about half or more, was separated from the others, and

proceeded in greater disorder. By the morning, nevertheless, they arrived

at the seacoast, and entering on what is called the Helorine road,

continued their march, in order that when they had reached the river

Cacyparis, they might march up along its banks through the interior; for

they hoped also that in this direction the Sicels, to whom they had sent,

would come to meet them. But when they had reached the river, they found

a guard of the Syracusans there too, intercepting the pass with a wall

and a palisade, having carried which, they crossed the river, and marched

on again to another called the Erineus; for this was the route which

their guides directed them to take.

_Demosthenes Surrenders His Detachment_

In the meantime the Syracusans and allies, as soon as it was day, and

they found that the Athenians had departed, most of them charged Gylippus

with having purposely let them escape; and pursuing with all haste by

the route which they had no difficulty in finding they had taken, they

overtook them about dinner-time. When they came up with the troops under

Demosthenes, which were behind the rest, and marching more slowly and

disorderly, ever since they had been thrown into confusion during the

night, at the time we have mentioned, they immediately fell upon and

engaged them; and the Syracusan horse surrounded them with greater ease

from their being divided, and confined them in a narrow space.

The division of Nicias was six miles in advance; for he led them on

more rapidly, thinking that their preservation depended, under such

circumstances, not on staying behind, if they could help it, and on

fighting, but on retreating as quickly as possible, and only fighting

as often as they were compelled. Demosthenes, on the other hand, was,

generally speaking, involved in more incessant labour (because, as he was

retreating in the rear, he was the first that the enemy attacked), and on

that occasion, finding that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he was not so

much inclined to push on, as to form his men for battle; until, through

thus loitering, he was surrounded by them, and both himself and the

Athenians with him were thrown into great confusion. Being driven back

into a certain spot which had a wall all round it, with a road on each

side, and many olive trees growing about, they were annoyed with missiles

in every direction. This kind of attack the Syracusans naturally adopted,

instead of close combat; since risking their lives against men reduced

to despair was no longer for their advantage, so much as for that of

the Athenians. Besides, after success which was now so signal, each man

spared himself in some degree, that he might not be cut off before the

end of the business. They thought too that, even as it was, they should

by this kind of fighting subdue and capture the Athenians.

At any rate, when, after plying the Athenians and their allies with

missiles all day from every quarter, they saw them now distressed by

wounds and other sufferings, Gylippus with the Syracusans and allies

made a proclamation, in the first place, that any of the islanders who

chose should come over to them, on condition of retaining his liberty;

and some few states went over. Afterwards, terms were made with all the

troops under Demosthenes, that they should surrender their arms, and

that no one should be put to death, either by violence or imprisonment,

or want of such nourishment as was most absolutely requisite. Thus there

surrendered, in all, to the number of six thousand; and they laid down

the whole of the money in their possession, throwing it into the hollow

of shields, four of which they filled with it. These they immediately led

back to the city, while Nicias and his division arrived that day on the

banks of the river Erineus; having crossed which, he posted his army on

some high ground.

_Nicias Parleys, Fights, and Surrenders_

The Syracusans, having overtaken him the next day, told him that

Demosthenes and his division had surrendered themselves, and called on

him also to do the same. Being incredulous of the fact, he obtained a

truce to enable him to send a horseman to see. When he had gone, and

brought word back again that they had surrendered, Nicias sent a herald

to Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that he was ready to agree with

the Syracusans, on behalf of the Athenians, to repay whatever money

the Syracusans had spent on the war, on condition of their letting his

army go; and that until the money was paid, he would give Athenians

as hostages, one for every talent. The Syracusans and Gylippus did

not accede to these proposals, but fell upon this division also, and

surrounded them on all sides, and annoyed them with their missiles until

late in the day. And they too, like the others, were in a wretched

plight for want of food and necessaries. Nevertheless, they watched for

the quiet of the night, and then intended to pursue their march. And

they were now just taking up their arms, when the Syracusans perceived

it and raised their pæan. The Athenians, therefore, finding that they

had not eluded their observation, laid their arms down again; excepting

about three hundred men who forced their way through the sentinels, and

proceeded, during the night, how and where they could.

As soon as it was day, Nicias led his troops forward; while the

Syracusans and allies pressed on them in the same manner, discharging

their missiles at them, and striking them down with their javelins on

every side. The Athenians were hurrying on to reach the river Assinarus,

being urged to this at once by the attack made on every side of them by

the numerous cavalry and the rest of the light-armed multitude (for they

thought they should be more at ease if they were once across the river),

and also by their weariness and craving for drink. When they reached its

banks, they rushed into it without any more regard for order, every man

anxious to be himself the first to cross it; while the attack of the

enemy rendered the passage more difficult. For being compelled to advance

in a dense body, they fell upon and trod down one another; and some of

them died immediately on the javelins and articles of baggage, while

others were entangled together, and floated down the stream. On the

other side of the river, too, the Syracusans lined the bank, which was

precipitous, and from the higher ground discharged their missiles on the

Athenians, while most of them were eagerly drinking in confusion amongst

themselves in the hollow bed of the stream. The Peloponnesians, moreover,

charged them and butchered them, especially those in the river. And thus

the water was immediately spoiled; but nevertheless it was drunk by them,

mud and all, and bloody as it was, it was even fought for by most of them.

At length, when many dead were now heaped one upon another in the

river, and the army was destroyed, either at the river, or, if any part

had escaped, by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus,

placing more confidence in him than in the Syracusans; and desired him

and the Lacedæmonians to do what they pleased with himself, but to stop

butchering the rest of the soldiers. After this, Gylippus commanded to

make prisoners; and they collected all that were alive, excepting such as

they concealed for their own benefit (of whom there was a large number).

They also sent a party in pursuit of the three hundred, who had forced

their way through the sentinels during the night, and took them. The part

of the army, then, that was collected as general property, was not large,

but that which was secreted was considerable; and the whole of Sicily

was filled with them, inasmuch as they had not been taken on definite

terms of surrender, like those with Demosthenes. Indeed no small part

was actually put to death; for this was the most extensive slaughter,

and surpassed by none of all that occurred in this Sicilian war. In the

other encounters also, which were frequent on their march, no few had

fallen. But many also escaped; some at the moment, others after serving

as slaves, and running away subsequently. These found a place of refuge

at Catana.

_The Fate of the Captives_

When the Syracusans and allies were assembled together, they took with

them as many prisoners as they could, with the spoils, and returned to

the city. All the rest of the Athenians and the allies that they had

taken, they sent down into the quarries, thinking this the safest way

of keeping them; but Nicias and Demosthenes they executed, against the

wish of Gylippus. For he thought it would be a glorious distinction

for him, in addition to all his other achievements, to take to the

Lacedæmonians the generals who had commanded against them. And it so

happened, that one of these, namely Demosthenes, was regarded by them

as their most inveterate enemy, in consequence of what had occurred on

the island and at Pylos; the other, for the same reasons, as most in

their interest; for Nicias had exerted himself for the release of the

Lacedæmonians taken from the island, by persuading the Athenians to make

a treaty. On this account the Lacedæmonians had friendly feelings towards

him; and indeed it was mainly for the same reasons that he reposed

confidence in Gylippus, and surrendered himself to him. But certain of

the Syracusans (as it was said) were afraid, some of them, since they had

held communication with him, that if put to the torture, he might cause

them trouble on that account in the midst of their success; others, and

especially the Corinthians, lest he might bribe some, as he was rich, and

effect his escape, and so they should again incur mischief through his

agency; and therefore they persuaded the allies, and put him to death.

For this cause then, or something very like it, he was executed, having

least of all the Greeks deserved to meet with such a misfortune, on

account of his devoted attention to the practice of every virtue.

As for those in the quarries, the Syracusans treated them with cruelty

during the first period of their captivity. For as they were in a hollow

place, and many in a small compass, the sun, as well as the suffocating

closeness, distressed them at first, in consequence of their not being

under cover; and then, on the contrary, the nights coming on autumnal and

cold, soon worked in them an alteration from health to disease, by means

of the change. Since, too, in consequence of their want of room, they did

everything in the same place; and the dead, moreover, were piled up on

one another--such as died from their wounds, and from the change they had

experienced, and such like. There were, besides, intolerable stenches;

while at the same time they were tormented with hunger and thirst, for

during eight months they gave each of them daily only a _cotyle_[56]

of water, and two of corn. And of all the other miseries which it was

likely that men thrown into such a place would suffer, there was none

that did not fall to their lot. For some seventy days they thus lived

all together; then the rest of them were sold, except the Athenians, and

whatever Siceliots or Italians had joined them in the expedition.

The total number of those who were taken, though it were difficult to

speak with exactness, was still not less than seven thousand. “And this,”

says Thucydides in conclusion, “was the greatest Grecian exploit of all

that were performed in this war; nay, in my opinion, of all Grecian

achievements that we have heard of also; and was at once most splendid

for the conquerors, and most disastrous for the conquered. For being

altogether vanquished at all points, and having suffered in no slight

degree in any respect, they were destroyed (as the saying is) with utter

destruction, both army, and navy, and everything; and only a few out of

many returned home. Such were the events which occurred in Sicily.”[i]

FOOTNOTES

[55] [Adolph Holm rates it at thirty thousand men.]

[56] The _cotyle_ was a little more than half an English pint; and the

allowance of food here mentioned was only half of that commonly given to

a slave.

[Illustration: THE GROVES OF THE ACADEMY]

[Illustration]