CHAPTER XXX. THE OUTBREAK OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

No admirer of Greek civilisation can turn from the peaceful age of

Pericles and follow the next step in Grecian history without a feeling

of sadness, for he has to see the most cultured people of antiquity torn

by internal dissensions and interstate jealousies; he has to see the

people who represent the acme of culture harassed for a generation by an

imbecile strife, which shall leave it so weakened that it will become an

easy prey to outside foes. In every succeeding generation, when men have

studied the history of classical times, the same feeling of amazement has

prevailed, and has often found expression in contemplating this period

of the Peloponnesian War; but it remained for John Ruskin to invent the

vivid phrase which in three words epitomises the entire story, when he

speaks of this amazing conflict as the “suicide of Greece.” It was in

truth nothing less than that.

There was no great question at issue between the Athenian and Spartan

peoples that must be decided by the arbitrament of arms or otherwise.

There was no reason outside the temperament of the people themselves why

the Athenians on the one hand, and the Spartans on the other, might not

have gone on indefinitely, each people pre-eminent in its own territory,

and each standing aloof from the other; but that interstate jealousy

which was responsible for so many things in Grecian history came as a

determining influence which at last could not longer be controlled.

Persian might, which dared not re-enter Greece, but which longed for the

overthrow of an old enemy, urged on one side or the other, as seemed

for the moment best to serve that end. The remaining Grecian cities

took sides with Athens or Sparta according to their predilections,

or their own personal enmities and jealousies, and there resulted a

war which involved practically all the cities of Greece, and which,

after continuing for a full generation, brought Hellas as a whole to

destruction.

OUR SOURCES

The history of this war has been preserved to posterity in far greater

detail than has the history of any preceding conflict anywhere in the

world. The Athenian general Thucydides, who himself took an active part

in the earlier stages of the war, commanding forces in the field until

finally he suffered the displeasure of the Athenians, determined from

the outset, as he himself tells us, to write a complete history of the

conflict which he believed would be the most memorable of all in the

annals of history. The work which he produced has probably been more

widely celebrated and more universally applauded than any other piece of

historical composition that was ever written. All manner of extravagant

things have been said about it. Every one has heard, for example, of

Macaulay’s saying that he felt he might perhaps equal any other piece of

historical writing that had ever been done except the seventh book of

Thucydides, before which he felt himself helpless. This eulogy is of a

piece with much more that has been said in similar kind by a multitude

of other critics. It has even been alleged that no historian of a later

period has ever dealt out such impartial judgment as is to be found in

the pages of Thucydides. Seemingly forgetful of the meaning of words,

critics have even assured us that no period of like extent of the world’s

history, ancient or modern, is so fully known to us as this period of the

Peloponnesian War through the history of Thucydides.

To any one, who himself will take up the history of Thucydides, either

in the original or in such a translation as the admirable one of Dale,

two things will at once be apparent; in the first place it will not long

be open to doubt, to any one who is familiar with the literature of

antiquity, that this work of Thucydides, considered in relation to the

time in which it was written, is really an extraordinary production; but,

in the second place, it will be equally clear that if we are to consider

the work not in comparison with the writings of ancient authors but as

a part of world-literature, then much that has been said of it must be

regarded as fulsome eulogy.

To say that this work covers the period of the Peloponnesian War as

no modern period of history has been covered; to say that no modern

historian has dealt with his topic with the calm impartiality of

Thucydides; to say that no writer can hope to produce an historical

narrative comparable to the seventh book, or to any other book, of

Thucydides--to say such things as these is to abandon the broad impartial

view from which alone criticism worthy of the name is possible, and to

come under the spell of other minds. _The History of the Peloponnesian

War_ is a great book; as an historical composition it is one of the

greatest ever written: but when one has said that one has said enough.

Its style, by common consent, is not such as to make it a model, and

its matter is very largely the recital of bald facts with evidence of

an insight into the political motives beneath the surface, which seems

extraordinary only because the predecessors of Thucydides and some of

his successors had seemed so woefully to lack such insight. As to the

impartiality of the narrative, we must not overlook the significance of

Professor Mahaffy’s remark, that for most of the period covered in the

history of Thucydides this history itself is our sole authority. That

it does, nevertheless, evince a high degree of impartiality and a broad

sweep of intellect on the part of its author will not be questioned; but

Professor Mahaffy makes an estimate, which no one who is not fully under

the spell of antiquity would think of disputing, when he asserts his

belief that such modern historians as, for example, Thirlwall, must be

accredited with at least as high a degree of impartiality as Thucydides

can claim.

But all this must not be taken as in any sense denying that the work of

Thucydides is a marvellous production. Considering the time when it was

written, and that its author was a participant in many of the events

which he describes, it is astonishing that his work should be measurably

free from partiality. That it is so was, perhaps, at least in some

measure, due to the fact that Thucydides was banished from Athens, and

hence wrote his history not so much from the Athenian standpoint, as

from the standpoint of a man without a country, who was at enmity with

both Spartans and Athenians. But, partial or impartial, the history

of Thucydides remains, and presumably must always remain, the sole

contemporary record open to posterity of that great struggle through

which Greece, as it were, voluntarily threw away her prestige and her

power.

Thucydides, to be sure, did not complete his history of the war, or,

if he did, his later chapters have not been preserved to us. The

former supposition is doubtless the correct one, because the thread of

the narrative, which Thucydides dropped so abruptly, was taken up by

Xenophon, also a contemporary. It was a not unusual custom among the

ancient authors to write important works as explicit continuations of

the works of other writers. Xenophon’s narrative of the events of the

later years of the Peloponnesian War is such a work. Like the history of

Thucydides it is practically our sole authority for the period that it

covers, but, by common consent of critics, it takes a much lower level

than the work which it supplements.

Xenophon was also an exile from Athens; but he differed from Thucydides

in being an ardent friend of Sparta, and his prejudices are well known to

readers of his works. One must suppose, however, that the favourite pupil

of Socrates may be depended upon for reasonable impartiality when he

deals with matters of fact. But, be this as it may, it is Xenophon, and

Xenophon alone, who tells us most that we know at first hand, not alone

of the closing years of the Peloponnesian War, but of many in the period

succeeding. We shall constantly support our narrative of the events of

this period, therefore, by references to the pages of Xenophon, as well

as to those of Thucydides.[a]

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR

Even before the recent hostilities at Corcyra and Potidæa, it had been

evident to reflecting Greeks that prolonged observance of the Thirty

Years’ Truce was becoming uncertain, and that the mingled hatred, fear,

and admiration which Athens inspired throughout Greece would prompt

Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize any favourable opening for

breaking down the Athenian power. That such was the disposition of Sparta

was well understood among the Athenian allies, however considerations

of prudence and general slowness in resolving might postpone the moment

of carrying it into effect. Accordingly not only the Samians when they

revolted had applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which they

appear to have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the pacific

interests then animating the Corinthians--but also the Lesbians had

endeavoured to open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose,

though the authorities to whom alone the proposition could have been

communicated, since it long remained secret and was never executed--had

given them no encouragement.

The affairs of Athens had been administered, under the ascendency of

Pericles, without any view to extension of empire or encroachment upon

others, though with constant reference to the probabilities of war, and

with anxiety to keep the city in a condition to meet it. But even the

splendid internal ornaments, which Athens at that time acquired, were

probably not without their effect in provoking jealousy on the part of

other Greeks as to her ultimate views. The only known incident, wherein

Athens had been brought into collision with a member of the Spartan

confederacy prior to the Corcyræan dispute, was her decree passed in

regard to Megara, prohibiting the Megarians, on pain of death, from

all trade or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within

the Athenian empire. This prohibition was grounded on the alleged

fact, that the Megarians had harboured runaway slaves from Athens,

and had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon her border;

partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis; partly a strip

of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore left by

mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent enclosure.

In reference to this latter point, the Athenian herald Anthemocritus

had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so rudely dealt

with, that his death shortly afterwards was imputed to the Megarians.

We may reasonably suppose that ever since the revolt of Megara fourteen

years before--which caused to Athens an irreparable mischief--the

feeling prevalent between the two cities had been one of bitter enmity,

manifesting itself in many ways, but so much exasperated by recent events

as to provoke Athens to a signal revenge. Exclusion from Athens and all

the ports in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in

the Ægean, was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they loudly complained

of it at Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the Thirty Years’

Truce; though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens

to enforce, and was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of

foreigners by Sparta, with which Pericles compared it.

[Illustration: ATTENDANT OF A GREEK WARRIOR

(From a vase)]

[Sidenote: [432 B.C.]]

These complaints found increased attention after the war of Corcyra

and the blockade of Potidæa by the Athenians. The sentiments of the

Corinthians towards Athens had now become angry and warlike in the

highest degree. It was not simply resentment for the past which animated

them, but also the anxiety farther to bring upon Athens so strong a

hostile pressure as should preserve Potidæa and its garrison from

capture. Accordingly they lost no time in endeavouring to rouse the

feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to invite

to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances against that

city. Not merely the Megarians, but several other confederates, came

thither as accusers; while the Æginetans, though their insular position

made it perilous for them to appear, made themselves vehemently heard

through the mouths of others, complaining that Athens withheld from them

the autonomy to which they were entitled under the truce.

According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary first that the

Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether there

existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens against themselves or

against Peloponnesus--either in violation of the Thirty Years’ Truce,

or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta herself were in the

negative, the case would never even be submitted to the vote of the

allies; but if it were in the affirmative, then the latter would be

convoked to deliver their opinion also: and assuming that the majority

of votes coincided with the previous decision of Sparta, the entire

confederacy stood then pledged to the given line of policy--if the

majority was contrary, the Spartans would stand alone, or with such

only of the confederates as concurred. Even in the oligarchy of Sparta,

such a question as this could only be decided by a general assembly of

Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution to the

public mess, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the assembly

so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities addressed

themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians

chose to reserve themselves to the last, after the assembly had been

inflamed by the previous speakers.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of

Greece turned, Thucydides has preserved an account unusually copious.

First, the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of some

Athenian envoys, who happening to be at the same time in Sparta on some

other matters, and being present in the assembly so as to have heard the

speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other complainants, obtained

permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn.

Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of

policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but eminently

characteristic, address of the ephor, Sthenelaidas, on putting the

question for decision. These speeches, the composition of Thucydides

himself, contain substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they

are ascribed. Neither of them is distinctly a reply to that which has

preceded, but each presents the situation of affairs from a different

point of view.

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, would not have suited

the purpose of the Corinthian envoy; for against such, the Thirty

Years’ Truce expressly provided that recourse should be had to amicable

arbitration--to which recourse he never once alludes. He knew that,

as between Corinth and Athens, war had already begun at Potidæa; and

his business, throughout nearly all of a very emphatic speech, is to

show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and especially Sparta, is

bound to take instant part in it, not less by prudence than by duty.

He employs the most animated language to depict the ambition, the

unwearied activity, the personal effort abroad as well as at home, the

quick resolves, the sanguine hopes never dashed by failure--of Athens,

as contrasted with the cautious, home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous

routine of Sparta. He reproaches the Spartans with their backwardness

and timidity, in not having repressed the growth of Athens before she

reached this formidable height, especially in having allowed her to

fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxes and afterwards to build the

Long Walls from the city to the sea. The Spartans (he observes) stood

alone among all Greeks in the notable system of keeping down an enemy,

not by acting, but by delaying to act--not arresting his growth, but

putting him down when his force was doubled. Falsely indeed had they

acquired the reputation of being sure, when they were in reality merely

slow. In resisting Xerxes, as in resisting Athens, they had always been

behindhand, disappointing and leaving their friends to ruin; while both

these enemies had only failed of complete success through their own

mistakes.

After half apologising for the tartness of these reproofs--which however,

as the Spartans were now well disposed to go to war forthwith, would

be well-timed and even agreeable--the Corinthian orator vindicates the

necessity of plain-speaking by the urgent peril of the emergency and

the formidable character of the enemy who threatened them. “You do

not reflect” he says “how thoroughly different the Athenians are from

yourselves. They are innovators by nature, sharp both in devising, and in

executing what they have determined: you are sharp only in keeping what

you have got, in determining on nothing beyond, and in doing even less

than absolute necessity requires. They again dare beyond their means, run

risks beyond their own judgment, and keep alive their hopes in desperate

circumstances: your peculiarity is, that your performance comes short of

your power, you have no faith even in what your judgment guarantees, when

in difficulties you despair of all escape. They never hang back, you are

habitual laggards: they love foreign service, you cannot stir from home:

for they are always under the belief that their movements will lead to

some further gain, while you fancy that new products will endanger what

you already have. When successful, they make the greatest forward march;

when defeated, they fall back the least. Moreover they task their bodies

on behalf of their city as if they were the bodies of others, while their

minds are most of all their own, for exertion in her service. When their

plans for acquisition do not come successfully out, they feel like men

robbed of what belongs to them: yet the acquisitions when realised appear

like trifles compared with what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes

fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the

want; for with them alone the possession and the hope of what they aim at

are almost simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all that

they have once resolved. And in this manner do they toil throughout all

their lives amidst hardship and peril, disregarding present enjoyment in

the continual thirst for increase, knowing no other festival recreation

except the performance of active duty, and deeming inactive repose a

worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak the truth in two

words, such is their inborn temper that they will neither remain at rest

themselves nor allow rest to others.

“Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lacedæmonians--yet ye

still hang back from action. Your continual scruples and apathy would

hardly be safe, even if ye had neighbours like yourselves in character:

but as to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated and out of

date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements which are sure

to come out victorious; and though unchanged institutions are best, if a

city be not called upon to act, yet multiplicity of active obligations

requires multiplicity and novelty of contrivance. It is through these

numerous trials that the means of Athens have acquired so much more new

development than yours.”

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous

warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to protect

her allies against Athens, if she delayed to perform her promise made

to the Potidæans of immediately invading Attica, they (the Corinthians)

would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance, which they felt

themselves fully justified in doing. They admonished her to look well to

the case, and to carry forward Peloponnesus, with undiminished dignity,

as it had been transmitted to her from her predecessors.

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited

by her fiercest enemy before the public assembly at Sparta. It was

calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to recent or particular

misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless

aggression which was imputed to Athens during the past, and by the

certainty held out that the same system, unless put down by measures of

decisive hostility, would be pushed still farther in future, to the utter

ruin of Peloponnesus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy (staying

in Sparta about some other negotiation and now present in the assembly)

address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from

the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the

younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under

which it had grown up, and what was needed as information for them would

be impressive as a reminder even to their seniors.

In her position, he asserted, no Grecian power either would or could have

acted otherwise--no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted

with so much equity and moderation or given so little ground of complaint

to her subjects. Worse they had suffered, while under Persia; worse they

would suffer, if they came under Sparta, who held her own allies under

the thraldom of an oligarchical party in each city; and if they hated

Athens this was only because subjects always hated the present dominion,

whatever that might be.

Having justified both the origin and the working of the Athenian empire,

the envoy concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being

hurried away by the passions and invectives of others, before she took

a step from which there was no retreat, and which exposed the future to

chances such as no man on either side could foresee. He called on her

not to break the truce mutually sworn to, but to adjust all differences,

as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration which that

truce provided. Should she begin war, the Athenians would follow her

lead and resist her, calling to witness those gods under whose sanction

the oaths were taken. At any time previous to the affair of Corcyra, the

topics insisted upon by the Athenian would probably have been profoundly

listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the Spartans was made up.

Having cleared the assembly of all “strangers,” and even all allies,

they proceeded to discuss and determine the question among themselves.

Most of their speakers held but one language--expatiating on the wrongs

already done by Athens, and urging the necessity of instant war. There

was however one voice, and that a commanding voice, raised against this

conclusion: the ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it.

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, setting

aside both hatred to Athens and blind partiality to allies, looks at

the question with a view to the interests and honour of Sparta only.

He reminded them of the wealth, the population (greater than that of

any other Grecian city), the naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites,

the large foreign dominion of Athens--and then asked by what means

they proposed to put her down. Ships, they had few; trained seamen,

yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They could indeed invade and ravage

Attica, by their superior numbers and land-force. But the Athenians had

possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispense with the produce

of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon

Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into

Attica would bring the war to an end, would be a deplorable error; such

proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their

real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps for a whole

generation. Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely necessary

to provide more efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their

allies not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also. While this

was in process, envoys ought to be sent to Athens to remonstrate and

obtain redress for the grievances of the allies. If the Athenians granted

this--which they very probably would do, when they saw the preparations

going forward, and when the ruin of the highly-cultivated soil of Attica

was held over them _in terrorem_ without being actually consummated--so

much the better: if they refused, in the course of two or three years,

war might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded

his countrymen that their allies would hold them responsible for the

good or bad issue of what was now determined; admonishing them, in the

true spirit of a conservative Spartan, to cling to that cautious policy

which had been ever the characteristic of the state, despising both

taunts on their tardiness and panegyric on their valour.

The speech of Archidamus was not only in itself full of plain reason and

good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan;

appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But

in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal esteem entertained for

the speaker, the tide of feeling in the opposite direction was at that

moment irresistible. Sthenelaidas, one of the five ephors to whom it fell

to put the question for voting, closed the debate. His few words mark

at once the character of the man, the temper of the assembly, and the

simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgment, for which

Archidamus had taken credit to his countrymen.

“I don’t understand,” he said, “these long speeches of the Athenians.

They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted

what is laid to their charge--that they are guilty of wrong against our

allies and against Peloponnesus. Now if in former days they were good men

against the Persians, and are now evil-doers against us, they deserve

double punishment as having become evil-doers instead of good. But we

are the same now as we were then: we know better than to sit still while

our allies are suffering wrong: we shall not adjourn our aid, while they

cannot adjourn their sufferings. Others have in abundance wealth, ships,

and horses--but we have good allies, whom we are not to abandon to the

mercy of the Athenians: nor are we to trust our redress to arbitration

and to words, when our wrongs are not confined to words. We must help

them speedily and with all our strength. Nor let any one tell us that

we can with honour deliberate when we are actually suffering wrong--it

is rather for those who intend to do the wrong, to deliberate well

beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, in a manner worthy of

Sparta. Suffer not the Athenians to become greater than they are: let us

not betray our allies to ruin, but march with the aid of the gods against

the wrong-doers.”

With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the prudential

admonitions of Archidamus, Sthenelaidas put the question for the decision

of the assembly--which at Sparta was usually taken neither by show of

hands, nor by deposit of balls in an urn, but by cries analogous to the

ay or no of the English House of Commons--the presiding ephor declaring

which of the cries predominated. On this occasion the cry for war was

manifestly the stronger. Yet Sthenelaidas affected inability to determine

which of the two was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse

for bringing about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and

a stronger apparent majority--since a portion of the minority would

probably be afraid to show their real opinions as individuals openly.

He therefore directed a division--like the speaker of the English House

of Commons when his decision in favour of ay or no is questioned by any

member--“Such of you as think that the truce has been violated and that

the Athenians are doing us wrong, go to that side; such as think the

contrary, to the other side.” The assembly accordingly divided, and the

majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important

decision, was to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it

would be beneficial to them to undertake the war. The answer brought back

(Thucydides seems hardly certain that it was really given) was--that if

they did their best they would be victorious, and that the gods would

help them, invoked or uninvoked. They at the same time convened a general

congress of their allies to Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their

recent resolution to the vote of all.

[Sidenote: [432-431 B.C.]]

If there were any speeches delivered at this congress in opposition to

the war, they were not likely to be successful in a cause wherein even

Archidamus had failed. After the Corinthian had concluded, the question

was put to the deputies of every city, great and small indiscriminately:

and the majority decided for war. This important resolution was adopted

about the end of 432 B.C., or the beginning of January 431 B.C.: the

previous decision of the Spartans separately, may have been taken about

two months earlier, in the preceding October or November 432 B.C.

Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this momentous

juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of

complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had done

nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the Thirty Years’

Truce: while for such of her acts as were alleged to be such, she

offered to submit them to that amicable arbitration which the truce

itself prescribed. The Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the

aggressors in the contest; and if Sparta, usually so backward, now came

forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, we are to ascribe it partly to

her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, partly to the pressure of her

allies, especially of the Corinthians. Thucydides, recognising these two

as the grand determining motives, and indicating the alleged infractions

of truce as simple occasions or pretexts, seems to consider the fear and

hatred of Athens as having contributed more to determine Sparta than

the urgency of her allies. That the extraordinary aggrandisement of

Athens, during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion,

was well-calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesus, is

indisputable. But if we take Athens as she stood in 432 _B.C._, it

deserves notice that she had neither made, nor (so far as we know) tried

to make, a single new acquisition during the whole fourteen years which

had elapsed since the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ Truce--and moreover

that that truce marked an epoch of signal humiliation and reduction of

her power. The triumph which Sparta and the Peloponnesians then gained,

though not sufficiently complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet

great enough to inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort

would subdue her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of

feeling out of which war was likely to grow.

Moreover the confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially

strengthened by the widespread sympathy in favour of their cause,

proclaiming as it did the intended liberation of Greece from a despot

city.

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very

different aspect; holding out scarcely any hope of possible gain, and the

certainty of prodigious loss and privation--even granting that at this

heavy cost, her independence and union at home, and her empire abroad,

could be upheld. By Pericles, and by the more long-sighted Athenians, the

chance of unavoidable war was foreseen even before the Corcyræan dispute.

But Pericles was only the first citizen in a democracy, esteemed,

trusted, and listened to, more than any one else by the body of citizens,

but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and

latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens--and even bitterly

hated by many active political opponents. The formal determination of the

Lacedæmonians, to declare war, must of course have been made known at

Athens, by those Athenian envoys who had entered an unavailing protest

against it in the Spartan assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to

carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies

and their pronounced confirmatory vote. Nor did the Spartans even then

send any herald, or make any formal declaration. They despatched various

propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain

satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war;

but with the contrary purpose--of multiplying demands, and enlarging

the grounds of quarrel. Meanwhile the deputies retiring home from the

congress to their respective cities carried with them the general

resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made with as little

delay as possible.

[Illustration: GREEK HELMETS AND STANDARD]

PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFLICT

The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a

political manœuvre aimed at Pericles, their chief opponent in that city.

His mother Agariste belonged to the great family of the Alemæonids, who

were supposed to be under an inexorable hereditary taint, in consequence

of the sacrilege committed by their ancestor Megacles nearly two

centuries before, in the slaughter of the Cylonian suppliants near the

altar of the Venerable Goddesses. Ancient as this transaction was, it

still had sufficient hold on the mind of the Athenians to serve as the

basis of a political manœuvre: about seventy-seven years before, shortly

after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, it had been so employed by

the Spartan king Cleomenes, who at that time exacted from the Athenians

a clearance of the ancient sacrilege, to be effected by the banishment

of Clisthenes (the founder of the democracy) and his chief partisans.

This demand, addressed by Cleomenes to the Athenians at the instance of

Isagoras, the rival of Clisthenes, had been then obeyed, and had served

well the purposes of those who sent it. A similar blow was now aimed

by the Lacedæmonians at Pericles (the grand-nephew of Clisthenes), and

doubtless at the instance of his political enemies: religion required,

it was pretended, that “the abomination of the goddess should be driven

out.” If the Athenians complied with this demand, they would deprive

themselves, at this critical moment, of their ablest leader. But the

Lacedæmonians, not expecting compliance, reckoned at all events upon

discrediting Pericles with the people, as being partly the cause of the

war through family taint of impiety; and this impression would doubtless

be loudly proclaimed by his political opponents in the assembly.

The influence of Pericles with the Athenian public had become greater

and greater as their political experience of him was prolonged. But the

bitterness of his enemies appears to have increased along with it; and

not long before this period, he had been indirectly assailed, as we

have seen, through the medium of accusations against three different

persons, all more or less intimate with him--his mistress Aspasia, the

philosopher Anaxagoras, and the sculptor Phidias. It is said also that

Dracontides proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, that

Pericles should be called on to give an account of the money which he had

expended, and that the dicasts, before whom the account was rendered,

should give their suffrage in the most solemn manner from the altar: this

latter provision was modified by Agnon, who, while proposing that the

dicasts should be fifteen hundred in number, retained the vote by pebbles

in the urn according to ordinary custom.

If Pericles was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt that

he was honourably acquitted: for the language of Thucydides respecting

his pecuniary probity is such as could not have been employed if a

verdict of guilty on a charge of peculation had been publicly pronounced.

But we cannot be certain that he ever was tried; indeed, another

accusation urged by his enemies, and even by Aristophanes in the sixth

year of the Peloponnesian War, implies that no trial took place: for

it was alleged that Pericles, in order to escape this danger, “blew up

the Peloponnesian War,” and involved his country in such confusion and

peril as made his own aid and guidance indispensably necessary to her,

especially that he passed the decree against the Megarians by which the

war was really brought on. We know enough, however, to be certain that

such a supposition is altogether inadmissible. The enemies of Pericles

were far too eager, and too expert in Athenian political warfare, to have

let him escape by such a stratagem. Moreover, we learn from the assurance

of Thucydides that the war depended upon far deeper causes--that the

Megarian decree was in no way the real cause of it; that it was not

Pericles, but the Peloponnesians, who brought it on, by the blow struck

at Potidæa.

All that we can make out, amidst these uncertified allegations, is that,

in a year or two immediately preceding the Peloponnesian War, Pericles

was hard pressed by the accusations of political enemies--perhaps even in

his own person, but certainly in the persons of those who were most in

his confidence and affection. And it was in this turn of his political

position, that the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens the above-mentioned

requisition, that the ancient Cylonian sacrilege might be at length

cleared out; in other words, that Pericles and his family might be

banished. Doubtless his enemies, as well as the partisans of Lacedæmon

at Athens, would strenuously support this proposition. And the party of

Lacedæmon at Athens was always strong, even during the middle of the war;

to act as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians was accounted an honour even by

the greatest Athenian families. On this occasion, however, the manœuvre

did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen to the requisition for

banishing the sacrilegious Alcmæonids. On the contrary, they replied that

the Spartans too had an account of sacrilege to clear off: for they had

violated the sanctuary of Poseidon at Cape Tænarus, in dragging from it

some helot suppliants; and the sanctuary of Athene Chalciœcus at Sparta,

in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias. To

require that Laconia might be cleared of these two acts of sacrilege,

was the only answer which the Athenians made to the demand sent for the

banishment of Pericles. Probably the actual effect of that demand was to

strengthen him in the public esteem--very different from the effect of

the same manœuvre when practised before by Cleomenes against Clisthenes.

Other Spartan envoys shortly afterwards arrived with fresh demands. The

Athenians were now required: (1) to withdraw their troops from Potidæa;

(2) to replace Ægina in its autonomy; (3) to repeal the bill of exclusion

against the Megarians.

It was upon the latter that the greatest stress was laid; an intimation

being held out that the war might be avoided if such repeal were granted.

We see plainly from this proceeding that the Lacedæmonians acted in

concert with the anti-Periclean leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her

confederacy the decree against the Megarians was of less importance than

the rescue of the Corinthian troops now blocked up in Potidæa; but on

the other hand, the party opposed to Pericles would have much better

chance of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of

the Megarians: and this advantage, if gained, would serve to enfeeble

his influence generally. No concession was obtained however on either

of the three points: even in respect to Megara, the decree of exclusion

was vindicated and upheld against all the force of opposition. At length

the Lacedæmonians--who had already resolved upon war and had sent three

envoys in mere compliance with the exigencies of ordinary practice, not

with any idea of bringing about an accommodation--sent a third batch of

envoys with a proposition which at least had the merit of disclosing

their real purpose without disguise. Rhamphias and two other Spartans

announced to the Athenians the simple injunction: “The Lacedæmonians

wish the peace to stand; and it may stand, if you will leave the Greeks

autonomous.” Upon this demand, so very different from the preceding, the

Athenians resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or

peace, to open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine

once for all on a peremptory answer.

The last demands presented on the part of Sparta, which went to nothing

less than the entire extinction of the Athenian empire--combined with

the character, alike wavering and insincere, of the demands previously

made, and with the knowledge that the Spartan confederacy had pronounced

peremptorily in favour of war--seemed likely to produce unanimity at

Athens, and to bring together this important assembly under the universal

conviction that war was inevitable. Such however was not the fact.

The reluctance to go to war was sincere amidst the majority of the

assembly, while among a considerable portion of them it was so

preponderant, that they even now reverted to the opening which the

Lacedæmonians had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as

if that were the chief cause of the war. There was much difference of

opinion among the speakers, several of whom insisted upon the repeal of

this decree, treating it as a matter far too insignificant to go to war

about, and denouncing the obstinacy of Pericles for refusing to concede

such a trifle. Against this opinion Pericles entered his protest, in an

harangue decisive and encouraging, which Dionysius of Halicarnassus ranks

among the best speeches in Thucydides: the latter historian may probably

himself have heard the original speech.

“I continue, Athenians, to adhere to the same conviction, that we must

not yield to the Peloponnesians. Now let none of you believe that we

shall be going to war about a trifle if we refuse to rescind the Megarian

decree--which they chiefly put forward, as if its repeal would avert

the war--let none of you take blame to yourselves as if we had gone to

war about a small matter. For this small matter contains in itself the

whole test and trial of your mettle: if ye yield it, ye will presently

have some other greater exaction put upon you, like men who have already

truckled on one point from fear: whereas if ye hold out stoutly, ye will

make it clear to them that they must deal with you upon a footing of

equality.”

Pericles then examined the relative strength of parties and the chances

of war. The Peloponnesians were a self-working population, with few

slaves, and without wealth, either private or public: they had no means

of carrying on distant or long-continued war: they were ready to expose

their persons, but not at all ready to contribute from their very narrow

means: in a border-war or a single land battle, they were invincible,

but for systematic warfare against a power like Athens, they had neither

competent headship, nor habits of concert and punctuality, nor money

to profit by opportunities, always rare and accidental, for successful

attack. They might perhaps establish a fortified post in Attica, but it

would do little serious mischief; while at sea, their inferiority and

helplessness would be complete, and the irresistible Athenian navy would

take care to keep it so. Nor would they be able to reckon on tempting

away the able foreign seamen from Athenian ships by means of funds

borrowed from Olympia or Delphi. For besides that the mariners of the

dependent islands would find themselves losers even by accepting a higher

pay, with the certainty of Athenian vengeance afterwards, Athens herself

would suffice to man her fleet in case of need, with her own citizens and

metics: she had within her own walls steersmen and mariners better, as

well as more numerous, than all Greece besides. There was but one side on

which Athens was vulnerable: Attica unfortunately was not an island--it

was exposed to invasion and ravage. To this the Athenians must submit,

without committing the imprudence of engaging a land battle to avert it:

they had abundant lands out of Attica, insular as well as continental, to

supply their wants, and they could in their turn, by means of their navy,

ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no subsidiary

lands to recur to.

“Mourn not for the loss of land and house,” continued the orator:

“reserve your mourning for men: houses and land acquire not men, but

men acquire them. Nay, if I thought I could prevail upon you, I would

exhort you to march out and ravage them yourselves, and thus show to the

Peloponnesians that for them at least ye will not truckle. And I could

exhibit many further grounds for confidently anticipating success, if

ye will only be willing not to aim at increased dominion when we are in

the midst of war, and not to take upon yourself new self-imposed risks;

for I have ever been more afraid of our own blunders than of the plans

of our enemy. But these are matters for further discussion, when we

come to actual operations: for the present, let us dismiss these envoys

with the answer--That we will permit the Megarians to use our markets

and harbours, if the Lacedæmonians on their side will discontinue their

summary expulsions of ourselves and our allies from their own territory;

for there is nothing in the truce to prevent either one or the other:

That we will leave the Grecian cities autonomous, if we had them as

autonomous at the time when the truce was made; and as soon as the

Lacedæmonians shall grant to their allied cities autonomy such as each

of them shall freely choose, not such as is convenient to Sparta: That

while we are ready to give satisfaction according to the truce, we will

not begin war, but will repel those who do begin it. Such is the reply at

once just and suitable to the dignity of this city. We ought to make up

our minds that war is inevitable: the more cheerfully we accept it, the

less vehement shall we find our enemies in their attack: and where the

danger is greatest, there also is the final honour greatest, both for a

state and for a private citizen. Assuredly our fathers, when they bore up

against the Persians--having no such means as we possess to start from,

and even compelled to abandon all that they did possess--both repelled

the invader and brought matters forward to our actual pitch, more by

advised operation than by good fortune, and by a daring courage greater

than their real power. We ought not to fall short of them: we must keep

off our enemies in every way, and leave an unimpaired power to our

successors.”

These animating encouragements of Pericles carried with them the majority

of the assembly, so that answer was made to the envoys, such as he

recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was announced

to them, moreover, on the general question of peace or war, that the

Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of complaint against

them, pursuant to the truce, by equal and amicable arbitration, but that

they would do nothing under authoritative demand. With this answer the

envoys returned to Sparta, and an end was put to negotiation.

It seems evident, from the account of Thucydides, that the Athenian

public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance, and

great fear of the consequences, especially destruction of property in

Attica; and that a considerable minority took opposition on the Megarian

decree--the ground skilfully laid by Sparta for breaking the unanimity

of her enemy, and strengthening the party opposed to Pericles. But we

may also decidedly infer from the same historian--especially from the

proceedings of Corinth and Sparta as he sets them forth--that Athens

could not have avoided the war without such an abnegation both of dignity

and power as no nation under any government will ever submit to, and

as would have even left her without decent security for her individual

rights. It is common to ascribe the Peloponnesian War to the ambition of

Athens, but this is a partial view of the case.

The aggressive sentiment, partly fear and partly hatred, was on the

side of the Peloponnesians, who were not ignorant that Athens desired

the continuance of peace, but were resolved not to let her stand as she

was at the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ Truce. It was their purpose

to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, wrongful, and

anti-Hellenic. The war was thus partly a contest of principle, involving

the popular proclamation of the right of every Grecian state to autonomy,

against Athens: partly a contest of power, wherein Spartan and Corinthian

ambition was not less conspicuous, and far more aggressive in the

beginning than Athenian.

[Sidenote: [431 B.C.]]

Conformably to what is here said, the first blow of the war was struck,

not by Athens, but against her. After the decisive answer given to the

Spartan envoys, taken in conjunction with the previous proceedings, and

the preparations actually going on, among the Peloponnesian confederacy,

the truce could hardly be said to be in force, though there was no formal

proclamation of rupture.

A few weeks undoubtedly passed in restricted and mistrustful intercourse;

though individuals who passed the borders did not think it necessary to

take a herald with them, as in time of actual war. Had the excess of

ambition been on the side of Athens compared with her enemies, this was

the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of course

greater probability of success, before their preparations were completed.

But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, while the

disastrous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear in pieces the

entrails of Hellas, was opened by her enemy and her neighbour.

The little town of Platæa, still hallowed by the memorable victory over

the Persians as well as by the tutelary consecration received from

Pausanias, was the scene of this unforeseen enterprise which marks the

opening of hostilities in the Peloponnesian war.[b]

[Illustration: GREEK HELMETS]

THE SURPRISE OF PLATÆA

War had been only threatened, not declared; and peaceful intercourse,

though not wholly free from distrust, was still kept up between the

subjects of the two confederacies. But early in the following spring, 431

B.C., in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years’ Truce, an event took

place which closed all prospects of peace, precipitated the commencement

of war, embittered the animosity of the contending parties, and prepared

some of the most tragical scenes of the ensuing history. In the dead

of night the city of Platæa was surprised by a body of three hundred

Thebans, commanded by two of the great officers called Bœotarchs. They

had been invited by a Platæan named Nauclides, and others of the same

party, who hoped with the aid of the Thebans to rid themselves of their

political opponents, and to break off the relation in which their city

was standing to Athens, and transfer its alliance to Thebes. The Thebans,

foreseeing that a general war was fast approaching, felt the less scruple

in strengthening themselves by this acquisition, while it might be made

with little cost and risk. The gates were unguarded, as in time of peace,

and one of them was secretly opened to the invaders, who advanced without

interruption into the marketplace. Their Platæan friends wished to lead

them at once to the houses of their adversaries, and to glut their hatred

by a massacre. But the Thebans were more anxious to secure the possession

of the city, and feared to provoke resistance by an act of violence.

Having therefore halted in the marketplace, they made a proclamation

inviting all who were willing that Platæa should become again, as it had

been in former times, a member of the Bœotian body, to join them.

The Platæans who were not in the plot, imagined the force by which their

city had been surprised to be much stronger than it really was, and, as

no hostile treatment was offered to them, remained quiet, and entered

into a parley with the Thebans. In the course of these conferences they

gradually discovered that the number of the enemy was small, and might

be easily overpowered; and, as they were in general attached to the

Athenians, or at least strongly averse to an alliance with Thebes, they

resolved to make the attempt, while the darkness might favour them, and

perplex the strangers. To avoid suspicion they met to concert their plan

of operation by means of passages opened through the walls of their

houses; and having barricaded the streets with wagons, and made such

other preparations as they thought necessary, a little before daybreak

they suddenly fell upon the Thebans.

The little band made a vigorous defence, and twice or thrice repulsed the

assailants; but as these still returned to the charge, and were assisted

by the women and slaves, who showered stones and tiles from the houses

on the enemy, all at the same time raising a tumultuous clamour, and a

heavy rain increased the confusion caused by the darkness, they at length

lost their presence of mind, and took to flight. But most were unable

to find their way in the dark through a strange town, and several were

slain as they wandered to and fro in search of an outlet. The gate by

which they were admitted had in the meanwhile been closed, and no other

was open. Some, pressed by their pursuers, mounted the walls, and threw

themselves down on the outside, but for the most part were killed by the

fall. A few were fortunate enough to break open one of the gates in a

lone quarter, with an axe which they obtained from a woman, and to effect

their escape. The main body, which had kept together, entered a large

building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates, which they found

open, for those of the town, and were shut in. The Platæans at first

thought of setting fire to the building; but at length the men within, as

well as the rest of the Thebans who were still wandering up and down the

streets, surrendered at discretion.

Before their departure from Thebes it had been concerted that as large

a force as could be raised should march the same night to support them.

The distance between the two places was not quite nine miles, and these

troops were expected to reach the gates of Platæa before the morning;

but the Asopus, which crossed their road, had been swollen by the rain,

and the state of the ground and the weather otherwise retarded them,

so that they were still on their way when they heard of the failure of

the enterprise. Though they did not know the fate of their countrymen,

as it was possible that some might have been taken prisoners, they were

at first inclined to seize as many of the Platæans as they could find

without the walls, and to keep them as hostages. The Platæans anticipated

this design, and were alarmed, for many of their fellow citizens were

living out of the town in the security of peace, and there was much

valuable property in the country. They therefore sent a herald to the

Theban army to complain of their treacherous attack, and call upon them

to abstain from further aggression, and to threaten that, if any was

offered, the prisoners should answer for it with their lives. The Thebans

afterwards alleged that they had received a promise, confirmed by an

oath, that, on condition of their retiring from the Platæan territory,

the prisoners should be released; and Thucydides seems disposed to

believe this statement. The Platæans denied that they had pledged

themselves to spare the lives of the prisoners, unless they should come

to terms on the whole matter with the Thebans; but it does not seem

likely that, after ascertaining the state of the case, the Thebans would

have been satisfied with so slight a security. It is certain however that

they retired, and that the Platæans, as soon as they had transported

their movable property out of the country into the town, put to death all

the prisoners--amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, the principal

author of the enterprise, and the man who possessed the greatest

influence in Thebes.

On the first entrance of the Thebans into Platæa a messenger had been

despatched to Athens with the intelligence, and the Athenians had

immediately laid all the Bœotians in Attica under arrest; and when

another messenger brought the news of the victory gained by the Platæans,

they sent a herald to request that they would reserve the prisoners for

the disposal of the Athenians. The herald came too late to prevent the

execution: and the Athenians, foreseeing that Platæa would stand in great

need of defence, sent a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it with

provisions, and removed the women and children and all persons unfit for

service in a siege.

After this event it was apparent that the quarrel could only be decided

by arms. Platæa was so intimately united with Athens, that the Athenians

felt the attack which had been made on it as an outrage offered to

themselves, and prepared for immediate hostilities. Sparta, too,

instantly sent notice to all her allies to get their contingents ready

by an appointed day for the invasion of Attica. Two-thirds of the whole

force which each raised were ordered to march, and when the time came

assembled in the isthmus, where King Archidamus put himself at their

head. An army more formidable, both in numbers and spirit, had never

issued from the peninsula; and Archidamus thought it advisable, before

they set out, to call the principal officers together, and to urge the

necessity of proceeding with caution and maintaining exact discipline,

as soon as they should have entered the enemy’s territory; admonishing

them not to be so far elated by their superior numbers as to believe

that the Athenians would certainly remain passive spectators of their

inroads. And though all except himself were impatient to move, he would

not yet take the decisive step, without making one attempt more to avert

its necessity. He still cherished a faint hope, that the resolution of

the Athenians might be shaken by the prospect of the evils of war which

were now so imminent, and he sent Melesippus to sound their disposition.

But the envoy was not able to obtain an audience from the people, nor so

much as to enter the walls. A decree had been made, at the instigation

of Pericles, to receive no embassy from the Spartans while they should

be under arms. Melesippus was informed that if his government wished

to treat with Athens, it must first recall its forces. He himself was

ordered to quit Attica that very day, and persons were appointed to

conduct him to the frontier, to prevent him from holding communication

with any one by the way. On parting with his conductors he exclaimed,

“This day will be the beginning of great evils to Greece.”

Such a prediction might well occur to any one, who reflected on the

nature of the two powers which were now coming into conflict, and on

the great resources of both, which, though totally different in kind,

were so evenly balanced that no human eye could perceive in which scale

victory hung; and the termination of the struggle could seem near only to

one darkened by passion. The strength of Sparta, as was implied in the

observation of Sthenelaidas, lay in the armies which she could collect

from the states of her confederacy. The force which she could thus bring

into the field is admitted by Pericles, in one of the speeches ascribed

to him by Thucydides, to be capable of making head against any that could

be raised by the united efforts of the rest of Greece. Within the isthmus

her allies included all the states of Peloponnesus, except Achaia and

Argos; and the latter was bound to neutrality by a truce which still

wanted several years of its term. Hence the great contest now beginning

was not improperly called the Peloponnesian War. Beyond the isthmus

she was supported by Megara and Thebes, which drew the rest of Bœotia

along with it; and Attica would thus have been completely surrounded

on the land side by hostile territories, if Platæa and Oropus had not

been politically attached to it. The Locrians of Opus, the Dorians of

the mother-country, and the Phocians (though these last were secretly

more inclined to the Athenians, who had always taken their part in their

quarrels with Delphi, the stanch friend of Sparta) were also on her

side. Thessaly, Acarnania, and the Amphilochian Argos, were in alliance

with her enemy; but for this very reason, and more especially from their

hostility to the Messenians of Naupactus, the Ætolians were friendly to

her; and she could also reckon on the Corinthian colonies, Anactorium,

Ambracia, and Leucas.

The power which Sparta exerted over her allies was much more narrowly

limited than that which Athens had assumed over her subjects. The Spartan

influence rested partly on the national affinity by which the head was

united to the Dorian members of the confederacy, but still more on the

conformity, which she established or maintained among all of them, to

her own oligarchical institutions. This was the only point in which she

encroached on the independence of any. Every state had a voice in the

deliberations by which its interests might be affected; and if Sparta

determined the amount of the contributions required by extraordinary

occasions, she was obliged carefully to adjust it to the ability of each

community. So far was she from enriching herself at the expense of the

confederacy, that at the beginning of the war there was, as we have seen,

no common treasure belonging to it, and no regular tribute for common

purposes. But, to compensate for these defects, her power stood on a more

durable basis of goodwill than that of Athens; and though in every state

there was a party attached to the Athenian interest on political grounds,

yet on the whole the Spartan cause was popular throughout Greece; and

while Athens was forced to keep a jealous eye on all her subjects, and

was in continual fear of losing them, Sparta, secure of the loyalty of

her own allies, could calmly watch for opportunities of profiting by the

disaffection of those of her rival.

At home indeed her state was far from sound, and the Athenians were

well aware of her vulnerable side; but abroad, and as chief of the

Peloponnesian confederacy, she presented the majestic and winning aspect

of the champion of liberty against Athenian tyranny and ambition: and

hence she had important advantages to hope from states which were but

remotely connected with her, and were quite beyond the reach of her arms.

Many powerful cities in Italy and Sicily were thus induced to promise

her their aid, and it was on this she founded her chief expectations

of forming a navy, which might face that of Athens. Her allies in this

quarter engaged to furnish her with money and ships, which, it was

calculated, would amount to no less than five hundred, though for the

present it was agreed that they should wear the mask of neutrality, and

admit single Athenian vessels into their ports. But as she was conscious

that she should still be deficient in the sinews of war, she already

began to turn her eyes to the common enemy of Greece, who was able

abundantly to supply this want, and would probably be willing to lavish

his gold for the sake of ruining Athens, the object of his especial

enmity and dread.

The extent of the Athenian empire cannot be so exactly computed. In the

language of the comic stage, it is said to comprehend a thousand cities;

and it is difficult to estimate what abatement ought to be made from this

playful exaggeration. The subjects of Athens were in general more opulent

than the allies of Sparta, and their sovereign disposed of their revenues

at her pleasure. The only states to which she granted more than a nominal

independence were some islands in the western seas, Corcyra, Zacynthus,

and Cephallenia--points of peculiar importance to her operations and

prospects in that quarter, though even there she was more feared than

loved. At the moment of the revolt of Potidæa her empire had reached its

widest range, and her finances were in the most flourishing condition;

and at the outbreak of the war her naval and military strength was at

its greatest height. Pericles, as one of the ten regular generals, or

ministers of war, before the Peloponnesian army had reached the frontier,

held an assembly, in which he gave an exact account of the resources

which the republic had at her disposal.

Her finances, beside the revenue which she drew from a variety of

sources, foreign and domestic, were nourished by the annual tribute

of her allies, which now amounted to six hundred talents [£120,000 or

$600,000]. Six thousand, in money, still remained in the treasury, after

the great expenditure incurred on account of the public buildings, and

the siege of Potidæa, before which the sum had amounted to nearly ten

thousand. But to this, Pericles observed, must be added the gold and

silver which, in various forms of offerings, ornaments, and sacred

utensils, enriched the temples or public places, which he calculated at

five hundred talents, without reckoning the precious materials employed

in the statues of the gods and heroes. The statue of Athene in the

Parthenon alone contained forty talents’ weight of pure gold, in the

ægis, shield, and other appendages. If they should ever be reduced to

the want of such a supply, there could be no doubt that their tutelary

goddess would willingly part with her ornaments for their service, on

condition that they were replaced at the earliest opportunity.

They could muster a force of 13,000 heavy-armed, beside those who were

employed in their various garrisons, and in the defence of the city

itself, with the long walls and the fortifications of its harbours, who

amounted to 16,000 more; made up, indeed, partly of the resident aliens,

and partly of citizens on either verge of the military age. The military

force also included 1200 cavalry and 1600 bowmen, beside some who were

mounted; and they had 300 galleys in sailing condition.

PERICLES’ RECONCENTRATION POLICY

After rousing the confidence of the Athenians by this enumeration,

Pericles urged them without delay to transport their families and all

their movable property out of the enemy’s reach, and, as long as the

war should last, to look upon the capital as their home. To encourage a

patriotic spirit by his example, and at the same time to secure himself

from imputations to which he might be exposed, either by the Spartan

cunning, or by an indiscreet display of private friendship, he publicly

declared, that if Archidamus, who was personally attached to him by the

ties of hospitality, should, either from this motive, or in compliance

with orders which might be given in an opposite intention, exempt his

lands from the ravages of war, they should from that time become the

property of the state.

[Illustration: OFFICERS’ HELMETS]

To many of his hearers that which he required was a very painful

sacrifice. Many had been born, and had passed all their lives, in the

country. They were attached to it, not merely by the profit or the

pleasure of rural pursuits, but by domestic and religious associations.

For though the incorporation of the Attic townships had for ages

extinguished their political independence, it had not interrupted

their religious traditions, or effaced the peculiar features of their

local worship; and hence the Attic countryman clung to his deme with

a fondness which he could not feel for the great city. In the period

of increasing prosperity which had followed the Persian invasion, the

country had been cultivated and adorned more assiduously than ever. All

was now to be left or carried away. Reluctantly they adopted the decree

which Pericles proposed; and, with heavy hearts, as if going into exile,

they quitted their native and hereditary seats. If the rich man sighed

to part from his elegant villa, the husbandman still more deeply felt

the pang of being torn from his home, and of abandoning his beloved

fields, the scenes of his infancy, the holy places where his forefathers

had worshipped, to the ravages of a merciless invader. All however was

removed: the flocks and cattle to Eubœa and other adjacent islands; all

beside that was portable, and even the timber of the houses, into Athens,

to which they themselves migrated with their families.

The city itself was not prepared for the sudden influx of so many new

inhabitants. A few found shelter under the roofs of relatives or friends;

but the greater part, on their arrival, found themselves houseless as

well as homeless. Some took refuge in such temples as were usually open;

others occupied the towers of the walls; others raised temporary hovels

on any vacant ground which they could find in the city, and even resorted

for this purpose to a site which had hitherto been guarded from all such

uses by policy, aided by a religious sanction. It was the place under the

western wall of the citadel, called, from the ancient builders of the

wall, the Pelasgicum: a curse had been pronounced on any one who should

tenant it; and men remembered some words of an oracle, which declared

it _better untrodden_. The real motive for the prohibition was probably

the security of the citadel; but all police seems to have been suspended

by the urgency of the occasion. It was some time before the newcomers

bethought themselves of spreading over the vacant space between the long

walls, or of descending to Piræus. But this foretaste of the evils of

war did not damp the general ardour, especially that of the youthful

spirits, which began at Athens, as elsewhere, to be impatient of repose.

Numberless oracles and predictions were circulated, in which every one

found something that accorded with the tone of his feelings. Even those

who had no definite hopes, fears, or wishes shared the excitement of

men on the eve of a great crisis. The holy island of Delos had been

recently shaken by an earthquake. It was forgotten, or was never known

out of Delos itself, that this had happened already, just before the

first Persian invasion. It was deemed a portent, which signified new and

extraordinary events, and it was soon combined with other prodigies,

which tended to encourage similar forebodings. Such was the state in

which the Athenians awaited the advance of the Peloponnesian army.[c]

Adolf Holm[e] compares the Periclean policy of voluntary reconcentration

with the acts of the Dutch, when in the sixteenth century they let the

Spanish destroy their crops, and then opened the dikes and flooded their

own country. We may compare also the compulsory reconcentration of the

country people in the cities as carried out by General Weyler in Cuba, in

1897, and by Lord Kitchener in South Africa, in 1901.[a]

THE FIRST YEAR’S RAVAGE

Archidamus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known to

him, continued his march from the isthmus into Attica--which territory he

entered by the road of Œnoe, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica

towards Bœotia. His march, was slow, and he thought it necessary to make

a regular attack on the fort of Œnoe, which had been put in so good a

state of defence that, after all the various modes of assault--in which

the Lacedæmonians were not skilful--had been tried in vain, and after a

delay of several days before the place, he was compelled to renounce the

attempt.

The want of enthusiasm on the part of the Spartan king, his multiplied

delays, first at the isthmus, next in the march, and lastly before Œnoe,

were all offensive to the fiery impatience of the army, who were loud in

their murmurs against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid

down in his discourse at Sparta--that the highly cultivated soil of

Attica was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of

the Athenians, who would be more likely to yield when devastation, though

not yet inflicted, was nevertheless impending and at their doors. In this

point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and

perhaps the partisans of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope

that it would enable them to prevail.

After having spent several days before Œnoe without either taking the

fort or receiving any message from the Athenians, Archidamus marched

onward to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain--about the middle of June,

eighty days after the surprise of Platæa. His army was of irresistible

force, not less than sixty thousand hoplites, according to the statement

of Plutarch, or of one hundred thousand, according to others. Considering

the number of constituent allies, the strong feeling by which they were

prompted, and the shortness of the expedition combined with the chance of

plunder, even the largest of these two numbers is not incredibly great,

if we take it to include not hoplites only, but cavalry and light armed

also. But as Thucydides, though comparatively full in his account of this

march, has stated no general total, we may presume that he had heard none

upon which he could rely.

As the Athenians had made no movement towards peace, Archidamus

anticipated that they would come forth to meet him in the fertile plain

of Eleusis and Thria, which was the first portion of territory that he

sat down to ravage. Yet no Athenian force appeared to oppose him, except

a detachment of cavalry, who were repulsed in a skirmish near the small

lakes called Rheiti. Having laid waste this plain without any serious

opposition, Archidamus did not think fit to pursue the straight road

which from Thria conducted directly to Athens across the ridge of Mount

Ægaleos, but turned off to the eastward, leaving that mountain on his

right hand until he came to Cropia, where he crossed a portion of the

line of Ægaleos over to Acharnæ.

He was here about seven miles from Athens, on a declivity sloping down

into the plain which stretches westerly and northwesterly from Athens,

and visible from the city walls; and here he encamped, keeping his army

in perfect order for battle, but at the same time intending to damage

and ruin the place and its neighbourhood. Acharnæ was the largest and

most populous of all the demes in Attica, furnishing no less than three

thousand hoplites to the national line, and flourishing as well by its

corn, vines, and olives, as by its peculiar abundance of charcoal burning

from the forests of ilex on the neighbouring hills. Moreover, if we are

to believe Aristophanes, the Acharnian proprietors were not merely sturdy

“hearts of oak,” but peculiarly vehement and irritable. It illustrates

the condition of a Grecian territory under invasion, when we find this

great deme, which could not have contained less than twelve thousand

free inhabitants of both sexes and all ages, with at least an equal

number of slaves, completely deserted. Archidamus calculated that when

the Athenians actually saw his troops so close to their city, carrying

fire and sword over their wealthiest canton, their indignation would

become uncontrollable, and they would march out forthwith to battle.

The Acharnian proprietors especially (he thought) would be foremost

in inflaming this temper, and insisting upon protection to their own

properties--or if the remaining citizens refused to march out along with

them, they would, after having been thus left undefended to ruin, become

discontented and indifferent to the general weal.

Though his calculation was not realised, it was nevertheless founded

upon most rational grounds. What Archidamus anticipated was on the point

of happening, and nothing prevented it except the personal ascendency

of Pericles, strained to its very utmost. So long as the invading army

was engaged in the Thriasian plain, the Athenians had some faint hope

that it might (like Plistoanax fourteen years before) advance no farther

into the interior. But when it came to Acharnæ within sight of the city

walls--when the ravagers were actually seen destroying buildings, fruit

trees, and crops, in the plain of Athens, a sight strange to every

Athenian eye except to those very old men who recollected the Persian

invasion--the exasperation of the general body of citizens rose to a

pitch never before known. The Acharnians first of all--next the youthful

citizens, generally--became madly clamorous for arming and going forth to

fight. Knowing well their own great strength, but less correctly informed

of the superior strength of the enemy, they felt confident that victory

was within their reach. Groups of citizens were everywhere gathered

together, angrily debating the critical question of the moment; while the

usual concomitants of excited feeling--oracles and prophecies of diverse

tenor, many of them doubtless promising success against the enemy at

Acharnæ--were eagerly caught up and circulated.

In this inflamed temper of the Athenian mind, Pericles was naturally

the great object of complaint and wrath. He was denounced as the

cause of all the existing suffering: he was reviled as a coward for

not leading out the citizens to fight, in his capacity of general:

the rational convictions as to the necessity of the war and the only

practical means of carrying it on, which his repeated speeches had

implanted, seemed to be altogether forgotten. This burst of spontaneous

discontent was of course fomented by the numerous political enemies of

Pericles, and particularly by Cleon,[47] now rising into importance as an

opposition-speaker; whose talent for invective was thus first exercised

under the auspices of the high aristocratical party, as well as of an

excited public.

But no manifestations, however violent, could disturb either the judgment

or the firmness of Pericles. He listened unmoved to all the declarations

made against him, resolutely refusing to convene a public assembly, or

any meeting invested with an authorised character, under the present

irritated temper of the citizens. It appears that he as general, or

rather the board of ten generals among whom he was one, must have been

invested constitutionally with the power not only of calling the ecclesia

when they thought fit, but also of preventing it from meeting, and of

postponing even those regular meetings which commonly took place at

fixed times, four times in the prytany. No assembly accordingly took

place, and the violent exasperation of the people was thus prevented from

realising itself in any rash public resolution. That Pericles should have

held firm against this raging force, is but one among the many honourable

points in his political character; but it is far less wonderful than the

fact that his refusal to call the ecclesia was efficacious to prevent the

ecclesia from being held. The entire body of Athenians were now assembled

within the walls, and if he refused to convoke the ecclesia, they might

easily have met in the Pnyx without him; for which it would not have been

difficult at such a juncture to provide plausible justification. The

inviolable respect which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion

for the forms of their democratical constitution--assisted doubtless by

their long-established esteem for Pericles, yet opposed to an excitement

alike intense and pervading, and to a demand apparently reasonable, in so

far as regarded the calling of an assembly for discussion--is one of the

most memorable incidents in their history.

While Pericles thus decidedly forbade any general march out for battle

he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the compressed

eagerness of the citizens. The cavalry were sent forth, together with

the Thessalian cavalry their allies, for the purpose of restraining the

excursions of the enemy’s light troops, and protecting the lands near the

city from plunder. At the same time he fitted out a powerful expedition,

which sailed forth to ravage Peloponnesus, even while the invaders

were yet in Attica. Archidamus, after having remained engaged in the

devastation of Acharnæ long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians

would not hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a northwesterly

direction towards the demes between Mount Brilessus and Mount Parnes,

on the road passing through Decelea. The army continued ravaging these

districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted Attica

by the northwestern road near Oropus, which brought them into Bœotia. As

the Oropians, though not Athenians, were yet dependent upon Athens--the

district of Græa, a portion of their territory, was laid waste; after

which the army dispersed and retired back to their respective homes.

It would seem that they quitted Attica towards the end of July, having

remained in the country between thirty and forty days.

Meanwhile, the Athenian expedition, under Caranus, Proteas, and Socrates,

joined by fifty Corcyræan ships and by some other allies, sailed round

Peloponnesus, landing in various parts to inflict damage, and among

other places at Methone (Modon), on the southwestern peninsula of the

Lacedæmonian territory. The place, neither strong nor well-garrisoned,

would have been carried with little difficulty, had not Brasidas, the

son of Tellis--a gallant Spartan now mentioned for the first time, but

destined to great celebrity afterwards--who happened to be on guard at

a neighbouring post, thrown himself into it with one hundred men by a

rapid movement, before the dispersed Athenian troops could be brought

together to prevent him. He infused such courage into the defenders of

the place that every attack was repelled, and the Athenians were forced

to re-embark--an act of prowess which procured for him the first public

honours bestowed by the Spartans during this war. Sailing northward

along the western coast of Peloponnesus, the Athenians landed again on

the coast of Elis, a little south of the promontory called Cape Ichthys:

they ravaged the territory for two days, defeating both the troops in

the neighbourhood and three hundred chosen men from the central Elean

territory. Strong winds on a harbourless coast now induced the captains

to sail with most of the troops round Cape Ichthys, in order to reach the

harbour of Phea on the northern side of it; while the Messenian hoplites,

marching by land across the promontory, attacked Phea and carried it by

assault. When the fleet arrived, all were re-embarked--the full force

of Elis being under march to attack them. They then sailed northward,

landing on various other spots to commit devastation, until they reached

Sollium, a Corinthian settlement on the coast of Acarnania. They

captured this place, which they handed over to the inhabitants of the

neighbouring Acarnanian town of Palærus, as well as Astacus, from whence

they expelled the despot Euarchus, and enrolled the town as a member of

the Athenian alliance. From hence they passed over to Cephallenia, which

they were fortunate enough also to acquire as an ally of Athens without

any compulsion--with its four distinct towns or districts, Pale, Cranii,

Same, and Proni. These various operations took up near three months from

about the beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens towards

the close of September--the beginning of the winter half of the year,

according to the distribution of Thucydides.

This was not the only maritime expedition of the summer. Thirty more

triremes, under Cleopompus, were sent through the Euripus to the Locrian

coast opposite to the northern part of Eubœa. Some disembarkations were

made, whereby the Locrian towns of Thronium and Alope were sacked, and

further devastation inflicted; while a permanent garrison was planted,

and a fortified post erected, in the uninhabited island of Atalante

opposite to the Locrian coast, in order to restrain privateers from Opus

and the other Locrian towns in their excursions against Eubœa. It was

further determined to expel the Æginetan inhabitants from Ægina, and to

occupy the island with Athenian colonists. This step was partly rendered

prudent by the important position of the island midway between Attica

and Peloponnesus. But a concurrent motive, and probably the stronger

motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy and revenge against

a people who had been among the foremost in provoking the war and in

inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The Æginetans, with their wives

and children, were all put on ship-board and landed in Peloponnesus,

where the Spartans permitted them to occupy the maritime district and

town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards Argos; some of them, however,

found shelter in other parts of Greece. The island was made over to a

detachment of Athenian cleruchs, or citizen proprietors, sent hither by

lot.

To the sufferings of the Æginetans, which we shall hereafter find still

more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the Megarians. Both

had been most zealous in kindling the war, but upon none did the distress

of war fall so heavily. Both probably shared the premature confidence

felt among the Peloponnesian confederacy, that Athens could never hold

out more than a year or two, and were thus induced to overlook their own

undefended position against her. Towards the close of September, the

full force of Athens, citizens and metics, marched into the Megarid,

under Pericles, and laid waste the greater part of the territory; while

they were in it, the hundred ships which had been circumnavigating

Peloponnesus, having arrived at Ægina on their return, joined their

fellow citizens in the Megarid, instead of going straight home. The

junction of the two formed the largest Athenian force that had ever yet

been seen together; there were ten thousand citizen hoplites (independent

of three thousand others who were engaged in the siege of Potidæa), and

three thousand metic hoplites, besides a large number of light troops.

Against so large a force the Megarians could make no head, so that their

territory was all laid waste, even to the city walls. For several years

of the war, the Athenians inflicted this destruction once, and often

twice in the same year. A decree was proposed in the Athenian ecclesia

by Charinus, though perhaps not carried, to the effect that the strategi

every year should swear, as a portion of their oath of office, that they

would twice invade and ravage the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same

time kept the port of Nisæa blocked up, by means of their superior naval

force and of the neighbouring coast of Salamis, the privations imposed

on the Megarians became extreme and intolerable. Not only their corn

and fruits, but even their garden vegetables were rooted up, and their

situation was that of a besieged city pressed by famine. Even in the time

of Pausanias, many centuries afterward, the miseries of the town during

these years were remembered and communicated to him, being assigned

as the reason why one of their most memorable statues had never been

completed.

To the various military operations of Athens during the course of

this summer, some other measures of moment are to be added. Moreover,

Thucydides notices an eclipse of the sun, which modern astronomical

calculations refer to the third of August; had this eclipse happened

three months earlier, immediately before the entrance of the

Peloponnesians into Attica, it might probably have been construed as an

unfavourable omen, and caused the postponement of the scheme. Expecting

a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for placing

Attica in a permanent state of defence, both by sea and land; what

these arrangements were, we are not told in detail, but one of them was

sufficiently remarkable to be named particularly. They set apart one

thousand talents [£200,000 or $1,000,000] out of the treasure in the

Acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except on the

single contingency of a hostile naval force about to assail the city,

with no other means at hand to defend it. They further enacted that if

any citizen should propose, or any magistrate put the question, in the

public assembly, to make any different application of this reserve, he

should be punishable with death. Moreover, they resolved every year to

keep back one hundred of their best triremes, and trierarchs to command

and equip them, for the same special necessity. It may be doubted whether

this latter provision was placed under the same stringent sanction, or

observed with the same rigour, as that concerning the money; which latter

was not departed from until the twentieth year of the war, after all

the disasters of the Sicilian expedition, and on the terrible news of

the revolt of Chios. It was on that occasion that the Athenians first

repealed the sentence of capital punishment against the proposer of

this forbidden change, and next appropriated the money to meet the then

imminent peril of the commonwealth.

The resolution here taken about this sacred reserve, and the rigorous

sentence interdicting contrary propositions, is pronounced by Mitford[48]

to be an evidence of the indelible barbarism of democratical government.

But we must recollect, first, that the sentence of capital punishment

was one which could hardly by possibility come into execution; for no

citizen would be so mad as to make the forbidden proposition while

this law was in force. Whoever desired to make it would first begin

by proposing to repeal the prohibitory law, whereby he would incur no

danger, whether the assembly decided in the affirmative or negative; and

if he obtained an affirmative decision he would then, and then only,

proceed to move the re-appropriation of the fund. To speak the language

of English parliamentary procedure, he would first move the suspension or

abrogation of the standing order whereby the proposition was forbidden;

next, he would move the proposition itself; in fact, such was the mode

actually pursued, when the thing at last came to be done. But though

the capital sentence could hardly come into effect, the proclamation

of it _in terrorem_ had a very distinct meaning. It expressed the deep

and solemn conviction which the people entertained of the importance of

their own resolution about the reserve; it forewarned all assemblies and

all citizens to come of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose;

it surrounded the reserve with an artificial sanctity, which forced

every man who aimed at the re-appropriation to begin with a preliminary

proposition formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee

which previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the

door to a contingency which they had looked upon as treasonable. The

proclamation of a lighter punishment, or a simple prohibition without

any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the same

emphatic conviction, nor produced the same deterring effect. The assembly

of 431 B.C. could not in any way enact laws which subsequent assemblies

could not reverse; but it could so frame its enactments, in cases of

peculiar solemnity, as to make its authority strongly felt upon the

judgment of its successors, and to prevent them from entertaining motions

for repeal except under necessity at once urgent and obvious.

Far from thinking that the law now passed at Athens displayed barbarism,

either in the end or in the means, we consider it principally remarkable

for its cautious and long-sighted view of the future--qualities the exact

reverse of barbarism--and worthy of the general character of Pericles,

who probably suggested it. Athens was just entering into a war which

threatened to be of indefinite length, and was certain to be very costly.

To prevent the people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and

to place them under a necessity of reserving something against extreme

casualties, was an object of immense importance. Now the particular

casualty, which Pericles (assuming him to be the proposer) named as the

sole condition of touching this one thousand talents, might be considered

as of all others the most improbable, in the year 431 B.C. So immense

was then the superiority of the Athenian naval force, that to suppose

it defeated, and a Peloponnesian fleet in full sail for Piræus, was

a possibility which it required a statesman of extraordinary caution

to look forward to, and which it is truly wonderful that the people

generally could have been induced to contemplate. Once tied up to this

purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible emergency:

and we shall find the actual employment of it incalculably beneficial

to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she could hardly have

protected herself without some such special resource. The people would

scarcely have sanctioned so rigorous an economy, had it not been proposed

to them at a period so early in the war that their available reserve

was still much larger. But it will be forever to the credit of their

foresight as well as constancy, that they should first have adopted such

a precautionary measure, and afterwards adhered to it for nineteen years,

under severe pressure for money, until at length a case arose which

rendered further abstinence really, and not constructively, impossible.

To display their force and take revenge by disembarking and ravaging

parts of the Peloponnesus, was doubtless of much importance to Athens

during this first summer of the war: though it might seem that the force

so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of Potidæa, which

still remained under blockade, and of the neighbouring Chalcidians in

Thrace, still in revolt. It was during the course of this summer that a

prospect opened to Athens of subduing these towns, through the assistance

of Sitalces, king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince had married the

sister of Nymphodorus, a citizen of Abdera; who engaged to render him,

and his son Sadocus, allies of Athens. Sent for to Athens and appointed

proxenus of Athens at Abdera, which was one of the Athenian subject

allies, Nymphodorus made this alliance, and promised in the name of

Sitalces that a sufficient Thracian force should be sent to aid Athens in

the reconquest of her revolted towns: the honour of Athenian citizenship

was at the same time conferred upon Sadocus. Nymphodorus further

established a good understanding between Perdiccas II of Macedonia and

the Athenians, who were persuaded to restore to him Therma, which they

had before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise of powerful

aid against the Chalcidians and Potidæans: yet the latter still held

out, with little prospect of immediate surrender. Moreover, the town of

Astacus in Acarnania, which the Athenians had captured during the summer,

in the course of their expedition round Peloponnesus, was recovered

during the autumn by the deposed despot Euarchus, assisted by forty

Corinthian triremes and one thousand hoplites. This Corinthian armament,

after restoring Euarchus, made some unsuccessful descents both upon other

parts of Acarnania and upon the island of Cephallenia: in the latter

they were entrapped into an ambuscade and obliged to return home with

considerable loss.[b]

FOOTNOTES

[47] “Cleon,” says Thucydides, “attacked him with great acrimony, making

use of the general resentment against Pericles, as a means to increase

his own popularity, as Hermippus testifies in these verses:

“‘Sleeps then, thou king of Satyrs, sleeps the spear,

While thundering words make war? Why boast thy prowess,

Yet shudder at the sound of sharpened swords,

Spite of the flaming Cleon?’”

[48] “A measure followed which, taking place at the time when Thucydides

wrote and Pericles spoke, and while Pericles held the principal influence

in the administration, strongly marks,” says Mr. Mitford, “both the

inherent weakness and the indelible barbarism of democratical government.

A decree of the people directed that a thousand talents should be set

apart in the treasury in the citadel, as a deposit, not to be touched

unless the enemy should attack the city by sea; a circumstance which

implied the prior ruin of the Athenian fleet, and the only one, it was

supposed, which could superinduce the ruin of the commonwealth. But

in a decree so important, sanctioned only by the present will of that

giddy tyrant, the multitude of Athens, against whose caprices, since

the depression of the court of Areopagus, no balancing power remained,

confidence so failed that the denunciation of capital punishment was

added against whosoever should propose, and whosoever should concur in,

any decree for the disposal of that money to any other purpose, or in

any other circumstances. It was at the same time ordered, by the same

authority, that a hundred triremes should be yearly selected, the best of

the fleet, to be employed on the same occasion only.”

[Illustration: GREEK TERRA-COTTA

(In the British Museum)]

[Illustration]