Peace between Lacedæmon and Athens was indispensable towards the quiet
of the rest of the nation, but, in the want of such a union as Pericles
had projected, was unfortunately far from being insured; and, when war
began anywhere, though among the most distant settlements of the Grecian
people, how far it might extend was not to be foreseen. A dispute between
two Asiatic states of the Athenian confederacy led Athens into a war
which greatly endangered the truce made for thirty years, when it had
scarcely lasted six. Miletus and Samos, each claiming the sovereignty of
Priene, originally a free Grecian commonwealth, asserted their respective
pretensions by arms. The Milesians, not till they were suffering under
defeat, applied to Athens for redress, as of a flagrant injury done them.
The usual feuds within every Grecian state furnished assistance to their
clamour; for, the aristocracy prevailing at that time in Samos, the
leaders of the democratical party joined the enemies of their country in
accusing the proceedings of its government before the Athenian people.
THE SAMIAN WAR
[Sidenote: [440-439 B.C.]]
The opposition at Athens maliciously imputed the measures following to
the weak compliance of Pericles with the solicitations of Aspasia in
favour of her native city; but it appears clearly, from Thucydides, that
no such motive was needful: the Athenian government would of course
take cognisance of the cause; and, as might be expected, a requisition
was sent to the Samian administration to answer, by deputies at Athens,
to the charges urged against them. The Samians, unwilling to submit
their claim to the arbitration of those who they knew were always
systematically adverse to the aristocratical interest, refused to send
deputies. A fleet of forty trireme galleys however brought them to
immediate submission; their government was changed to a democracy, in
which those who had headed the opposition of course took the lead; and
to insure permanent acquiescence from the aristocratical party, fifty
men and fifty boys, of the first families of the island, were taken as
hostages, and placed under an Athenian guard in the island of Lemnos.
What Herodotus mentions, as an observation applicable generally, we may
readily believe was on this occasion experienced in Samos, “that the
lower people were most unpleasant associates to the nobles.” A number of
these, unable to support the oppression to which they found themselves
exposed, quitted the island, and applied to Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis.
The project of conquering Greece by arms appears to have been abandoned
by the Persian government; but the urgency for constantly watching its
politics, and interfering, as occasion might offer, with a view to the
safety, if not to the extension, of the western border of the empire,
was obvious; and it appears that the western satraps were instructed
accordingly. The Samian refugees were favourably received by Pissuthnes.
They corresponded with many of their party yet remaining in the island,
and they engaged in their interest the city of Byzantium, itself a
subject ally of Athens. Collecting then about seven hundred auxiliary
soldiers, they crossed by night the narrow channel which separates Samos
from the continent, and, being joined by their friends, they surprised
and overpowered the new administration. Without delay they proceeded to
Lemnos, and so well conducted their enterprise that they carried off
their hostages, together with the Athenian guard set over them. To win
then more effectually the favour of the satrap, the Athenian prisoners
were presented to him. Assured of assistance from Byzantium, being also
not without hopes from Lacedæmon, they prepared to prosecute their
success by immediately undertaking an expedition against Miletus.
Information of these transactions arriving quickly at Athens, Pericles,
with nine others, according to the ancient military constitution, joined
with him in command, hastened to Samos with a fleet of sixty trireme
galleys. Pericles met the Samian fleet and defeated it. He debarked his
infantry on the island of Samos, and laid siege to the city by land and
sea.
In the ninth month from the commencement of the siege, it capitulated:
the ships of war were surrendered, the fortifications were destroyed, the
Samians bound themselves to the payment of a sum of money by instalment
for the expenses of the war, and gave hostages as pledges of their
fidelity to the sovereign commonwealth of Athens. The Byzantines, not
waiting the approach of the coercing fleet, sent their request to be
readmitted to their former terms of subjection, which was granted.
This rebellion, alarming and troublesome at the time to the
administration of Athens, otherwise little disturbed the internal peace
of the commonwealth; and, in the event, contributed rather to strengthen
its command over its dependencies. Pericles took occasion from it to
acquire fresh popularity. On the return of the armament to Athens the
accustomed solemnities, in honour of those who had fallen in the war,
were performed with new splendour; and, in speaking the funeral oration,
he exerted the powers of his eloquence very highly to the gratification
of the people. As he descended from the _bema_, the stand whence orations
were delivered to the people, the women presented him with chaplets; an
idea derived from the ceremonies of the public games, where the crowning
with a chaplet was the distinction of the victors, and, as something
approaching to divine honour, was held among the highest tokens of
admiration, esteem, and respect.
THE WAR WITH CORCYRA
[Sidenote: [439-435 B.C.]]
The threatened renewal of general war in Greece having been obviated by
the determination of the Peloponnesian congress not to interfere between
the Athenians and their Asiatic allies, peace prevailed during the next
three years after the submission of the Samians; or, if hostilities
occurred anywhere, they were of so little importance that no account of
them remains. A fatal spark then, raising fire in a corner of the country
hitherto little within the notice of history, the blaze rapidly spread
over the whole with inextinguishable fury; insomuch that the further
history of Greece, with some splendid episodes, is chiefly a tale of
calamities, which the nation, in ceaseless exertions of misdirected
valour and genius, brought upon itself.
The island of Corcyra had been occupied, in an early age, by a
colony from Corinth. The political connection of colonies with the
mother-country will always depend upon their respective strength; and the
Grecian colonies, all having been the offspring of very small states, in
many instances acquired more than the parent’s force. Corcyra, already
populous, had not yet entirely broken its connection with Corinth, when
the resolution was taken by its government to settle a colony on the
Illyrian coast. An embassy was therefore sent, in due form, to desire
a Corinthian for the leader. Phaleus, of a family boasting its descent
from Hercules, was accordingly appointed to that honour: some Corinthians
and others of Dorian race accompanied him; and Phaleus thus became
the nominal founder of Epidamnus, which was however considered as a
Corcyræan, not a Corinthian colony.
But in process of time Epidamnus, growing populous and wealthy, followed
the example of its mother-country, asserted independency, and maintained
the claim. Like most other Grecian cities, it was then, during many
years, torn by sedition; and a war supervening with the neighbouring
barbarians, it fell much from its former flourishing state. But the
spirit of faction remaining in spite of misfortune untamed, the
commonalty at length expelled all the higher citizens. These, finding
refuge among the Illyrians, engaged with them in a predatory war, which
was unremittingly carried on against the city by land and sea. Unable
thus to rest, and almost to subsist, the Epidamnians in possession
requested assistance from Corcyra. This humble supplication however being
rejected, they hastened a deputation to Corinth.
Fortunately for their object, though peace had not yet been broken, yet
animosity between Corinth and Corcyra had so risen that the Corcyræans,
who had long refused political dependency, now denied to the Corinthians
all those honours and compliments usually paid by Grecian colonies to
their parent states. Under stimulation thus from affront, and with
encouragement from the oracle, the prospect of an acquisition of dominion
was too tempting, and the proposal of the Epidamnians was accepted. But
Corinth had at this time only thirty ships of war, whereas Corcyra was
able to put to sea near four times the number; being, next to Athens, the
most powerful maritime state of Greece. Application for naval assistance
was therefore made to the republics with which Corinth was most bound in
friendship, and thus more than forty vessels were obtained. It had been
the settled policy of the Corcyræans, islanders and strong at sea, to
engage in no alliances. They had avoided both the Peloponnesian and the
Athenian confederacy; and hitherto with this policy they had prospered.
But, alarmed now at the combination formed against them, and fearing it
might still be extended, they sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon and Sicyon;
who prevailed so far that ministers from those two states accompanied
them to Corinth, as mediators in the existing differences. In presence
of these the Corcyræan ambassadors proposed to submit the matters in
dispute to the arbitration of any Peloponnesian states, or to the
Delphian oracle, which the Corinthians had supposed already favourable
to them. The Corinthians however, now prepared for war, and apparently
persuaded that neither Lacedæmon nor Sicyon would take any active part
against them, refused to treat upon any equal terms, and the Corcyræan
ambassadors departed (435 B.C.).
[Sidenote: [435-433 B.C.]]
The Corinthians then hastened to use the force they had collected. The
Corcyræans had manned those of their ships which were already equipped,
and hastily prepared some of those less in readiness, when their herald
returned, bearing no friendly answer. With eighty galleys then they
quitted their port, met the enemy off Actium, and gained a complete
victory, destroying fifteen ships. Returning to Corcyra, they erected
their trophy on the headland of Leucimme, and they immediately put to
death all their prisoners, except the Corinthians, whom, as pledges, they
kept in bonds. Epidamnus surrendered to their forces on the same day.
The opportunities now open, for both revenge and profit, were not
neglected by the Corcyræans. During that year, unopposed on the sea,
there was scarcely an intermission of their smaller enterprises; by
some of which they gained booty, by others only gave alarm, but by all
together greatly distressed the Corinthians and their allies (434 B.C.).
But since their misfortune off Actium the Corinthians had been
unremittingly assiduous in repairing their loss, and in preparing to
revenge it. Triremes were built, all necessaries for a fleet were largely
collected, rowers were engaged throughout Peloponnesus, and where else
in any part of Greece they could be obtained for hire. The Corcyræans,
informed of these measures, notwithstanding their past success were
uneasy with the consideration that their commonwealth stood single,
while their enemies were members of an extensive confederacy; of which,
though a part only had yet been induced to act, more powerful exertions
were nevertheless to be apprehended. In this state of things it appeared
necessary to abandon their ancient policy, and to seek alliances.
Thucydides gives us to understand that they would have preferred the
Peloponnesian to the Athenian confederacy; induced, apparently, both by
their kindred origin, and their kindred form of government. But they were
precluded by the circumstances of the existing war, Corinth being one of
the most considerable members of the Peloponnesian confederacy; and it
was beyond hope that Lacedæmon could be engaged in measures hostile to
so old and useful an ally. It was therefore finally resolved to send an
embassy to Athens. As soon as the purpose of the Corcyræans was known at
Corinth, ambassadors were sent thence to Athens to remonstrate against it.
The Athenian people were assembled to receive the two embassies, each
of which, in presence of the other, made its proposition in a formal
oration. The point to be determined was highly critical for Athens. A
truce existed, but not a peace, with a confederacy inferior in naval
force, but far superior by land; and Attica, a continental territory, was
open to attack by land. But next to Athens Corcyra was the most powerful
maritime republic; and to prevent the accession of its strength, through
alliance, or through conquest, to the Peloponnesian confederacy, was,
for the Athenian people, highly important. In the articles of the truce
moreover it was expressly stipulated, that any Grecian state, not yet a
member of either confederacy, might at pleasure be admitted to either.
But, notwithstanding this, it was little less than certain that, in the
present circumstances, an alliance with Corcyra must lead to a rupture
with the Peloponnesians; and this consideration occasioned much suspense
in the minds of the Athenians. Twice the assembly was held to debate the
question. On the first day, the arguments of the Corinthian ambassadors
had so far effect that nothing was decided: on the second, the spirit of
ambition, ordinary in democracy, prevailed, and the question was carried
for alliance with Corcyra.
[Sidenote: [433 B.C.]]
Meanwhile the earnestness with which the Corinthians persevered in their
purpose of prosecuting war against the Corcyræans, now to be supported
by the power of Athens, appears to mark confidence in support, on their
side, from the Lacedæmonian confederacy; some members of which indeed
were evidently of ready zeal. The Corinthians increased their own trireme
galleys to ninety. The Eleans, resenting the burning of Cyllene, had
exerted themselves in naval preparation, and sent ten triremes completely
manned to join them. Assistance from Megara, Leucas, and Ambracia made
their whole fleet a hundred and fifty: the crews would hardly be less
than forty thousand men. With this large force they sailed to Chimerium,
a port of Thesprotia, over against Corcyra, where, according to the
practice of the Greeks, they formed their naval camp.
The Athenian government meanwhile, desirous to confirm their new
alliance, yet still anxious to avoid a rupture with the Peloponnesian
confederacy, had sent ten triremes to Corcyra, under the command of
Lacedæmonius, son of Cimon; but with orders not to fight, unless a
descent were made on the island, or any of its towns were attacked. The
Corcyræans, on receiving intelligence that the enemy was approaching, put
to sea with a hundred and ten triremes, exclusive of the Athenian, and
formed their naval camp on one of the small islets called Sybota, the
Sow-leas or Sow-pastures, between their own island and the main. Their
land-forces at the same time, with a thousand auxiliaries from Zacynthus,
encamped on the headland of Leucimme in Corcyra, to be prepared
against invasion; while on the opposite coast of the continent the
barbarians, long since friendly to Corinth, assembled in large number.
The Corinthians however, moving in the night, perceived in the dawn the
Corcyræan fleet approaching. Both prepared immediately to engage.
So great a number of ships had never before met in any action between
Greeks and Greeks. The onset was vigorous; and the battle was maintained,
on either side, with much courage but little skill. Both Corcyræan
and Corinthian ships were equipped in the ancient manner, very
inartificially. The decks were crowded with soldiers, some heavy-armed,
some with missile weapons; and the action, in the eye of the Athenians,
trained in the discipline of Themistocles, resembled a battle of
infantry rather than a sea-fight. Once engaged, the number and throng
of the vessels made free motion impossible: nor was there any attempt
at the rapid evolution of the diecplus, as it was called, for piercing
the enemy’s line and dashing away his oars, the great objects of the
improved naval tactics; but the event depended, as of old, chiefly upon
the heavy-armed soldiers who fought on the decks. Tumult and confusion
thus prevailing everywhere, Lacedæmonius, restrained by his orders from
fighting, gave yet some assistance to the Corcyræans, by showing himself
wherever he saw them particularly pressed, and alarming their enemies.
The Corcyræans were, in the left of their line, successful: twenty of
their ships put to flight the Megarians and Ambracians who were opposed
to them, pursued to the shore, and, debarking, plundered and burnt
the naval camp. But the Corinthians, in the other wing, had meanwhile
been gaining an advantage which became decisive through the imprudent
forwardness of the victorious Corcyræans. The Athenians now endeavoured,
by more effectual assistance to their allies, to prevent a total rout;
but disorder was already too prevalent, and advantage of numbers too
great against them. The Corinthians pressed their success; the Corcyræans
fled, the Athenians became mingled among them; and in the confusion
of a running fight acts of hostility passed between the Athenians and
Corinthians. The defeated however soon reached their own shore, whither
the conquerors did not think proper to follow.
In the action several galleys had been sunk; most by the Corinthians,
but some by the victorious part of the Corcyræan fleet. The crews had
recourse, as usual, to their boats; and it was common for the conquerors,
when they could seize any of these, to take them in tow and make the men
prisoners: but the Corinthians, in the first moment of success, gave
no quarter; and, unaware of the disaster of the right of their fleet,
in the hurry and confusion of the occasion, not easily distinguishing
between Greeks and Greeks, inadvertently destroyed many of their
unfortunate friends. When pursuit ceased, and they had collected whatever
could be recovered of the wrecks and the dead, they carried them to a
desert harbour, not distant, on the Thesprotian coast, called, like
the neighbouring islets, Sybota: and depositing them under the care of
their barbarian allies, who were there encamped, they returned, on the
afternoon of the same day, with the purpose of renewing attack upon the
Corcyræan fleet.
The Corcyræans meanwhile had been considering the probable consequences
of leaving the enemy masters of the sea. They dreaded descents upon
their island, and consequent ravage of their lands. The return of their
victorious squadron gave them new spirits: Lacedæmonius encouraged them
with assurance that, since hostilities had already passed, he would no
longer scruple to afford them his utmost support; and they resolved upon
the bold measure of quitting their port and, though evening was already
approaching, again giving the enemy battle. Instantly they proceeded to
put this in execution. The pæan, the song of battle, was already sung,
when the Corinthians began suddenly to retreat. The Corcyræans were at
a loss immediately to account for this; but presently they discovered
a squadron coming round a headland, which had concealed it longer from
them than from the enemy. Still uncertain whether it might be friendly or
hostile, they also retreated into their port; but shortly, to their great
joy, twenty triremes under Glaucon and Andocides, sent from Attica, in
the apprehension that the small force under Lacedæmonius might be unequal
to the occurring exigencies, took their station by them.
Next day the Corcyræans did not hesitate, with the thirty Athenian
ships, for none of those under Lacedæmonius had suffered materially in
the action, to show themselves off the harbour of Sybota, where the
enemy lay, and offer battle. The Corinthians came out of the harbour,
formed for action, and so rested. They were not desirous of risking an
engagement against the increased strength of the enemy, but they could
not remain conveniently in the station they had occupied, a desert shore,
where they could neither refit their injured ships, nor recruit their
stock of provisions; and they were encumbered with more than a thousand
prisoners; a very inconvenient addition to the crowded complements of
their galleys. Their object therefore was to return home: but they were
apprehensive that the Athenians, holding the truce as broken by the
action of the preceding day, would not allow an unmolested passage. It
was therefore determined to try their disposition by sending a small
vessel with a message to the Athenian commanders, without the formality
of a herald. This was a service not without danger. Those Corcyræans,
who were near enough to observe what passed, exclaimed, in the vehemence
of their animosity, “that the bearers should be put to death;” which,
considering them as enemies, would have been within the law of war of
the Greeks. The Athenian commanders however thought proper to hold a
different conduct. To the message delivered, which accused them of
breaking the truce, by obstructing the passage of Corcyra, they replied
that “it was not their purpose to break the truce, but only to protect
their allies. Wherever else the Corinthians chose to go, they might go
without interruption from them; but any attempt against Corcyra, or any
of its possessions, would be resisted by the Athenians to the utmost of
their power.”
Upon receiving this answer, the Corinthians, after erecting a trophy
at Sybota on the continent, proceeded homeward. In their way they took
by stratagem Anactorium, a town at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf,
which had formerly been held in common by their commonwealth and the
Corcyræans; and, leaving a garrison there, proceeded to Corinth. Of their
prisoners they found near eight hundred had been slaves, and these they
sold. The remainder, about two hundred and fifty, were strictly guarded,
but otherwise treated with the utmost kindness. Among them were some of
the first men of Corcyra; and through these the Corinthians hoped, at
some future opportunity, to recover their ancient interest and authority
in the island.
The Corcyræans meanwhile had gratified themselves with the erection of
a trophy on the island Sybota, as a claim of victory, in opposition to
the Corinthian trophy on the continent. The Athenian fleet returned
home; and thus ended, without any treaty, that series of actions which
is distinguished among Greek writers by the name of the Corcyræan, or,
sometimes, the Corinthian war.[b]
THE WAR WITH POTIDÆA AND MACEDONIA
[Sidenote: [433-432 B.C.]]
The Corinthians had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing
allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From
this time forward they considered the Thirty Years’ Truce as broken, and
conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so that
the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in sparing
the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long
wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy, through one
of her widespread dependencies.
On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pallene, which forms
the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater Thracian peninsula
called Chalcidice, between the Thermaic and the Strymonic gulfs, was
situated the Dorian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary allies of
Athens, but originally colonised from Corinth, and still maintaining
a certain metropolitan allegiance towards the latter: insomuch that
every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates under
the title of Epidemiurgi. On various points of the neighbouring coast,
also, there were several small towns belonging to the Chalcidians and
Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list of Athenian tributaries.
The neighbouring inland territory, Mygdonia and Chalcidice, was held by
the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, son of that Alexander who had taken part,
fifty years before, in the expedition of Xerxes. These two princes appear
gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian
power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired
all the territory between the rivers Axius and Strymon. Now Perdiccas had
been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other
Macedonian princes, his brother Philip, and Derdas, holding independent
principalities in the upper country, apparently on the higher course
of the Axius near the Pæonian tribes, with whom he was in a state of
dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens,
Perdiccas from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his
intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their
first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over
the seaports on the mainland than over the islands: for the former were
always more or less dependent on any powerful land-neighbour, sometimes
more dependent on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall
find Athens herself cultivating assiduously the favour of Sitalces and
other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the
seaports. Perdiccas immediately began to incite and aid the Chalcidians
and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens, and the violent enmity against the
latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians by the recent events at
Corcyra, enabled him to extend the same projects to Potidæa. Not only
did he send envoys to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking
the revolt of Potidæa, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian
league to a general declaration of war against Athens. And he further
prevailed on many of the Chalcidian inhabitants to abandon their separate
small town on the seacoast, for the purpose of joint residence at
Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well
as the Chalcidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perdiccas
further assigned some territory near Lake Bolbe to contribute to the
temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.
The Athenians were not ignorant either of his hostile preparations or
of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth after the Corcyræan
sea-fight immediately after which they sent to take precautions against
the revolt of Potidæa; requiring the inhabitants to take down their
wall on the side of Pallene, so as to leave the town open on the side
of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea-side, and fortified
only towards the mainland--requiring them further both to deliver
hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came to them from
Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and one thousand
hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, despatched to act against
Perdiccas in the Thermaic gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce
these requisitions against Potidæa, and to repress any dispositions to
revolt among the neighbouring Chalcidians. Immediately on receiving
the requisitions, the Potidæans sent envoys both to Athens, for the
purpose of evading and gaining time, and to Sparta, in conjunction with
Corinth, in order to determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the
event of Potidæa being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities
they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the Thirty
Years’ Truce still subsisting: at Athens they had no success, and they
accordingly openly revolted (seemingly about midsummer 432 B.C.), at the
same time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalcidians
and Bottiæans revolted also, at the express instigation of Corinth,
accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance. Archestratus with
his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic gulf, found them all in proclaimed
enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perdiccas
in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to admit of a division of his
force. He accordingly laid siege to Therma, in co-operation with the
Macedonian troops from the upper country, under Philip and the brothers
of Derdas; after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna.
But it would probably have been wiser had he turned his whole force
instantly to the blockade of Potidæa; for during the period of more than
six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians
conveyed to Potidæa a reinforcement of sixteen hundred hoplites and four
hundred light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians,
hired for the occasion--under Aristeus, son of Adimantus, a man of such
eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the
soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put in a
state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt reached
Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to attack it.
A second armament, however, was speedily sent forth--forty triremes and
two thousand Athenian hoplites under Callias, son of Calliades, with four
other commanders--who on reaching the Thermaic gulf, joined the former
body at the siege of Pydna. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a
short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation
on the best terms they could with Perdiccas, from the necessity of
commencing immediate operations against Aristeus and Potidæa. They then
quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast
of the Thermaic Gulf--next attacking, though without effect, the town of
Berœa--and then marching by land along the eastern coast of the gulf, in
the direction of Potidæa. On the third day of easy march, they reached
the seaport called Gigonus, near which they encamped.
[Sidenote: [432 B.C.]]
In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdiccas, whose character
for faithlessness we shall have more than one occasion to notice, was
now again on the side of the Chalcidians, and sent two hundred horse to
join them, under the command of Iolaus. Aristeus posted his Corinthians
and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa, providing a market without the
walls, in order that they might not stray in quest of provisions. His
position was on the side towards Olynthus--which was about seven miles
off, but within sight, and in a lofty and conspicuous situation. He here
awaited the approach of the Athenians, calculating that the Chalcidians
from Olynthus would, upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in
the rear when they attacked him. But Callias was strong enough to place
in reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against
Olynthus; while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the
isthmus and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which
ensued, Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about
him were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them,
and pursuing for a considerable distance; but the remaining Potidæans
and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within the
walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious Athenians
between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative either
of cutting his way through them into the latter town, or of making a
retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the least of two
hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the Athenians, wading
into the sea in order to turn the extremity of the Potidæan wall, which
reached entirely across the isthmus with a mole running out at each
end into the water: he effected this daring enterprise and saved his
detachment, though not without considerable difficulty and some loss.
Meanwhile, the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had begun their
march on seeing the concerted signal, had been kept in check by the
Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans had been beaten and the signal
again withdrawn, before they could make any effective diversion: nor did
the cavalry on either side come into action. The defeated Potidæans and
Corinthians, having the town immediately in their rear, lost only three
hundred men, while the Athenians lost one hundred and fifty, together
with the general, Callias.
The victory was, however, quite complete, and the Athenians, after
having erected their trophy and given up the enemy’s dead for burial,
immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus on the side
of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all communication with
Olynthus and the Chalcidians. To make the blockade complete, a second
wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other side towards Pallene:
but they had not force enough to detach a completely separate body for
this purpose, until after some time they were joined by Phormion with
sixteen hundred fresh hoplites from Athens. That general, landing at
Aphytis, in the peninsula of Pallene, marched slowly up to Potidæa,
ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle: but
the challenge not being accepted, he undertook, and finished without
obstruction, the blockading wall on the side of Pallene, so that the
town was now completely enclosed and the harbour watched by the Athenian
fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard
it, leaving Phormion at liberty to undertake aggressive operations
against the Chalcidic and Bottiæan townships. The capture of Potidæa
being now only a question of more or less time, Aristeus, in order that
the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose
a favourable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly from the
harbour, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving
only five hundred defenders behind. Though he offered himself to be among
those left, he could not determine the citizens to so bold an enterprise,
and therefore sallied forth, in the way proposed, with a small
detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without--especially
some aid or diversion from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish
nothing beyond some partial warlike operations among the Chalcidians,
and a successful ambuscade against the citizens of Sermyla, which did
nothing for the relief of the blockaded town: it had, however, been so
well provisioned that it held out for two whole years--a period full of
important events elsewhere.
From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at
Corcyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprang those important
movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted later.[c]
[Illustration: GREEK TERRA-COTTA FIGURE]
[Illustration]