THE PERIL OF APATHY
There is an apathy towards any peril of invasion that is astounding.
Of our military measures, pure and simple, I shall say nothing except
that it is the bounden duty of every Briton to place implicit reliance
upon Lord Kitchener and the military authorities and, if necessary,
to assist them by every means in his power. We can do no good by
criticising measures of the true meaning of which we know nothing.
There are some other points, however, on which silence would
be culpable, and one of these is the amazing lack of any clear
instructions as to the duties of the civil population in the event of a
German attack.
Now it is perfectly obvious that one of the first things necessary in
the face of a German landing would be to get the civilian population
safely beyond the zones threatened by the invaders. It is simply
unthinkable that men, women, and children shall be left to the tender
mercies of the German hordes. Yet, so far as I am able to ascertain, no
steps have yet been taken to warn inhabitants at threatened points what
they shall do. They have been _advised_, it is true, to continue in
their customary avocations and to remain quietly at home. Does any sane
human being, remembering the treatment of Belgian civilians who just
did this, expect that such advice will be followed? We can take it for
granted that it will not, and I contend that in all districts along the
East Coast, where, it is practically certain, any attempt at landing
must be made, the inhabitants should at once be told, in the clearest
and most emphatic manner, just what is required of them, and the best
and quickest way to get out of harm's way, leaving as little behind
them as possible to be of any use to the invaders, and leaving a clear
field of operations for our own troops.
A century ago, when the peril of a French invasion overshadowed the
land, the most careful arrangements were made for removing the people
from the threatened areas, and the destruction of food and fodder. Is
there any reason why such arrangements should not be taken in hand
to-day, and the people made thoroughly familiar with all the conditions
necessary for carrying out a swift and systematic evacuation?
I am aware, of course, that already certain instructions have been
issued to Lord-lieutenants of the various counties in what may be
called the zone of possible invasion. But I contend that the public
at large should be told plainly what is expected of them. It is not
enough to say that when the moment of danger comes they should blindly
obey the local policeman. In the event of a withdrawal from any part
of the coast-line becoming necessary, it ought not to be possible that
the inhabitants should be taken by surprise; their course ought to be
mapped out for them quite clearly, and in advance, so that all will
know just what they have to do to get away with the minimum of delay
and without impeding the movements of our defensive forces. Whatever
we may say or do, the appearance off the British coast of a raiding
German force would be the signal for a rush inland, and there is every
reason to take steps for ensuring that that rush shall be orderly
and controlled, and in no sense a blind and panic flight which would
be alike unnecessary and disastrous. It may well be, and it is to be
hoped, that the danger will never come. That does not absolve us from
the necessity of being ready to meet it. War is an affair of surprises,
and Germany has sprung many surprises upon the world since last August.
The refusal of the War Office authorities to extend any sympathetic
consideration towards the new Civilian Corps, which are striving,
despite official discouragement, to fit themselves for the duty of home
defence in case the necessity should arise, is another instance of
the lack of imagination and insight which has shown itself in so many
ways during our conduct of the campaign. These Corps now number well
over a million men. All that the Army Council has done for them is to
extend to such of them as became affiliated to the Central Volunteer
Training Association the favour of official "recognition" which will
entitle them to rank as combatants in the event of invasion. Even that
recognition is coupled with a condition that has given the gravest
offence and which threatens, indeed, to go far towards paralysing the
movement altogether.
It is in the highest degree important, as will readily be admitted,
that these Corps should not interfere with recruiting for the Regular
Army. That the Volunteers themselves fully recognise. But to secure
this non-interference the Government have made it a condition of
recognition that any man under military age joining a Corps shall sign
a declaration that he will enlist in the Regular Army when called upon
unless he can show some good and sufficient reason why he should not do
so.
Here we have the cause of all the trouble. The Army Council, in spite
of all entreaties, obstinately refuses to state what constitutes a
good and sufficient reason for non-enlistment. One such reason, it is
admitted, is work on Government contracts. But it is impossible for us
to shut our eyes to the fact that there are many thousands of men of
military age and good physique who, however much they may desire to do
their duty, are fully absolved by family or business reasons from the
duty of joining the Regular Army. Many of them have dependents whom
it is simply impossible for them to leave to the blank poverty of the
official separation allowance; many of them are in businesses which
would go to rack and ruin in their absence; many of them are engaged on
work which is quite as important to the country as anything they could
do in the field, even though they may not be in Government employ. To
withdraw every able-bodied man from his employment would simply mean
that industry would be brought to a standstill, and as this country
must, to some extent, act as general provider for the Allies, it is,
plainly, our duty to keep business going as well as to fight.
Rightly or wrongly, this particular provision is looked upon as an
attempt to introduce a veiled form of compulsion. It has been pointed
out that there is no power to compel men to enlist, even if they have
signed such a declaration as is required. But the men, very properly,
say that Britain has gone to war in defence of her plighted word, and
that they are not prepared to give their word and then break it.
What is the result? Many thousands of capable men, fully excused by
their own consciences from the duty of joining the Regular Army, find
that, unless they are prepared to take up a false and wholly untenable
position, they are _not even allowed to train_ for the defence of
their country in such a grave crisis that all other considerations but
the safety of the Empire must go by the board. I am not writing of
the slackers who want to "swank about in uniform" at home when they
ought to be doing their duty in the trenches. I refer to the very
large body of genuinely patriotic men who, honestly and sincerely,
feel that, whatever their personal wishes may be, their duty at the
moment is to "keep things going" at home. For men over military age
the Volunteer Corps offer an opportunity of getting ready to strike a
blow for England's sake should the time ever come when every man who
can shoulder a rifle must take his place in the ranks. And it certainly
argues an amazing want of sympathy and foresight that, for the lack of
a few words of intelligible definition, a splendid body of men should
lose the only chance offered them of getting a measure of military
education which in time to come may be of priceless value.
No one complains that the Army Council does not immediately rush to
arm and equip the Volunteers. Undoubtedly, there is still much to be
done in the way of equipping the regular troops and accumulating the
vast reserves that will be required when the great forward move begins.
Much could be done even now, however, to encourage the Volunteers to
persevere with their training. It should not be beyond the power of the
military authorities, in the very near future, to arm and equip such
of the Corps as have attained a reasonable measure of efficiency in
simple military movements, and in shooting with the miniature rifle. At
the same time some clear definition ought to be forthcoming of what,
in the opinion of the Army Council, constitutes a valid reason, in the
case of a man of military age, for not joining the regular forces. It
is certain that when the time comes for the Allies to take a strong
offensive we shall be sending enormous numbers of trained men out of
the country, and, the wastage of war being what it is, huge drafts
will be constantly required to keep the fighting units up to full
strength. In the meantime large numbers of Territorials in this country
are chained to the irksome--though very necessary--duty of guarding
railways, bridges, and other important points liable to be attacked.
There seems to be no good reason why a great deal, if not the whole,
of this work should not be undertaken by Volunteers. This would free
great numbers of Territorials for more profitable forms of training and
would, undoubtedly, enable us to send far more men out of the country
if the necessity should arise.
If the Volunteers were regarded by those in authority with the proper
sympathy which their patriotism deserves, it would be seen that they
provide, in effect, a class of troops closely corresponding to the
German Landsturm, which is already taking its part in the war. It is
important to remember that, up to the present time, we have enlisted
none but picked men, every one of whom has had to pass a strict
medical and physical examination. We have left untouched, in fact,
our real reserves. Those reserves, apparently scorned by the official
authorities, are capable, if they receive adequate encouragement, of
providing an immense addition to our fighting forces.
No one pretends, of course, that the entire body of Volunteers whom we
see drilling and route-marching day by day are capable of the exertions
involved in a strenuous campaign. But a very large percentage of them
are quite capable of being made fit to serve in a home-defence army,
and it is a feeble and shortsighted policy to give them the official
cold shoulder and nip their enthusiasm in the bud. At the present
moment they cost nothing, and they are doing good and useful work. Is
it expecting too much to suggest that their work should be encouraged
with something a little more stimulating than a scarlet arm-band and a
form of "recognition" which, upon close analysis, will be found to mean
very little indeed?
There has been too strong a tendency in the past to praise, in
immoderate terms, German methods and German efficiency. But,
undoubtedly, there are certain things which we can learn from the
enemy, and one of them is the speed and energy with which the Germans,
at the present moment, are turning to their advantage popular
enthusiasm of exactly the same nature as that which has produced the
Volunteer movement here. It is a popular misconception that in a
conscriptionist country every man, without distinction, is swept into
the ranks for his allotted term. This is by no means the case. There
are many reasons for exemption, and a very large proportion of the
German people, when war broke out, had never done any military duty.
Travellers who have recently returned from Germany report that the
Volunteer movement there has made gigantic strides. Men have come
forward in thousands, and the Government, with German energy and
foresight, has pounced upon this splendid volume of material and is
rapidly licking it into shape. I don't believe, for one moment, the
highly coloured stories which represent Germany as being short of
rifles, ammunition, and other munitions of war: she has, apparently,
more than sufficient to arm her forces in the field and to permit her
_to arm her volunteers as well_.
Whether I am right or wrong, the German Government is taking full
advantage of the patriotic spirit of its subjects, and there does not
appear to be any good reason why our Government should not take a leaf
out of the enemy's book. If they would do so and help the Volunteer
movement by sympathy and encouragement, and the assurance that more
would be done at the earliest possible moment, we should be in a better
condition to meet an invasion than we are to-day, in that we should
have an enormous reserve of strength for use in case of emergency.
No doubt the military authorities, after the most careful study of
the subject, feel convinced that our safety is assured: my point is,
that in a matter of such gravity it is impossible to have too great
a margin of safety. It is no use blinking the fact that, despite the
efforts we have made, and are making, the time may come when the entire
manhood of the United Kingdom must be called upon to take part in a
deadly struggle for national existence. Trust-worthy reports state
that the Germans are actually arming something over four million fresh
troops--some of them have already been in action--and if this estimate
prove well founded, it is quite clear that the crisis of the world-war
is yet to come. I do not think any one will deny that when it does come
we shall need every man we can get.
Closely allied with the subject of invasion are the German methods
of "frightfulness" by means of their submarines and aircraft. Of the
latter, it would seem, we are justified in speaking with absolute
contempt. Three attempts at air raids on our shores have been made, and
though, unhappily, some innocent lives were lost through the enemy's
indiscriminate bomb-dropping, the military effect up to the day I pen
these lines has been absolutely nil, except to assist us in bringing
more recruits to the colours. Several of the vast, unwieldy Zeppelins,
of which the Germans boasted so loudly, have been lost either through
gunfire or in gales, while we have official authority for saying
that our own air-service is so incomparably superior to that of the
enemy that the German aviators, like the baby-killers of Scarborough,
seek safety in retreat directly they are confronted by the British
fliers. No doubt the German air-men have their value as scouts and
observers, but it is abundantly clear that, as a striking unit, they
are hopelessly outclassed. They have done nothing to compare with the
daring raids on Friedrichshafen and Düsseldorf, to say nothing of the
magnificent and devastating attack by the British and French air-men on
Zeebrugge, Ostend, and Antwerp.
The submarine menace stands on another and very different footing,
for the simple reason that luck, pure and simple, enters very largely
into the operations of the underwater craft. It is quite conceivable
that, favoured by fortune and with a conveniently hidden base of
supplies--one of which, a petrol-base, I indicated to the authorities
on March 15th--either afloat or ashore, submarines might do an enormous
amount of damage on our trade routes.
A few dramatic successes may, of course, produce a scare and send
insurance and freight rates soaring. Moreover, the submarine is
exceedingly difficult to attack: it presents a very tiny mark to
gunfire, and when it sights a hostile ship capable of attacking it, it
can always seek safety by submerging. But, when all is said and done,
the number of German submarines, given all the good fortune they could
wish, is quite inadequate seriously to threaten the main body of either
our commerce or our Navy.
We are told, and quite properly, nothing of the methods which the
Admiralty are adopting to deal with German pirates. But it will not
have escaped the public attention that the submarines have scored no
great success against British warships since the _Hawke_ was sunk
in the Channel. I think we may fairly conclude, therefore, that our
Admiralty have succeeded in devising new means of defence against the
new means of attack. We know that at the time of writing two enemy
submarines have been sunk by the Navy, and it seems fairly certain
that another was rammed and destroyed in the Channel by the steamer
_Thordis_. Whatever, therefore, may be our views on the general subject
of the war, it seems clear that we can safely treat the submarine
menace as the product of the super-heated Teutonic imagination.
We know of, and can guard against, the risks we run of any armed attack
from Germany. But there is another peril which will face us when the
war is over--a renewal of the commercial invasion which we have seen in
progress on a gigantic scale for years past.
We know how the British market has, for years, been flooded with
shoddy German imitations of British goods to the grave detriment of
our home trade. We know, too, how the German worker, over here "to
learn the language," has wormed himself into the confidence of the
foolish English employer, and has abused that confidence by keeping
his real principals--those in Germany--fully posted with every scrap
of commercial information which might help them to capture British
trade. We know, though we do not know the full story, that hundreds
of "British" companies have been, in fact, owned, organised, and
controlled solely by Germans. We know that for years German spies and
agents, ostensibly engaged in business here, have plotted our downfall.
Are we going to permit, when the war is over, a repetition of all this?
I confess I look upon this matter with the gravest uneasiness. It is
all very well to say that after the war Germans will be exceedingly
unpopular in every civilised community. That fact is not likely to keep
out the German, who is anything but thin-skinned. And, I regret to say,
there are only too many British employers who are likely to succumb to
the temptation to make use of cheap German labour, regardless of the
fact that they will thus be actively helping their country's enemies.
Germans to-day are carrying on business in this country with a freedom
which would startle the public, if it were known. I will mention
two instances which have come to my knowledge lately. The first is
the case of a company with an English name manufacturing certain
electric fittings. Up to the time the war broke out, every detail
of this company's business was regularly transmitted once a week to
Germany: copies of every invoice, every bill, every letter, were sent
over. Though the concern was registered as an "English" company, the
proprietorship and control were purely and wholly German. That concern
is carrying on business to-day, and in the city of London, protected,
no doubt, by its British registration. And the manager is an Englishman
who, before the war, explained very fully to my informant the entire
system on which the business was conducted.
The second case is similar, with the exception that the manager is a
German, at least in name and origin, who speaks perfect English, and
is still, or was very recently, conducting the business. In this case,
as in the first, every detail of the business was, before war broke
out, regularly reported to the head office of the firm in Germany. I
wonder whether English firms are being permitted to carry on business
in Berlin to-day!
Whether we shall go on after the war in the old haphazard style of
rule-of-thumb rests solely with public opinion. And if public opinion
will tolerate the employment of German waiters in our hotels in time
of war, I see very little likelihood of any effort to stay the German
invasion which will, assuredly, follow the declaration of peace. Then
we shall see again the unscrupulous campaign of commercial and military
espionage which has cost us dear in the past, and may cost us still
more in the future. Our foolish tolerance of the alien peril will be
used to facilitate the war of revenge for which our enemy will at once
begin to prepare.