modern times, took control of the forces of the French
Revolution and directed them toward purposes little dreamed
of by the earlier leaders of the uprising. The excesses of
the Reign of Terror had caused such a reaction that even in
Paris men began to talk of restoring the monarchy, and in
1795 a new tumult began, due in part to the efforts of the
Royalists. Once more a mob marched against the hall of the
National Convention; and the general of the national troops
in the city, uncertain what to do, gladly left affairs in
the hands of a subordinate, one of the few remaining French
officers who had received a regular military training under
the old _regime_. This lesser general, a young man of
twenty-six, was Napoleon Bonaparte, who had already won
repute as a military engineer. Bonaparte met the mob as no
Paris mob had yet been met. He had a row of cannon loaded
with grape-shot, and these were fired to kill. Many of the
rabble fell, the rest fled in dismay. "That whiff of
grape-shot," says Carlyle, "ended the Revolution."
Bonaparte, made much of by the Convention he had defended,
was appointed commander of the army fighting on the Italian
frontier. Ever since Valmy, Revolutionary France had been
compelled to defend herself against civil war within and the
attacks of the foreign monarchs, friends and relatives of
Louis XVI, from without. The tremendous energy of her
aroused people had made her equal to the task. She had
conquered Holland and the German lands west of the Rhine,
she had forced both Prussia and Spain to sue for peace. But
England from her island throne, and Austria, the most
powerful of France's continental foes, the most closely
related to the murdered Queen Marie Antoinette, were still
threatening the French borders. The Austrians held most of
Italy and it was against them that Napoleon was despatched.
He was the first to carry the war away from the French
border line and into the heart of the countries of her foes.
France was starving; and Napoleon from the treasuries of
Italy sent her unlimited supplies; sent her splendid works
of art. No wonder the impoverished people hailed him with
delight as their preserver. No wonder the purer aspirations
after liberty perished in the passion for conquest, spoils,
and that Frenchest of French vanities, "_la gloire_."
Napoleon has himself observed that no country in the world is more
distinctly marked out by its natural boundaries than Italy. The Alps
seem a barrier erected by nature herself, on which she has inscribed in
gigantic characters "Here let ambition be staid." Yet this tremendous
circumvallation of mountains, as it could not prevent the ancient Romans
from breaking out to desolate the world, so it has been in like manner
found, ever since the days of Hannibal, unequal to protect Italy herself
from invasion. The French nation, in the times of which we treat, spoke
indeed of the Alps as a natural boundary, so far as to authorize them to
claim all which lay on the western side of these mountains, as naturally
pertaining to their dominions; but they never deigned to respect them as
such when the question respected their invading, on their own part, the
territories of other states which lay on or beyond the formidable
frontier. They assumed the law of natural limits as an unchallengeable
rule when it made in favor of France, but never allowed it to be quoted
against her interest.
During the Revolutionary War, the general fortune of battle had varied
from time to time in the neighborhood of these mighty boundaries. The
King of Sardinia possessed almost all the fortresses which command the
passes on these mountains, and had therefore been said to wear the keys
of the Alps at his girdle. He had indeed lost his dukedom of Savoy, and
the county of Nice, in the last campaign; but he still maintained in
opposition to the French a very considerable army, and was supported by
his powerful ally the Emperor of Austria, always vigilant regarding that
rich and beautiful portion of his dominions which lies in the North of
Italy. The frontiers of Piedmont were therefore covered by a strong
Austro-Sardinian army, opposed to the French armies to which Napoleon
had been just named commander-in-chief. A strong Neapolitan force was
also to be added, so that in general numbers their opponents were much
superior to the French; but a great part of this force was cooped up in
garrisons which could not be abandoned.
It may be imagined with what delight the General, scarce aged
twenty-six, advanced to an independent field of glory and conquest,
confident in his own powers, and in the perfect knowledge of the country
which he had acquired, when, by his scientific plans of the campaign,
he had enabled General Dumorbion to drive the Austrians back, and obtain
possession of the Col di Tenda, Saorgio, and the gorges of the higher
Alps. Bonaparte's achievements had hitherto been under the auspices of
others. He made the dispositions before Toulon, but it was Dugommier who
had the credit of taking the place. Dumorbion, as we have just said,
obtained the merit of the advantages in Piedmont. Even in the civil
turmoil of 13th Vendemiaire, his actual services had been overshaded by
the official dignity of Barras, as commander-in-chief. But if he reaped
honor in Italy the success would be exclusively his own; and that proud
heart must have throbbed to meet danger upon such terms; that keen
spirit have toiled to discover the means of success.
For victory, he relied chiefly upon a system of tactics hitherto
unpractised in war, or at least upon any considerable or uniform scale.
As war becomes a profession, and a subject of deep study, it is
gradually discovered that the principles of tactics depend upon
mathematical and arithmetical science; and that the commander will be
victorious who can assemble the greatest number of forces upon the same
point at the same moment, notwithstanding an inferiority of numbers to
the enemy when the general force is computed on both sides.
No man ever possessed in a greater degree than Bonaparte the power of
calculation and combination necessary for directing such decisive
manoeuvres. It constituted indeed his secret--as it was for some time
called--and that secret consisted in an imagination fertile in
expedients which would never have occurred to others; clearness and
precision in forming his plans; a mode of directing with certainty the
separate moving columns which were to execute them, by arranging so that
each division should arrive on the destined position at the exact time
when their service was necessary; and above all, in the knowledge which
enabled such a master-spirit to choose the most fitting subordinate
implements, to attach them to his person, and by explaining to them so
much of his plan as it was necessary each should execute, to secure the
exertion of their utmost ability in carrying it into effect.
Thus, not only were his manoeuvres, however daring, executed with a
precision which warlike operations had not attained before his time; but
they were also performed with a celerity which gave them almost the
effect of surprise. Napoleon was like lightning in the eyes of his
enemies; and when repeated experience had taught them to expect this
portentous rapidity of movement, it sometimes induced his opponents to
wait in a dubious and hesitating posture for attacks, which, with less
apprehension of their antagonist, they would have thought it more
prudent to frustrate and to anticipate.
The forces which Bonaparte had under his command were between fifty and
sixty thousand good troops, having, many of them, been brought from the
Spanish campaign in consequence of the peace with that country; but very
indifferently provided with clothing, and suffering from the hardships
they had endured in those mountains, barren and cold regions. The
cavalry, in particular, were in very poor order; but the nature of their
new field of action not admitting of their being much employed, rendered
this of less consequence. The misery of the French army, until these
Alpine campaigns were victoriously closed by the armistice of Cherasco,
could, according to Bonaparte's authority, scarce bear description. The
officers for several years had received no more than eight livres a
month (twenty-pence sterling a week) in name of pay, and staff-officers
had not among them a single horse. Berthier preserved, as a curiosity,
an order dated on the day of the victory of Albenga, which munificently
conferred a gratuity of three louis d'ors upon every general of
division. Among the generals to whom this donation was rendered
acceptable by their wants were, or might have been, many whose names
became afterward the praise and dread of war. Augereau, Massena,
Serrurier, Joubert, Lannes, and Murat, all generals of the first
consideration, served under Bonaparte in the Italian campaign.
The plan of crossing the Alps and marching into Italy suited in every
respect the ambitious and self-confident character of the General to
whom it was now intrusted. It gave him a separate and independent
authority, and the power of acting on his own judgment and
responsibility; for his countryman Salicetti, the deputy who accompanied
him as commissioner of the Government, was not probably much disposed to
intrude his opinions. He had been Bonaparte's patron, and was still his
friend. The young General's mind was made up to the alternative of
conquest or ruin, as may be judged from his words to a friend at taking
leave of him. "In three months," he said, "I will be either at Milan or
at Paris;" intimating at once his desperate resolution to succeed, and
his sense that the disappointment of all his prospects must be the
consequence of a failure.
With the same view of animating his followers to ambitious hopes, he
addressed the Army of Italy to the following purpose: "Soldiers, you are
hungry and naked; the Republic owes you much, but she has not the means
to acquit herself of her debts. The patience with which you support your
hardships among these barren rocks is admirable, but it cannot procure
you glory. I am come to lead you into the most fertile plains that the
sun beholds: rich provinces, opulent towns; all shall be at your
disposal. Soldiers, with such a prospect before you, can you fail in
courage and constancy?" This was showing the deer to the hound when the
leash is about to be slipped.
The Austro-Sardinian army, to which Bonaparte was opposed, was commanded
by Beaulieu, an Austrian general of great experience and some talent,
but no less than seventy-five years old; accustomed all his life to the
ancient rules of tactics, and unlikely to suspect, anticipate, or
frustrate those plans formed by a genius so fertile as that of Napoleon.
Bonaparte's plan for entering Italy differed from that of former
conquerors and invaders, who had approached that fine country by
penetrating or surmounting at some point or other her Alpine barriers.
This inventive warrior resolved to attain the same object by turning
round the southern extremity of the Alpine range, keeping as close as
possible to the shores of the Mediterranean, and passing through the
Genoese territory by the narrow pass called the Boccheta, leading around
the extremity of the mountains, and betwixt these and the sea. Thus he
proposed to penetrate into Italy by the lowest level which the surface
of the country presented, which must be of course where the range of the
Alps unites with that of the Apennines. The point of junction where
these two immense ranges of mountains touch upon each other is at the
heights of Mount St. Jacques, above Genoa, where the Alps, running
northwestward, ascend to Mont Blanc, their highest peak, and the
Appenines, running to the southeast, gradually elevate themselves to
Monte Velino, the tallest mountain of the range.
To attain this object of turning the Alps in the manner proposed, it was
necessary that Bonaparte should totally change the situation of his
army; those occupying a defensive line, running north and south, being
to assume an offensive position, extending east and west. Speaking of an
army as of a battalion, he was to form into column upon the right of the
line which he had hitherto occupied. This was an extremely delicate
operation to be undertaken in presence of an active enemy, his superior
in numbers; nor was he permitted to execute it uninterrupted.
No sooner did Beaulieu learn that the French General was concentrating
his forces, and about to change his position, than he hastened to
preserve Genoa, without possession of which, or at least of the adjacent
territory, Bonaparte's scheme of advance could scarce have been
accomplished. The Austrian divided his army into three bodies. Colli, at
the head of a Sardinian division, he stationed on the extreme right at
Ceva; his centre division, under D'Argenteau, having its head at
Sasiello, had directions to march on a mountain called Monte Notte, with
two villages of the same name, near to which was a strong position at a
place called Montelegino, which the French had occupied in order to
cover their flank during their march toward the east.
At the head of his left wing, Beaulieu himself moved from Novi upon
Voltri, a small town nine miles west of Genoa, for the protection of
that ancient city, whose independence and neutrality were like to be
held in little reverence. Thus it appears, that while the French were
endeavoring to penetrate into Italy by an advance from Sardinia by the
way of Genoa, their line of march was threatened by three armies of
Austro-Sardinians, descending from the skirts of the Alps, and menacing
to attack their flank. But, though a skilful disposition, Beaulieu's
had, from the very mountainous character of the country, the great
disadvantage of wanting connection between the three separate divisions;
neither, if needful, could they be easily united on any point desired,
while the lower line, on which the French moved, permitted constant
communication and cooperation.
On April 10, 1796, D'Argenteau, with the central division of the
Austro-Sardinian army, descended upon Monte Notte, while Beaulieu on
the left attacked the van of the French army, which had come as far as
Voltri. General Cervoni, commanding the French division which sustained
the attack of Beaulieu, was compelled to fall back on the main body of
his countrymen; and had the assault of D'Argenteau been equally
animated, or equally successful, the fame of Bonaparte might have been
stifled in its birth. But Colonel Rampon, a French officer, who
commanded the redoubts near Montelegino, stopped the progress of
D'Argenteau by the most determined resistance. At the head of not more
than fifteen hundred men, whom he inspired with his own courage, and
caused to swear to maintain their post or die there, he continued to
defend the redoubts, during the whole of the 11th, until D'Argenteau,
whose conduct was afterward greatly blamed for not making more
determined efforts to carry them, drew off his forces for the evening,
intending to renew the attack next morning.
But on the morning of the 12th, the Austrian General found himself
surrounded with enemies. Cervoni, who retreated before Beaulieu, had
united himself with La Harpe, and both advancing northward during the
night of the 11th, established themselves in the rear of the redoubts of
Montelegino, which Rampon had so gallantly defended. This was not all.
The divisions of Augereau and Massena had marched, by different routes,
on the flank and on the rear of D'Argenteau's column; so that next
morning, instead of renewing his attack on the redoubts, the Austrian
General was obliged to extricate himself by a disastrous retreat,
leaving behind him colors and cannon, a thousand slain, and two thousand
prisoners.
Such was the Battle of Monte Notte, the first of Bonaparte's victories;
eminently displaying the truth and mathematical certainty of
combination, which enabled him on many more memorable occasions, even
when his forces were inferior in numbers, and apparently disunited in
position, suddenly to concentrate them and defeat his enemy, by
overpowering him on the very point where he thought himself strongest.
He had accumulated a superior force on the Austrian centre, and
destroyed it, while Colli, on the right, and Beaulieu himself, on the
left, each at the head of numerous forces, did not even hear of the
action till it was fought and won. In consequence of the success at
Monte Notte, and the close pursuit of the defeated Austrians, the
French obtained possession of Cairo, which placed them on that side of
the Alps which slopes toward Lombardy, and where the streams from these
mountains run to join the Po.
Beaulieu had advanced to Voltri, while the French withdrew to unite
themselves in the attack upon D'Argenteau. He had now to retreat
northward with all haste to Dego, in the valley of the river Bormida, in
order to resume communication with the right wing of his army,
consisting chiefly of Sardinians, from which he was now nearly separated
by the defeat of the centre. General Colli, by a corresponding movement
on the left, occupied Millesimo, a small town about nine miles from
Dego, with which he resumed and maintained communication by a brigade
stationed on the heights of Biastro. From the strength of this position,
though his forces were scarce sufficiently concentrated, Beaulieu hoped
to maintain his ground till he should receive supplies from Lombardy,
and recover the consequences of the defeat at Monte Notte. But the
antagonist whom he had in front had no purpose of permitting him such
respite.
Determined upon a general attack on all points of the Austrian position,
the French army advanced in three bodies upon a space of four leagues in
extent. Augereau, at the head of the division which had not fought at
Monte Notte, advanced on the left against Millesimo; the centre, under
Massena, directed themselves upon Dego, by the vale of the Bormida; the
right wing, commanded by La Harpe, manoeuvred on the right of all, for
the purpose of turning Beaulieu's left flank. Augereau was the first who
came in contact with the enemy. He attacked General Colli, April 13th.
His troops, emulous of the honor acquired by their companions, behaved
with great bravery, rushed upon the outposts of the Sardinian army at
Millesimo, forced and retained possession of the gorge by which it was
defended, and thus separated from the Sardinian army a body of about two
thousand men, under the Austrian General Provera, who occupied a
detached eminence called Cossaria, which covered the extreme left of
General Colli's position. But the Austrian showed the most obstinate
courage. Although surrounded by the enemy, he threw himself into the
ruinous castle of Cossaria, which crowned the eminence, and showed a
disposition to maintain the place to the last; the rather that, as he
could see from the turrets of his stronghold the Sardinian troops, from
whom he had been separated, preparing to fight on the ensuing day, he
might reasonably hope to be disengaged.
Bonaparte in person came up; and seeing the necessity of dislodging the
enemy from his strong post, ordered three successive attacks to be made
on the castle. Joubert, at the head of one of the attacking columns, had
actually, with six or seven others, made his way into the outworks, when
he was struck down by a wound in the head. General Banal and
Adjutant-General Quenin fell, each at the head of the column which he
commanded; and Bonaparte was compelled to leave the obstinate Provera in
possession of the castle for the night. The morning of the 14th brought
a different scene. Contenting himself with blockading the castle of
Cossaria, Bonaparte now gave battle to General Colli, who made every
effort to relieve it. These attempts were all in vain. He was defeated
and cut off from Beaulieu; he retired as well as he could upon Ceva,
leaving to his fate the brave General Provera, who was compelled to
surrender at discretion.
On the same day, Massena, with the centre, attacked the heights of
Biastro, being the point of communication betwixt Beaulieu and Colli,
while La Harpe, having crossed the Bormida, where the stream came up to
the soldiers' middle, attacked in front and in flank the village of
Dego, where the Austrian Commander-in-Chief was stationed. The first
attack was completely successful--the heights of Biastro were carried,
and the Piedmontese routed. The assault of Dego was not less so,
although after a harder struggle. Beaulieu was compelled to retreat, and
was entirely separated from the Sardinians, who had hitherto acted in
combination with him. The defenders of Italy now retreated in different
directions, Colli moving westward toward Ceva, while Beaulieu, closely
pursued through a difficult country, retired upon D'Aqui.
Even the morning after the victory, it was nearly wrested out of the
hands of the conquerors. A fresh division of Austrians, who had
evacuated Voltri later than the others, and were approaching to form a
junction with their General, found the enemy in possession of Beaulieu's
position. They arrived at Dego like men who had been led astray, and
were no doubt surprised at finding it in the hands of the French. Yet
they did not hesitate to assume the offensive, and by a brisk attack
drove out the enemy, and replaced the Austrian eagles in the village.
Great alarm was occasioned by this sudden apparition; for no one among
the French could conceive the meaning of an alarm beginning on the
opposite quarter to that on which the enemy had retreated, and without
its being announced from the outposts toward D'Aqui.
Bonaparte hastily marched on the village. The Austrians repelled two
attacks; at the third, General Lanusse, afterward killed in Egypt, put
his hat upon the point of his sword, and advancing to the charge
penetrated into the place. Lannes also, afterward Duke of Montebello,
distinguished himself on the same occasion by courage and military
skill, and was recommended by Bonaparte to the Directory for promotion.
In this Battle of Dego, more commonly called of Millesimo, the
Austro-Sardinian army lost five or six thousand men, thirty pieces of
cannon, with a great quantity of baggage. Besides, the Austrians were
divided from the Sardinians; and the two generals began to show not only
that their forces were disunited, but that they themselves were acting
upon separate motives; the Sardinians desiring to protect Turin, whereas
the movements of Beaulieu seemed still directed to prevent the French
from entering the Milanese territory.
Leaving a sufficient force on the Bormida to keep in check Beaulieu,
Bonaparte now turned his strength against Colli, who, overpowered, and
without hopes of succor, abandoned his line of defence near Ceva, and
retreated to the line of the Tanaro.
Napoleon in the mean time fixed his head-quarters at Ceva, and enjoyed
from the heights of Montezemoto the splendid view of the fertile fields
of Piedmont, stretching in boundless perspective beneath his feet,
watered by the Po, the Tanaro, and a thousand other streams which
descended from the Alps. Before the eyes of the delighted army of
victors lay this rich expanse like a promised land; behind them was the
wilderness they had passed--not indeed a desert of barren sand, similar
to that in which the Israelites wandered, but a huge tract of rocks and
inaccessible mountains, crested with ice and snow, seeming by nature
designed as the barrier and rampart of the blessed regions, which
stretched eastward beneath them. We can sympathize with the
self-congratulation of the General who had surmounted such tremendous
obstacles in a way so unusual. He said to the officers around him, as
they gazed upon this magnificent scene, "Hannibal took the Alps by
storm. We have succeeded as well by turning their flank."