From the clause in the Constitution, the Committee pass to a
consideration of the legislation founded upon it. Of course, if the
clause is misunderstood, no legislation can derive any validity from
it. _Nothing can come out of nothing_; and since there is nothing in
the Constitution positively requiring rendition of fugitive slaves by
the National Government, there can be no authority for any legislation
by Congress on the subject. Therefore the argument against the existing
statutes is complete. But, since it is proposed to reverse an early
policy of the Government, the Committee are unwilling to stop here.
These statutes must be considered in their history and character.
As early as 1793, while Congress was sitting in Philadelphia,
provisions for the surrender of fugitive slaves were fastened upon a
bill for the surrender of fugitives from justice, and the whole was
adopted, apparently with little consideration. Thus, accidentally,
Congress assumed the _odious_ power to organize slave-hunting. But the
Act was scarcely passed, before the conscience of people, not only at
the North, but even in Maryland, began to be aroused. Granville Sharp,
who in England so bravely maintained the national cause as well as the
cause of the slave, addressed a letter to the “Maryland Society for
Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and the Relief of Free Negroes and
others unlawfully held in Bondage,” where he set forth elaborately
those binding rules of interpretation, which, according to English
law, require a court to incline always in favor of Liberty. This
letter purports to have been published, as a pamphlet, by order of the
Society, and to have been printed at “Baltimore, in Calvert Street,
near the Court-House, by D. Graham, L. Yundt, and W. Patton,” in 1793.
In a brief preface, the Maryland Society thus reveals the trials
attending the new Fugitive Slave Act:--
“Still Slavery exists, and, _in the case of slaves escaping
from their masters_, the friends of Universal Liberty are
often embarrassed in their conduct by a conflict between their
principles and _the obligations imposed by unwise and perhaps
unconstitutional laws_.”
Such is a contemporary record of sensibilities in a Slave State; and
let it be mentioned to the honor of Maryland. But it is reasonable
to suppose that sensibilities in States further north were touched
still more. Mr. Quincy, whose living memory embraces this early
period, reports, that, when an enforcement of this Act was attempted
in Boston, the crowd thronging the room of the magistrate quietly and
spontaneously opened a lane for the fugitive, who was thus enabled to
save himself from Slavery, and also save the country from the dishonor
of such a sacrifice. Almost at the same time, in patriotic Vermont,
a judge of the Supreme Court of the State, on application for the
surrender of an alleged slave, accompanied by documentary evidence,
refused to comply, _unless the master could show a bill of sale
from the Almighty_. Such was the popular feeling which this earlier
legislation encountered.
There is authentic evidence that this popular feeling was recognized
by President Washington as a proper guide, where he was personally
interested. A slave of Mrs. Washington had escaped to New Hampshire.
The President, in an autograph letter, which has been produced in the
Senate,[346] addressed to Mr. Whipple, the collector at Portsmouth, and
dated at Philadelphia, November 28, 1796, after expressing the desire
of “her mistress” for the return of the slave, lays down the following
rule of conduct:--
“I do not mean, however, by this request, that _such violent
measures_ should be used as _would excite_ a mob or riot,
which might be the case, if she has adherents, _or even uneasy
sensations in the minds of well-disposed citizens_. Rather than
either of these should happen, I would forego her services
altogether,--and the example, also, which is of infinite more
importance.”
The fugitive never was returned, but survived to a good old age, down
to a recent period,--a living witness to that public opinion which made
even the mildest of Fugitive Slave Acts a dead letter.
At last, in 1850, after the subject of Slavery had been agitated in
Congress without interruption for nearly twenty years, a series of
propositions was adopted, and solemnly declared to be _compromises_, by
which all the questions concerning Slavery were permanently settled,
so as never again to vex the country,--as if any question could be
permanently settled except on principles of justice. But the “gruel”
was made, and among its ingredients “for a charm of powerful trouble”
was a new Fugitive Slave Act, first reported from the Committee on the
Judiciary by Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, but afterwards amended by a
substitute from Mr. Mason, of Virginia, so as to become substantially
his measure. It is needless to mention its details. Suffice it to
say, that in these, as in general conception, it was harsh, cruel,
and vindictive. Few statutes in history have been so utterly inhuman,
not excepting even those British statutes for the oppression of the
Irish Catholics, which are pictured by Edmund Burke in words strictly
applicable to the monstrosity of our country:--
“That truly barbarous system, where almost all the parts were
outrages on the rights of humanity and the laws of Nature,”--“a
machine of wise and elaborate contrivance, and as well fitted
for the oppression, impoverishment, and degradation of a
people, and the debasement in them of human nature itself, as
ever proceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man.”[347]
Such, unquestionably, was the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which is
still allowed to remain on the statute-book, a blot upon our country
and age.
Where a measure is so plainly repugnant to reason and authority, and on
its face has so little foundation in the Constitution, any elaborate
argument seems superfluous, especially at this moment, when Slavery
everywhere is yielding to Freedom. The general conscience condemns the
inhuman statute, and this is enough.
But it is important to show how the country has been deceived.
Therefore, briefly, the Committee call attention to the constitutional
objections.