Looking more minutely at the precise words of this clause, we see how
completely it is stamped with equivocation from beginning to end.
_Every descriptive word it contains is double in signification._ The
clause may be seen, first, in what it does not contain; and, secondly,
in what it does contain. It does not contain the word “slave” or
“slavery,” which singly and exclusively denotes the idea of property in
man. Had either of these fatal words been employed, there would have
been no uncertainty or duplicity. But in abandoning these words, all
idea of property in man was abandoned also. Other words were adopted,
simply because they might mean something else, and therefore would not
render the Constitution on its face “odious.” But the unquestionable
fact that these words might mean something else makes it impossible
for them to mean “slave” or “slavery,” unless in this behalf we set
aside the most commanding rules of interpretation. It is clear that
the authors of this clause attempted an impossibility. They wished
to secure Slavery without plainly saying so; but such is Slavery
that it cannot be secured without plainly saying so. Naturally and
inevitably they failed, as if they had attempted to describe _black_ by
words which might mean _white_, or to authorize crime by words which
naturally mean something that is not crime. The thing could not be
done. The attempt to square the circle is not more absurd.
The clause begins with the descriptive words, “No _person_ held to
service or labor in one State under the laws thereof.” Now a slave
is not a “person,” with the rights of persons, but a _chattel_ or
_thing_. Such is the received definition of the Slave States, handed
down from Aristotle. He is not “held to service or labor,” but he is
held as property. The terms employed describe an apprentice, but not
a slave. And he must be held “under the laws” of a State. Here again
is the case of an apprentice, who is clearly held “under the laws”
of a State. But we have the authority of Mr. Mason, recently of the
Senate from Virginia, for saying that no proof can be produced that
Slavery in any State “is established by _existing laws_.”[325] The
person thus described shall not “be _discharged_ from such service or
labor.” Clearly an apprentice is discharged, but a slave is manumitted
or emancipated. This undischarged person “shall be delivered up on
_claim_ of the party to whom such service or labor may be _due_.” But
all these words imply _contract_, or at least _debt_, as in the case of
an apprentice. The slave can _owe_ no “service or labor” to his master.
There is nothing in their relations out of which any such obligation
can spring. The whole condition stands on force and nothing else. It is
robbery tempered by the lash,--not merely robbery of all the fruits of
industry, but robbery of wife and child. To such terrible assumption
the language of _contract_ or _debt_ is totally inapplicable. Nothing
can be “due” from slave to master, unless it be that “resistance to
tyrants” which is “obedience to God.” It is absurd to say that “labor
or service,” in any sense, whether of justice or of law, can be “due”
from the slave. The same power which takes wife and child may exact
this further sacrifice, but not because it is “due.”
Such is the simple truth touching this much debated clause. At the
touchstone of unquestioned rules of interpretation its _odious_
character disappears, and astonishment prevails that the public mind
for so long a period could have been perverted with regard to its true
meaning. Nobody can doubt that this clause _may_ be interpreted in
favor of Freedom, so as to exclude all idea of property in man. But if
it _may_, then such is the voice of Freedom that it _must_.