MR. PRESIDENT,--The question before the Senate is very simple. It is
plain as one of the Ten Commandments. But the Senator from Maryland,
with that nimbleness of speech which belongs to him, while undertaking
to discuss it, has ranged over a very extensive field. He has treated
the Senate to a discourse on almost everything, and something else
also,--the elective franchise, social privileges of the Presidential
mansion, the equality of races, the intermarriage of races, the state
of Slavery in Maryland, also in some other States, and then the state
of Slavery generally. Now, Sir, I shall not follow him on any of those
topics. My desire is to present the precise point in issue. The Senate
will then be prepared to vote.
But the Senator from Maryland will allow me to remind him that he seems
to exhibit a rare inconsistency,--first, in declaring the absolute
right of colored people to a seat in the cars, and then arguing, that,
on every consideration of social life and of principle, they ought
not to be admitted to any such privilege. The two parts do not go
together. If colored people have the legal right to enter these cars,
why does the Senator argue that they ought not to have that right? I
agree with the Senator in the first point. They have the legal right
to enter these cars, and the proprietors are trespassers, when they
exclude them. Here I agreed with the Senator the other day. To my mind
it is clear, because any other conclusion authorizes a corporation to
establish a caste offensive to religion and humanity, injurious to a
whole race now dwelling among us, and bringing shame upon our country.
The Senator asks, why, as I accept this conclusion, do I bring forward
the present proposition? To this there are two answers, either of which
is sufficient. The first is, that in the last railroad statute passed
by Congress this provision was introduced, and I have heard of no
complaint or trouble from it. In that now before us let us introduce
the same provision, and make the two uniform. That is one reason. But
the better reason is, that, while, beyond all question, colored persons
have the legal right, even without this amendment, yet that legal right
has been drawn in question. In point of fact, they are excluded from
the cars. The Senator from Maryland refers to one case, because it
has become well known. I am familiar with many other cases. They are
brought to my attention almost daily. There is, then, at this moment,
an existing abuse. Colored persons are kept out of their rights. But we
cannot afford, at this crisis of our history, to sanction injustice.
Every such act rises in judgment against us, and hangs on the movements
of our armies, checking even the currents of victory.
The Senator admits their rights, but he says, Let them go to the
courts. Sir, what is that for a poor, humble person, without means and
without consideration? The Senator knows something of the law’s delay
and the law’s expense; and I ask him whether it is just to subject an
oppressed people to this additional oppression, when, by a few words,
Congress, now in session, can overturn the wrong.
MR. JOHNSON. Will the Senator permit me to ask him a question
by way of reply? Suppose the amendment is adopted; if it will
not give them a greater right than they have now, and the
Company refuse to let them enjoy the right, what is their
remedy? They must go to the courts. I suppose there is no other
remedy. You do not provide that the charter shall be forfeited
at once.
MR. SUMNER. I know very well that they may, in the last resort, be
obliged to go to the courts; but I know that it will be more difficult
for the Company to exclude them in the face of a positive statute than
when their rights are simply founded on _inference_. The positive words
which I propose leave no loophole for doubt. They must be obeyed.
There is nothing more common in legislation than, in case of doubt as
to the meaning of a statute, or of the Common Law, to remove it by what
is well known as a “declaratory” statute. I have in my hands a work
of authority, which the Senator knows well, Dwarris on Statutes, from
which I read:--
“And first of declaratory acts. These are made where the old
custom of the kingdom is almost fallen into disuse or become
disputable, in which case the Parliament has thought proper,
_in perpetuum rei testimonium_, and for avoiding all doubts and
difficulties, to declare what the Common Law is and ever hath
been.”[310]
Are not these words completely applicable to the case before us? What
should be the custom is, according to these words, “almost fallen into
disuse, or become disputable.” I say, therefore, again, following these
words, “for avoiding all doubts and difficulties,” it is the duty of
Congress “to declare” what the law of the land is.
Again, in another place, this same authority, speaking still further of
declaratory statutes, says:--
“Acts to explain laws are properly acts of interpretation
by legislative authority,--or, to borrow an expression from
the writers on the Roman Law, they are acts of _authentic
interpretation_.”[311]
I ask the attention of the Senator to the expression, “they are acts
of _authentic interpretation_.” Now, Sir, what I desire is, that the
Senate shall give an authentic interpretation to the law. To do this it
is not needful to range over the whole field of history, of morals, or
of politics, in imitation of the Senator, or to discuss the equality
of races, or their fortunes in the future; but it is enough for us to
become acquainted with the existing abuse, every day under our own
eyes, in the streets of this capital, and then to apply the remedy.
Beyond all question, there is an abuse. The remedy is simple, and I
cannot doubt that it will be effective.
Listening to the objections which this measure has encountered, I
am reminded of those so often brought against the Wilmot Proviso.
Sometimes it was said that Slavery could not go into the Territories
without positive statute, and that therefore the prohibition was
unnecessary. But it generally happened that those who opposed the
positive prohibition were indifferent to the great question. No, Sir;
there can be but one true rule. It is this: the rights of colored
persons must be placed under the protection of positive statute,
warning their oppressors against continued outrage.
The question being taken on Mr. Sumner’s amendment, it was
adopted,--Yeas 19, Nays 17. The House concurred, and the
President approved the bill.
Thus was another road brought within the sphere of this
prohibition. But the exclusion was continued on the main road
in Pennsylvania Avenue.
* * * * *
June 21st, the Senate having under consideration a bill to
amend the charter of the Washington and Georgetown Railroad
Company, Mr. Sumner moved the following amendment:--
“_And provided, further_, That there shall be no exclusion
of any person from any car on account of color.”
Debate ensued. Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, thought “the amendment
ought not to be adopted.” Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, thought it
tended to depreciate the value of investments made on the faith
of former legislation. Mr. Willey, of West Virginia, declared
his opposition, saying, “It is a matter to be regulated by the
interests of the Company, the convenience of the people, and
especially the tastes of the people.” Mr. Powell, of Kentucky,
said: “If the Senator from Massachusetts is such a vehement
friend of this down-trodden race, as he is a lawyer, why did
he not undertake their case, and propose to argue it for them
before the courts? That would have indicated that he really
felt for the negro.… The Senator shows his devotion to this
down-trodden race here, and only in words.… The Senator’s
staple is this fanatical idea. He wants this little hobby to
ride through Massachusetts on, and to feed a fanatical flame
there. He can fool nobody here with this kind of thing. Take
the negro out of the Senator’s vocabulary, and, rich as it is,
it would be exceedingly barren.” Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois,
also opposed the amendment. In the course of the debate, Mr.
Sumner spoke as follows, especially in reply to Mr. Trumbull.
MR. PRESIDENT,--The Senator from Illinois [Mr. TRUMBULL], in former
days, was a sincere, intelligent, devoted supporter of the Wilmot
Proviso. As I understand that Proviso, it was simply a prohibition
of Slavery in the Territories. Now I know not whether the Senator
held, as I did, that, even without that prohibition, yet, by a strict
interpretation of the Constitution, Slavery could not go into the
Territories. I presume he did; most of us did. For myself, I held
it resolutely and sincerely. I always regarded the Wilmot Proviso,
if the Constitution were properly interpreted, as mere surplusage,
sheer supererogation; and yet I never hesitated, in season or out of
season, to vindicate it; and I believe the Senator never hesitated, in
season or out of season, to do the same. I remember that my earliest
admiration of that Senator was founded on his brave and able support
of that very prohibition. Not then was he deterred from a humane
provision because without it, according to his interpretation of the
Constitution, Slavery could not enter the Territories. Nor was he
deterred because the provision might be offensive to persons of weak
nerves. No, Sir; openly and courageously he maintained the principle
that Slavery must be prohibited. And on the same principle--if I may
pass from great things to smaller, I admit, but not small--I insist
that this proviso should also be adopted.
Our experience shows that the law as the Senator expounds it is not
so accepted by this railroad corporation. He knows as well as I that
colored persons are daily insulted. Some of these victims will compare
in respectability of conduct with any whom I now have the honor to
address. My colleague alluded to a colored clergyman whom he saw thrust
out only the other day. We know of an officer of the United States,
wearing the national uniform, thrust out; and the Senator from Illinois
will allow all these things to be done, and not interfere. He tells
us that it is contrary to law, and yet he allows it to proceed under
the very eyes of the Senate. Sir, I insist that the Senate, when
such outrage occurs, shall show that it has power, and is willing to
exercise it on the side of justice.
But the Senator reminds us that in other days the Fugitive Act was
passed here, and made especially offensive; and he pleads with us
not to imitate that bad example, by introducing anything that may be
offensive. I do not like the comparison of the Senator. Does he not
know well that everything introduced into the Fugitive Slave Bill
was in the interest of Slavery, and contrary to every sentiment of
humanity, and that it was intended to give offence? The proposition
now moved is opposite in character. It is to sustain the principles of
humanity, to uphold human rights, to vindicate human equality, and with
no purpose of offence,--none, not the least. The illustration of the
Senator is entirely out of place. True it is that in those other days
we were offended, and it was part of the hardships to which we were
exposed. As, in the days which preceded our Revolution, the British
officers said they would cram the stamps down the throats of the
American people, so, in the same malignant spirit, the Slave-Masters
insisted upon cramming Slavery down the throats of the Senate and the
country. There was nothing but brutality then. Slavery in all its
features is bad, but one of its most odious manifestations was the
revolting insensibility to every sentiment of delicacy and humanity
which it created in its supporters.
Sir, the Senator from Illinois knows well that it is in a very
different spirit that propositions like the present are brought
forward. It is always in the interest of human rights, and I need
not say to that Senator, so far as I am concerned, with no other
purpose than that patent in the proposition itself, and with no idea
of offending any human being,--on the contrary, with a desire to avoid
offence, if I possibly can. In that spirit I wish to do my duty on this
floor. I would never give offence to any one, here or elsewhere, if I
knew how to avoid it, while in all things I faithfully discharge my
public duty.
The debate continued, when Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, said he should
like to have Mr. Sumner answer one question. “Suppose we pass
this amendment and put it into the law, and the Company goes
on and does exactly as it has been doing, excluding these men,
what are these colored men going to do? Have they not got to
go to law then? Will they not be compelled to enforce their
rights in court? Will they not be compelled to employ lawyers?
If that be so, what advantage will it be to them to adopt this
amendment under the present condition of things?”
MR. SUMNER. I will answer. Because the Company will not dare
to continue this outrage in the face and eyes of a positive
provision of statute. That is the answer.
On the Yeas and Nays, the amendment was lost,--Yeas 14, Nays
16,--several Republicans uniting with the Democrats against it.
At the next stage of the bill, Mr. Sumner renewed his
amendment, when it was adopted,--Yeas 17, Nays 16. The bill
passed the Senate, and was the subject of conference between
the two Houses, but it never became a law.
* * * * *
January 17, 1865, the Senate having under consideration the
bill to incorporate the Baltimore and Washington Depot and
Potomac Ferry Railway Company, Mr. Sumner moved the same
amendment, which was adopted,--Yeas 24, Nays 6. This bill was
passed by the Senate, but it never became a law.
February 4, 1865, the Senate having under consideration a bill
to amend the charter of the Metropolitan Railroad Company, Mr.
Sumner moved the following amendment:--
“That the provision prohibiting any exclusion from any car
on account of color, already applicable to the Metropolitan
Railroad, is hereby extended to every other railroad in the
District of Columbia.”
This amendment became necessary in order to reach the
Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company. It was opposed by
Mr. Dixon, of Connecticut, Mr. Conness, of California, and Mr.
Hale, of New Hampshire, the last regarding it in the nature
of general legislation on a private act. Mr. Sumner replied,
that it was needed, in order to bring the Metropolitan Railroad
on an equality with the other roads, inasmuch as Congress had
already imposed the prohibition upon that road; and, secondly,
that it was germane, inasmuch as the Senate might engraft upon
any railroad charter any proposition, special or general,
concerning the subject-matter.
The amendment was lost,--Yeas 19, Nays 20.
At the next stage of the bill, Mr. Sumner renewed his
amendment. February 6th, Mr. Dixon, Chairman of the Committee
on the District of Columbia, withdrew his opposition, saying:
“I opposed it on the ground that it seemed to conflict with
the rights of another Company, not now before the Senate
[the Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company]; but since
that time I have seen the managers and controllers of that
Company, and find that they are unwilling to contend on this
subject with what they consider to be the public opinion. They
therefore make no objection to it, and I shall make none.”
The amendment was adopted,--Yeas 26, Nays 10. The bill as
amended passed the House and was approved by the President,
so that it became illegal for any railroad in the District of
Columbia to exclude any person from any car on account of color.
The Washington and Georgetown Railroad did not promptly
recognize the law. Colored persons were excluded from their
cars, when Mr. Sumner addressed a letter to the President of
the road, calling attention to the contumacy of the Company,
and announcing his purpose, if it continued, to move, at the
next session of Congress, the forfeiture of the charter. At
the same time he addressed a communication to the District
Attorney, asking him to proceed against the Company. At last
the law was recognized, and from that date all the street-cars
of Washington have been open to colored persons.