This argument was prepared as a speech on the resolutions of
February 11, 1862, entitled “State Rebellion State Suicide,
Emancipation and Reconstruction”; but the tardy success of
our arms and the press of business caused its postponement,
until, during the recess of Congress, it was thought best to
print it as an article in the _Atlantic Monthly_. It was much
discussed. Hon. Montgomery Blair, at the time a member of
the Cabinet, in a speech at Rockville, Maryland, October 3d,
replied to it at length, insisting that it was “the keynote of
the revolution,”--“the programme of the movement,”--presenting
“the issue on which the Abolition party has resolved to rest
its hopes of setting up its domination in this country”; and
in opposition to this “programme” he placed “that which is
presented by President Lincoln,” alleging that Mr. Sumner had
directly arrayed himself against the President on a question
of fundamental policy in the conduct of the war. The _National
Intelligencer_, at Washington, in an elaborate leader,
sustained the position of Mr. Blair.
From this time forward, the discussion proceeded in the press,
in public meetings, and in Congress, followed by the measures
of Reconstruction, including especially the requirement by
Congress of the colored suffrage in the reorganization of
the Rebels and in their new Constitutions,[175] all of which
assumed the power of Congress.
At this moment our domestic relations all hinge upon one question,--How
to treat the Rebel States. No patriot citizen doubts the triumph of
our arms in the suppression of the Rebellion. Early or late triumph
is inevitable,--perhaps by sudden collapse of the bloody imposture, or
perhaps by slower and more gradual surrender. For ourselves, we are
prepared for either alternative, and shall not be disappointed, if
constrained to wait yet a little longer; but when the day of triumph
comes, political duties will take the place of military. The victory
won by our soldiers must be assured by wise counsels, so that its
hard-earned fruits shall not be lost.
The relations of the States to the National Government must be
carefully considered,--not too boldly, not too timidly,--that we may
understand in what way or by what process _the transition from Rebel
forms may be most surely accomplished_. If I do not greatly err, it
will be found that the powers of Congress, thus far so effective
in raising armies and supplying moneys, will be important, if not
essential, in fixing the conditions of perpetual peace. But there is
one point on which there can be no question. The dogma and delusion of
State Rights, as mischievously interpreted, which did so much for the
Rebellion, must not be allowed to neutralize all that our arms have
gained.
Already, in a remarkable instance, the President has treated the
pretension of State Rights with proper indifference. Quietly and
without much discussion, he has constituted military governments in
the Rebel States, with governors nominated by himself: all of which
testifies against the old delusion. Strange will it be, if this
extraordinary power, amply conceded to the President, is denied to
Congress. Practically, the whole question is opened here. Therefore to
this aspect of it I ask your first attention.
Already four military governors have been appointed: one for Tennessee,
one for South Carolina, one for North Carolina, and the other for
Louisiana. So far as known, the appointment of each was by simple
letter from the Secretary of War. But if this can be done in four
States, where is the limit? It may be done in every Rebel State; and
if not in every other State of the Union, it will be simply because
the existence of a valid State government excludes the exercise of
this extraordinary power. Assuming, that, as our arms prevail, it will
be done in every Rebel State, we shall then have _eleven_ military
governors, all deriving authority from one source, ruling a population
amounting to upwards of nine millions. And this imperatorial dominion,
indefinite in extent, will also be indefinite in duration; for, if,
under the Constitution and laws, it be proper to constitute such
governors, it is clear that they may be continued without regard to
time,--for years, if you please, as well as for weeks; and the whole
region they are called to sway will be a military empire, with all
powers, executive, legislative, and even judicial, derived from one
man in Washington. Talk of “the one-man power!” Here it is with a
vengeance. Talk of military rule! Here it is, in the name of a republic.
The bare statement of this case may put us on our guard. We may well
hesitate to organize a single State under military government, when we
see where such step leads. If you approve one, you must approve eleven,
and the National Government may crystallize into military despotism.
In appointing military governors of States, we follow an approved
example in certain cases beyond the jurisdiction of the National
Constitution,--as in California and Mexico, after their conquest, and
before peace. It is evident that in these cases there was no constraint
from the Constitution, and we were perfectly free to act according to
the assumed exigency. It may be proper to set up military governors for
a conquered country beyond our civil jurisdiction, and yet it may be
questionable if we should undertake to set up such governors in States
that we all claim to be within our civil jurisdiction. At all events,
the two cases are different, so that it is not easy to argue from one
to the other.
In Jefferson’s Inaugural Address, where he develops what he calls “the
essential principles of our Government, and consequently those which
ought to shape its administration,” he mentions “_the supremacy of
the civil over the military authority_” as one of these “essential
principles,” and then says:--
“These should be the creed of our political faith, the text of
civil instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services
of those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments
of error or alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps, and
to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and
safety.”[176]
Undertaking to create military governors of States, we reverse the
policy of the Republic, as solemnly declared by Jefferson, and subject
the civil to the military authority. If this has been done in patriotic
ardor, without due consideration, in a moment of error or alarm, it
only remains, that, according to Jefferson, we should “hasten to
retrace our steps, and to regain the road which alone leads to peace,
liberty, and safety.”
There is nothing new under the sun, and the military governors we are
beginning to appoint find a prototype in the Protectorate of Oliver
Cromwell. After the execution of the King and the establishment of
the Commonwealth, the Protector conceived the idea of parcelling the
kingdom into military districts, of which there were _eleven_, being
precisely the number now proposed, under favor of success, among us. Of
this system a great authority, Mr. Hallam, speaks thus:--
“To govern according to law may sometimes be an usurper’s wish,
but can seldom be in his power. The Protector abandoned all
thought of it. Dividing the kingdom into districts, he placed
at the head of each a major-general, as _a sort of military
magistrate_, responsible for the subjection of his prefecture.
These were _eleven in number_, men bitterly hostile to the
royalist party, and insolent towards all civil authority.”[177]
Carlyle, in his Life of Cromwell, gives a glimpse of this military
government.
“The beginning of a universal scheme of Major-Generals, the
Lord Protector and his Council of State having well considered
and found it the feasiblest,--‘if not _good_, yet best.’ …
‘It is an arbitrary government,’ murmur many. Yes, arbitrary,
but beneficial. _These are powers unknown to the English
Constitution, I believe; but they are very necessary for the
Puritan English nation at this time._”[178]
Perhaps no better words could be found in explanation of the
Cromwellian policy adopted by our President.
A contemporary republican, Lieutenant-General Ludlow, whose “Memoirs”
add to the authentic history of those interesting times, characterizes
these military magistrates as so many “bashaws.” Here are some of his
words:--
“The major-generals carried things with unheard-of insolence
in their several precincts, decimating to extremity whom they
pleased, and interrupting the proceedings at law upon petitions
of those who pretended themselves aggrieved; _threatening such
as would not yield a ready submission to their orders with
transportation to Jamaica, or some other plantations in the
West Indies_.”[179]