III.

There is a species of foreign intervention which stands by itself and

has its own illustrations. Therefore I speak of it by itself. It is

where a foreign power undertakes to acknowledge the independence of

a colony or province renouncing its original allegiance, and it may

be compendiously called _Intervention by Recognition_. Recognition

is strictly applicable only to the act of the original government,

renouncing all claim of allegiance, and at last acknowledging the

independence in dispute. It becomes an act of intervention, where

a foreign government steps between the two parties. The original

government is so far master of its position, that it may select its

own time in making this recognition. But the question arises, At what

time and under what circumstances can this recognition be made by a

foreign power? It is obvious that a recognition proper at one time

and under special circumstances would not be proper at another time

and under different circumstances. Mr. Canning said, with reference

to Spanish America, that, “if he piqued himself upon anything, it was

upon the subject of _time_”; and he added, that there were two ways of

proceeding,--“recklessly and with a hurried course to the object, which

might be soon reached and almost as soon lost, or by another course so

strictly guarded that no principle was violated and no strict offence

given to other powers.”[101] These are words of wise statesmanship,

and they present the practical question occurring in every case of

recognition: What condition of the controversy will justify such

intervention?

Here again the whole matter is best explained by historic instances.

The earliest is that of Switzerland, as long ago as 1307, breaking

off from the House of Hapsburg, whose original cradle was a Swiss

canton. But Austria did not acknowledge the independence of the

Republic until the Peace of Westphalia, nearly three centuries and

a half after the struggle began under William Tell. Meanwhile the

cantons lived through the vicissitudes of war, foreign and domestic,

and formed treaties with other powers, including the Pope. Before Swiss

independence was acknowledged, the Dutch conflict began under William

of Orange. Smarting from intolerable grievances, and with a price set

upon the head of their illustrious Stadtholder, the United Provinces

of the Netherlands, in 1581, renounced the tyrannical sovereignty

of Philip the Second, and declared themselves independent. In the

history of Freedom this is an important epoch. They were Protestants,

battling for rights denied, and Queen Elizabeth of England, the

head of Protestantism, acknowledged their independence, and shortly

afterwards extended military aid. Nor did other powers stand aloof.

In 1594, Scotland, Protestant also, under James the Sixth, afterwards

the first James of England, treated with the insurgent Provinces as

successors of the Houses of Burgundy and Austria, and in 1596 France

entered into alliance with them. The contest continued, sustained on

the side of Spain by the genius of Parma and Spinola, and on the side

of the infant Republic by the youthful talent of Maurice, son of the

great Stadtholder. But the claims of Spain were enduring; for it was

not until the Peace of Westphalia, eighty years after the revolt, and

nearly seventy years after their Declaration of Independence, that this

power consented to Dutch independence. Nor do these examples stand

alone, even at that early day. Portugal, unjustly subjugated by Spain

in 1580, broke away in 1640 and declared herself independent, under

the Duke of Braganza as King. A year scarcely passed before Charles

the First of England negotiated a treaty with the new sovereign.

The contest had ceased, but not the claim; for it was only after

twenty-eight years that Spain made this other recognition.

Traversing the Atlantic Ocean in space and more than a century in

time, I come to the next historic instance, so interesting to us all,

while as a precedent it dominates the whole question. The long discord

between the Colonies and the mother country broke forth in blood on

the 19th of April, 1775. Independence was declared on the 4th of July,

1776. Battles ensued,--Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine, Germantown,

Saratoga, followed by the winter of Valley Forge. The contest was yet

undecided, when, on the 6th of February, 1778, France entered into

a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, containing,

among other things, a recognition of their independence, with mutual

stipulations between the two parties to protect the commerce of the

other, by convoy on the ocean, “against all attacks, force, and

violence”;[102] and on the 13th of March this treaty was communicated

to the British Government by the French ambassador at London, with a

diplomatic note, in which the United States are described as “in full

possession of the independence pronounced by their Act of 4th July,

1776,” and the British Government is warned that the King of France,

“being determined effectually to protect the legitimate freedom of the

commerce of his subjects and to maintain the honor of his flag, has

taken in consequence some eventual measures with the United States

of North America.”[103] A further treaty of alliance, whose declared

object was the maintenance of the independence of the United States,

had been signed on the same day, but this was not communicated; nor is

there evidence that it was known to the British Government at the time.

The communication of the other sufficed, for it was an open recognition

of the new power, with promise of protection on the ocean, _while the

war was yet flagrant between the two parties_. As such it must be

regarded as an armed recognition, constituting in itself a belligerent

act, aggravated and explained by the circumstances under which it

was made, the warning, in the nature of menace, by which it was

accompanied, the clandestine preparations by which it was preceded, and

the corsairs to cruise against British commerce, which for some time

had been allowed to swarm under the American flag from French ports.

It was so accepted by the British Government. The British minister

was summarily withdrawn from Paris, all French vessels in British

harbors were seized, and on the 17th March a message from the King

was brought down to Parliament in the nature of a declaration of war

against France. In this declaration there was no allusion to anything

but the treaty of amity and commerce officially communicated by the

French ambassador, which was denounced by his Majesty as an “unprovoked

and unjust aggression on the honor of his crown and the essential

interests of his kingdoms, _contrary to the most solemn assurances,

subversive of the Law of Nations, and injurious to the rights of every

sovereign power in Europe_.” Only three days later, on the 20th March,

the Commissioners of the United States were received by the King of

France in solemn audience, with all the pomp and ceremony accorded by

the Court of Versailles to the representatives of sovereign powers.

War ensued between France and Great Britain on land and sea, in which

Holland and Spain afterwards took part against Great Britain. With such

allies, a just cause prevailed. Great Britain, by provisional articles,

signed at Paris 30th November, 1782, acknowledged the United States

“to be free, sovereign, and independent,” and declared the boundaries

thereof.

Colonial independence was contagious, and the contest for it presented

another illustration, more discussed, and constituting a precedent, if

possible, more interesting still. This was when the Spanish colonies

in America, following the Northern example, broke away from the mother

country and declared themselves independent. The contest began as

early as 1810, but it was long continued, and extended over an immense

region,--from New Mexico and California in the North to Cape Horn in

the South,--washed by two vast oceans, traversed by mighty rivers,

and buttressed by lofty mountains fruitful in silver, capped with

snow, and shooting volcanic fire. At last the United States, satisfied

that the ancient power of Spain had ceased to exist beyond reasonable

chance of restoration, and that the contest was practically ended,

acknowledged the independence of Mexico and five other provinces. This

act was approached only after frequent debate in Congress, where Henry

Clay took an eminent part, and after most careful consideration in the

Cabinet, where John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State, shed upon the

question all the light of his unsurpassed knowledge, derived from

long practice as well as from laborious study of International Law.

This judgment must be regarded as a sufficient authority. President

Monroe, in a special message, on the 8th of March, 1822, twelve years

after the war began, called the attention of Congress to the state of

the contest, which he said had “now reached such a stage, and been

attended with such decisive success on the part of the provinces,

that it merits the most profound consideration whether their right

to the rank of independent nations, with all the advantages incident

to it in their intercourse with the United States, is not complete.”

After setting forth the _de facto_ condition of things, he proceeded:

“Thus it is manifest that all those provinces are not only in the full

enjoyment of their independence, but, _considering the state of the war

and other circumstances, that there is not the most remote prospect

of their being deprived of it_.” In proposing their recognition, the

President declared that it was done “under a thorough conviction that

it is in strict accord with the Law of Nations”; and further, that “it

is not contemplated to change thereby, in the slightest manner, our

friendly relations with either of the parties.” In accordance with this

recommendation, Congress authorized the recognition. Three years later

the same thing was done by Great Britain, after much debate, diplomatic

and Parliamentary. No case of international duty has been illustrated

by a clearer eloquence, an ampler knowledge, or a purer wisdom.

The despatches were written by Mr. Canning, and upheld by him in

Parliament; but Lord Liverpool took part in the discussion, succinctly

declaring “that there could be no right to recognition while the

contest was actually going on,”[104]--a conclusion cautiously, but

strongly, enforced by Lord Lansdowne, and nobly vindicated, in an

oration reviewing the whole subject, by that great publicist, Sir James

Mackintosh. All inclined to recognition, but admitted that it could not

take place _so long as the contest continued_,--and that there must

be “such a contest as exhibits some equality of force, and of which,

if the combatants were left to themselves, the issue would be in some

degree doubtful.” The Spanish strength throughout the whole continent

was reduced to a single castle in Mexico, an island on the coast of

Chile, and a small army in Upper Peru, while in Buenos Ayres no Spanish

soldier had set foot for fourteen years. “Is this a contest,” said

Mackintosh, “approaching to equality? Is it sufficient to render the

independence of such a country doubtful? Does it deserve the name of

a contest?”[105] It was not until 1825 that Great Britain was so far

satisfied as to acknowledge this independence. France followed in 1830,

and Castilian pride relaxed in 1836, twenty-six years from the first

date of the contest.

The next instance is Greece, which declared independence January 27,

1822. After a cruel contest of more than five years, with alternate

success and disaster, the great powers intervened forcibly in 1827;

but the final recognition was postponed till May, 1832. Then came the

instance of Belgium, which declared independence in November, 1830,

and was promptly recognized by the great powers intervening for this

purpose. The last instance is Texas, which declared independence in

December, 1835, and defeated the Mexican army under Santa Aña, making

him prisoner, in 1836. The power of Mexico seemed to be overthrown; but

Andrew Jackson, then President of the United States, in his Message

of December 21, 1836, laid down the rule of caution and justice,

as follows: “The acknowledgment of a new state as independent and

entitled to a place in the Family of Nations is at all times an act

of great delicacy and responsibility, but more especially so when

such state has forcibly separated itself from another, of which it

had formed an integral part, and which still claims dominion over it.

_A premature recognition_ under these circumstances, _if not looked

upon as justifiable cause of war_, is always liable to be regarded

as a proof of an unfriendly spirit.” And he concluded by proposing

that our country should “stand aloof” until the question was decided

“beyond cavil or dispute.” During the next year, when the contest had

practically ceased and only the claim remained, this new power was

acknowledged by the United States, who were followed in 1839 by France,

and in 1840 by Great Britain, Holland, and Belgium. Texas was annexed

to the United States in 1845; but at this time Mexico had not joined in

the general recognition.

* * * * *

Such are historic instances illustrating Intervention by Recognition.

As in other cases of intervention, the recognition may be _armed_ or

_unarmed_, with an intermediate case, where the recognition may seem

unarmed, when in reality it is armed,--as when France simply announced

recognition of the independence of the United States and at the same

time prepared to maintain it by war.

_Armed_ recognition is simply _Recognition by Coercion_. It is a

belligerent act, constituting war, and can be vindicated only as

war. No nation will undertake it, unless ready to assume all the

responsibilities of war,--as in the recent cases of Greece and Belgium,

not to mention the recognition of the United States by France. But

an attempt, under guise of recognition, to coerce the dismemberment

or partition of a country is in its nature offensive beyond ordinary

war, especially when the country to be sacrificed is a republic,

and the plotters against it are crowned heads. Proceeding from the

consciousness of brute power, such an attempt is an insult to mankind.

If armed recognition at any time can find apology, it is only _where

sincerely made for the protection of Human Rights_. It would be hard to

condemn that intervention which saved Greece to Freedom.

_Unarmed_ recognition is where a foreign power acknowledges in some

pacific form the independence of a colony or province against the claim

of its original government. Although excluding all idea of _coercion_,

yet it cannot be uniformly justified.

* * * * *

Here we are brought to that question of “time,” on which Mr. Canning

so pointedly piqued himself, and to which President Jackson referred,

when he suggested that “a premature recognition” might be “looked

upon as justifiable cause of war.” Nothing is more clear than that

recognition may be favored at one time, while it must be rejected

at another. So far as it assumes to determine rights instead of

facts, or to anticipate the result of a contest, it is wrongful. No

nation can undertake to sit in judgment on the rights of another

nation without its consent. Therefore it cannot declare that _de

jure_ a colony or province is _entitled_ to independence, but, from

the necessity of the case, and that international intercourse may

not fail, it must ascertain the facts, carefully and wisely, and,

on the actual evidence, it may declare that _de facto_ the colony

or province appears _to be in possession_ of independence,--which

means, first, that the original government is dispossessed beyond the

possibility of recovery, and, secondly, that the new government has

achieved a reasonable stability, with fixed limits, giving assurance

of solid power. All this is simply fact and nothing more. But just

in proportion as a foreign nation anticipates the fact, or imagines

the fact, or substitutes its own passions for the fact, it transcends

the well-defined bounds of International Law. Without the fact of

independence, positive and fixed, there is nothing but a claim. Now

nothing is clearer than, that, while the terrible litigation is still

pending, and the trial by battle, to which appeal is made, remains

undecided, _the fact of independence cannot exist_. There is only a

paper independence, which, though reddened with blood, is no better

than a paper empire or a paper blockade; and any pretended recognition

of it is a wrongful intervention, inconsistent with just neutrality,

since the obvious effect must be to encourage the insurgent party. Such

has been the declared judgment of our country, and its practice, even

under circumstances tempting in another direction; and such, also, was

the declared judgment and practice of Great Britain with reference to

Spanish America.

The conclusion, then, is clear. To justify recognition, it must appear

beyond doubt that _de facto_ the contest is finished, and that _de

facto_ the new government is established secure within fixed limits.

_These are conditions precedent_, not to be avoided without open

offence to a friendly power, and open violation of that International

Law which is the guardian of the world’s peace, even if there be not

_another condition precedent_ which civilization in this age will

require.

Do you ask now if foreign powers can acknowledge our Rebel embryo as

an independent nation? There is madness in the thought. Recognition

accompanied by the breaking of the blockade would be war, impious war,

against the United States, where Slavemongers would be the allies and

Slavery the inspiration. Of all wars in history, none more accursed,

none more sure to draw down upon its authors the judgment alike of God

and man. But the thought of recognition, under existing circumstances,

while the contest is still pending, even without any breaking of the

blockade or attempted coercion, is a Satanic absurdity, hardly less

impious than the other. It would assume unblushingly, that, already

Rebel Slavery had succeeded in establishing an independent nation

with an untroubled government and a secure conformation of territory,

when, _in fact_, nothing is established, nothing untroubled, nothing

secure, not even a single boundary-line, and there is no element of

independence except the audacious attempt,--when, _in fact_, the

conflict is still waged on numerous battle-fields, and these pretenders

to independence have been driven from State to State, driven away

from the Mississippi which parts them, driven back from the sea which

surrounds them, and shut up in the interior or in blockaded ports,

so that only by stealth can they communicate with the outward world.

Any recognition of such a pretension, existing only as pretension,

scouted and denied by a whole people with invincible armies and navies

embattled against it, would be a mockery of truth. It would assert

independence as _a fact_, when notoriously it was not _a fact_. It

would be an enormous lie. Naturally a power thus guilty would expect to

support the lie by arms.

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