And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? Considering that you
and your companion fight in armour, I thought that you would have known
better...Here Euthydemus held his peace, but Dionysodorus returned to
the previous answer of Ctesippus and said:--
Do you not think that the possession of gold is a good thing?
Yes, said Ctesippus, and the more the better.
And to have money everywhere and always is a good?
Certainly, a great good, he said.
And you admit gold to be a good?
Certainly, he replied.
And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much
as possible in himself, and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who
has three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his pate, and a
stater of gold in either eye?
Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; and the Scythians reckon those who have
gold in their own skulls to be the happiest and bravest of men (that
is only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and
father), and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their
own skulls gilt, and see the inside of them, and hold their own head in
their hands.
And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of
vision, or that which has not? said Euthydemus.
That which has the quality of vision clearly.
And you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said. [Note:
the ambiguity of (Greek), 'things visible and able to see,' (Greek),
'the speaking of the silent,' the silent denoting either the speaker
or the subject of the speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English.]
Compare Aristot. Soph. Elenchi (Poste's translation):--
'Of ambiguous propositions the following are instances:--
'I hope that you the enemy may slay.
'Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known
is here affirmed to know.
'What one sees, that one sees: one sees a pillar: ergo, that one pillar
sees.
'What you ARE holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a
stone you are.
'Is a speaking of the silent possible? "The silent" denotes either the
speaker are the subject of speech.
'There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is
when there is an equal linguistic propriety in several interpretations;
the second when one is improper but customary; the third when the
ambiguity arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves
unambiguous, as in "knowing letters." "Knowing" and "letters" are
perhaps separately unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that
the letters are known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are
the modes in which propositions and terms may be ambiguous.'
Yes, I do.
Then do you see our garments?
Yes.
Then our garments have the quality of vision.
They can see to any extent, said Ctesippus.
What can they see?
Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not
see; and certainly, Euthydemus, you do seem to me to have been caught
napping when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to speak
and say nothing--you are doing so.
And may there not be a silence of the speaker? said Dionysodorus.
Impossible, said Ctesippus.
Or a speaking of the silent?
That is still more impossible, he said.
But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the
silent?
Not when I pass a smithy; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise
and outcry if they are touched: so that here your wisdom is strangely
mistaken; please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when
speaking (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because
Cleinias was present).
When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all
things?
Yes, he said.
But if speaking things are included in all things, then the speaking are
silent.
What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent?
Certainly not, said Euthydemus.
Then, my good friend, do they all speak?
Yes; those which speak.
Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things
are silent or speak?
Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing; I am sure that
you will be 'non-plussed' at that answer.
Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter; he
said, That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma; all is
over with him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus
ten times as uproarious; but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must
have picked up this answer from them; for there has been no wisdom like
theirs in our time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn
and beautiful things?
Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing?
Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many.
Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful?
Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I
thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all: I
said however, They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have
beauty present with each of them.
And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you
Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you?
God forbid, I replied.
But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another,
will one thing be another?
Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning to imitate their
skill, on which my heart was set.
Of course, he replied, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the
non-existent.
What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said. Is not the honourable honourable
and the base base?
That, he said, is as I please.
And do you please?
Yes, he said.
And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for
surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child
will hardly deny the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that
you must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you
and your brother seem to me to be good workmen in your own department,
and to do the dialectician's business excellently well.
What, said he, is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first
place, whose business is hammering?
The smith's.
And whose the making of pots?
The potter's.
And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast?
The cook, I said.
And if a man does his business he does rightly?
Certainly.
And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted
that?
Yes, I have admitted that, but you must not be too hard upon me.
Then if some one were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do
his business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and make a pot of the
potter, he would do their business.
Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have
such wisdom of my own?
And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has
become your own?
Certainly, I said, if you will allow me.
What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own?
Yes, I do, subject to your correction; for you are the bottom, and
Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom.
Is not that which you would deem your own, he said, that which you have
in your own power, and which you are able to use as you would desire,
for example, an ox or a sheep--would you not think that which you could
sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased, to be your own,
and that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think
not to be in your own power?
Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come out of the
questions, which I was impatient to hear); yes, such things, and such
things only are mine.
Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings?
Yes, I said.
You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have
the power to do all these things which I was just naming?