Nor would any other knowledge, whether of money-making, or of medicine,
or of any other art which knows only how to make a thing, and not to use
it when made, be of any good to us. Am I not right?
He agreed.
And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal,
without giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality,
neither would there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy
of the previous instances?
To all this he agreed.
Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses
as well as makes?
True, he said.
And our desire is not to be skilful lyre-makers, or artists of that
sort--far otherwise; for with them the art which makes is one, and the
art which uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they
are divided: for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre
differ widely from one another. Am I not right?
He agreed.
And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; this is only
another of the same sort?
He assented.
But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making
speeches--would that be the art which would make us happy?