EUTHYDEMUS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue.

Crito, Cleinias, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Ctesippus.

SCENE: The Lyceum.

CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking

yesterday at the Lyceum? There was such a crowd around you that I could

not get within hearing, but I caught a sight of him over their heads,

and I made out, as I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were

talking: who was he?

SOCRATES: There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean?

CRITO: The one whom I mean was seated second from you on the right-hand

side. In the middle was Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has

wonderfully grown; he is only about the age of my own Critobulus, but

he is much forwarder and very good-looking: the other is thin and looks

younger than he is.

SOCRATES: He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus; and on my left

hand there was his brother Dionysodorus, who also took part in the

conversation.

CRITO: Neither of them are known to me, Socrates; they are a new

importation of Sophists, as I should imagine. Of what country are they,

and what is their line of wisdom?

SOCRATES: As to their origin, I believe that they are natives of this

part of the world, and have migrated from Chios to Thurii; they were

driven out of Thurii, and have been living for many years past in

these regions. As to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they

are wonderful--consummate! I never knew what the true pancratiast was

before; they are simply made up of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian

brothers who fight with their bodies only, but this pair of heroes,

besides being perfect in the use of their bodies, are invincible in

every sort of warfare; for they are capital at fighting in armour, and

will teach the art to any one who pays them; and also they are most

skilful in legal warfare; they will plead themselves and teach others to

speak and to compose speeches which will have an effect upon the courts.

And this was only the beginning of their wisdom, but they have at last

carried out the pancratiastic art to the very end, and have mastered the

only mode of fighting which had been hitherto neglected by them; and now

no one dares even to stand up against them: such is their skill in

the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true or

false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of placing myself in their hands; for

they say that in a short time they can impart their skill to any one.

CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old? there may be reason to fear

that.

SOCRATES: Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the

consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I

covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before,

they had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may

bring the two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of

Metrobius, the harp-player, who is still my music-master; for when the

boys who go to him see me going with them, they laugh at me and call him

grandpapa's master. Now I should not like the strangers to experience

similar treatment; the fear of ridicule may make them unwilling to

receive me; and therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men

to accompany me to them, as I persuaded them to go with me to Connus,

and I hope that you will make one: and perhaps we had better take your

sons as a bait; they will want to have them as pupils, and for the sake

of them willing to receive us.

CRITO: I see no objection, Socrates, if you like; but first I wish

that you would give me a description of their wisdom, that I may know

beforehand what we are going to learn.

SOCRATES: In less than no time you shall hear; for I cannot say that I

did not attend--I paid great attention to them, and I remember and will

endeavour to repeat the whole story. Providentially I was sitting alone

in the dressing-room of the Lyceum where you saw me, and was about to

depart; when I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign: so

I sat down again, and in a little while the two brothers Euthydemus and

Dionysodorus came in, and several others with them, whom I believe to

be their disciples, and they walked about in the covered court; they had

not taken more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered, who,

as you truly say, is very much improved: he was followed by a host of

lovers, one of whom was Ctesippus the Paeanian, a well-bred youth, but

also having the wildness of youth. Cleinias saw me from the entrance as

I was sitting alone, and at once came and sat down on the right hand of

me, as you describe; and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him,

at first stopped and talked with one another, now and then glancing at

us, for I particularly watched them; and then Euthydemus came and

sat down by the youth, and the other by me on the left hand; the rest

anywhere. I saluted the brothers, whom I had not seen for a long time;

and then I said to Cleinias: Here are two wise men, Euthydemus and

Dionysodorus, Cleinias, wise not in a small but in a large way of

wisdom, for they know all about war,--all that a good general ought

to know about the array and command of an army, and the whole art of

fighting in armour: and they know about law too, and can teach a man how

to use the weapons of the courts when he is injured.

They heard me say this, but only despised me. I observed that they

looked at one another, and both of them laughed; and then Euthydemus

said: Those, Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously;

to us they are secondary occupations.

Indeed, I said, if such occupations are regarded by you as secondary,

what must the principal one be; tell me, I beseech you, what that noble

study is?

The teaching of virtue, Socrates, he replied, is our principal

occupation; and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than

any man.

My God! I said, and where did you learn that? I always thought, as I was

saying just now, that your chief accomplishment was the art of fighting

in armour; and I used to say as much of you, for I remember that you

professed this when you were here before. But now if you really have the

other knowledge, O forgive me: I address you as I would superior beings,

and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions. But are you

quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? the promise is so

vast, that a feeling of incredulity steals over me.

You may take our word, Socrates, for the fact.

Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king

is in the possession of his kingdom. And please to tell me whether you

intend to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do?

That is why we have come hither, Socrates; and our purpose is not only

to exhibit, but also to teach any one who likes to learn.

But I can promise you, I said, that every unvirtuous person will want

to learn. I shall be the first; and there is the youth Cleinias, and

Ctesippus: and here are several others, I said, pointing to the lovers

of Cleinias, who were beginning to gather round us. Now Ctesippus was

sitting at some distance from Cleinias; and when Euthydemus leaned

forward in talking with me, he was prevented from seeing Cleinias, who

was between us; and so, partly because he wanted to look at his love,

and also because he was interested, he jumped up and stood opposite to

us: and all the other admirers of Cleinias, as well as the disciples of

Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, followed his example. And these were the

persons whom I showed to Euthydemus, telling him that they were all

eager to learn: to which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice

vehemently assented, and bid him exhibit the power of his wisdom. Then

I said: O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I earnestly request you to do

myself and the company the favour to exhibit. There may be some trouble

in giving the whole exhibition; but tell me one thing,--can you make a

good man of him only who is already convinced that he ought to learn

of you, or of him also who is not convinced, either because he imagines

that virtue is a thing which cannot be taught at all, or that you are

not the teachers of it? Has your art power to persuade him, who is of

the latter temper of mind, that virtue can be taught; and that you are

the men from whom he will best learn it?

Certainly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; our art will do both.

And you and your brother, Dionysodorus, I said, of all men who are now

living are the most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and to the

study of virtue?

Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are.

Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the

exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he

ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will

confer a great favour on me and on every one present; for the fact is

I and all of us are extremely anxious that he should become truly good.

His name is Cleinias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the

old Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young,

and we are naturally afraid that some one may get the start of us, and

turn his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit,

therefore, is most happily timed; and I hope that you will make a trial

of the young man, and converse with him in our presence, if you have no

objection.

These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used; and Euthydemus,

in a manly and at the same time encouraging tone, replied: There can

be no objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer

questions.

He is quite accustomed to do so, I replied; for his friends often come

and ask him questions and argue with him; and therefore he is quite at

home in answering.

What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the

task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets,

I ought to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the

Muses. Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O

Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant?

The youth, overpowered by the question blushed, and in his perplexity

looked at me for help; and I, knowing that he was disconcerted, said:

Take courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think;

for my belief is that you will derive the greatest benefit from their

questions.

Whichever he answers, said Dionysodorus, leaning forward so as to catch

my ear, his face beaming with laughter, I prophesy that he will be

refuted, Socrates.

While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: and therefore I

had no time to warn him of the predicament in which he was placed, and

he answered that those who learned were the wise.

Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are

there not?

The boy assented.

And they are the teachers of those who learn--the grammar-master and the

lyre-master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners?

Yes.

And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you

were learning?

No, he said.

And were you wise then?

No, indeed, he said.

But if you were not wise you were unlearned?

Certainly.

You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were

learning?

The youth nodded assent.

Then the unlearned learn, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine.

At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a

chorus at the bidding of their director, laughed and cheered. Then,

before the youth had time to recover his breath, Dionysodorus cleverly

took him in hand, and said: Yes, Cleinias; and when the grammar-master

dictated anything to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who

learned the dictation?

The wise, replied Cleinias.

Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned; and your

last answer to Euthydemus was wrong.

Then once more the admirers of the two heroes, in an ecstasy at their

wisdom, gave vent to another peal of laughter, while the rest of us were

silent and amazed. Euthydemus, observing this, determined to persevere

with the youth; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking

another similar question, which might be compared to the double turn of

an expert dancer. Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or

what they do not know?

Again Dionysodorus whispered to me: That, Socrates, is just another of

the same sort.

Good heavens, I said; and your last question was so good!

Like all our other questions, Socrates, he replied--inevitable.

I see the reason, I said, why you are in such reputation among your

disciples.

Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn

what they do not know; and he put him through a series of questions the

same as before.

Do you not know letters?

He assented.

All letters?

Yes.

But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters?

To this also he assented.

Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know?

This again was admitted by him.

Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he

only who does not know letters learns?

Nay, said Cleinias; but I do learn.

Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters?

He admitted that.

Then, he said, you were wrong in your answer.

The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the

argument, like a ball which he caught, and had another throw at the

youth. Cleinias, he said, Euthydemus is deceiving you. For tell me now,

is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns?

Cleinias assented.

And knowing is having knowledge at the time?

He agreed.

And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time?

He admitted that.

And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing?

Those who have not.

And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number

of those who have not?

He nodded assent.

Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of

those who have?

He agreed.

Then, Cleinias, he said, those who do not know learn, and not those who

know.

Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew

that he was in deep water, and therefore, as I wanted to give him a

respite lest he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly: You

must not be surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of

speech: this I say because you may not understand what the two strangers

are doing with you; they are only initiating you after the manner of

the Corybantes in the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement,

which, if you have ever been initiated, is, as you will know,

accompanied by dancing and sport; and now they are just prancing and

dancing about you, and will next proceed to initiate you; imagine then

that you have gone through the first part of the sophistical ritual,

which, as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into the correct use

of terms. The two foreign gentlemen, perceiving that you did not know,

wanted to explain to you that the word 'to learn' has two meanings, and

is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of

which you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have the

knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter, whether something done

or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired knowledge; the latter

is generally called 'knowing' rather than 'learning,' but the word

'learning' is also used; and you did not see, as they explained to you,

that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who

know, and of those who do not know. There was a similar trick in the

second question, when they asked you whether men learn what they know

or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not serious, and

therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing

with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he

would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play with men,

tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words. He

would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one when he is

about to sit down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of his

friend overturned and laid on his back. And you must regard all that has

hitherto passed between you and them as merely play. But in what is to

follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious purpose,

and keep their promise (I will show them how); for they promised to give

me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I suppose that they wanted

to have a game with you first. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus,

I think that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you

explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of

virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the

nature of the task, and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear; and

if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh

at me, for I only venture to improvise before you because I am eager

to hear your wisdom: and I must therefore ask you and your disciples to

refrain from laughing. And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question

to you: Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one

of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought

not to be asked by a sensible man: for what human being is there who

does not desire happiness?

There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not.

Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be

happy?--that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many

good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the

first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.

He assented.

And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us

this, which may be easily answered; for every one will say that wealth

is a good.

Certainly, he said.

And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?

He agreed.

Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one's

own land, are goods?

He assented.

And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance,

justice, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we

shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as

goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you

say?

They are goods, said Cleinias.

Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for

wisdom--among the goods or not?

Among the goods.

And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods.