of the island, where most of the rebel forces were located, is very
peculiar; and if the disadvantages of position which the course of
events gradually unfolded could have been foreseen, the site would never
have been selected. Commencing at a point about a mile and a half above
the island is a range of high land, which extends back south-eastwardly
to Reelfoot Lake, a distance of four miles. This lake, in the rear of
the peninsula, is fifteen miles in length, and terminates in a swamp,
which extends south of Tiptonville, a town on the river bank, below the
peninsula. The swamp at that time varied in width from one and a half to
eight miles, its narrowest point being four miles above Tiptonville,
where the rebels had prepared a corduroy road and bridge, as a means of
escape from their position, should retreat by land become necessary.
On the 15th of March, the gun and mortar-boats comprising the fleet of
Commodore Foote commenced the investment and bombardment of Island No.
10, and the rebel batteries and camps at the adjacent peninsula on the
Tennessee shore.
The fleet consisted of eleven gunboats, and twelve mortar-boats, each of
the latter carrying one immense mortar, throwing a shell of two hundred
and twenty pounds weight a distance of from two to three miles. The
Commodore engaged the rebel batteries almost daily for three weeks,
deeming it imprudent to risk the destruction of his vessels by close
action, as any misfortune to them would have placed all the towns on the
Upper Mississippi at the mercy of the armed steamers of the enemy.
The rebels had eighty guns of heavy calibre in the batteries on the
island and the adjacent peninsula, while the iron-clad ram Manassas, and
a fleet of twenty vessels—gunboats, steamers and transports, were moored
under their guns, prepared to act as opportunity or emergency might
require.
One or more gunboats would advance to attack a shore battery from the
right hand of the river—or engage the water battery on the island,
approaching from the left bank. The mortars kept continually changing
positions, generally hugging the shore on the left bank where the rebel
batteries could not reach them, as they were covered by a promontory, or
neck of land, made by the bend of the river; and their fire was kept up
so unceasingly, that frequently a mortar-shell was thrown every hour
during the night.
At two o’clock on the morning of April 1, a most daring enterprise on
the part of Colonel Roberts, of the Forty-second Illinois regiment, was
crowned with success. Taking advantage of a severe storm while the
elements were raging furiously, and a dreadful hurricane, accompanied
with thunder and lightning, was sweeping the earth and driving the
vessels from their moorings, he started with forty picked men, in six
yawl boats, and with muffled oars rowed towards the upper water battery
on Island No. 10, keeping close to the edge of the river bank. The
boats, favored by the intense darkness, approached within a few rods of
the battery, when a blinding sheet of lightning flashed across the
water, revealing the adventurous party to the enemy’s sentinels. The
dark object looming out from the storm alarmed the sentinels, who fired
wildly and at random, fleeing with the first discharge. The Union boats
made no reply. A few minutes more brought them to the slope of the
earthworks, and the men at once sprung over the parapet. In less than
five minutes the huge guns on the battery were securely spiked. They
were all of large calibre, consisting of two 64, two 80-pounders and one
splendid 9-inch pivot gun. Their desperate work accomplished, the boats
returned safely to the fleet, having performed a perilous exploit with
wonderful success.
CAPTURE OF ISLAND No. 10 AND THE REBEL ARMY.
After the surrender of the forts at New Madrid, Colonel Bissell’s
engineer regiment was engaged for four days unspiking guns, changing
batteries, and establishing new works. Then they were sent over by
General Pope to ascertain whether it would be practicable to establish
batteries opposite Island No. 10, and enfilade the rebel works on the
Tennessee shore. They spent three days in the swamps, living in their
canoes with negroes, but found the project impracticable. Colonel
Bissell, however, stated that he could by hard labor get steamboats and
flatboats through the woods and bayous, and by that means avoid the
batteries on the island, and bring the vessels to New Madrid, whence
General Pope’s army could be transported to a point nearly opposite, and
take all the enemy’s works in the rear.
General Pope at once gave him a _carte blanche_, and he sent to Cairo
for four steamboats, six flats, and such guns as could be spared. They
sent the steamers W. B. Terry, John Trio, Gilmore, and Emma, with the
barges, a quantity of lumber, etc., and one eight-inch columbiad and
three thirty-two pounders. Tools were not needed, for the regiment
carried everything, from the heaviest ropes and screws down to fine
steel drills for unspiking guns.
The route was about twelve miles long, of which two traversed were
through thick timber, and the remaining ten narrow, crooked bayous,
choked up with brush and small trees. They cut their way through, the
track being fifty feet wide, of which thirty feet was required for the
hulls of the boats. The timber was cut four feet below the surface of
the water. In one short stretch they cut seventy-five trees, not one
less than two feet through. The machines were rigged from rafts and
flats, and each worked by about twenty men. In the first place three
large launches went ahead to cut out and clear away the underbrush and
driftwood; then three rafts followed, on which were the axemen, followed
by the saws, two large barges, and one of the steamboats. Very large
lines were provided to run from the capstan of the steamboat and haul
out by snatchblocks what the men could not handle. Men were engaged all
the time in the fleet which followed, converting the flatboats into
floating batteries.
[Illustration:
BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10.
1. Rebel Floating Battery.—2. Rebel Gunboats and Rams.—3. Federal
Gunboats.—4. Point Pleasant.—5. Island No. 10.—6. Smith’s
Landing.—7. Mortar Boats.
]
From the starting point on the river to the levee the distance is about
five hundred feet; here the water was shallow and the route full of
stumps. It took one whole day to pass this point. Then they cut in the
levee. Here the fall was over two feet, and the rush of water
tremendous. The largest boat was dropped through with five lines out
ahead. Then a corn field, overflowed from a cut in the levee, where a
channel was cut by the swift water, and floated them onward nearly a
quarter of a mile to the woods. Here was great labor—two straight and
long miles to the nearest point in the bayou. It took eight days to get
through this distance. Then came Wilson’s Bayou, East Bayou, and St.
John’s Bayou, which empties into the Mississippi at New Madrid. It
sometimes took twenty men a whole day to get out a half sunken tree
across the bayou; and as none of the rafts or flats could get by, this
always detained the whole fleet. The water, after they got in the woods,
was about six feet deep, with a gentle current setting across the
peninsula. In the East Bayou the current was tremendous, and the boats
had to be checked down with heavy head lines. Here they found some
obstructions, caused by heaps of driftwood, but a few sturdy blows
dislodged some of the logs and sent the whole mass floating down the
current.
While the engineers were engaged in this herculean enterprise, the
gunboat Carondelet ran safely by the rebel batteries on the island, and
reached New Madrid on the night of April 4th. On the succeeding night
another boat, the Pittsburg, ran the gauntlet of the enemy’s fire
unscathed, in time to convoy the transports as they entered the river.
On the 6th of April the two gunboats attacked and destroyed four
batteries erected by the rebels on the Tennessee shore. On the 7th, by
daylight, the divisions of Generals Paine and Stanley were marched to
Tiptonville, fifteen miles down the river from New Madrid. The rebels
had retreated in that direction the afternoon before, and it was thought
that they were endeavoring to cross over Reelfoot lake. The troops were
pushed forward with all possible speed, and at night encamped at
Tiptonville and Merriwether’s, while a strong force was posted at the
only point where by any possibility the rebels could cross the lake,
some four miles from the town. Squads of rebel soldiers kept in sight of
the Union pickets during the night, and at times would come boldly up
and surrender themselves as prisoners of war. At daylight General Pope
and staff, and Assistant Secretary of War Scott, went down to the
locality, and General Pope assumed the full command. It was expected
that some resistance would be made, and no one surmised that the enemy,
who it was learned had marched over from Island No. 10, had concluded to
give himself up. But shortly after sunrise General Pope received a
message from the General commanding the Confederates, stating that he
had surrendered the island and fortifications to Commodore Foote the
night before, and that the forces under his command were ready to follow
the “fortunes of war;” and he requested General Pope to receive and
march them into camp. General Pope gave directions for the Confederate
troops to come into camp and go through the formula. Accordingly about
four thousand rebels were marched in and stacked their arms.
On the same day Island No. 10 was surrendered to Commodore Foote, with
all its war material; and all the gunboats and transports fell into the
hands of the victors.
BATTLE OF WINCHESTER, VA.
MARCH 22, 23, 1862.
On the 21st of March, General Shields, commanding a division of the
Fifth Army Corps of the Potomac, under General Banks, was stationed at
Winchester, with a force of about seven thousand men. General Jackson,
with a rebel force of ten thousand men, and twenty-eight pieces of
artillery, was then at Strasburg, ten miles distant, closely
scrutinizing the movements of the Federal army, and only awaiting the
arrival of General Johnston, his superior, who was daily expected with a
much larger force. With these united, they expected to strike a telling
blow on the army of General Banks, and thus prevent any combined action
on his part with General McClellan.
Not anticipating an immediate attack from General Jackson, General Banks
had just left Winchester for Harper’s Ferry, and General Williams’
division had marched the same day towards Centreville. Of these
movements the rebel General was duly notified, as his numerous spies
within the Federal lines lost no opportunity of supplying the enemy with
full details of all the actions of the Federal commanders.
Though looking for reinforcements from Generals Longstreet and Smith,
Jackson determined to attack Shields’ troops;—but his attempt to
surprise them was frustrated by the vigilance of that officer.
Apprehensive that the enemy designed an early advance, General Shields
had just completed a hasty reconnoissance to Strasburg, by which he
obtained important information of Jackson’s numbers and intentions. This
induced him to withdraw most of his men to a position two miles
north-east of Winchester, while his pickets extended five miles beyond,
on the Strasburg road. The enemy were led to believe that the town was
open to their occupation, and that the greater portion of the Federal
troops had been withdrawn from the vicinity.
On Saturday afternoon, March 22, about a quarter-past two o’clock, the
Federal advanced pickets on the Strasburg road discovered the rebel
cavalry, under Colonel Ashby, about half a mile beyond them,
reconnoitering the woods on both sides of the turnpike, and steadily
advancing. The pickets consisted of a few men of the Fourteenth Indiana
infantry at that point, and they fell back half a mile to the hamlet of
Kernstown, four miles from Winchester. Steadily did the troopers advance
as the Union men wheeled to aim and fire. The first volley sent many
rebels reeling from their saddles, and threw the rest into confusion.
Before they could be again rallied for a charge, the gallant little band
of infantry was beyond their power, without having lost a man killed or
wounded. General Shields hearing of the advance of the rebel cavalry,
ordered four advanced companies of infantry to rally to the support of
the pickets, and hold the rebels in check till he could move down the
division. These companies were one from the Maryland First, one from the
Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, one from the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, and
one from the Twenty-eighth New York. Their regiments had marched away
under General Williams.
A battery of artillery was also sent forward, and General Shields, after
ordering out the division, rode to the front, accompanied by his staff.
While engaged in directing the fire of the artillery, a shell from the
rebel battery of four guns, which now began to play on them, burst near
him, and a splinter from it struck him in the left arm, just above the
elbow, fracturing the bone and creating a painful wound. But without
heeding it he gave a fresh order to the artillery, and continued on the
field till satisfied that all was right.
The Federal division began to arrive in force on the field towards dark;
the rebels, perceiving this, did not push their advance, but halted
about three miles from Winchester for the night, lighted their camp
fires and bivouacked, while the opposing army lay between them and the
town.
About ten o’clock on Sunday, reinforcements of five regiments of
infantry and two batteries of artillery having arrived from Strasburg,
under General Garnett, were welcomed by vociferous and prolonged cheers
from their lines. The attack was not long delayed. The enemy advanced
his army, which now consisted of sixteen regiments of infantry,
numbering eleven thousand men; five batteries of artillery, with a total
of twenty-eight field pieces, and three battalions of horse, under Ashby
and Stewart. His line of battle extended about a mile on the right of
the village of Kernstown, and a mile and three-quarters on the left of
it. The village lay on the road between the rebel right and centre.
There is a mud road branching from the turnpike a mile or so from
Winchester to the right of the road going towards Strasburg. This road
passed through the left of the enemy’s centre, and was one of their
points of defence. Beyond that is a grove of trees, and farther on, a
ridge of hills with a stone wall about breast-high running along its
summit. This was the rebel line of offence and defence on the right of
the Union line.
The most advanced regiment on the Union side was the Eighth Ohio, of
General Tyler’s brigade. The rebels made a furious onslaught about
half-past ten o’clock, A. M., on Thursday, with the intention of turning
the right flank. The Ohio Eighth met them with a deadly fire of rifles.
Five times did the enemy emerge from the woods and from behind their
stone parapet with vastly superior numbers, and strive in vain to
accomplish their object. The Union left wing, consisting of the
Thirteenth Indiana, Seventh Ohio and a battery of the Fourth regular
artillery, under Captain Jenks, had a feint made on it, while the real
attack of the enemy was being directed against the Union right wing. The
feint on the left was a heavy fire of artillery posted on both sides of
the village and the turnpike, which, however, did trifling damage. The
Union battery replied, silencing those of the enemy, though the firing
was well maintained for a long time on both sides. The Union centre
consisted of the Fourteenth Indiana, the Eighth and Sixty-seventh Ohio,
and the Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania. Two artillery batteries belonging to
the First Ohio artillery, and the cavalry, consisting of the First
Michigan and First Ohio, were drawn up in the rear. The Union right wing
was made up of the Fifth and Eighth Ohio regiments and a battery of the
First Virginia regiment. The reserves consisted of the Twelfth Indiana,
the Thirty-ninth Illinois and a squadron of the Michigan cavalry.
General Shields was unable to appear on the field in person, and the
command consequently devolved upon Acting Brigadier Kimble, who led the
centre. The right was commanded by Acting Brigadier General Tyler, while
Colonel Sullivan directed the operations on the left.
The battle raged along the whole line with great fury from eleven A. M.
till half-past two P. M., when General Shields, who received accounts of
the progress of the fight on his couch, ordered the right, where the
contest raged the hottest, to charge upon the enemy. That was an awful
charge. The left of the enemy prepared desperately to repel the gallant
troops, but their rush was irresistible. Previous to this the Union line
of battle had been somewhat changed. The Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania
reinforced its right, and also a battery of artillery. The whole Union
force now engaged was about six thousand men, while that of the enemy
was at the lowest estimate eight thousand. The rebels had also changed
their line, and extending both their wings, presented a concave front.
They had reinforced their left wing, and the charge to be made by the
Union right was all important in its consequences. On it, at three
o’clock, depended the fate of the entire battle. Tyler led the charge,
sword in hand. The rebels fired from the woods with artillery and small
arms, while the Federals advanced against their murderous showers of
lead and iron, returning few shots and reserving their fire.
[Illustration:
SPLENDID CHARGE OF THE RIGHT WING, UNDER GENERAL TYLER.
]
Up to this time the armies had not been much nearer to each other than
three hundred yards, unless in some few instances. The wood was soon
cleared at the point of the bayonet, the Unionists discharging their
pieces at twenty and even five yards distance from the rebels, and then
dashing at them with the bayonet.
The rebels fought well. They contested the ground foot by foot, and
marked every yard of their retreat with blood. They retired behind the
stone wall, on the ridge, but the Unionists jumped over, and drove them
in the greatest confusion and with fearful slaughter upon their centre.
The panic was contagious. Kimble ordered a charge along the whole line,
and for a short time the fighting was desperate. The roar of the cannon
was no longer heard, unless in occasional bursts, but the rattle of
musketry was more deafening than ever.
The rout of the rebels had fairly commenced; two of their guns and four
caissons were taken, and though many of them turned and fired again and
again at the pursuing host, many more threw away muskets and bayonets
without hesitation. Darkness and the extreme fatigue of the Union
troops, however, saved them for the time, and the Federals retired about
two miles and bivouacked.
At daybreak General Shields ordered the rebel position to be attacked,
and the enemy, after replying by a few shots from his artillery,
continued his retreat. Meantime General Banks, who had been at Harper’s
Ferry, arrived, and taking command of the troops in person, continued
the pursuit with about ten thousand men, and pressed the rebels beyond
Middleburg, cutting off many stragglers. The object was to capture his
whole force, if possible. General Williams, with his forces, arrived on
the field, too late to participate in the action. They joined in the
chase.
The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was six hundred. The number
of prisoners taken was three hundred.
The Union loss in killed was one hundred, and about four hundred
wounded. Though the enemy had a much larger force, four pieces of cannon
more than the Federals, the selection of fighting ground, and every
other advantage, yet all the trophies of the occasion belong to the
Union army.
The rebels had an Irish battalion of one hundred and fifty men, of whom
forty were killed on the field, and many of the rest wounded. Their
commander, Captain Jones, was captured, having lost both eyes by a
bullet.
The loss on the Union side was heaviest in the Eighty-fourth
Pennsylvania regiment. Of the five companies of three hundred men, in
all, engaged, they lost Colonel Murray, a brave officer; one captain,
one lieutenant, twenty-three privates and non-commissioned officers
killed, and sixty-three wounded. The loss in the Eighth and Fifth Ohio
regiments was about seventy-five and sixty, respectively, killed and
wounded.
Lieutenant-Colonel Thorburn, of the Third Virginia, was among the
wounded. These were the only field officers killed or wounded in the
Union forces.
The battle-field after the struggle was a terrible sight. The night was
dark and cold. After the battle the ambulances were busily engaged
removing the wounded. The enemy carried off most of their wounded and
some of their dead. The wounded were intermingled with the dead, and
their sufferings before they were removed to the hospitals were
heart-rending. The next day was spent in burying the dead. The ghastly
aspect of the field after the wounded were removed, and before the dead
were interred, was appalling.
BATTLE OF PITTSBURG LANDING.
APRIL 6–7, 1862.
When the surrender of Forts Henry and Donelson reached Washington and
Richmond there was depression among the secessionists and great
rejoicing at the North. The news of these events was followed directly
by the capture of Nashville and New Madrid, and it became certain to the
Confederate leaders that Island No. 10 must soon surrender. Under these
untoward events it became imperative that a new strategic point should
be at once established beyond reach of the gunboats, that had already
produced so much mischief. Beauregard, then in command, selected Corinth
as the most promising point for his operations, and a position which
would render any attempt of the Federals to cut him off from western
Tennessee, or the eastern and southern States, extremely difficult of
success. He called on the Governors of Tennessee, Mississippi and
Alabama for help, and a prompt response was made. First came Polk from
Columbus, then Bragg from Mobile and Pensacola, followed by General A.
S. Johnston from Murfreesborough, who took command. After selecting
their new line of defence, they commenced fortifying it and diligently
concentrated their forces. Generals Hardee, Breckinridge, Sterling Price
and Hindman soon came in, and the fortifications made rapid progress.
Corinth is a very important strategical point. It is situated in a
branch of the Apalachian range, which diverges from the Alleghany
mountains, and forms the uplands and gold-bearing regions of Georgia and
Alabama. The village is nearly surrounded by an irregular circle of
hills, rising in the north, about four miles distant, with the State
line between Tennessee and Mississippi crossing their summit. The Mobile
and Ohio railway intersects this ridge through a cut seventy-five feet
in depth. Similar cuts, of lesser depth, penetrate the hills on the
east, west and south, where the railways enter. Beyond these hills, in
the direction of Pittsburg and Savannah, the ground becomes more level,
and is generally low and swampy. The topography of the region renders
Corinth susceptible of strong defences. The village was formerly called
Farmington, and is so mentioned in the gazetteers. It is a post village
of Tishomingo county, Mississippi, distant two hundred and sixty-two
miles north-east from Jackson, the capital of the State. There were not
half a dozen stores in the village, and its population was relatively
small. Tishomingo county forms the north-eastern extremity of
Mississippi, bordering on Tennessee and Alabama. The Tombigbee river
rises in the county; the Tennessee flows along the north-east border,
and it is drained by Tuscumbia creek. A large portion of the county is
covered with forests of oak, hickory, walnut and pine.
The principal military value of this place consists in the fact that the
railroads from Memphis on the west, Columbus, on the north, and Mobile
on the south, cross at this point.
About the middle of March Grant’s victorious army at Nashville was sent
by Halleck to occupy first Savannah, and then Pittsburg Landing,
preparatory to the arrival of Buell’s Kentucky army, when Halleck
intended himself to take the field and move on Corinth.