The loss of General Lyon, and the reverses to the national army,

afforded cause for great exultation to the secessionists of St. Louis

and its vicinity, and their demonstrations of hostility became so marked

that General Fremont, on the 14th of August, was compelled to resort to

the extreme measure of declaring martial law in that city. This had the

effect of restraining the rebel sympathizers in immediate proximity with

the headquarters of the Commander, but was not regarded in the State at

large. Under these circumstances General Fremont followed this

proclamation with another on the 30th of August, establishing martial

law in the State, and fixing the lines of the army of occupation as

extending from Leavenworth by way of the posts of Jefferson City, Rolla

and Ironton, to Cape Girardeau, on the Mississippi river. All persons

taken with arms in their hands were to be tried by courts-martial, and

if found guilty, shot. The property of persons taking up arms against

the United States was declared confiscated to public use, “and their

slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared free men.”

This proclamation produced a profound excitement throughout the country,

and was received by the people with varied emotions—enthusiastically

applauded by some, and bitterly condemned by others.

The President, on the 2d of September, addressed a letter to General

Fremont, recommending him to modify his proclamation. General Fremont

desired the President to make an order for the modification in his own

name, a request with which the Chief Magistrate complied, and under date

of September 11th, communicated to General Fremont, that the

proclamation in question should be made to conform to the act of

Congress of August 6th, which confiscated only property _used_ in

rebellion; and referred the question regarding slaves to the

determination of the courts, or to subsequent legislation.

While in St. Louis, General Fremont was actively engaged in the

organization of his forces, and making preparations for his approaching

campaign. To protect the city he had extensive fortifications

constructed. He also projected and ordered the building of the gunboats,

which have since rendered such signal service. The necessity of massing

a large army near Washington, after the defeat at Bull Run, compelled

the withdrawal of many regiments which had been assigned to the Missouri

Department. It was not until the 27th of September that Fremont was

prepared to enter upon an offensive campaign. Accordingly on that day he

left St. Louis, and with fifteen steamers and fifteen thousand men,

sailed up the Missouri to Jefferson City. Here he halted several days to

collect additional material necessary for his march into the interior.

On the 29th, two days after General Fremont’s departure from St. Louis,

General Price commenced the evacuation of Lexington, leaving a small

force as a guard. On the 7th of October, General Fremont left Jefferson

City, marching in the direction of Sedalia, for the purpose of attacking

the rebel commander at the earliest opportunity.

On the 16th, two hundred and twenty men of the First Missouri Scouts,

under Major F. J. White, surprised the rebel garrison at Lexington, and

recaptured the place, with the Federal sick and wounded there, together

with two pieces of cannon, a quantity of guns, pistols and other

articles which the rebels threw away in their flight. The garrison

numbered three hundred men. The victorious troops found the inhabitants

in a deplorable condition. Some portions of the town had been plundered

of everything that could be appropriated, and many persons were

suffering for the necessaries of life. It was a painful scene, and

formed one of those early pictures of the war which have since been

multiplied so fearfully in the border States.

On the 1st of November, General Fremont, then at Springfield, entered

into an arrangement with General Price, to facilitate the exchange of

prisoners, agreeing to release any who had been made prisoners “for the

mere expression of political opinions;” and providing also that “the war

in future be confined exclusively to the armies in the field.” Armed

bodies, unauthorized by the commanders, were to be disbanded, and

persons guilty of violence and lawless acts were to be subject to trial

by courts-martial. This agreement was signed by Major Henry W. Williams

and D. Robert Barclay, Esq., for General Price, and J. H. Eaton,

Assistant-Adjutant-General, for General Fremont. A proclamation,

announcing this negotiation, was accordingly published on the first of

November.

The next day, General Fremont received from the Department at

Washington, an order relieving him from his command. General David

Hunter was appointed to the Department of Missouri, temporarily as his

successor. General Fremont returned to St. Louis, and soon afterwards

reached New York city, where he awaited the orders of the Government.

The Federal army was now withdrawn from the south-western portion of the

State, and the whole of that vast field was reoccupied by the insurgent

forces, and thousands of recruits were gathered into their ranks.

On the 4th of November, the antagonist forces were commanded as

follows:—General Hunter, 5,000; General Sigel, 4,000; General Ashboth,

4,500; General McKinstry, 5,500; General Pope, 4,000; General Lane,

2,500; General Sturgis, 1,000. The rebels under General Price numbered

15,000; under General McCulloch, 7,000.

The disloyal members of the Legislature held a session at Neosho, Newton

county, in the extreme south-western portion of the State, and on the

19th of November passed an ordinance of secession, and sent their

Commissioners to the Confederate Congress at Richmond. Missouri, as

represented by them, was admitted to the Confederacy on the 27th of

November.

On the 30th of November, General Price, then at Neosho, issued a

proclamation to the people of Missouri, calling upon them in the most

earnest manner for recruits to the rebel army. He called for fifty

thousand men, who might rendezvous at headquarters with anything in the

shape of arms that they could find; and if unarmed, to enroll

themselves, and they would be supplied. He represented the hopelessness

of the cause, and the certain defeat of the rebel army unless

immediately reinforced. His appeals had some effect in promoting

sedition, and in securing enlistments, but they fell far short of the

number he demanded.

On the 1st of December, Gen. Price was at Osceola, with 18,000 men.

On the 6th of December, Independence was entered by a band of rebels,

who seized several citizens and compelled them to take an oath not to

bear arms against the Southern Confederacy.

On the 13th of the same month, Governor Jackson, at New Madrid, issued a

proclamation to the insurgent army, in which he attempted a defence of

the rebellion, and asserted that the people of Missouri were in favor of

secession. Unfortunately for the veracity or the knowledge of Governor

Jackson, wherever the people of the State were delivered from the

terrorism of the rebels and marauders, they adhered to the Union, as was

verified by the fact, that up to the 20th of January, 1862, no less than

33,882 Missourians had entered the Federal service for three years, and

6,000 had volunteered for three months.

Major-General Henry W. Halleck was now in command of the Department. He

was compelled to adopt rigorous measures in some cases in consequence of

the pertinacious conduct of the secessionists. A memorable event of the

month of January was the annual election for officers of the Mercantile

Library Association, in which loyalty and secession were antagonistic

elements. General Halleck officially announced that each officer of the

Association would be expected to take the oath of allegiance within ten

days from the date of his order, and in default thereof the officers

failing should be deemed to have resigned their offices. Any officer

refusing to take the oath of allegiance, who should exercise or attempt

to exercise the functions of his office, should be arrested and dealt

with under the laws of war.

He also ordered that all carriages bearing the enemy’s flag should be

seized and confiscated; and that women resorting to the neighborhood of

the military prison and insulting the Federal troops, or communicating

with prisoners by exhibiting and waving secession flags, should be

imprisoned. Disloyal persons who, under the military rules, were liable

to assessment for the support of loyal fugitives from their homes,

should be compelled to pay their assessment. All persons of every rank

or position, violating the laws, or interfering with their execution,

should be dealt with under strict penalties.

This energetic administration had the desired effect; and the violent

minority who were determined, at every hazard, to plunge the State into

war, were restrained, and order and peace assured and restored.

THE STONE FLEET.

Notwithstanding all the activity and watchfulness of the blockading

vessels off the Southern coast, many instances were exultingly heralded

by the Southern press, as well as in Europe, of the successful running

of the blockade by vessels bound both outward and inward. The logic of

these occurrences was very simple on the part of the secessionists and

their sympathizers. The frequent evasion of the blockade proved that it

was “inefficient” on the part of the Federal government, and therefore

not only to be disregarded, but officially declared by foreign

governments to be incomplete, and practically null and void. This

declaration was expected to be sufficient to warrant the free movements

of commerce, and any attempt to interfere on the part of the United

States would be a challenge for the intervention of England and France.

The repeated instances of vessels escaping rendered it an imperative

necessity for the government to adopt some measure that would, if

possible, prevent their recurrence at the principal ports of the South.

For this purpose it was determined to close several of the harbors by

placing obstructions in the channels. Most of the harbors of the

Southern coast, in consequence of the deltas, and numerous islands at

their entrances, have several channels, through which vessels of light

draft may pass, while those of the heaviest draft are confined to one

principal channel. This is the case in the approach to both Charleston

and Savannah. The obstructing of these two principal channels was

therefore assigned for the month of December.

For this purpose a number of old whaling vessels were purchased at New

Bedford and New London, freighted with granite from the Bay State, and

taken to Port Royal as a rendezvous, whence they were to be convoyed to

their destination. The people of Savannah, after the capture of Port

Royal and Beaufort, anticipating the approach of the Federal fleet,

volunteered the work on their own behalf and blockaded their own port by

similar means. The fleet was therefore at liberty to repair to

Charleston, and within sight of the walls of Sumter, to shut out the

rebellious people of that city from the ocean.

The “Stone Fleet” sailed from Port Royal on the 18th of December,

accompanied by the steamers Cahawba, Philadelphia and Ericsson, to tow

and assist, the whole convoyed by the Mohican, Captain Gordon, the

Ottawa, Captain Stevens, and Pocahontas, Captain Balch.

The fleet arrived off Charleston harbor the next day and preparations

were made for sinking them in their places. Each of the weather-beaten

and storm-tossed old vessels that had so long borne the stars and

stripes in every latitude, were now to make a stubborn protest against

treason by keeping watch at the very door of its birth-place. They were

furnished with ingenious contrivances and plugs, the withdrawal of which

would allow the water to flow in and sink them on the floor of the

channel.

The sinking of the fleet was intrusted to Captain Charles H. Davis,

formerly on the Coast Survey, and ever since more or less intimately

connected with it. It is remarkable that when, in 1851, an appropriation

was made by the Federal Government for the improvement of Charleston

harbor, and, at the request of South Carolina, a commission of army and

navy officers was appointed to superintend the work, Captain Davis was

one of the commission, and for three or four years was engaged in these

operations. The present attempt was of somewhat different character. The

entrance by the main ship channel runs from the bar to Fort Sumter, six

miles, nearly south and north. The city is three miles beyond, bearing

about N. W. The other channels are Sanford’s, Swash, the North, and

Maffit’s, or Sullivan’s Island, which need not to be particularly

described. Only the latter is practicable for vessels of any draught,

but all serve more or less to empty the waters discharged by the Ashley

and Cooper rivers. Over the bar, at the entrance of the main ship

channel, is a narrow passage, through which vessels may carry eleven

feet at low water; about seventeen at high water. The plan of Captain

Davis for closing the harbor proceeded on the following principles:

The obstructions were to be placed on both sides of the crest of the

bar, so that the same forces which created the bar might be relied on to

keep them in their places.

The bar was not to be obstructed entirely; for natural forces would soon

open a new passage, since the rivers must discharge themselves by some

outlet; but to be only partially obstructed, so that, while this channel

was ruined, no old one, like Swash or Sanford, should be improved, or a

new one formed.

The vessels were so placed that on the channel course it would be

difficult to draw a line through any part of it that would not be

intercepted by one of them. A ship, therefore, endeavoring to make her

way out or in could not, by taking the bearings of any point of

departure, as she could not sail on any straight line.

The vessels were placed checkerwise, at some distance from each other,

so as to create an artificial unevenness of the bottom, remotely

resembling Hell Gate and Holmes’s Hole, which unevenness would give rise

to eddies, counter-currents and whirlpools, adding so seriously to the

difficulties of navigation that it could only be practicable by

steamers, or with a very commanding breeze.

The execution of this plan was begun by buoying out the channel and

circumscribing within four points the space where the vessels were all

to be sunk, as follows:

*

S. W. * THE BAR. * N. E.

*

The distance between the points from S. W. to N. E. is about an eighth

of a mile; the breadth perhaps half as much. It was no part of the plan

to build a wall of ships across, but to drop them at a little distance

from each other, on the principles above stated, closing the channel to

navigation, but leaving it open to the water.

Work was resumed on Friday morning, the 20th, the Ottawa and Pocahontas

bringing the ships to their stations. The placing of them was an

operation of considerable nicety, especially as some of the vessels were

so deep as to be with difficulty dragged on the bar, except at high

water. A graver hindrance to their exact location was found in the

imperfection of the arrangement for sinking, several of the ships

remaining afloat so long after the plug was knocked out, that they swung

out of position. They were, nevertheless, finally placed very nearly

according to the plan. Great credit was earned by Mr. Bradbury and Mr.

Godfrey for the successful execution of so difficult an undertaking. The

last ship, the Archer, closed the only remaining gap, and the manner in

which Mr. Bradbury took her in with the Pocahontas and then extricated

the latter from her perilous position, filled the fleet with admiration

for his skillful seamanship and cool daring. By half-past ten the last

plug was drawn, and every ship of the sixteen was either sunk or

sinking.

One of the vessels, the Robin Hood, with upright masts, stood erect, in

water too shallow to submerge her. As evening drew near she was set on

fire, and in a little time the evening sky was lighted up with the

pyrotechnic display, while the inhabitants of Charleston, the garrison

of Fort Moultrie, and the surroundings, were compelled to look on and

see the temporary completion of the blockade they had so long derided

and defied.

This event provoked loud and vindictive complaints and assaults in

France and England, and the measure was denounced as an outrage on

civilization, and a sufficient warrant for interference in the war. But

an examination of the historical precedents afforded by British practice

closed the mouths of the declaimers in Parliament as well as through the

press, and once more American practice was permitted to pass, justified

by the verdict of opinion as well as of illustrious example.

BATTLE OF CAMP ALLEGHANY, W. VIRGINIA.

DECEMBER 13, 1861.

On Thursday morning, December 12th, Brigadier-General R. H. Milroy

started from his headquarters on Cheat Mountain Summit, with fifteen

hundred men, with the design of attacking a rebel camp on the Alleghany

mountains, twenty-five miles distant. The column started at eight

o’clock, and after a fatiguing day’s march arrived, at eight P. M., at

the old Camp Bartow, on the Greenbrier river, the scene of General

Reynolds’ rencontre on the 3d of October previous. Here the troops

rested until eleven P. M., when the General divided his force into two

columns, with the intention of reaching the enemy’s camp on the summit

of the mountain, about eight and a half miles distant, from two opposite

points, at four o’clock, A. M., of the 13th.

The first division, consisting of detachments from the Ninth Indiana,

Colonel Moody, and Second Virginia, Major Owens, about one thousand

strong, took up its march on the old Greenbank road to attack the enemy

on the left.

The second division consisted of detachments from the Thirteenth

Indiana, Twenty-fifth and Thirty-second Ohio, and Bracken Cavalry, under

Major Dobbs, Colonel J. A. Jones, Captain Hamilton and Captain Bracken.

Brigadier-General Reynolds and his staff conducted this division,

numerically about the same as the first division. This column took the

Staunton pike, and marched cautiously until they came in sight of the

enemy’s camp, where, after throwing out more skirmishers, the division

left the road and commenced to ascend the mountain to the enemy’s right.

After driving in some of the hostile pickets they reached the summit in

good order. The enemy were fully prepared to receive them. The fight on

the enemy’s right commenced about twenty minutes after daylight.

Lieutenant McDonald, of General Reynolds’ staff, with one company of the

Thirteenth Indiana, formed the line of battle, placing the Twenty-fifth

Ohio on his left, part of the Thirteenth Indiana on their left, and part

of the Thirty-second Ohio on their left. The enemy immediately advanced

to attack the Federal troops, but after a few rounds retreated in great

confusion, leaving their dead and wounded. Colonel Moody’s division not

appearing to attack the enemy on the left, the rebels seeing the

inferior force opposed to them, were again encouraged to advance toward

their assailants, which they did with a far superior force, pouring in

their fire with vigor. Some of the Federals now commenced falling to the

rear, all along the line; but Captains Charlesworth and Crowe, of the

Twenty-fifth Ohio, Lieutenant McDonald, Captains Myers and Newland, of

the Thirteenth Indiana, and Hamilton, of the Thirty-second Ohio, rallied

them, and brought them into line in a few moments. The enemy again fell

back and attempted to turn their right flank, but was immediately met

and repulsed. The fortunes of the day appeared to alternate between the

respective armies for three hours, the Federals holding out bravely

against the superior numbers of the enemy, who were enabled to

concentrate their entire army of two thousand men and four or five

pieces of artillery against this comparatively small force.

Colonel Moody’s force not having then been heard from, Colonel Jones,

who had charge of the division now in action, after exhausting his

ammunition, withdrew his men from the field.

Almost at this juncture, Colonel Moody’s command, which had been

detained by obstructions placed in the road over which they were

compelled to pass, arrived, and attacked the enemy vigorously on his

left, and in turn maintained an obstinate contest, unaided, against the

entire rebel command, which they did with much courage and skill, until

three o’clock, P. M., when they too were compelled to retire before the

superior force of their opponents.

Though thwarted in his plan of attack by the unexpected obstructions

which Colonel Moody’s division had to encounter, General Milroy was far

from being disconcerted by the result. The men had evinced a high order

of courage, and the divisions had alternately maintained an obstinate

fight against an army of nearly three times their number.

The official report of the casualties on the Federal side gives the

number of killed, twenty; wounded, one hundred and seven; missing, ten.

The rebel loss is acknowledged by the Richmond _Enquirer_ to have been

about the same.

BATTLE AT MUNFORDSVILLE, KY.

DECEMBER 17, 1861.

Colonel Willich, with the Thirty-second Indiana, a regiment composed of

Germans, occupying an advance post of General McCook’s division of the

Federal army in Kentucky, was attacked on the 17th of December, by three

regiments of Arkansas infantry, Colonel Terry’s Texan Rangers, and Major

Phifer’s cavalry, and also an artillery company, with four pieces, the

whole under the command of General T. C. Hindman.

Colonel Willich’s regiment was guarding a new bridge built by the

Federal troops over Green river, at Rowlett’s Station, on the Louisville

and Nashville railroad, a temporary substitute for the handsome iron

structure which had been destroyed by the rebels, in front of

Mumfordsville. A picket guard of two companies had been thrown across

the river on the south side, occupying a wide area of cleared ground,

which was skirted by forests, from whence the rebels attempted to

surprise and capture them.

The second company, Captain Glass, was acting in detached squads as

pickets in the woods on the right flank, and were attacked in detail by

the enemy’s skirmishers. The pickets made a gallant defence, and fell

back slowly and in good order on their supports. The alarm in the mean

time having been given to the other companies on the north side of the

river, they started in “double-quick” over the bridge, crossed the hill

on the opposite side, and rushed with fierce haste into the woods whence

the firing proceeded, led on by Lieutenant-Colonel Treba, Colonel

Willich at the time being necessarily at headquarters. A portion of the

third company, under Lieutenant Sachs, occupied a covered position on

the left flank, where they were now attacked by the advancing enemy.

Unable to restrain the ardor of his men, the Lieutenant boldly left his

sheltered position and attacked the rebels in the open field; but fierce

as his onset was, the disparity of numbers proved too greatly against

him, and his little band would have inevitably been cut to pieces but

for the timely arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Treba, with the main body

of the regiment. He sent the sixth, seventh and tenth companies to

support the second company on the right, and the first, fifth, eighth

and ninth companies to support the third company on the left flank. At

the very first rush of the skirmishers, the enemy were thrown into

confusion, and driven back at all points.

Then the most severe and bloody part of the battle commenced. With

terrible ferocity Colonel Terry’s regiment of Texas Rangers poured in

black masses of cavalry upon the Union skirmishers along the whole line.

They rode up within fifteen or twenty yards, some even in the very midst

of the men, and commenced a terrible fire from their carbines and

revolvers. At their first onset, it seemed as if every one of the men

would be destroyed. But here it was that the veteran coolness and

bravery of the Union troops shone forth. They allowed the enemy to come

almost as near as he chose, and then poured a deadly fire upon him,

which shook the entire line. Upon the right flank of the third company’s

position, by order of Adjutant Schmidt, the eighth company was led forth

by Lieutenants Kappel and Levy; upon the left, Lieutenant-Colonel Treba

advanced with the ninth company; both attacked the enemy in close

skirmishers’ line, drove him back, and rescued the rest of the heroic

little band under Lieutenant Sachs. He himself and a number of his men

were, however, already killed, though they had made the enemy pay dearly

for their lives.

Pictorial history of the war for the Union, volume 1 (of 2) · 第 21 / 50 段