SUBMARINES
It is, of course, a debatable point in this war, the first in which
submarines have played a large part, to what extent they have justified
their existence. Certain it is that as a moral force they are in a
very strong position. Our own main battle-fleets have had to take very
complete measures for protection against this form of attack. Any
excursions to sea must always be done at high speed with an advance
guard of destroyers and other light craft, though there is consolation
in the fact that the fleet of the enemy have chosen to remain in more
or less land-locked harbours with elaborate boomed defences. At the
same time it is certain that the war at sea cannot be brought to a
final end by the submarine, but must eventually be settled by the
Capital ship.
The German submarines have had greater opportunities of paring down
our Navy than we theirs. This applies especially to the early days of
the war, when, owing to the total unexpectedness of the upheaval,
before experience had taught us how to deal with these unseen craft,
they failed entirely to achieve anything that caused us alarm from a
military standpoint. A few ancient cruisers fell to them, three of
which, the _Aboukir_, the _Hogue_, and the _Cressy_, were so destroyed
while indulging in a perfectly human desire to save life. All the ships
so sunk were easy targets owing to slow speed. So far not one really
fast modern vessel has been sunk by this form of attack.
If it could ever be known, which I fear is impossible, how many
torpedoes have been fired at warships without taking effect (and the
number is large), it would only go to show the difficulties encountered
by the submarine and the immunity of the fast vessel. Add to this the
large number of enemy submarines destroyed, nearly all by means evolved
since war began (a period notoriously difficult in which to carry out
experiments), and it is only reasonable to presume that, when times of
peace come again, it will not be long before means are arrived at which
will render surface vessels almost entirely immune from this form of
attack.
Everyone is agreed that one of the brightest spots in our campaign in
the Dardanelles has been supplied by the British submarines. If there
are still people at home who ask what the Navy is doing, one can point
to these vessels as an example of what the whole Navy would do had they
any scope in which to exercise their activities.
But we are dealing with an enemy who feels that he has nothing to gain
and everything to lose by seeking an engagement. The impossibility of
forcing his stronghold must be obvious to the least enlightened.
Our submarines out here have penetrated what most naval men would have
declared to be an impassable barrier until it became an achieved fact.
Think of the obstacles their crews have surmounted: rows of mines
susceptible to the lightest touch, nets completely across the Narrows,
and last, but not least, a strong current flowing seawards. Only then
can you begin to realise the difficulties and dangers in endeavouring
to gain an entrance into the Sea of Marmora and the main sea route for
the Turkish water-borne supplies. The following signal, typical of
many others, "E— arrived in Sea of Marmora without trouble, torpedoed
a steamer in False Bay on her way," furnishes an indication that these
desperate ventures are undertaken as a matter of course.
I met Commander Nasmith one afternoon at Kephalo. He had just returned
from an aeroplane flight up the Narrows after an investigation of
the net defence placed across at that point to prevent submarines
from penetrating into the Sea of Marmora. He did not seem very much
impressed, and his judgment was justified next day when he took E11
through the defences and arrived in Marmora without mishap. The
train-like regularity with which our submarines have accomplished this
task is apt to make the venture appear commonplace to the newspaper
reader, who may imagine that there is some easy road which, when once
found, is plain-sailing. Nothing could be further from the truth. Every
submarine that goes up does so with the full knowledge of the dangers
to be faced, and the occasional loss of one of them shows the perils
incurred.
In the early stages of the operations the net across the Narrows could
be negotiated by diving under it; but, on a subsequent occasion, a
submarine returning to the open sea found that the Turks had placed a
deeper net in position. This particular submarine fouled the net at a
depth of over one hundred feet, and was actually hung up by stout wire
for upwards of fifteen minutes. It is impossible to imagine anything
more likely to unnerve men than to be caught like herrings in a net
below the surface, and actually to hear, as they did, hydrostatic
bombs exploding around them. The Turks would know, of course, by the
agitation of the net above, that a submarine was caught; however, by
going astern and then ahead, and allowing her whole weight to come on
the net, the vessel broke through and returned in safety.
Many of our submarines after penetrating to the Sea of Marmora have
made protracted stays of twenty-eight to thirty days, which is the
more astonishing when one realises the cramped conditions and general
discomfort when living on one of these boats for any length of time.
I think it may be said that the Turks have ceased to regard the sea
route as a means of supplying their troops with any degree of safety,
the number of transports sunk being very large, including war vessels.
One of the most successful pieces of work accomplished at the time of
the Suvla Bay landing was the sinking of the _Kaiserin Barbarossa_ by a
British submarine. This ship had formerly belonged to Germany, but was
purchased from them by Turkey. She was sent down from Constantinople to
take position off Gallipoli or thereabouts with a view to indirect fire
over the land with her 11-inch guns, of which she possessed eight. She
was also reported to be carrying large quantities of ammunition for
the land forces. One can well imagine, therefore, the enthusiasm with
which the signal of her sinking was received. Undoubtedly our ships and
land-force thus escaped what might have been a severe menace, while the
effect on the enemy was evidently salutary, as no further attempt was
made to dispatch a war vessel with guns of heavy calibre to co-operate
with their army.
Possibly at some future time a fuller description may be written when
all the facts become known of the adventures of our submarines in this
inland sea. These should certainly supply the historian with some of
the most romantic episodes of the war.