The government of that unfortunate country discovers its faithlessness
so much, that peace on any terms with her is scarcely worth obtaining.
Of what use is peace with a government that will employ that peace for
no other purpose than to repair, as far as it is possible, her shattered
finances and broken credit, and then go to war again? Four times within
the last ten years, from the time the American war closed, has the
Anglo-germanic government of England been meditating fresh war. First
with France on account of Holland, in 1787; afterwards with Russia;
then with Spain, on account of Nootka Sound; and a second time against
France, to overthrow her revolution. Sometimes that government employs
Prussia against Austria; at another time Austria against Prussia; and
always one or the other, or both against France. Peace with such a
government is only a treacherous cessation of hostilities.
The frequency of wars on the part of England, within the last century,
more than before, must have had some cause that did not exist prior to
that epoch. It is not difficult to discover what that cause is. It is
the mischievous compound of an Elector of the Germanic body and a King
of England; and which necessarily must, at some day or other, become
an object of attention to France. That one nation has not a right to
interfere in the internal government of another nation, is admitted; and
in this point of view, France has no right to dictate to England what
its form of government shall be. If it choose to have a thing called a
King, or whether that King shall be a man or an ass, is a matter with
which France has no business. But whether an Elector of the Germanic
body shall be King of England, is an _external_ case, with which
France and every other nation, who suffers inconvenience and injury in
consequence of it, has a right to interfere.
It is from this mischievous compound of Elector and King, that
originates a great part of the troubles that vex the continent of
Europe; and with respect to England, it has been the cause of her
immense national debt, the ruin of her finances, and the insolvency of
her bank. All intrigues on the continent, in which England is a party,
or becomes involved, are generated by, and act through, the medium of
this Anglo-germanic compound. It will be necessary to dissolve it. Let
the Elector retire to his Electorate, and the world will have peace.
England herself has given examples of interference in matters of this
kind, and that in cases where injury was only apprehended. She engaged
in a long and expensive war against France (called the succession war)
to prevent a grandson of Louis the Fourteenth being king of Spain;
because, said she, _it will be injurious_ to me; and she has been
fighting and intriguing against what was called the family-compact ever
since. In 1787 she threatened France with war to prevent a connection
between France and Hoi-land; and in all her propositions of peace to-day
she is dictating separations. But if she look at the Anglo-germanic
compact at home, called the Hanover succession, she cannot avoid seeing
that France necessarily must, some day or other, take up that subject,
and make the return of the Elector to his Electorate one of the
conditions of peace. There will be no lasting peace between the two
countries till this be done, and the sooner it be done the better will
it be for both.
I have not been in any company where this matter aas been a topic, that
did not see it in the light it is here stated. Even Barthelemy,(1) when
he first came to the Directory (and Barthelemy was never famous for
patriotism) acknowledged in my hearing, and in company with Derche,
Secretary to the Legation at Lille, the connection of an Elector of
Germany and a King of England to be injurious to France. I do not,
however, mention it from a wish to embarrass the negociation for peace.
The Directory has fixed its _ultimatum_; but if that ultimatum be
rejected, the obligation to adhere to it is discharged, and a new one
may be assumed. So wretchedly has Pitt managed his opportunities" that
every succeeding negociation has ended in terms more against him than
the former. If the Directory had bribed him, he could not serve his
interest better than he does. He serves it as Lord North served that of
America, which finished in the discharge of his master.*
1 Marquis de Barthelemy (Francois) (1750-1830) entered the
Directory in June, 1796, through royalist influence. He
shared Pichegru's banishment, and subsequently became an
agent of Louis XVIII.--_Editor._
* The father of Pitt, when a member of the House of Commons,
exclaiming one day, during a former war, against the
enormous and ruinous expense of German connections, as the
offspring of the Hanover succession, and borrowing a
metaphor from the story of Prometheus, cried out: "Thus,
Hie Prometheus, is Britain chained to the barren rock of
Hanover; whilst the imperial eagle preys upon her vitals."--
Author.
Thus far I had written when the negociation at Lille became suspended,
in consequence of which I delayed the publication, that the ideas
suggested in this letter might not intrude themselves during the
interval. The _ultimatum_ offered by the Directory, as the terms of
peace, was more moderate than the government of England had a right to
expect. That government, though the provoker of the war, and the first
that committed hostilities by sending away the ambassador Chauvelin,(**)
had formerly talked of demanding from France, _indemnification for
the past and security for the future_. France, in her turn, might have
retorted, and demanded the same from England; but she did not. As it was
England that, in consequence of her bankruptcy, solicited peace, France
offered it to her on the simple condition of her restoring the islands
she had taken. The ultimatum has been rejected, and the negociation
broken off. The spirited part of France will say, _tant mieux_, so much
the better.
** It was stipulated in the treaty of commerce between
France and England, concluded at Paris, that the sending
away an ambassador by either party, should be taken as an
act of hostility by the other party. The declaration of war
(Feb. M *793) by the Convention, of which I was then a
member and know well the case, was made in exact conformity
to this article in the treaty; for it was not a declaration
of war against England, but a declaration that the French
Republic is in war with England; the first act of hostility
having been committed by England. The declaration was made
immediately on Chauvelin's return to France, and in
consequence of it. Mr. Pitt should inform himself of things
better than he does, before he prates so much about them, or
of the sending away of Malmesbury, who was only on a visit
of permission.--Author.
How the people of England feel on the breaking up of the negociation,
which was entirely the act of their own Government, is best known to
themselves; but from what I know of the two nations, France ought to
hold herself perfectly indifferent about a peace with the Government of
England. Every day adds new strength to France and new embarrassments
to her enemy. The resources of the one increase, as those of the other
become exhausted. England is now reduced to the same system of paper
money from which France has emerged, and we all know the inevitable fate
of that system. It is not a victory over a few ships, like that on the
coast of Holland, that gives the least support or relief to a paper
system. On the news of this victory arriving in England, the funds did
not rise a farthing. The Government rejoiced, but its creditors were
silent.
It is difficult to find a motive, except in folly and madness, for the
conduct of the English government. Every calculation and prediction of
Mr. Pitt has turned out directly the contrary; yet still he predicts.
He predicted, with all the solemn assurance of a magician, that France
would be bankrupt in a few months. He was right as to the thing, but
wrong as to the place, for the bankruptcy happened in England whilst the
words were yet warm upon his lips. To find out what will happen, it is
only necessary to know what Mr. Pitt predicts. He is a true prophet if
taken in the reverse.
Such is the ruinous condition that England is now in, that great as
the difficulties of war are to the people, the difficulties that would
accompany peace are equally as great to the Government. Whilst the war
continues, Mr. Pitt has a pretence for shutting up the bank. But as that
pretence could last no longer than the war lasted, he dreads the peace
that would expose the absolute bankruptcy of the government, and unveil
to a deceived nation the ruinous effect of his measures. Peace would be
a day of accounts to him, and he shuns it as an insolvent debtor shuns
a meeting of his creditors. War furnishes him with many pretences; peace
would furnish him with none, and he stands alarmed at its consequences.
His conduct in the negociation at Lille can be easily interpreted. It is
not for the sake of the nation that he asks to retain some of the taken
islands; for what are islands to a nation that has already too many for
her own good, or what are they in comparison to the expense of another
campaign in the present depreciating state of the English funds? (And
even then those islands must be restored.)
No, it is not for the sake of the nation that he asks. It is for the
sake of himself. It is as if he said to France, Give me some pretence,
cover me from disgrace when my day of reckoning comes!
Any person acquainted with the English Government knows that every
Minister has some dread of what is called in England the winding up
of accounts at the end of a war; that is, the final settlement of all
expenses incurred by the war; and no Minister had ever so great cause of
dread as Mr. Pitt. A burnt child dreads the fire, and Pitt has had some
experience upon this case. The winding up of accounts at the end of the
American war was so great, that, though he was not the cause of it,
and came into the Ministry with great popularity, he lost it all by
undertaking, what was impossible for him to avoid, the voluminous
business of the winding up. If such was the case in settling the
accounts of his predecessor, how much more has he to apprehend when the
accounts to be settled are his own? All men in bad circumstances
hate the settlement of accounts, and Pitt, as a Minister, is of that
description.
But let us take a view of things on a larger ground than the case of
a Minister. It will then be found, that England, on a comparison of
strength with France, when both nations are disposed to exert their
utmost, has no possible chance of success. The efforts that England made
within the last century were not generated on the ground of _natural
ability_, but of _artificial anticipations_. She ran posterity into
debt, and swallowed up in one generation the resources of several
generations yet to come, till the project can be pursued no longer. It
is otherwise in France. The vastness of her territory and her population
render the burden easy that would make a bankrupt of a country like
England.
It is not the weight of a thing, but the numbers who are to bear that
weight, that makes it feel light or heavy to the shoulders of those who
bear it. A land-tax of half as much in the pound as the land-tax is in
England, will raise nearly four times as much revenue in France as is
raised in England. This is a scale easily understood, by which all the
other sections of productive revenue can be measured. Judge then of the
difference of natural ability.
England is strong in a navy; but that navy costs about eight millions
sterling a-year, and is one of the causes that has hastened her
bankruptcy. The history of navy bills sufficiently proves this. But
strong as England is in this case, the fate of navies must finally be
decided by the natural ability of each country to carry its navy to the
greatest extent; and France is able to support a navy twice as large as
that of England, with less than half the expense per head on the people,
which the present navy of England costs.
We all know that a navy cannot be raised as expeditiously as an army.
But as the average duration of a navy, taking the decay of time, storms,
and all circumstances and accidents together, is less than twenty years,
every navy must be renewed within that time; and France at the end of a
few years, can create and support a navy of double the extent of that of
England; and the conduct of the English government will provoke her to
it.
But of what use are navies otherwise than to make or prevent invasions?
Commercially considered, they are losses. They scarcely give any
protection to the commerce of the countries which have them, compared
with the expense of maintaining them, and they insult the commerce of
the nations that are neutral.
During the American war, the plan of the armed neutrality was formed and
put in execution: but it was inconvenient, expensive, and ineffectual.
This being the case, the problem is, does not commerce contain within
itself, the means of its own protection? It certainly does, if the
neutral nations will employ that means properly.
Instead then of an _armed neutrality_, the plan should be directly the
contrary. It should be an _unarmed neutrality_. In the first place,
the rights of neutral nations are easily defined. They are such as are
exercised by nations in their intercourse with each other in time of
peace, and which ought not, and cannot of right, be interrupted in
consequence of war breaking out between any two or more of them.
Taking this as a principle, the next thing is to give it effect. The
plan of the armed neutrality was to effect it by threatening war; but an
unarmed neutrality can effect it by much easier and more powerful means.
Were the neutral nations to associate, under an honourable injunction of
fidelity to each other, and publicly declare to the world, that if any
belligerent power shall seize or molest any ship or vessel belonging
to the citizens or subjects of any of the powers composing that
Association, that the whole Association will shut its ports against the
flag of the offending nation, and will not permit any goods, wares,
or merchandise, produced or manufactured in the offending nation, or
appertaining thereto, to be imported into any of the ports included in
the Association, until reparation be made to the injured party,--the
reparation to be three times the value of the vessel and cargo,--and
moreover that all remittances on money, goods, and bills of exchange, do
cease to be made to the offending nation, until the said reparation be
made: were the neutral nations only to do this, which it is their
direct interest to do, England, as a nation depending on the commerce of
neutral nations in time of war, dare not molest them, and France would
not. But whilst, from the want of a common system, they individually
permit England to do it, because individually they cannot resist it,
they put France under the necessity of doing the same thing. The supreme
of all laws, in all cases, is that of self-preservation.
As the commerce of neutral nations would thus be protected by the means
that commerce naturally contains within itself, all the naval operations
of France and England would be confined within the circle of acting
against each other: and in that case it needs no spirit of prophecy to
discover that France must finally prevail. The sooner this be done, the
better will it be for both nations, and for all the world.