rifles. They cannot attack the tank, because even if they had weapons
that could penetrate the tank’s armour, the latter’s speed would enable
it to avoid conflict at will. Similarly, infantry have no power to hit
the aeroplane unless it swoops very low, whereas it can remain at a
moderate height and bomb its helpless foes.
For defence against either, infantry are dependent on the help of other
arms or on going to earth like rabbits――in which case their offensive
value in war is _nil_.
A business which retained the aged and infirm as the bulk of its
employees would soon be bankrupt; it may find use for a few as
caretakers――and that is the only feasible _rôle_ for infantry in mobile
warfare of the future.
It is needless to consider cavalry, for they suffer all the
disabilities, save one, of infantry, and in greater degree because they
offer a larger and more vulnerable target. The sole exception is that
they can run away faster!
Then, with regard to field artillery――though moderately effective
against the sluggish tanks of the Great War, its chances would be
infinitely less against a modern tank zigzagging at over 20 m.p.h., and
infinitesimal against them if launched in masses. If it cannot hit, it
will be hit. In any case, its value depends on the tanks coming to meet
it; its _rôle_ thus becomes purely defensive. Only by being fitted in a
tank――the obvious solution――can it compel the tank to come to action,
and resume its offensive _rôle_ in a war of movement.
Though the tank is not yet perfect――it is only as old as the automobile
of 1902, or the aeroplane of 1910――the fact that it combines in itself
the three essential elements of warfare――hitting power, protection, and
mobility――makes it clearly superior in normal country to any of the
existing arms, which are deficient in one, or all, of these elements.
To anyone who has experienced the sense of helplessness caused by the
sight of the modern tanks racing towards one at 20 m.p.h., sweeping
over banks and nullahs, swinging round with amazing agility in their
own length, the question arises: “Can flesh and blood, however heroic,
be persuaded to face them?” It is a sight to freeze the blood of a
witness with imagination to grasp the demoralizing effect if their guns
and machine-guns were actually spitting forth death.
The tank has its limitations; there are certain types of ground
on which it is handicapped――hills, woods, and swamps, and certain
defences against which it is helpless. By taking advantage of such
partially tank-proof terrain, infantry may survive for a time. But
the limitations of the tank are exaggerated by the fact that its
tactics have not been thought out and adapted to its qualities and
limitations. Regarded as a mere prop to an arm――infantry――too helpless
to look after itself, it has been frittered away in driblets or under
unsuitable conditions――as in the swamps of Passchendaele.
To discover its true use let me suggest an historical parallel:
The military bulwark of the Roman Empire was its legions, for six
centuries the “queen of battle,” defying all efforts to oppose them by
like means. On the _9th August, 378_ A.D., on the plains of Adrianople,
they met a new challenge――the cavalry of the Goths. “The Goths swept
down on the flank of the Roman infantry, so tremendous was the impact
that the legions were pushed together in helpless confusion.... Into
this quivering mass the Goths rode, plying sword and lance against the
helpless enemy.” When the sun went down that evening, it set not only
on the great Roman Empire, but on the reign of infantry――the instrument
and token of Roman world-power. The age of cavalry was ushered in.
Fifteen hundred years later the German army was, in turn,
the traditional symbol of military power. For four years, her
machine-gunners, heirs of the Roman legionaries, defied all the efforts
of orthodox tactics to overthrow them.
On the _8th of August, 1918_, the German infantry legions were overrun
and slaughtered by the onset of the British tanks, almost as helplessly
as their forerunners at Adrianople, exactly fifteen hundred and forty
years before. Let the story be epitomized in the words of the enemy, of
Ludendorf himself:
“_August 8th was the black day of the German army in the history of
the war._ The divisions in line allowed themselves to be completely
overwhelmed. Divisional staffs were surprised in their headquarters by
enemy tanks.” On the final phase of the war the verdict of Ludendorf
was “mass attacks by tanks ... remained hereafter our most dangerous
enemies.”
The lesson to be drawn from this historical analogy is that the tank
attack is the modern substitute for the cavalry charge, the supreme
value of which lay in its speed and impetus of assault, and the
demoralizing effect of its furious onset. The deadliness of modern
fire-weapons brought about the extinction of the cavalry charge, and
with its disappearance warfare became lopsided and stagnant. The
stalemates of recent campaigns are to be traced to the lack of any
means of delivering and exploiting a decisive blow. If, instead of
regarding cavalry as men on horseback, soldiers thought of it as _the
mobile arm_, the main cause of the interminable siege warfare of the
Russo-Japanese and Great Wars would be apparent. The practical view of
history lies in projecting the film of the past on the blank screen of
the future.
Once appreciate that tanks are not an extra arm or a mere aid to
infantry but the modern form of heavy cavalry and their true military
use is obvious――to be concentrated and used in as large masses as
possible for a decisive blow against the Achilles’ heel of the enemy
army, the communications and command centres which form its nerve
system. Then not only may we see the rescue of mobility from the toils
of trench-warfare, but with it the revival of generalship and the
art of war, in contrast to its mere mechanics. Instead of machines
threatening to become the master of men, as they actually did in
1914–18, they will give man back opportunities for the use of his
art and brain, and on the battlefields of the future may be expected
the triumphs of an Arbela, of quality over quantity. “It is the
_Man_, not men, who count in war.” The tank assault of to-morrow is
but the long-awaited re-birth of the cavalry charge, with the merely
material changes that moving fire is added to shock, and that the
armoured cavalry-tank replaces the vulnerable cavalry-horse. Thus, to
paraphrase, “The cavalry is dead! Long live the cavalry!”
The last war was the culmination of brute force; the next will be the
vindication of moral force, even in the realm of the armies. From the
delusion that the armed forces themselves were the real objective in
war, it was the natural sequence of ideas that the combatant troops who
composed the armies should be regarded as the object to strike at.
Thus progressive butchery, politely called “attrition,” becomes the
essence of war. To kill, if possible, more of the enemy troops than
your own side loses, is the sum total of this military creed, which
attained its tragi-comic climax on the Western front in the Great War.
The absurdity and wrong-headedness of this doctrine should surely have
been apparent to any mind which attempted to think logically instead of
blindly accepting inherited traditions. War is but a duel between two
nations instead of two individuals. A moment’s unprejudiced reflection
on the analogy of a boxing match would be sufficient to reveal the
objective dictated by common sense. Only the most stupid boxer would
attempt to beat his opponent by battering and bruising the latter’s
flesh until at last he weakens and yields. Even if this method of
attrition finally succeeds, it is probable that the victor himself will
be exhausted and injured. The victorious boxer, however, has won his
stake, and can afford not to worry over the period of convalescence,
whereas the recovery of a nation is a slow and painful process――as the
people of these Isles know to their cost.
A boxer who uses his intelligence, however, aims to strike a single
decisive blow as early as possible against some vital point――the jaw
or the solar plexus――which will instantly paralyse his opponent’s
resistance. Thus he gains his objective without himself suffering
seriously. Surely those responsible for the direction of war might be
expected to use their intelligence as much as a professional pugilist?
The first gleam of light on the military horizon appeared in the
closing stages of the Great War. Recent publications have revealed that
in 1918 the Tank Corps General Staff put forward a scheme, originating,
it is understood, with its chief, Colonel Fuller, to strike at the
nerve centres of the German army instead of at its flesh and blood――the
fighting troops. Reflection on the disaster of March, 1918, showed
that its extent was due far more to the breakdown of command and staff
control than to the collapse of the infantry resistance. A scheme
was evolved to launch a fleet of light fast tanks, under cover of a
general offensive, which should pass through the German lines, and,
neglecting the fighting troops, aim straight for the command and
communication centres in rear of the front. By the annihilation of
these, the disorganization and capitulation of the combatant units
was visualized――for without orders, without co-ordination, without
supplies, an army is but a panic and famine-stricken mob, incapable of
effective action.
This plan, adapted as the basic tactical idea for 1919, had the war
lasted, heralds the dawn of scientific military thought in its grasp
of the truth that even the military objective is a moral one――the
paralysis of the enemy’s command and not the bodies of the actual
soldiers.
“The wheel has come full circle,” for this blow at the hostile command
was the method of Alexander, one of the greatest captains in all
history――and who, unlike Napoleon, attained his ultimate political
objective in its entirety. It was thus at Arbela that Alexander, with
a small but highly trained force, manœuvred to strike through a gap
at Darius, and with the flight of its chief the huge Persian army
dissolved into a mob, its superior numbers but an encumbrance.
THE EVOLUTION OF “NEW MODEL” ARMIES
“Rome was not built in a day”――nor will be the armies of the “new
model,” though, since the history of the material world is a tale
of the replacement of the human muscles by machines, the end is
inevitable. Civil developments in mechanical science have repeatedly
and continuously influenced and changed the methods of warfare. The
longbows of mediæval England had to give way to the musket, the “wooden
walls” of Nelson’s time yielded to the ironclad, the sailing ship was
replaced by the steamship. But natural conservatism and financial
stringency make rapid changes in peace-time unlikely.
Thus the first stage will probably be to provide infantry with
mechanical legs to carry them to the battlefield, to replace
horse-drawn artillery with motor-drawn, or motor-borne guns, and to
develop the tank arm to the proportion that its tactical importance as
the heir of cavalry demands. With their transport no longer tied to
roads and railways, such armies could well make advances of a hundred
miles in the day.
A longer period must elapse before tanks swallow the older arms
completely, though the absorption of these Jonahs will be hastened
if the military leaders of the nations realize that the gas-weapon
has come to stay, notwithstanding the paper decrees of Leagues and
Conferences.
To realize this we have only to ask the question: How can the
respective arms protect themselves against gas? Aircraft, by rising
above it; tanks, by being air-tight and producing their own oxygen
inside; infantry, cavalry, artillery, by the use of some form of
respirator. A respirator is only proof against known kinds of gas; it
cannot be worn for long without incapacitating its wearer from active
exertion; it cannot protect the whole body, unless it be developed into
a complete diver’s suit, in which movement would be almost impossible.
If a man cannot move freely, he cannot fight. If a horse cannot move,
what use is his rider? If the artillery-man cannot serve the gun
freely and the gun is immovable, field artillery is useless. Therefore,
if gas becomes a standard weapon, we are left with the tank and the
aeroplane as the sole effective arms for offensive action. Only as the
static defenders of the fortified bases――the land-ports――of tanks and
aircraft will there be a future for infantry and artillery, the former
armed with super-heavy armour-piercing machine-guns, and the latter
with anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns.
How long even tanks will persist is a moot point. To hit so small and
rapidly moving a target is not easy for the aeroplane, and if it come
low, the tank can hit back. In the next lap of the immemorial race
between the means of offence and protection, mobility is on the side
of the aeroplane, but gravity on that of the tank――in increasing the
degree of armour.
Again, though gas is the weapon which will sign the death-warrant of
the traditional arms, and by which the new arms will attack the enemy
nation, its very triumph will cause one more revolution of the eternal
cycle.
Since both are gas-proof, the armour-piercing projectile will come
back into its own for air and tank battles. Both machines also are
self-contained fighting organisms, combining hitting power, mobility
and protection. What present type of weapon already possesses this
combination? The warship.
Thus the tactics of tank _versus_ tank will conform to those of naval
war, while overhead Tennyson’s “Airy navies grappling in the central
blue” find literal and not only figurative fulfilment.
Although overland warfare will ultimately assume a close resemblance to
sea fighting, the novelists’ dream of land “dreadnoughts” is unlikely
of fruition. The obstacles met with on land, the benefit of using
an already cleared and graduated path, such as road systems provide
through and over these obstacles, the load-capacity and width of
bridges, will limit the size of the landships. Even the amphibious tank
does not solve the problem of getting out of a river with steep banks.
Thus a concentrated essence of fighting power, rather than bulk, will
be the aim of the tank designers of the future, just as the organizers
of armies will pin their faith on quality instead of quantity, turning
for inspiration to Alexander Xenophon and Gustavus Adolphus in place
of Clausewitz. Not “how large,” but “how good” will be the standard of
to-morrow.
To sum up our deductions――The land “punch” of the future will be
delivered by fleets of tanks, their communications, maintained by
cross-country and air vehicles, offering no fixed and vulnerable target
for an enemy blow, either on land or from the air. These quick-moving
and quick-hitting forces will advance by rapid bounds into the enemy
country to strike at its vitals, establishing behind them, as they
progress, a chain of fortified bases, garrisoned by heavy artillery and
land marines――_late_ infantry. A proportion of land marines might also
be carried in this tank fleet to be used as “landing parties” to clear
fortifications and hill defences under cover of the fire from the tank
fleet.
Speed, on land as in the air, will dominate the next war, transforming
the battlefields of the future from squalid trench labyrinths into
arenas where surprise and manœuvre will reign again, restored to life
and emerging from the mausoleums of mud built by Clausewitz and his
successors.
EPILOGUE
The critic may ask why this survey has been confined to weapons already
known, why, in our forecast, we have not endeavoured to imitate
the imaginative flights of a Jules Verne or an H. G. Wells in the
past? The future may bring to fruition the sensational dreams of the
novelist――discovery in bacteriological and electrical science may lead
to the wars of the future being waged by means of the germs, or the
green, purple, and other “death” rays, lurid in hue and effect, which
form the properties of the prophetic novelist. But for a reasoned
attempt to forecast the future of war we cannot rely on hypothetical
discoveries of a revolutionary nature――which may prove but chimeras
in the desert. For our suggestions to have a practical value, they
must be based, not on the shifting sands of speculations, but on solid
rock――the evolutionary development of weapons and powers already
available. We appreciate that further scientific discoveries may
modify our conclusions as to the means by which the moral objective is
gained――but the goal itself will remain true.
It is hoped that the danger and futility of the Napoleonic doctrine of
“absolute war,” and of its fungus growth――the “nation in arms,” has
been demonstrated so clearly that they may be cast on the ash-heap.
Let us never again confound the means with the end. The goal in war
is the prosperous continuance of national policy in the years after
the war, and the only true objective is the moral one of subduing the
enemy’s will to resist with the least possible economic, human, and
ethical loss――which implies a far-sighted choice, and blend, of the
weapons most suitable for our purpose. A statue of General Sherman
in Washington bears this inscription: “The legitimate object of war
is a more perfect peace.” The phrase is too narrow, and warring
nations reck little of legitimacy――but common sense, reinforced by
bitter experience, should lead the grand strategists of the future
to the wider truth that a more perfect peace is the only _rational_
object of war, and that any military plan or act which infringes this
prospect causes a bad debt on the balance sheet of victory. May the
nations and their political and military chiefs remember the words of
Solomon: “Where there is no vision, the people perish.” Future wars
will be waged by weapons that are the product of peace-time industry;
these weapons will be directed against the nerve centres and arteries
of civil life, and if wisdom prevail, the ultimate peace will be the
guiding star of the military policy and plans. Weapons, target, and aim
will alike be civil. The future of war lies in the future of peace.
* * * * *
Transcriber’s Notes:
――Text in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).
――Archaic and variable spelling has been preserved.
――Variations in hyphenation and compound words have been preserved.