_Thetis_ increased to full speed and, passing round {227} the end of

the Mole, steered for the extremity of the barge boom. A fairly heavy

fire was being directed at her by such guns of the Mole-extension

battery as were still in action; as far as could be seen, nothing was

fired by the three-gun heavy battery at the end of the broad part of

the Mole. The ship's guns opened fire at the lighthouse, which was

believed to be used as a signalling and observation station, and at the

southernmost barge; the latter was sunk. At this stage _Thetis_ was

caught by the strong east-going tidal stream and was set towards the

boom of entanglement nets. The ship passed over the latter between the

two northern buoys and tore the nets away with her momentum. The piers

at the entrance to the canal were then sighted, but the propellers were

so badly fouled by the nets that the engines were brought to a stop.

[Illustration: AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN THROUGH THE CLOUDS A FEW HOURS

AFTER THE ENTERPRISE. Note the blockships sunk in the entrance, the

break in the viaduct, and the southern barge missing from the boom.]

It must have been at about this moment that the enemy first realised

the true nature of the enterprise. The attacks on the Mole, the

blowing up of the viaduct, the explosions of torpedoes on the inside of

the Mole, the smoke, the rapid changes of visibility, and the terrific

noise on all sides had combined to leave the enemy in a hopeless state

of stupefaction as to our real intentions. We heard afterwards that

they believed a forced landing on the coast was in progress. The

impossibility of using one's defensive measures to the best advantage

when the initiative lies in the hands of the attackers has already been

referred to. Suffice it to say that the enemy do not appear to have

discovered the real purpose of our operations until too late to make

the best use of their defensive measures.

{228}

_Thetis_ now came under extremely heavy fire both from the direction of

the Mole and from shore batteries near the canal. Her six-inch gun on

the forecastle was replying to the shore batteries. She appeared to

have grounded about three hundred yards from the canal entrance.

_Thetis_ now appeared to be settling down. All chances of struggling

into the canal entrance appeared to be hopeless. She had been hit

again and again and was on fire in several places. She had taken the

brunt of the firing whilst her two consorts were following

comparatively undamaged. She could do little more now than assist

_Intrepid_ and _Iphigenia_ to reach their objectives. Prearranged

signals, therefore, were made to these other two ships guiding them to

the canal. It must be remembered that it was now half an hour after

midnight. _Intrepid_ and _Iphigenia_, in that order, passed close to

_Thetis_. Thanks to the latter's signals they were able to locate the

entrance piers; the further movements of those two vessels will be

described in a moment.

As soon as _Iphigenia_ was clear Captain Sneyd in _Thetis_ ordered the

artificial smoke to be turned on, and had almost decided to abandon

ship when Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Boddie succeeded in getting the

starboard engine to go ahead.

The ship moved slowly forward for a short distance, but was apparently

dragging her stern along the bottom. As far as could be seen she was

not only in the dredged channel leading to the canal, but was lying

across it. The ship was undoubtedly in a sinking condition, so her

captain decided to blow the bottom out of her in accordance with the

Plan.

[Sidenote: Sinking the Blockships]

The blockships had each been fitted with explosive {229} charges inside

the bottom of the ship. These charges had been connected electrically

to a firing arrangement which could be operated from alternative

positions in the ship. The petty officer in charge of the foremost

firing keys had been killed and they could not be found owing to the

fumes from bursting shell and those from the artificial smoke. The

firing keys at the other end of the ship were, therefore, pressed after

the crew had been ordered on deck. The charges immediately exploded.

The bottom of the ship was blown out; in a few moments the vessel had

sunk. The upper deck was now just under water. The ship's company

abandoned the ship, which was still under incessant fire, in the only

remaining boat and pulled away to the northward, where M.L. 526, which

had followed the blockships, picked them up. The _Thetis'_ boat was

the cutter. It had been badly holed by shell fire and was crowded to

its full capacity. Some of the crew were wounded; Sneyd and his

second-in-command had been wounded and gassed. The proceedings of M.L.

526, which also rescued some of the crew from another blockship, will

be described later.

_Intrepid_ had experienced a certain amount of shell fire when

approaching the Mole, having apparently passed through an area which

was being barraged by the enemy. She passed the Mole without

difficulty and navigated between the obstruction booms. The sinking of

the southernmost barge and the tearing away of the entanglement nets by

_Thetis_, with the resultant widening of the unobstructed channel, had

greatly reduced the chance of _Intrepid_ getting into trouble at this

point. During the final run to the canal she had escaped serious

damage from gun-fire {230} because nearly all the German guns were

concentrating either on _Thetis_ or on the forces attacking the Mole.

Having located the entrance pier, passing close to _Thetis_ _en route_,

_Intrepid_ entered the canal and proceeded up the latter until just

inland of the coast-line. Having reached the exact position as signed

to her, Lieutenant Bonham-Carter at once commenced to turn his ship

across the channel. As soon as he found she could be turned no

further--it must be remembered that the navigable channel at that

position was exceedingly narrow--he decided to blow the bottom out of

the ship. The crew had been previously ordered to take to the boats,

but Engineer Sub-Lieutenant Meikle and three ratings had not been able

to leave the engine-room when the charges exploded. Fortunately these

four individuals escaped destruction. The ship sank immediately.

[Illustration: THE THREE BLOCKSHIPS SHORTLY AFTER THE ATTACK. INTREPID

AND IPHIGENIA. The former the nearer to the camera]

One cutter full of men pulled out to seaward and was picked up by M.L.

526, which has already been mentioned as saving the crew of _Thetis_.

Another cutter pulled out to sea, actually past the Mole, and was

picked up by the destroyer _Whirlwind_. Lieutenant Bonham-Carter,

Lieutenant Cory-Wright his second-in-command, Sub-Lieutenant Babb the

navigator, and four petty officers were the last party to leave the

sunken vessel. They launched a raft and proceeded to paddle it towards

M.L. 282, which had followed the blockships into the canal. Whilst on

the raft this party had a very trying experience. The Germans had a

machine-gun on the shore within a few yards. This gun and many others

had been pouring a hot fire into the ship. A lifebuoy light had been

inadvertently left on the raft and automatically {231} lit up on

reaching the water. This gave away their movements. Every effort was

made to extinguish the light; they even sat on it, but could not either

obscure or destroy it for some time. The machine-gun bullets were

cutting up the water all round them, and it was extraordinary that none

of the party was killed. It is difficult to imagine any more awkward

situation. By dint of great efforts they managed to reach the motor

launch and all got into her in safety.

[Sidenote: Completing the Block]

_Iphigenia_ had followed _Intrepid_ and had rounded the Mole with much

the same experience as the latter ship. Having dropped somewhat astern

she increased to full speed and made for the canal. By this time so

many star shell were being fired and so many searchlights being used

that there was not much difficulty in locating the entrance piers; she

was also assisted by the signals from _Thetis_. Passing close to the

latter, _Iphigenia_ was twice hit by shell, one of which cut a steam

pipe, with the result that the forepart of the ship was enveloped in

steam. In addition to that she shortly afterwards ran into thick smoke

and temporarily lost sight of the entrance.

Suddenly the western pier loomed up close ahead. Lieutenant

Billyard-Leake ordered "full speed astern." The ship ran between a

dredger and a barge; on going ahead again she pushed the barge up the

canal. There appeared to be a gap between the bow of the _Intrepid_

and the eastern bank of the canal, so _Iphigenia_ was steered to close

it. Turning his ship by going alternately ahead and astern,

Billyard-Leake managed to get her round well across the channel and

then grounded with his bows on the eastern side. He ordered the crew

to abandon ship and exploded his {232} charges. Exactly as had

occurred in the other two ships, the bottom was blown out and the ship

sank at once. The upper deck was still above water.

The entire crew, officers and men, got away in a single cutter, the

other boat having been severely damaged. M.L. 282 was then seen close

ahead of the ship. The cutter pulled up to her and most of the crew

managed to get on board. The remainder turned the cutter and again

pulled to the launch. All except about three men, of whom one had been

killed, climbed into the launch at the second attempt. The cutter

herself was secured to the bows of the launch, which, having just

picked up the raft party from _Intrepid_, was still heading up the

canal. The launch went astern and backed out of the canal, stern

first, with the cutter in tow. No less than a hundred and one

survivors from the blockships were on board the motor launch. Under

ordinary circumstances such craft can carry from forty to fifty

passengers with a bit of a squash; a hundred and one passengers,

several of them wounded, must have crowded every inch of her deck.

M.L. 282, commanded by Lieutenant Percy T. Deane, R.N.V.R., and M.L.

526, commanded by Lieutenant H. A. Littleton, R.N.V.R., had followed

the blockships, exactly in accordance with the Plan, during their

perilous journey from the Mole. These officers had been specially

chosen for the rescue work from the large number of volunteers for that

dangerous task.

[Illustration: THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE BLOCKED CHANNEL]

M.L. 282 had steamed straight into the canal and stopped between the

two sunken blockships. She came under heavy machine-gun fire from

close range, {233} but was not in the least deterred from the work of

rescuing the blockships' survivors. The fact that this motor launch

was not sunk and that the crew survived was little short of a miracle.

Lieutenant Deane, with his precious cargo, turned his boat round as

soon as he was clear of the canal. Owing to the steering gear having

been damaged, he was forced to steer by means of working the engines at

unequal speeds. He passed as near to the Mole as was possible to

escape the gun-fire from that direction--the reverse of the usual

procedure being necessary under the peculiar circumstances in which

they found themselves. After passing the Mole the launch was steered

to the north-westward and fell in with the Vice-Admiral's vessel,

H.M.S. _Warwick_. Many casualties had been sustained as a result of

the continual fire which she had experienced.

[Sidenote: Rescue of the Crews]

M.L. 526 had steamed into the sunken blockships in the canal, embarking

many of _Intrepid's_ men from a cutter, and then proceeded to _Thetis_,

where all the survivors from that vessel were also embarked from a

cutter. The motor launch had come under heavy fire from the shore guns

and her escape added one more item to the long list of miracles which

took place that night. With sixty-five survivors Lieutenant Littleton

steamed out to sea past the Mole and made the entire passage to Dover

under her own steam, in spite of the gruelling which his frail vessel

had gone through.

The rescue work, as carried out by these two motor launches, compels

admiration. Their chances of success had seemed to be exceedingly

remote. Yet, in spite of all the difficulties, they had rescued no

less {234} than one hundred and sixty-six men from right under the

enemy's batteries. It will be remembered that _Intrepid_ had not

disembarked her surplus crew at position D on the passage across, with

the result that she carried no fewer than eighty-seven officers and men

into the canal. Of these, every single officer and man was brought

back to Dover, although one petty officer had been killed and one

officer mortally wounded whilst being rescued.

Of the crew of M.L. 282 one officer and two men (out of four) laid down

their lives in this splendid achievement. Of all the blockships'

officers and men not a single living soul fell into the hands of the

enemy.

In a subsequent chapter I shall give a more detailed description of the

results of the actual blocking.

There can be no two opinions concerning the handling of the blockships.

The utmost that can be said of the diversions, from the point of view

of their connection with the main object of the enterprise, is that

they assisted the blockships to pass a danger point nearly a mile short

of the canal entrance, and, to a lesser extent, diverted _some_ of the

enemy's attention during the final run to the blocking position.

[Illustration: THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE BLOCKED CHANNEL]

From the vicinity of the Mole batteries to their final destination the

blockship commanders had to depend almost entirely on their own

efforts. Running the gantlet of modern batteries at point-blank range

would ordinarily appear to be foolhardy in the extreme. Yet these

officers made light of the task and showed that difficulties cannot

always be judged by first impressions. The navigation alone was

hazardous enough; concentration of thought in that particular direction

must have been greatly hampered by the {235} kaleidoscopic conditions

of the situation. But perhaps the finest feat of all was the splendid

display of seamanship in the face of extraordinary difficulty. The

complete absence of local knowledge, the opposition of the enemy, and

the unavoidable lack of practice in sinking vessels under such

conditions, all combined to make the task appear quite impracticable.

Yet all difficulties were surmounted and the object of the operation

was achieved.

[Sidenote: Well Done, Blockships]

Of all the happenings on that memorable night the outstanding feature,

which turned success from a possibility into a certainty, was the

magnificent handling of the blockships by Commander Sneyd and

Lieutenants Bonham-Carter and Billyard-Leake. This fact cannot be too

strongly emphasised, for, although it was naturally and fully realised

in the Navy, there were indications that it was not so well grasped by

the man-in-the-street.

{236}

CHAPTER VIII

THE RETIREMENT

It had been arranged that the storming parties on the Mole should have

twenty minutes' warning of _Vindictive_ leaving the outer wall. A

maximum length of stay alongside had also been laid down so that, under

certain circumstances, watches would provide some guide as to the

amount of time available.

The warning signal for leaving the Mole was to consist of a succession

of long and short blasts on the siren, or a particular method of waving

the searchlight beams, or, if all other means failed, a message

conveyed by runner.

At about 12.50 A.M., three-quarters of an hour after _Vindictive's_

arrival alongside, the question of the length of stay was considered.

The blockships had been seen passing the lighthouse _en route_ to the

canal, the viaduct had been blown up. The diversion on the Mole had

throughout served to attract the fire of a large number of enemy

batteries. From this followed the deduction that some chance of rescue

work had probably offered itself to our motor launches. It was likely

that in another twenty minutes these latter vessels would have

definitely succeeded or failed in their object.

[Sidenote: Beginning of the End]

The primary object for which the attack on the Mole was designed had

been attained. There remained the secondary object of demolition. The

only guns in _Vindictive_ which could have borne directly on the Mole

had been put out of action. Her upper {237} works were still being hit

every few seconds with a continually increasing list of casualties

amongst those in exposed positions. Owing to the failure of the Mole

anchors no member of the storming parties could hope to return if

_Daffodil_ was disabled. That the latter vessel had thus far escaped

destruction was little short of a miracle. The maximum period allowed

for the operations of the storming parties would expire at twenty

minutes past one. Thirty minutes remained. If the warning signal was

made immediately, the storming parties would have their maximum time

cut down by only ten minutes.

The question which arose out of the foregoing considerations was as to

whether it was worth while to remain alongside during the last ten

minutes for the sake of demolition work whilst risking, _at the least_,

the loss of the whole of the storming parties then on the Mole.

Shortly after 12.50 A.M. the order was given to make the retirement

signal. _Vindictive's_ sirens had both been shot away. The starboard

searchlight had received a direct hit from a projectile and had been

hurled off the bridge down to the upper deck. The port searchlight had

also been put out of action. An order was passed to _Daffodil_ to make

the retirement signal on her siren. The latter spluttered and gurgled

whilst emitting a veritable shower bath, but presently began to show

signs of being useful. A low groan developed into a growling note

which in turn travelled gradually up the scale until loud enough to be

heard at a distance. The signal was repeated several times and then

came an anxious period of waiting.

At about this time a large stack of Stokes bomb {238} boxes, containing

fused bombs, was set on fire by a shell. All the fire-extinguishing

apparatus in the vicinity had already been shot away. The chief

Quartermaster, Petty Officer E. G. Youlton, whilst shouting to others

to take cover, extinguished the fire by hauling out the burning boxes

and stamping on them. A few moments later the fire broke out afresh.

Youlton repeated his very gallant efforts and succeeded in saving a

very awkward situation.

[Sidenote: The Recall]

The storming parties commenced to return to the ship almost at once.

Many of the ship's company, officers and men, assisted in carrying the

wounded on board over the gangways, which were as rickety as ever. One

Marine carried a disabled man on board, placed his charge on the deck,

kissed him on both cheeks and was heard to remark, "I wasn't going to

leave you, Bill."

I have seen both statements and illustrations to the effect that our

storming parties, before leaving, erected a staff on the Mole and

hoisted a Union Jack upon it. It may seem a pity to spoil a good

story, but this event was quite imaginary. A memento of our visit,

however, was prepared in the shape of a board to which were attached

our visiting cards bearing the letters P.P.C., but there is no very

clear evidence as to whether this memento was left on the Mole, though

I believe that was the case.

A shell burst just outside the conning tower whilst three of us were

discussing the probability of any men being still on the Mole.

Lieutenant-Commander Rosoman was shot through both legs; Petty Officer

Youlton had an arm shattered; a very slight wound in the shoulder was

my own share of the damage.

{239}

By the time that fifteen minutes had elapsed from the sounding of the

retirement signal practically all the storming parties had returned.

No more men were seen to come back, but I had given a definite promise

that the full twenty minutes' notice would be allowed. After repeated

assurances from other officers, backed up by my own personal

observation, that no others were returning we decided to leave the

Mole. The cable had already been unshackled ready for slipping

overboard when no longer required.

Lieutenant-Commander Rosoman, in spite of his wounds, accompanied me to

the conning tower. He absolutely refused to sit down, but remained

standing so that he could keep a lookout through the slit in the armour.

The conning tower was of very small dimensions. Four wounded men had

previously crawled inside and had died where they lay. Three or four

other wounded men had crawled in later on and had collapsed. One of

the telegraphs to the engine-room had been shot away, but the telephone

was intact.

All the other compasses having been destroyed, we had to depend upon

the conning-tower compass. The magnetic directive force on a compass

needle is necessarily very weak in a conning tower of such small

dimensions. The ship had received so many hard knocks that the

magnetism on board was pretty certain to have undergone considerable

change. Thus, whereas this particular compass was somewhat

independable before, it was now exceedingly unreliable.

In spite of the many hundreds of times that I must previously have

instructed young officers that no iron should be placed within five

feet of the compass, I have {240} my first lieutenant to thank for

pointing out that the presence of so many steel helmets in the conning

tower was inadvisable.

_Daffodil_ was ordered to tow _Vindictive's_ bow away from the wall.

Lieutenant Campbell obeyed at once; our anchor cable was slipped

overboard. Directly after the strain came on the _Daffodil's_ hawser

the latter broke, but it had served its purpose. "Full speed ahead"

was ordered and the ship moved forward almost immediately. This was at

1.11 A.M.

A large steel boom--the original mainmast of the ship--had been rigged

over the port side of the quarter-deck, jutting out rather further than

the port propeller with the object of saving the latter from hitting

the wall. When _Vindictive's_ helm was put over to port, her stern

swung towards the Mole, but the boom saved the situation as a result of

a heavy blow against the wall.

As soon as _Vindictive_ had moved a few feet the gangways slipped off

the wall and fell overboard with a resounding crash. For a few moments

the wreckage fouled and stopped the port propeller, but quickly cleared

again without having done any serious damage.

[Sidenote: The German's Last Straw]

It is not difficult to gauge the feelings of the enemy when they first

noticed the ship moving off. We had taken them more or less by

surprise on arrival and had managed to storm the Mole in spite of every

effort to prevent us. The enemy could not have been over-pleased about

that. The ship had been able to remain at the Mole for one hour and

ten minutes without sustaining any vital damage. That fact was not

calculated to engender a pleasant frame of mind {241} amongst the

enemy. But _they knew_ exactly where we were. _They knew_ we should

endeavour to leave sooner or later; _they knew_ that any attempt to do

so would inevitably expose the vitals of the ship to their batteries at

point-blank range; _they thought they knew_ that our fate was sealed

immediately we were clear of the wall; there could be no surprise about

leaving. But all such matters had been carefully thought out

beforehand. _Vindictive_, _Iris_, and _Daffodil_ each carried several

sets of artificial smoke apparatus for use on retirement. Immediately

we started to go ahead orders were given for the smoke to be turned on.

In less than a minute all previous fog records were beaten beyond

comparison. Thus in place of a victim the enemy found a fog.

We steamed away to the northwestward at utmost speed. The flames were

pouring through the holes in the funnels; the ship had the appearance

of being heavily on fire. The wind being now offshore brought the fog

along with us; fortunately for the navigation we had a clear lookout

ahead. The enemy cannot have seen much more than the vivid glare of

our funnel flames illuminating the upper part of the fog. From all

accounts their batteries were far from idle. As the ship sped seaward

we had the sensation of the ship jumping at irregular but frequent

intervals. This may have been due to the concussion of heavy shell

striking the water near the ship. Whether any shell hit us or not

during the retirement is unlikely to be known. One could hardly see

one's own feet. The ship had already been hit so often that any

further damage of the same description would hardly have been noticed.

Suffice it to say that no vital damage to the hull was received.

{242}

After steaming for twenty minutes the first lieutenant reported a light

off the starboard bow. It was the Blankenberghe buoy, which we had

passed during the approach. We altered course to pass close to the

buoy and then for our line of retirement.

[Sidenote: Homeward Bound]

Presently the dark form of a vessel was sighted ahead. Our guns' crews

were ready for any emergency, but the vessel proved to be H.M.S.

_Moorsom_, one of the patrolling destroyers. All the bridge signalling

lamps had been destroyed. With an ordinary pocket torch we flashed a

signal requesting _Moorsom_ to lead us as our compass was hopeless.

On the way across to Zeebrugge my anxiety with regard to accuracy of

compass course had led me to criticise the steering of one of the

quartermasters. Now, on the return voyage, I had become quartermaster,

in the absence of Petty Officer Youlton, and am afraid the steering was

execrable. That fact was officially recorded by the Commanding Officer

of _Moorsom_ who, knowing nothing about our amateur steersmanship,

reported, "... _Vindictive_ appeared ... steering a very erratic

course!" Fortunately the services of another petty officer, as

steersman, were obtained later on.

Lieutenant-Commander Rosoman combined the duties of lookout and

navigator; his advice was most helpful. A visit from the stretcher

parties relieved the congestion in the conning tower. Another

memorable incident was the arrival of the Paymaster with a jug full of

a certain stimulating beverage which put new life into us; I shall

_not_ complete the testimonial.

Several signals were interchanged with _Moorsom_ on the subject of

shoals; it was a great relief when {243} we eventually located a buoy

marking a danger spot.

_Vindictive_ was steaming nearly seventeen knots until daylight--a

great achievement on the part of Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Bury and

his department.

Soon after daylight a destroyer was observed to be racing up from

astern at high speed. She quickly ranged up alongside and proved to be

H.M.S. _Warwick_. The first signal from her, "Well done,

_Vindictive_," cheered us up immensely, not because of its actual

import, but because it looked very much as if the Vice-Admiral were

alive. To make sure we enquired if that surmise was correct and,

greatly to our relief, received a reply in the affirmative.

H.M.S. _Warwick_ had continued throughout the operation to patrol in a

central position, namely, near the Mole lighthouse. She had come under

a heavy fire and altogether experienced a couple of hectic hours. Soon

after one o'clock she had moved towards _Vindictive_ and suddenly came

upon the latter leaving the Mole. _Vindictive's_ smoke screen made it

impossible to keep touch, so the Vice-Admiral decided to search for

_Iris_ and _Daffodil_ in case they should require assistance. Shortly

after this M.L. 282 was met and transferred her blockship survivors to

_Warwick_, who was also informed that _Iris_ and _Daffodil_ had left

the Mole. _Warwick_ then escorted some motor launches out of the

danger zone, and, after rallying several other craft at a prearranged

rendezvous, she steered for Dover and overtook _Vindictive_ as

mentioned above.

Admiral Keyes ordered _Moorsom_ to lead _Vindictive_ to Dover, to which

place _Warwick_ proceeded at {244} high speed to land her wounded and

to arrange for the arrival of the casualties from the remaining vessels.

The weather being misty, we did not sight Dover until within a mile or

so. Our reception was wonderful, the result of the operation being

already known at Dover. I think everybody cheered himself hoarse that

morning. Presently we were ordered to proceed alongside the railway

jetty. Within me there was some feeling of satisfaction at having

berthed the ship at Zeebrugge, a place which I had never seen, in face

of certain difficulties additional to the tide. Any feeling of pride,

however, was quickly dispelled when, in accordance with the routine of

the port, on my ship being ordered to proceed alongside Dover jetty in

broad daylight, with no opposition from the enemy, and with every

convenience in the way of hawsers and bollards, _a pilot was sent on

board to handle her_!

On arrival alongside the wounded were disembarked into a Red Cross

train, which immediately took them off to hospital. Those who had laid

down their lives were then carried ashore; this, indeed, was a sad

parting. Finally we moved out to a buoy to make room for other vessels.

[Sidenote: A Souvenir from the Mole]

After our arrival at Dover it was discovered that a large block of

concrete was jambed between a fender and a ledge on the port side of

the ship. Apparently a German shell fired from one of the heavy land

batteries had struck the upper part of the outer wall and had torn away

this block, which fell into the position mentioned. This concrete

block, weighing nearly half a ton, was hoisted on board. A few pieces

were taken as souvenirs. The main portion was {245} presented to the

Imperial War Museum and formed rather a unique piece of evidence, not

only of the fact that _Vindictive_ lay alongside the Mole, but of the

exact position at which the Mole was stormed. The illustration facing

page 74 shows the damaged portion of the wall from which this block of

concrete was torn.

[Illustration: H.M.S. VINDICTIVE AT DOVER AFTER THE ATTACK. A large

piece of the Mole was found resting on the ledge shown at the bottom

right-hand corner of the photograph]

_Daffodil_ was exceedingly fortunate in having escaped serious damage.

Her hull had been exposed to the fire of the German batteries

throughout the whole hour and the odd minutes during which she had been

keeping _Vindictive_ alongside the Mole. On the retirement signal

being made everything was prepared for towing the bows of _Vindictive_

away from the wall. Immediately the order was received, Lieutenant

Campbell turned his ship and commenced to tow. The hawser had parted

almost at once, but that was of no consequence. _Daffodil_ then

steamed away to the northward under cover of her own artificial smoke

and eventually spoke H.M.S. _Trident_. The latter took her in tow and

brought her safely to Dover, which was reached at 1 P.M. The

enthusiastic reception commenced all over again. It must be realised

that the fate of each vessel was unknown to the majority of the

remainder until some hours after the completion of the operation.

It has already been described how _Iris_, after leaving _Vindictive_

and suffering severe damage from hostile gun-fire, had been

smoke-screened by a motor boat and had disappeared from view. This

smoke screen, augmented by further smoke from their own apparatus,

undoubtedly saved _Iris_ from destruction. Under the directions of

Lieutenant Oscar Henderson, R.N., who had assumed command after his

captain {246} had been mortally wounded, _Iris_ steamed away to seaward

and eventually proceeded to Dover under her own steam, whilst being

escorted by other vessels met with in the small hours. She arrived at

Dover at 2.45 P.M. and, once more, everybody cheered himself hoarse.

At intervals throughout the forenoon and afternoon of the 23d the

several vessels and craft arrived at Dover. We then had the

opportunity of piecing together the information obtained from each unit

and were thus able to gauge the probable results attained.

The air force had been requested to obtain new photographs of Zeebrugge

as early as practicable, but the sky was so clouded over that no

absolutely indisputable evidence was obtained until 2 P.M., when a

photograph was taken through a chink in the clouds. This photograph

showed the positions of the inner blockships and the break in the

railway viaduct. The operation had been an unqualified success.

[Sidenote: The Operation at Ostende]

The operation at Ostende had unfortunately failed. The difficulties of

navigation had been accentuated by the change of wind which brought the

artificial fog back to seaward. The consequent obscuration of the

harbour entrance made it necessary to place some dependence on a buoy

which had, unknown to us and by the merest coincidence, just been moved

a mile or so to the eastward by the enemy. In spite of the most

gallant attempt by Commander A. E. Godsal in H.M.S. _Brilliant_ and

Lieutenant-Commander H. N. M. Hardy in H.M.S. _Sirius_, ably assisted

as they were by their officers and men and by a large number of other

craft, the blocking attempt had not achieved success. The Vice-Admiral

decided, therefore, to {247} make another attempt at the earliest

possible moment. _Vindictive_, being the only suitable vessel

available, was immediately prepared for this further service. Owing to

a continuation of impossible weather conditions the operation could not

be carried out until May 10th; thus it is clear that if our expedition

had not started on their journey on April 22d the operation at

Zeebrugge could not have taken place during the allotted period.

Just one other reference to the further use of _Vindictive_ cannot be

omitted. Immediately on their return, after the failure to block

Ostende, both officers who have been mentioned above as commanding the

blockships at that place, begged to be given ships for a further

attempt. They had failed through no fault of their own and had gone

through some terrible experiences. Nothing could curb their ardour,

and I believe they gave the Vice-Admiral no peace until he consented to

give them another chance. Poor Godsal. Nothing could have been finer

than his handling of the old _Vindictive_ on the night of May 9th-10th,

but he was killed at the very moment when complete success seemed to be

assured; Ostende was partially blocked.

It was with considerable feelings of regret that, on April 25th, we

made way in _Vindictive_ for the new crew destined to take her to

Ostende. It was a sad farewell.

The behaviour of the wounded had been splendid; their cheerfulness was

unbounded. One poor fellow who had suffered severe internal injuries

as well as the loss of both legs was asked if he was sorry that he went

over to Zeebrugge. He replied, "No, sir, {248} because I got on the

Mole." That was all that mattered to him. There was practically no

chance of saving his life, but "he had got on the Mole."

The spirit of all the men in _Vindictive_ was fine. Nevertheless, I do

not deceive myself into imagining that these men were exceptional.

They only represented one small contingent of many which fought at

Zeebrugge and Ostende on St. George's Day; the combined crews of all

the vessels in the operation only represented a trifling percentage of

our total naval personnel; the behaviour of my men was merely typical

of all those others.

Those of our survivors who had not been sent to hospital with wounds

proceeded on a few days' leave before rejoining their depots or their

ships in the Grand Fleet. What a piratical appearance the crew

presented on their departure! Many of them had lost all their clothes,

except those in which they stood during the action. Those others whose

clothes had survived the fight were not much better off. The souvenir

hunters had raided my ship, had "picked up" some of the men's

belongings, and had even been inconsiderate enough to break into my

cabin and make a complete clearance of the officers' handbags placed

there for safety.

[Illustration: H.M.S. VINDICTIVE ON HER RETURN TO DOVER AFTER THE

ATTACK]

One last story of a personal nature. On receipt of the news at Dover a

young officer, in his desire to do me a kindness, decided to wire the

good news to my wife. He forgot that she would know nothing of the

enterprise or even of its preparation, and he worded the telegram:

"Operation successful. Husband quite all right." The recipient's

feelings may be easily imagined; she guessed it was appendicitis!

{249}

CHAPTER IX

THE MATERIAL RESULTS

The results of the operations on the night of April 22-23, 1918, were

undoubtedly important. They can be classified under the two headings

of "material" and "moral."

The degree of moral effect cannot usually be assessed until long after

an operation has been completed. Recognisable evidence comes to hand

very gradually. The actual results of moral effect may be early

experienced without being recognised, especially in the case of effect

on the enemy's morale.

Material results are more easily gauged. In this particular case

photographic evidence was soon obtainable.

I must recall to the reader's mind the description of the entrance

channel of the canal. It was shown in Part I, Chapter II, how very

narrow the navigable channel had become owing to the silting of the

sand, and how rapidly the latter process would accentuate the

obstructive quality of a sunken vessel. It was also shown why the

channel at the shore end of the two curved piers was the ideal position

at which to place the blockships. _Intrepid_ and _Iphigenia_ had been

sunk by us exactly at their selected positions. Each vessel spanned

right across the dredged channel, and therefore blocked it effectually.

For the first time in naval history a blocking operation had been

carried out successfully in the face of up-to-date defence measures.

{250}

Some of the photographs, taken at high tide, appear to show sufficient

space through which vessels could pass on either side of the

blockships. But the presence of water does not signify the presence of

sufficient water to float such craft as submarines and destroyers even

at high tide. Two other photographs show clearly that the ends of the

vessels were practically on the edges of the sandbanks.

[Sidenote: The Work of Salvage]

The Germans, as prompt in propaganda as they were unenterprising in

sea-fighting, at once published a communiqué to the effect that the

operation had utterly failed, adding that the blockships had been sunk

by the German batteries before reaching their goal. Curiously enough,

their official statements were strangely silent on the subject of

prisoners. They also averred that the attack on the Mole had been

driven back. Not content with these "terminological inexactitudes,"

they went so far as to take a photograph to prove their contention.

The photograph was taken with the camera pointed inland. The land was

eliminated from the background in the original so as to give the

impression that the camera was pointing out to sea. A line was drawn

between, and parallel to, the blockships and marked "The line of the

channel," whereas it was a line nearly at right angles to the channel.

Words were added to the effect that the photograph proved clearly that

the channel was not blocked, and copies of the photograph were

circulated all over Germany and neutral countries. What wonderful

liars!--but clumsy! The amusing part of it was that we knew the German

naval authorities reported "Zeebrugge is blocked" to their craft

stationed elsewhere, and, further, our airmen {251} obtained

photographs day after day showing some twenty-three torpedo craft and

twelve submarines bottled up at Bruges.

From the morning after the operation until the Germans finally

evacuated Zeebrugge, our aerial bombers dropped, on the average, four

tons of bombs daily on that place. Our special measures with regard to

constructive work in each blockship, designed to hamper the work of

salvage, must have presented the enemy with a formidable problem. The

work of clearing the channel was certainly not assisted by the dropping

of bombs upon the salvors. To what extent the Germans attempted to

remove the vessels is unknown to me, but we do know well enough that

none of the three was moved a foot nor were they cut away to allow

vessels to pass over them. Thanks to our airmen, we knew, almost from

hour to hour, what measures were being taken to dredge a new channel.

I believe that no torpedo craft or submarines could use the exit for a

considerable time, and that about five months elapsed before they could

enter or leave the canal at any other period than the top of high tide.

Having contrived that each blockship should embody all the main

obstacles to salvage work, we were more or less confident that, if once

placed in position, these ships could not be easily removed.

Subsequently, at the earliest opportunity, our own salvage service

commenced their endeavours to clear the canal. In January, 1921, _two

years and three months_ after Zeebrugge was again in the hands of the

Allies, the last of the three blockships was moved sufficiently to

enable the channel to be used with freedom. A {252} great amount of

labour and money had already been expended, but still further efforts

were required before the canal could be altogether freed from

obstructions. One may certainly remark that the canal was "well and

truly blocked."

Information reached us afterwards that the Kaiser personally visited

Zeebrugge shortly after the operation so that he could discover the

actual truth for himself. What his remarks were on arrival is not

known to me, but a photograph in my possession, taken on that occasion,

certainly does not give him an air of affability.

[Sidenote: The Reckoning]

The main material result, then, was that the canal was blocked and that

the services of twelve submarines and twenty-three torpedo craft were

unavailable for a considerable period. As long as the canal remained

blocked, German submarines detailed for operating against Allied

commerce in the English Channel and other waters outside the North Sea

were, for the most part, compelled to do so from the Heligoland Bight.

This increased the length of voyage to and from their areas of

operation and consequently reduced the duration of their stay in such

waters.

But there were other material results. Firstly, the German High

Command considered it necessary to send reënforcements to Ostende in

the shape of modern destroyers. Now vessels, like individuals, cannot

be in two places at once. Those sent to Ostende had to be drawn away

from the Heligoland Bight, consequently the forces in the latter area

were weakened in strength _pro rata_.

The loss of German lives and vessels and the {253} damage sustained

during the action were by no means negligible.

Then again the efficiency of Bruges as a naval base was greatly

lessened because the canal exit to Ostende proved to be too shallow for

the larger craft. The fuel, dockyard, and stores at Bruges were also

rendered comparatively useless as means of support for sea-going

vessels.

The Mole, as a seaplane base, must have lost much of its value owing to

the severance of the railway communication, heavy stores having to be

transported to the Mole by sea-carriers. Finally, the work of "locking

the stable door after the horse had been stolen," as practised by the

enemy on this occasion, entailed extra mining at sea, mounting

additional guns on the outer wall, and covering the floor of the Mole

with such an abundance of barbed wire as to make the place exceedingly

uncomfortable for themselves.

Our own losses consisted of one destroyer and two motor launches; no

other vessel was rendered unfit for further services. Our casualties

at Zeebrugge amounted to approximately one hundred and seventy killed,

four hundred wounded, and forty-five missing; the majority of the

latter were believed to have been killed. The casualties in

_Vindictive_, including her storming parties, were sixty killed and one

hundred and seventy-one wounded.

With regard to the loss of material we had not paid a high price

considering the results achieved. The loss of personnel was small in

comparison with losses sustained in military fighting, but was none the

less keenly felt by those of us who had been in personal {254} touch

with these splendid fellows. They had all realised the danger and had

been perfectly willing to lay down their lives in the attainment of the

desired end. They did not die in vain.

{255}

CHAPTER X

THE MORAL EFFECT

The moral effect on the enemy was shown, to a certain degree, almost at

once. The fact that they thought it necessary to indulge in falsehood

to appease their own countrymen, although they must have realised that

the truth would inevitably become known, was clear enough proof that

their morale was badly shaken.

Their earliest report stated that the attack had failed and that three

British cruisers had been sunk at Zeebrugge. The latter portion of the

statement was correct. The ships had, indeed, been sunk--by ourselves.

All reference to the destruction of the viaduct was withheld until

later. The fact of no prisoners being captured from any of the three

British cruisers was never mentioned. As soon as our own reports had

been circulated, the German authorities apparently considered it

necessary to account for our success by stating that some Belgian

fishermen had been arrested for piloting our vessels into position!

Imagine, for a moment, the effect on our own public if they heard that

the enemy had attacked Dover, stormed the breakwater and remained in

possession of it for over an hour, destroyed the railway jetty, and

blocked the entrance. Even such a case as that would not be wholly

analogous, for the blockships at Zeebrugge had sunk themselves nearly a

mile _inside_ the outer entrance. Imagine the outcry and the {256}

question, "What is the Navy doing?" It is not difficult to conceive

the downfall of highly placed personages and the feeling of insecurity

that would pervade the atmosphere in our own country. Not only would

the public be shaken by such news, but the loss of morale would be felt

in the fighting services, firstly as a result of their own ineptitude,

and secondly because of the visions of further enemy operations which

would be conjured up.

Some such effect as described above was inevitable amongst both the

German civilian element and their fighting services. We know that the

operation caused a great scare at Bruges. Many of the German officials

there hurriedly collected their effects ready for evacuating the city;

it had been reported that the allies were landing an immense force on

the coast of Flanders.

It is not generally known that friendship between the German Navy and

Army was conspicuous by its absence. They had been at daggers drawn

for some years; the Crown Prince himself was in the habit of being

openly rude to naval officers of high rank. This antagonism was

evidenced recently in a letter written by a certain German general to

his brother-in-law, a young officer in our Navy. Apparently the

general hated the German Navy to such an extent that his letter

remarked that there were two British officers with whom he particularly

desired to shake hands--one was the officer in charge of our siege guns

on the Flanders coast and the other was the officer commanding the

attack on Zeebrugge; his friendly feelings arose from the fact that

these two officers had "put it across" that section {257} of the German

Navy which had charge of the Flanders coast defences.

The German Information Bureau had never ceased to sing the praises of

their Navy; that fact was conducive to increasing the shock received by

the enemy when they learned the truth. Many excuses have been invented

in Germany to account for the fact that the final breakdown of morale

which immediately preceded the ignominious flight of their War Lord

emanated from the so-called High Seas Fleet, and that this breakdown

coincided with the receipt of orders to try conclusions with our fleet.

It can hardly be styled far-fetched if one suggests that the loss of

morale was intimately connected with the situation at sea. It is also

not outside the bounds of possibility that, in some measure, the events

of St. George's Day, 1918, assisted towards the _débâcle_. A certain

highly placed German official at Bruges certainly exaggerated when he

averred that "the hopes of the Fatherland were buried at Zeebrugge,"

but such a statement as that clearly indicates the weakening of

confidence.

The other aspect of the effect on morale may be worthy of mention. I

refer to the effect on our own public, on our fighting services, and on

neutral and Allied countries.

The great German military offensive, which everybody realised indicated

the supreme effort on the part of the enemy, was in full swing in the

month of April. The Allied troops were stubbornly contesting every

inch of ground, but were being steadily pushed back on important

sections of the main battle front. The British Fifth Army had suffered

appalling losses. {258} The Allies had their backs to the wall. The

tension at home was apparent in all walks of life, and the extremely

anxious days of 1914 were being repeated. Future generations will

never be able to realise the depression and anxiety which pervaded the

public mind. Everybody was wondering what the outcome would be, and

there were days when one hardly dared to scan the morning paper. That

very fact had provided us with an additional reason for wishing to

register a success.

There is very little doubt that the success attained had a marked

effect on the public; the latter fairly jumped at the opportunity to

show enthusiasm. In addition to that, the public palate was tickled by

the unusual and apparently spectacular nature of the attack.

This sudden rise of the "moralometer" served a good purpose. The

pessimist changed his tune, the optimist earned the qualification

"cheery." To those ignorant of naval matters the operation seemed to

have bordered on the accomplishment of the impossible. "We always

knew," they declared, "that our fighting men were invincible." Their

old certainty of ultimate victory was re-born. That was all to the

good. Modern war is national war. War is not merely a struggle

between fighting forces, but between the opposing "crowds." The

destruction of an enemy's Army or Navy is of primary importance as a

means to an end, but the ultimate end and aim of each belligerent is to

exert influence on the "crowd," to nourish the will to win amongst

their own public and to bring about a feeling of hopeless despair, a

complete loss of morale, throughout the enemy's country. {259} It is

for that important reason that the sentiments of one's own public must

ever be borne in mind by the Higher Command.

The receipt of the news on the western front is reported to have been

beneficial. Every fighting force must occasionally have its dark days;

they are never so dark that news of success on another front will fail

to bring a ray of light. Those of us in the fleet itself had often

experienced such feelings of elation when our military brothers had

brought off a "coup." The Navy and Army, and the Air Force with them,

are one at heart. The fighting services are interdependent. Our Navy

cannot win a war unaided any more than our Army can prevent Great

Britain from being defeated by starvation. The waging of war, in the

case of a maritime country which is unselfsupporting, cannot rightly be

divided into naval warfare, military warfare, and combined naval and

military operations, though the three types are commonly referred to

and in that order. All war in which the British Empire is involved is

in the nature of combined naval and military warfare. The actions of

one arm are inevitably reflected in the other.

The Grand Fleet, from which so many of our officers and men were drawn

for the operation on St. George's Day, was naturally elated at the

result. Certainly the morale in the fleet had always been of a high

order, but an extra touch of enthusiasm was not without value.

Of the effect in neutral countries I am not competent to speak, but I

have some personal knowledge of the manner in which the news was

received in the United States. The enthusiasm in that part of the

{260} world was genuine enough and undoubtedly assisted to cement the

friendship between that country and our own Empire, a friendship which

has a firm foundation even if the latter be occasionally hidden beneath

a political superstructure which we are apt to mistake for the

foundation itself.

{261}

CHAPTER XI

SOME REMARKS ON THE ENTERPRISE

This book would be incomplete if I omitted to append some general

remarks on the operation and on the factors which led to success.

First and foremost, it is necessary to indulge in comparisons. The

enterprise described in this book attracted attention owing to its

somewhat unusual type as far as the Navy was concerned. Nevertheless,

there are many points of similarity between the attack on Zeebrugge and

the military trench raids which took place night after night on the

Allied fronts. The preliminary bombardment, the advance under cover of

darkness and smoke, the wild firing of star shell, the rush across No

Man's Land, the encounter with barbed wire and other defence material,

the leap down into the enemy's trench, the hand-to-hand fighting, the

holding of the position whilst demolition work was in progress, and the

final withdrawal when the object had been attained; such was a trench

raid as carried out again and again by our brothers in the Army. In

their case the following day brought a two-line communiqué, e.g., "Last

night in the Ypres salient our troops carried out a trench raid; they

captured seven prisoners." In our case the communiqué and unofficial

reports filled many pages. I would warn the reader not to be misled

into thinking that the military raids were any less hazardous than our

own.

{262}

The story provides just one more illustration of the fact that, however

large may loom the difficulties with which one is confronted, the means

to overcome them can usually be found if one possesses the "will to win

through."

The fundamental principles of war demand the Offensive and

Concentration. The all-important element of strategy to be utilised

against a strongly entrenched enemy is that of Surprise. From the

latter spring Diversion and Mystification.

An attempt has been made to describe the manner in which the seemingly

impossible was accomplished without very great difficulty.

The plan was built up on the foundation of surprise--not surprise in

the sense that something would suddenly occur where all had been quiet

up to that moment, but surprise in that the real object of the

enterprise would be concealed up to the latest possible moment, the

concealment to be brought about by mystifying the enemy and diverting

his attention.

Whilst concentrating all available powers of offence against the enemy,

and allowing nothing to divert us from our main object, we took every

step to bewilder the defence and to shift the weight of the

difficulties upon the shoulders of our opponents. But that was only

the foundation. The material brought into use was the best available

at the moment; it is not suggested that, given further time, it would

have been incapable of improvement.

Earlier in this book a few remarks were offered on the importance of

the personnel. Many further remarks could now be added after the story

has been told. I only propose, however, to deal with certain {263}

aspects which, by their nature, are less likely to be realised by the

man-in-the-street.

It has already been mentioned that a considerable percentage of the

vessels and craft engaged in the attack were commanded and manned by

officers and men of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer

Reserve. The majority of the smoke-screening craft and rescue craft

came under that heading. Without the smoke the operation must have

failed. Without the rescue work the price paid for success would have

been excessive. These representatives of the auxiliary naval services

earned a full measure of admiration. Their daring in the face of

danger, their coolness in situations which lacked nothing in

excitement, their initiative when confronted with the unexpected, and

their perfect co-operation with the remaining forces engaged in the

enterprise, were worthy of the best traditions of the Navy. The more

that one considers the dependence upon seamanship, the practical use of

technical knowledge, the mental and physical strain, the value of

perfect discipline, and the initiative called for on such an occasion,

the greater is one's admiration for these fine fellows of whom the

majority had seen comparatively little of sea life and had lacked that

severity of training which is inseparable from the naval profession.

The reports of all Commanding Officers contained one particular

similarity--I refer to the behaviour of the men. The cynic who might

be inclined to discount such unqualified praise, on the plea that the

men were specially chosen, could easily be silenced. The specially

selected personnel were certainly picked {264} with difficulty, not

because the desired qualities were rare, but for exactly the opposite

reason. The Grand Fleet and naval bases contained many thousands of

such men; the embarrassment lay in deciding who of these thousands

should be taken to make up the seventeen hundred and eighty personnel

required. But the latter were only required for some ten vessels out

of one hundred and sixty-two; required because those ten vessels were

out of commission and therefore had no crews. The remaining one

hundred and fifty-two vessels and craft took part in the operation with

their ordinary crews, and I repeat that the behaviour of the crews of

_all_ units was exemplary.

But co-operation between units, and efficiency of individuals, are not

alone sufficient to ensure success. Absolute confidence and perfect

co-operation between officers and men, founded on true discipline, is

of vital importance. Without these, little or nothing can be achieved

in war. The seeds of these vital requirements were sown by our

forefathers. Those of our predecessors who, although too old to serve

in the Great War, were still in the land of the living had reason to

feel proud at the success attained by their pupils.

There is one other human aspect which cannot be omitted without leaving

a serious blank in these pages. That aspect is the one of Leadership.

Leadership has been defined as that power in a man which causes others

to follow him irrespective of the direction in which he leads.

It would be a presumption, almost amounting to an impertinence, for me

to endeavour to measure out the praise which is due to the Vice-Admiral

in command of the enterprise, now Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes. {265}

The reader will understand my difficulty. In past history, again and

again, it was manifest that some of the outstanding factors which led

to success were the personality of the leader, the supreme confidence

in him held by all ranks, his realisation of the powers and limits of

his subordinates, his personal courage, and his intensity of purpose.

The outstanding factors which brought success on the particular

occasion described in this book have served to repeat and illustrate

these old historical lessons.

A few more words and I shall have finished.

I venture to suggest that this particular exploit provides just one

more example, such as are recorded again and again in the histories of

most civilised countries, of what can be accomplished in the face of

difficulty. Unfortunately, when hostilities cease, we are prone to

forget, not only the sacrifices by which successes were achieved, but

also the principles which guided us in the achievement. We are all

ready enough to admit that confidence and co-operation are of prime

necessity for the preservation of our lives and our interests when

danger threatens us in war, but, somehow, when the welfare of

communities is threatened in days of so-called peace, by international

suspicions, by revolutionary doctrines, by economic difficulties, by

unemployment, and by political schisms, we weaken ourselves as a result

of deconcentrating into numberless camps, one against the other, in

direct opposition to those fundamental principles which are the root

cause of our existence.

It is all very strange, and, I suppose, very human, for nothing is

stranger than humanity. How many of us realise that our superiority

over the rest of the {266} animal world is directly attributable to the

fact that human beings, alone, have sufficient understanding to combine

when danger threatens? Having successfully combined for the greatest

of all causes, are we now to revert to the instincts of the inferior

animals? Are we to persuade ourselves that co-operation merely results

from paper treaties rather than from a common spirit, forgetting that

officers and men, armies and navies, needed no signed agreements

between them for the overthrow of the greatest menace to civilisation

that the world has ever seen?

The Great War is over; is a Great Peace to follow?

What is our object? Surely it is the welfare of civilised communities

and the progress of those who are less enlightened.

There will always be secondary objects calculated to divert us from our

purpose. There will always be individuals who, for their own ends,

will endeavour to sow discord and confuse the issue. It is of

paramount importance that we keep our object in view, and that we

cultivate intensity of purpose and wholeheartedness, without which our

object is unattainable.

We know that the right spirit exists, but it is of little value if we

keep it locked away within us until disaster is imminent; the mere fact

of its existence cannot keep us free from danger any more than the

existence of medicine stored at the apothecary's can protect us from

infection and illness.

Let each one of us, each class, each sect, each nation, each group of

nations, do all that is humanly possible to foster that spirit, to

further mutual {267} understanding, to breed confidence in one another,

and to co-operate for the weal of all.

Without such confidence and co-operation success is impossible; with

them, our well-being is assured.

THE END

{269}

APPENDIX

The following vessels and craft took part in the simultaneous blocking

operations at Zeebrugge and Ostende.

THE ZEEBRUGGE ENTERPRISE

(_a_) _Special services during the oversea voyage_

Aerial Escort--

61st Wing of Royal Air Force.

Other services--

Special service vessel Lingfield. Motor Launches Nos. 555, 557.

(_b_) _Off shore forces_

Outer Patrol--

Scout--_Attentive_.

Destroyers--_Scott, Ulleswater, Teazer, Stork_.

Long-range Bombardment--

Monitors--_Erebus, Terror_.

Destroyers--_Termagant, Truculent, Manly_.

(_c_) _Inshore forces_

Flagship--

Destroyer--_Warwick_ (Flag of Vice-Admiral R. J. B. Keyes).

Blockships--

Light Cruisers--_Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia_.

Storming Vessels--

Light Cruiser--_Vindictive_.

Special vessels--_Iris, Daffodil_.

Attack on Viaduct--

Submarines--C1, C3, and one picket boat.

Aerial Attack--

Aircraft--65th Wing, Royal Air Force.

Other Operations--

Destroyers--_Phoebe, North Star, Trident, Mansfield,

Whirlwind, Myngs, Felox, Morris, Moorsom, Melpomene_.

{270}

Motor Launches--Nos. 79, 110, 121, 128, 223, 239,

241, 252, 258, 262, 272, 280, 282, 308, 314, 345, 397,

416, 420, 422, 424, 513, 525, 526, 533, 549, 552, 558,

560, 561, 562.

Coastal Motor Boats--Nos. 5, 7, 15, 16A, 17A, 21B,

226, 236, 24A, 25BD, 266, 27A, 28A, 306, 32A, 35A.

THE OSTENDE ENTERPRISE

(_a_) _Bombarding forces_

Monitors--

_Marshall Soult, Lord Clive, Prince Eugene, General Craufurd,

M. 24, M. 26, M. 21_.

Destroyers--

_Mentor, Lightfoot, Zubian_.

Motor Launches--

Nos. 249, 448, 538, and three others.

French Destroyers and Torpedo Boats--

_Lestin, Roux, Bouclier_, and Torpedo Boats Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 34.

French Motor Launches--Nos. 1, 2, 33, 34. British Siege Guns in

Flanders.

(_b_) _Inshore forces_

Blockships--

Light Cruisers--_Sirius, Brilliant_.

Destroyers--

_Swift, Faulknor, Matchless, Mastiff, Afridi, Tempest, Tetrarch_.

Motor Launches--

Nos. 11, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 60, 105, 254, 274, 276, 279,

283, 429, 512, 532, 551, 556.

Coastal Motor Boats--

Nos. 2, 4, 10, 12, 19, 20, 20A, 34A.

COVERING SQUADRON FOR BOTH ENTERPRISES

Forces from Harwich--

Light Cruisers, seven.

Leaders, two.

Destroyers, fourteen.

{271}

INDEX

Acetylene gas, use of, for salvage, 47, 52

Adams, Lieut.-Comdr. B. F., R.N., 187, 188, 200, 201

Admiralty, Board of, responsibility of, 69

Aerial attack--

at first attempt, 146, 147

at final attempt, 171

_Afridi_, H.M.S., App.

Aircraft--

German in Flanders, 6, 41

utility in defence, 40, 41

Allied lines of communication, 3, 12, 13

Anchoring of _Vindictive_, 184

Approach, the story of the, 173 _ff._

Astronomical conditions, 134

Attack, expected duration of, 132, 134

Attempt--

the first, 141 _ff._, 155

the second, 153, 154

the final start, 165

_Attentive_, H.M.S., App.

Babb, Sub-Lieut, R.N., 230

Bamford, Captain E., R.M.L.I., 203

Barrage firing from coast batteries, 37

Bases, use of advanced, 19

Beatty, Admiral Sir David, 63, 104, 105, 107, 108

Billyard-Leake, Lieut. Edward W., R.N., 226, 231, 234, 235

Blake, Able-Seaman F. E., R.N., 209

Blake, Sub-Lieut. L. R., R.N.R., 218

Blankenberghe,

buoy, 174, 175, 242

description, 8, 9

German craft at, 11, 12, 190

Blocking--

alternative methods of, 17, 42, 43

favourable position for, 44

influence of current, 57

previous attempts elsewhere, 54-56, 58

summary of difficulties, 41, 56

Blockships--

capabilities of, 49, 52, 69, 70

credit due to, 73, 234, 235

difficulty of sinking, 56, 57, 58

preparatory work in, 52, 100

types of, 45-47, 69, 70

See _Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia_

Blockship's crews, disembarkation of surplus, 124, 125, 170, 171

Boddie, Engineer Lieut.-Comdr., R.N., 228

Bombardment--

by our monitors, 16, 84, 174, 175

previous attempts at, 35, 43, 44

Bonham-Carter, Lieut. Stuart S., R.N., 226, 228, 230, 234, 235

_Botha_, H.M.S., 91; App.

_Bouclier_, French destroyer, App.

Bowen, Lieut. G., 225

Bradford, Lieut. George N., R.N., 206, 207

_Brilliant_, H.M.S., 70, 143, 246; App.

British morale, effect on, 258, 259

Brock, Wing-Commander Frank, R.N.A.S., 98, 115, 116, 153, 187, 200

Bruges, 9, 10, 11, 270

_Brussels_, merchant steamer, 29

Buckley, Yeoman of Signals John, R.N., 189, 190

Buoys, lack of dependence on, 8, 91, 92

Bury, Engineer Lieut.-Comdr. W. A., R.N., 184, 243

Calais, 13

Cameroon River, German attempt to block, 58

Campbell, Lieut. H. G., R.N., 185, 188, 189, 240, 245

Campbell, Commander V. L. A., R.N., 220

Canal system in Flanders, 9-11

Casualties, British, 253, 254

Cement, use of, in blockships, 52

Chappell, Lieut.-Comdr., R.N.V.R., 224

Chevallier, Sub-Lieut. F. E., R.N., 205

Clerical work, 140

Coast defences, German, 35-38

Coastal Motor Boats, 144, 145, 149-151

No. 5, 219; App.

No. 7, 218, 233; App.

No. 16, 217; App.

Nos. 21, 25, 26, 219; App.

No. 22B, 217; App.

No. 23B, 217, 232; App.

No. 32, 219, 220; App.

Nos. 2, 4, 10, 12, 15, 17A, 19, 20, 24A,

27A, 28A, 29A, 30B, 34A, 35A; App.

Collins, Captain Ralph, R.N., 224

Command of the sea, 3, 4

Compasses, damage to--in _Vindictive_, 239, 240

Concentration, 144, 145, 262

Cooke, Lieut. F. T. V., R.M.L.I., 203

Co-operation, value of, 264

Cordner, Major, R.M.L.I., 182

Cory-Wright, Lieut., R.N., 230

Crews, size of, in blockships, 86, 124.

_Daffodil_, H.M.S.--

choice of, 79, 80

duties of, 81, 86, 176

fitting out of, 100, 108, 109, 118, 119

previous history, 80

proceedings of, 168, 173, 185, 188, 189, 199, 205, 237, 240

retirement of, 245

Dallas-Brooks, Captain Reginald, R.M.A., 192, 193, 194

Darkness, use of, 37, 38, 132

Davidson, Captain A. P., R.N., 111

Deane, Lieut. Percy T., R.N.V.R., 232, 233

Defence measures, 61, 62

Defences, summary of German, 41

Demolition--

object of, 76, 77, 195, 196

training for, 111, 112

the work of, 189, 205

Depths--

at Blankenberghe, 9

in entrance channel at Zeebrugge, 48, 49, 131

Destroyers, 84, 220, 221

D'Eyncourt, Sir Tennyson, 100

Dickinson, Lieut.-Comdr. C. C., R.N., 111, 205

Diversions, 59, 60, 61, 196, 208, 279

practibility of using, 61

Douglas, Captain H. P., R.N., 90 _n._

Dover--

the return to, 243, 244

the reception at, 244

Dover Patrol--

memorials, 15

morale, 96, 97

work of, 13, 14, 15, 97, 98

Dover Straits, difficulty of closing, 13, 14

Dunkerque, 13

Eagles, Major C. E. E., R.M.L.I., 208

Eastlake, Lieut. A. L., attached R.E., 186, 187

Edwards, Commander, R.N.V.R., 182

Elliot, Lieut.-Col. Bertram N., R.M.L.I., 111, 112, 128, 182

Endurance of German submarines, 4, 5

_Erebus_, H.M.S., 174; App.

_Faulknor_, H.M.S.; App.

Finch, Sergeant, R.M.L.I., 192

Flame-throwers in _Vindictive_, 115, 186, 187

Flanders Coast--

description of, 6, 7, 8, 22, 24, 25

value to Germany, 5-7, 10-12

Fog, effect on attackers, 60, 175

effect on defence, 59, 175

Fogs, artificial, 59, 60

Franks, Lieut. Ivor B., R.N., 110

French motor launches Nos. 1, 2, 33, 34; App.

French Torpedo Boats Nos. 1, 2, 3, 34; App.

Fuel, 4

Function of the Navy, 3

Gas, poison, 60

Geddes, Sir Eric, 157

_General Craufurd_, H.M.S.; App.

Geographical situation, 6, 7

German bases in Flanders, 6, 10, 29

German craft based on Flanders, 6

German High Seas Fleet, 3, 4, 19, 21, 94, 95

German morale before the attack, 96, 97, 104

German morale after the attack, 255-257

German reports of the attack, 250, 251

German submarines, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16

Gibbs, Commander Valentine F., R.N., 185, 207, 208

Godsal, Commander A. E., R.N., 42, 246, 247

Goeben battery, 204

Gore-Langton, Lieut-Commander Hubert E., R.N., 220, 223

Grand Fleet--

duties of, 94, 95

work of, 102, 103

Groynes, 7, 24, 25

Guerre de Course tactics, 5

Halahan, Captain H. C., R.N., 111, 114, 116, 128, 182, 201

Hardy, Lieut.-Comdr. H. N. M., R.N., 246

Harrison, Lieut.-Comdr. A. L., R.N., 200, 201, 202

Harwich, forces from; App.

Haselfoot, Lieut.-Comdr. F. E. B., R.N., 90 _n._

Hawkings, Lieut. Claude E. K., R.N., 206

Heligoland, 19

Helyar, Lieut.-Comdr. Kenneth C., R.N., 220, 222, 223

Henderson, Lieut. Oscar, R.N., 209, 245

_Hermione_, cutting out of--in 1799, 54, 55

Hewett, Lieutenant Graham S., R.N.V.R., 194

Hilton-Young, Lieut. E., R.N.V.R., 196

_Hindustan_, H.M.S., 111, 118, 119, 120, 125, 127; App.

History--

lack of encouragement from, 58

object of studying, 54

Historical analogies, 54-56, 58

Howitzers in _Vindictive_, 79, 98, 193, 194

Hydrographic Department, 91

Initiative, 89, 149, 150

Instructions, the art of writing, 66,67

_Intrepid_, H.M.S., 70, 143, 170, 228, 229-231, 232, 234; App.

_Iphigenia_, H.M.S., 70, 143, 171, 228,

229, 231, 232, 234, 241, 243-251; App.

_Iris_, H.M.S.--

choice of, 79, 80

duties of, 81, 86

fitting out of, 100, 108, 109, 118, 119

proceedings of, 168, 173, 185, 205-209

retirement of, 245, 246

Jakobynessen battery, 37

Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John, R.N., 17, 157

Kaiser's visit to Zeebrugge, 252

Kaiser Wilhelm battery, 204

Keyes, Vice-Admiral Roger J. B., R.N., 14, 63, 109, 113, 114, 167,

168, 220, 243, 246, 263, 264, 265, 282

appreciation of, 63, 68, 69

connection with planning, 67, 68, 82

postponement decision, 147, 148

Lamplough, Lieut. C. R. W., R.M.L.I., 203

Leadership, 264, 265

_Lestin_, French destroyer; App.

_Lightfoot_, H.M.S.; App.

Lines of communication, 3, 12, 13, 96

_Lingfield_, H.M.S.; App.

Littleton, Lieut. H. A., R.N.V.R., 232, 233

_Lord Clive_, H.M.S.; App.

Lock gate, 10, 22, 28, 43, 44, 49

Losses, British material, 253, 254

MacVean, Lieut. D. E. J., R.N.V.R., 217

Mails, precautions, 120

_Manly_, H.M.S.; App.

_Mansfield_, H.M.S., 224; App.

Marine Artillery, 104, 112, 113, 126, 192-194

Infantry, 104, 111, 112, 126

Marines, embarkation of, 118, 119

_Marshal Soult_, H.M.S.; App.

Martinique, attack on--in 1794, 54, 55

_Mastiff_, H.M.S.; App.

_Matchless_, H.M.S.; App.

Material results obtained, 249-253.

Matériel, relation to personnel, 181

McCutcheon, Staff Surgeon, R.N., 197, 198

McKenzie, Able Seaman, 202

Medical, 197, 198

Meikle, Engineer Sub-Lieut., R.N., 230

_Melpomene_, H.M.S., 224; App.

_Mentor_, H.M.S.; App.

Mercantile Marine, appreciation, 143, 144

_Merrimac_, U.S. steamer, 54, 58, 88

Meteorological conditions, 131

Military training, 112, 113

Minefields, German, 38, 39

Mines--

effect of, 93, 94, 173

precautions against, 94

Mine-sweepers, 6, 39, 94

Monitors, 36, 146, 174

Monitors: M. 21, M. 24, M. 26; App.

Moon, state of, 134

_Moorsom_, H.M.S., 224, 242, 243; App.

Moral results obtained, 255-260

Morale, 96, 97

_Morris_, H.M.S., 224; App.

Motor launches, 144, 225, 240

Motor launches:--

No. 110, 225; App.

No. 128, 224; App.

No. 282, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234; App.

No. 308, 225; App.

No. 424, 224; App.

No. 526, 229, 232, 233; App.

No. 558, 224, 226; App.

Nos. 11, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 60, 79,

105, 121, 223, 239, 241, 249, 252,

254, 258, 262, 272, 274, 276, 279,

280, 283, 314, 345, 397, 416, 420,

422, 429, 448, 512, 513, 525, 532,

533, 538, 549, 551, 552, 555, 556,

557, 560, 561, 562; App.

_Myngs_, H.M.S., 224; App.

Napoleon's maxim, 95

Navigation, coastal, 56, 57

difficulties and dangers, 7, 8, 40, 41

importance of accuracy, 90 _ff._, 178

open sea, 56

Nelson, Lord, 55, 147, 148

Newbold, Lieut. Aubrey C., R.N., 210, 214

Nieuport, 6, 7, 8

_North Star_, H.M.S., 220, 221, 222, 223; App.

Objectives, difficulty of locating, 42, 56, 71

Objects, secondary, 77

Offensive measures, 16, 17, 43, 262

Officers, choice of, 106, 107

Orders--

art of writing, 66, 67

the drafting of the, 66, 67, 140, 156, 166

Osborne, Commander E. O. B. S., R.N., 178

Ostende--

attack on, in 1798, 54, 55, 56

description of, 9, 10, 11, 12

difficulty of locating entrance, 42, 71

reason for blocking, 42

reason for omitting story, 41, 42

Outhwaite, Sub-Lieut. C., R.N.V.R., 219

Patrol craft, German, 40, 96

Peace, 266

Period available for attack, 134 Personnel, remarks on behaviour, 263,

264

selection of, 102 ff.

training of, 112, 125, 126

_Phoebe_, H.M.S., 220-224; App.

Photography, 129, 130, 246

Plan--

credit for, 17, 18, 19

how built up, 262

inception, 17, 18, 67

history of, 17, 18, 67, 68

modifications of, 65

previous suggestions, 17, 70

various stages of, 64 _ff._, 72, 76

Plans department, 17, 67

Poison gas, 60

Port Arthur, attempts to block, 54, 56, 58

Postponement, first, 148

second, 154

Power, Rear Admiral L. E., R.N., 100

Preparations--

preliminary, 125 _ff._

final, 145, 167, 168

Preservation of life, 87

_Prince Eugene_, H.M.S.; App.

Printing the orders, 140

Puerto Cabello, attack on, in 1799, 54

Pyrotechnic Brigade, 194

Rain, effect of, 171, 172, 173

Rescue of men from Mole, 218

Rescue work, 87, 88, 89, 132, 229 _ff._, 244-249

vessels, 84

Results--

material, 249-253

moral, 255-260

Retirement, 132, 252-260

Rigby, Lieut. Charles N. B., R.M.A., 191, 192

Robinson, Lieut. J. W., R.N.V.R., 224

Robinson, Lieut. O., R.N.V.R., 224

Rocket apparatus, 194

Rodman, Rear Admiral Hugh, U.S.N., 107, 108

Rosoman, Lieut.-Comdr. R. R., R.N., 176, 184, 188, 238, 239, 242, 259

_Roux_, French destroyer; App.

Royal Air Force--

61st Wing, 85, 130

65th Wing, 85, 146

Royal Naval Reserve, 130, 263

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, 130, 263

Rufigi River, attempt to block, 54

St. George for England, 169

Salvage--

effect of silt on, 23, 24, 25, 28, 51

German attempts, 251

importance of, 44, 45

previous experience, 25

remarks on, 25, 26, 44 _ff._, 251, 252

Sandford, Lieut-Comdr. F. H., R.N., 213, 214

Sandford, Lieut. R. D., R.N., 210, 211, 213

Santiago, attempt to block in 1898, 54, 56, 58

_Scott_, H.M.S.; App.

Seamanship, importance of, 41, 57, 58

Seaplane base, German, 12

Secrecy, 100, 111, 120, 121, 155

Secret, divulging the, 108, 119, 120

Shoals, 7, 41

Siege guns, 84

Signalling difficulties, 137, 138

Silt, description, 23, 24

effect of, 24, 28, 51

_Sirius_, H.M.S., 70, 143, 246; App.

Smith, Petty Officer, R.N., 209

Smoke, artificial--

limitations of, 59, 60, 99

use of, 59, 60, 83, 99, 100, 175, 176, 208, 216, 217, 218, 246

Smoke-screen vessels, 83, 175

Sneyd, Commander R. S., R.N., 226, 228, 229, 235

Souvenir hunters, 248

Staff, operational duties, 66, 67, 139

Star shell, 38, 175

Stonewall Jackson's maxim, 60, 61

_Stork_, H.M.S.; App.

Storming the Mole, 186, 187, 188, 200-204, 213

Submarines--

attack on viaduct, 82, 100

defensive use, 40

German, 4, 40

shelters, 10, 11

Submarines--

C1, 210, 211, 214; App.

C3, 210-211, 213, 215, 224; App.

Success, chances of, 54, 62

Supporting squadrons, 146

Surprise, 59, 60, 61, 262

Surveys, 7, 91

_Swift_, H.M.S.; App.

Swin Deep, 118, 153

Synchronisation of events, 137, 138, 170

_Teazer_, H.M.S.; App.

_Tempest_, H.M.S.; App.

Teneriffe, Nelson's attack on--in 1797, 54, 55

_Termagant_, H.M.S.; App.

_Terror_, H.M.S., 174; App.

_Tetrarch_, H.M.S.; App.

_Thetis_, H.M.S., 70, 143, 171, 226 _ff._, 233; App.

Tidal stream--

description, 7, 24, 30, 74

effect, 24, 92, 174, 183

Tide, rise and fall, 8, 48, 49

Tigris River, blocking of, 58

Time factor, 137-139

Time table, 138, 156

Tomkinson, Captain Wilfred, R.N., 220

Towing--

necessity for, 142

of _Iris_ and _Daffodil_, 142, 143, 173

Trench raid, analogy, 112, 113, 265

_Trident_, H.M.S., 224, 245; App.

_Truculent_, H.M.S.; App.

_Ulleswater_, H.M.S.; App.

United States--

battle squadron, 107

personnel, 107, 108

_Velox_, H.M.S., 224; App.

Viaduct--

attack on, 194, 195, 210-215

description, 23, 25, 82, 83

_Vindictive_, H.M.S.--

anchoring, 184

attack on Ostende, 247

choice of, 76, 126

command of, 114

damage, 181, 182, 198, 238, 239, 241, 255, 256

fitting out of, 77-79, 100, 110

position at Mole, 128, 129, 202, 203

proceedings of, 143, 148, 150, 170, 173, 176, 179 _ff._, 200 _ff._

retirement of, 230 ff.

Visibility, 136, 165

Volunteering--

for danger, 89, 122-125, 189, 202

how arranged, 104, 105, 122, 123

Von Capelle, Admiral, 158

Walcheren expedition, 156

Walker, Lieut. H. T. C., R.N., 190

_Warwick_, H.M.S., 144, 168, 173, 220, 221, 222, 233, 243; App.

Weather, vagaries of, 41, 93, 246

Weller, Major B. G., R.M.L.I., 202

Welman, Lieut. A. P., R.N., 217

Wemyss, Admiral Sir Rosslyn, R.N., 157

_Whirlwind_, H.M.S., 224, 230; App.

Wind, importance of direction, 60, 131, 176

Wounded, behaviour of, 196, 197

Youlton, Petty Officer, E. G., R.N., 238, 242

Young, Lieut.-Comdr., R.N.V.R., 225

Yser Canal, 7

Zeebrugge, 7, 8, 9, 11

batteries, 28, 29, 31, 33

craft based at, 11, 32

German belief in security at, 33, 34

German constructions at, 26, 28, 29

canal, 10, 22

canal lock, 22, 29, 43, 44, 49

navigable channel, 28, 49

obstruction and boom, 32, 33, 41, 227

tidal harbour, 22

village, 22

Zeebrugge Mole, description, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27

approach to, 27-30

attack on: _see_ Storming the Mole

buildings on, 26, 28, 29, 32, 183

currents alongside, 30

garrison, 32, 81, 82

lighthouse extension, 27

outer wall, 26-28, 73, 74, 76

peace use, 22

seaplane base, 29, 32

souvenir, 244, 245

viaduct, 23, 25

_Vindictive's_ position, 128, 129, 202, 203

war use, 29, 30

Zero time, meaning and object, 170, 173

Zone of fire, German batteries, 30

_Zubian_, H.M.S.; App.