THE ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS. THE TIME FACTOR
The work of drafting, reproducing, and distributing the necessary
orders and instructions to the large number of craft concerned was not
so simple as it may sound. The amount of instructions required in an
operation of this sort can only be appreciated by those who have had
experience of staff work during war. The command to "carry on" is only
applicable when the means have been provided and the manner of its use
has been made known.
[Sidenote: Synchronizing the Events]
To mention a few of the items: Separate orders for the oversea voyage
were required for each squadron destined to make the passage
independently of the remainder. Others were needed for the voyage of
the main force, others to cover the aerial attacks and the long-range
bombardments. The supporting squadrons must have their instructions.
Still further orders were designed to deal with the period of
"approach." Then there were those for the main attack on the Mole, for
the demolition work, for the destruction of the railway viaduct, and
for the proceedings of the artificial-fog craft; also those for the
blockships and the rescue work. The retirement required its own share.
Even now we have not mentioned those designed to meet possible
eventualities, such as encountering enemy vessels _en route_, or
returning to harbour if postponement of the enterprise was necessary.
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Having decided _where_ and _how_ things should be done, the remaining
question was _when_ they should take place. The operation with its
various phases and diversions could not be carried out on the
go-as-you-please principle. Every item needed to be carefully fitted
in to suit the remainder. The timing of each event was of paramount
importance. A long-range bombardment or an aerial attack, if delayed,
might destroy our own vessels. The blowing up of the viaduct was
calculated to render _hors de combat_ all human beings within a certain
distance--our own men on the Mole must not be endangered by it. It
would be useless for the blockships to arrive before the fire of the
Mole batteries had been suitably diverted. Aerial bombers flying at a
hundred miles per hour could not accompany the ships steaming at about
one-tenth of that speed. The line of fire from the bombarding vessels
could not very well coincide with our approach course, hence the
necessity for the monitors to take up independent positions. And so
on. How could a satisfactory synchronisation of events be
arranged?--that was the problem.
There were only two methods to consider: firstly, that of centralised
command by signal; secondly, that of working in accordance with a
prearranged time table.
The former method was obviously impracticable. Signals passed by
either the wireless or visual method, during the approach, would make
our presence known to the enemy and thus preclude all chance of taking
the latter by surprise. After the attack had commenced signals would
be impracticable for obvious reasons, chief amongst them being the
deafening noise {138} and the presence of artificial fog. So direction
by signal could be ruled out.
[Sidenote: The Timing Question]
Recourse was had to the time-table method. A table was made out
showing the exact times (by clock) that the main force was to pass
through various positions and to arrive at the several destinations.
All other movements were to synchronise according to plan. The time
table naturally varied for each day according to the projected time of
arrival of the blockships, this, in turn, depending on the time of high
tide. But that was not all. It was necessary to guard against
unexpected delays due to accident, and against vagaries of the tidal
stream. Every unit should know, at a late stage of the oversea trip,
if the blockships were likely to be late or early, and the probable
difference between actual and projected time involved.
We would not be satisfied with the degree of punctuality usually
associated with certain railways. A few minutes out, one way or the
other, might be serious; an error of half an hour would probably be
disastrous. But the oversea passage involved a journey of
approximately a hundred miles for the blockships and storming vessels,
though rather less for the Dover contingents. That fact, combined with
the usual unwieldiness of a fleet comprising over one hundred and fifty
vessels, was not likely to render punctuality very easy of attainment.
The disadvantages of daylight made it inadvisable to leave our bases
extra early for the sake of having plenty of time to spare. Careful
calculations were necessary and the resulting time table was circulated
to all concerned.
Before leaving this consideration of the timing {139} question it may
be of interest to mention that the storming vessels were to be twenty
minutes ahead of the Zeebrugge blockships on arrival in the vicinity of
the Mole. In that twenty minutes we were to get alongside and land the
storming parties; the latter were to take the necessary steps to put
the batteries out of action as far as the safety of the blockships was
concerned. At the expiration of the twenty minutes the blockships were
to pass round the end of the Mole and make their dash for the canal
entrance. The reader may wonder why twenty minutes was the chosen
interval. Too long a time might allow the German defences to recover
from the initial surprise; too short a time might not enable the
storming vessels to complete their work before the blockships were seen
by the enemy. Twenty minutes, short though it was, was chosen as a
compromise.
All this operational staff work was carried out at Dover under the
direction of the Vice-Admiral, who, as previously stated, was already
overloaded with duties and responsibilities arising from the work of
the Dover Patrol.
The office accommodation was hardly palatial; the building might
certainly have been satisfactory as a small apartment house in pre-war
days, but, as the Admiral's office of our busiest naval command outside
the Grand Fleet, it was not quite up to standard. The small staff were
pretty busy for a few weeks. Meals were either bolted down or missed.
The night hours did not bring over-much sleep.
Visits to the Grand Fleet were also necessary; one grudged the hours
spent in the train. Conferences and discussions, visits to the ships
fitting out at the {140} dockyards, inspection of special material,
trials of the artificial fog, and the above-mentioned expenditure of
stationery helped to keep one occupied. Occasional aerial trips
assisted to clear away the cobwebs from one's brain; they constituted a
first-class tonic.
We had no printing-press. All orders had to be typed and reproduced by
a duplicating machine. Secrecy was as essential in this work as
elsewhere; information had to be confined to the minimum number of
persons. The ordinary office staff had all the Dover Patrol work to
attend to; that was as heavy as it was unceasing. It was a new
experience to turn the handle of the duplicator, and, in shirt-sleeve
garb, to clip up the pages. We obtained the assistance of a civilian
clerk from the Admiralty, and I vow that individual discovered the real
meaning of "overtime"; incidentally he was a very rapid and accurate
worker and helped us enormously.
At last the office work was more or less completed. Improvements were
thought out from time to time and had to be embodied, even up to the
eleventh hour. That was natural enough, seeing that we had very little
previous experience to guide us in the detailed planning of the Mole
attack and blockship work. It was a great relief when the paper work
was finished; those of us who had other business in hand could then
turn our attention to preparations of a more material nature, much of
which has already been described.
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