[Frontispiece: STORMING THE MOLE. _Drawn by Charles De Lacy from
details supplied by the Author_]
THE BLOCKING OF
ZEEBRUGGE
BY
CAPTAIN A. F. B. CARPENTER, V.C., R.N.
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
ADMIRAL EARL BEATTY
AND APPRECIATIONS BY
MARSHAL FOCH, REAR-ADMIRAL SIMS
AND
COUNT VISART
(BURGOMASTER OF BRUGES)
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS
BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
The Riverside Press Cambridge
1922
COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
The Riverside Press
CAMBRIDGE -- MASSACHUSETTS
PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.
TO
THE MAN-IN-THE-STREET
{vii}
INTRODUCTION
BY ADMIRAL EARL BEATTY
In appreciating the military reasons which directed the operations
connected with the blocking of Zeebrugge, it is desirable to recall to
mind the general naval situation at the beginning of 1918.
Briefly stated, the German High Seas Fleet was contained within the
waters of the Heligoland Bight by the British Grand Fleet, whilst
German submarines were engaged on vast operations, having for their
object the stoppage of the trade of Great Britain, and interference
with our lines of communication.
In the face of such an attack, the aim of Great Britain was either to
destroy the enemy submarines, or, failing destruction, to prevent their
egress from their bases. Convoy operations, patrol operations, and
mining operations in all seas were carried out to achieve the former
aim, and accomplished great results.
But enemy submarines continued to be built almost as rapidly as they
were destroyed. It was essential, therefore, to take what measures
were possible to render useless their bases and interfere with their
freedom of exit, and it was with this military object that plans for
the blocking of Zeebrugge were initiated.
Emphasis has been laid on the military reason which underlay this
operation, because an erroneous impression has existed in some quarters
that the Zeebrugge operations were more in the nature of an offensive
designed to lower the morale of the enemy and enhance that of the
British Navy, which, as a whole, had little opportunity of coming to
grips with the enemy.
{viii}
Whilst these moral results undoubtedly were felt after the operation,
they were not the military reasons, reasons alone which justified so
complex and difficult an undertaking, reasons which were never lost
sight of during the planning and carrying out of the operations.
The plan was surely laid; simple in general design, details were worked
out with foresight and exactitude. The factors of surprise,
mystification, and diversion were utilised to the utmost. The
resources of science were given full scope. Training to carry out the
plan proceeded with energy and understanding, co-ordination and
co-operation being apparent throughout. It was carried out with
determination.
In Captain Carpenter's book we are let into the full secret, and are
led step by step through the various phases referred to above, which
were to be crowned by the glorious achievement of St. George's Day,
1918. His pages bring out once again the moral and military virtues of
the British Navy, Officers and Men. They demonstrate that the spirit
which existed in our Naval Wars of past centuries, wars which laid the
foundation of the Empire, remains undiminished in the naval personnel
of to-day.
It is for us to ensure that these glorious traditions are understood by
all, and in being understood are handed on to those who come after us.
This book, in placing on record the matchless qualities displayed by
all concerned in the blocking of Zeebrugge, I welcome for this purpose.
BEATTY
_Admiral of the Fleet_
19_th July_, 1921
{ix}
APPRECIATION
BY MARSHAL FOCH
C'est dans un sentiment de solidarité que s'est réalisée l'union des
Alliés, en 1914, quand la cause de la Civilisation s'est trouvée
menacée.
A tous les moments critiques de la guerre, l'union s'est ainsi
resserrée devant le danger, et lorsqu'il s'est agi de fermer un des
repaires d'où les sousmarins ennemis menaçaient les communications
vitales des Alliés, dans une manoeuvre splendide, avec un esprit commun
de sacrifice absolu, le port de Zeebrugge a été attaqué et
definitivement fermé.
Le Commandant du _Vindictive_ a tenu à rappeler les détails de
l'opération dans laquelle il a joué un rôle si brillant, et son livre
constituera un précieux enseignement et donnera aux générations futures
un exemple splendide.[1]
F. FOCH
[1] When in 1914 the cause of civilisation was menaced, it was the
instinct of solidarity that brought about the Union of the Allies.
At every critical moment of the war, in the face of peril, this bond
was renewed; and when it became a question of closing one of the lairs
from which the enemy submarines threatened the vital communications of
the Allies, the port of Zeebrugge was attacked and closed once and for
all by a superb manoeuvre involving a common spirit of supreme
sacrifice.
The Captain of the _Vindictive_ has undertaken to tell in detail the
story of the action in which he played so brilliant a part, and his
book will afford a valuable record and set forth a fine example to
future generations.
{xi}
APPRECIATION
BY REAR-ADMIRAL SIMS, U.S.N.
Few incidents of the Great War had a greater influence in inspiring
enthusiasm in the fighting forces and increasing their morale than the
successful attack upon Zeebrugge; and it will long remain as an example
of what can be accomplished by the thorough co-ordination of the
elements of a sound plan with the various limiting conditions of place,
time, state of sea and air, and the material equipment suitable and
available.
The reader of this volume will at once be struck by the painstaking
care with which it was necessary that each detail be worked out, and
each unit assigned its particular task to be executed at a specified
time and place. Also that the amount of detail was necessarily so
great, and their dependence one upon another so vital to ultimate
success, that the whole may be compared to a complicated mechanism so
designed to meet peculiar conditions that the failure of any part--any
unit or group--or a material change in any of the conditions, would
have deranged essential elements of the plan and might have jeopardised
the success of the expedition.
But the principal lesson to be learned from the attack is not so much
the thoroughness of the preparation and training and the efficiency of
the weapons, essential as they of course were, as it is the influence
of the spirit and the initiative and loyalty of the {xii} personnel
that carried it out. These elements supplied the "steam," the
flexibility, and the lubrication that ensured the harmonious working of
the whole mechanism of which they were the soul. The basic principle
was the splendid morale of the personnel inspired by the high character
of its leaders.
Apart from the great interest of this narrative to the laymen, as a
military exploit of the most brilliant character, and an inspiring
story of heroism in war, it will always prove of great value to those
military men of both branches of the service who realise the tremendous
influence of the morale of their forces--the confidence in the ability
of the leader which encourages initiative and inspires the highest type
of loyalty.
WM. S. SIMS
{xiii}
APPRECIATION
BY COUNT VISART
(_Burgomaster of Bruges_)
Ainsi que tous mes concitoyens j'ai appris avec une grande satisfaction
que la fameuse attaque de Zeebrugge par le _Vindictive_ allait faire le
sujet d'un livre publié prochainement par Capitaine Alfred F. B.
Carpenter, un des héros qui ont pris une part glorieuse à cet exploit.
Cette entreprise de la Marine de Guerre Anglaise a été assurément une
des faits de guerre les plus extraordinaires des temps anciens et
modernes. Elle a été accompliée avec une énergie et une audace qui a
déjoué toutes les prévisions des Allemands.
Ainsi en dépit de toutes les difficultés, de tous les dangers, et de
pertes cruelles, l'assaut prodigieux du mole a jeté l'épouvante parmi
les ennemis et en même temps le _Vindictive_ et les bateaux qui le
suivaient ont embouteillé dans leur repaire les abominables U.B.
La cannonade entendue à Bruges nous avait déjà donné l'éveil et bientôt
les rumeurs que les Allemands n'avaient pu intercepter et la
consternation qu'ils tentaient vainement de dissimuler nous ont appris
que l'Angleterre avait frappé un grand coup. Un tel événement releva
tous nos courages.
Nous espérons qu'à Zeebrugge, sur le territoire de Bruges, un
magnifique monument immortalisera ce fait inoui, mais c'est avec le
plus grand intérêt que nous connaîtrons par le livre de Capitaine
Carpenter toutes les circonstances de cette histoire héroïque et {xiv}
les noms des hommes qui ont donné une nouvelle gloire à la Marine
Anglaise.[2]
AMIDER VISART
_Bourgemestre de Bruges_
[2] It was with great satisfaction that I and all my fellow citizens
learned that the famous attack on Zeebrugge by the _Vindictive_ was to
be the subject of a book, to be published in the near future, written
by Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter, one of the heroes who took a
glorious part in that exploit.
This enterprise of the British Navy was assuredly one of the most
extraordinary feats of war in both ancient and modern times. It was
accomplished with such energy and audacity as to baffle all the German
plans.
In spite of all the difficulties, dangers, and cruel losses, the
wonderful assault on the mole created consternation amongst the enemy;
and the ships which followed the _Vindictive_ bottled up the abominable
submarines in their base.
The sound of heavy firing heard in Bruges had already warned us; later,
the receipt of rumours which the Germans had been unable to intercept,
and their consternation which they were vainly endeavouring to conceal,
proved to us that England had struck a mighty blow. Such an event
renewed our courage.
We hope that at Zeebrugge, which is within the territory of Bruges, a
magnificent memorial will eventually immortalise this unprecedented
action, and it is with the greatest interest that we shall learn from
Captain Carpenter's book all the circumstances of this heroic episode
and the names of the men who added this new glory to the British Navy.
{xv}
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
As a result of having delivered many lectures, under official auspices
and in compliance with private invitations, on "The Blocking of
Zeebrugge," the author has received several requests to record the
story in more permanent form. Underlying these requests there appears
to be a feeling that first-hand accounts of enterprises in the Great
War should be of some value towards preserving that spirit which
rallied all classes of individuals in the British Empire, in the Allied
Countries, and in the United States of America, to the common cause of
upholding civilisation in the face of danger. That opinion, indeed,
has been openly stated to the author in Great Britain, by leading
members of the educational profession and of the Church, by naval and
military officers and others. Opinions of a similar type also have
been received from the United States, where, during a recent series of
visits to many of the larger cities, the author personally experienced
that solid friendship for Great Britain which is sometimes hidden
beneath surface irritations of a political nature.
Misunderstandings must occasionally arise between communities and
between the members of any single community; they readily take root and
develop into serious argument where the existence of a _common cause_
is forgotten. For that reason the author feels that the
above-mentioned opinions are not without foundation. Whilst attempting
to show that co-operation between the several units of a fighting force
{xvi} and confidence between superiors and subordinates are important
factors towards success in war, he has made this humble endeavour to
induce the belief that co-operation and confidence in other walks of
life are no less necessary.
There is danger of this blocking enterprise being allotted a false
position in the contemporary histories of the late war owing to the
somewhat prevalent custom of describing war operations with little
reference to the various considerations, factors, and events which gave
them birth.
The man-in-the-street is sometimes carried away by enthusiasm or
despondency, as the case may be, when unexpected events occur during
hostilities; he is apt to give little thought to the "why" and
"wherefore" of the occurrences. That fact has been exemplified clearly
enough with respect to this particular event, for, on all sides, one
heard the public verdict, given in the colloquial vulgarism of the
period, that the affair was a fine "stunt." The word "stunt," as
unmusical to the ear as it was offensive to those concerned in the
operations, has been defined as "a voluntary act, spectacular, usually
unnecessary, sometimes involving risk, and designed to attract
attention." However, the man-in-the-street meant well, and, after all,
could justifiably plead that his lack of education on naval matters was
to blame. The author has therefore addressed this book to the
man-in-the-street, and has endeavoured to "put him wise," as our
cousins across the water are in the habit of remarking.
The official despatches dealing with the blocking operations on the
Flanders coast were published early {xvii} in 1919, and, as far as
despatches can go, gave a splendid account of the enterprise forming
the subject of this book. But despatches are strictly limited in
length and necessarily deal more with cold-blooded statements of fact
than with psychological aspects. When one reads despatches of the
great leaders of the past concerning the operations in their campaigns
one cannot fail to notice the almost complete absence of any reference
to the moral factor in war. Yet Napoleon himself declared, "The moral
is to the physical as three is to one." Material results can easily be
gauged under peace conditions, whereas moral effect on human nature in
war is only discoverable from one's own war experiences, which are
necessarily limited, and from the experiences of others as set forth in
the historical records of past wars. It was partly for that reason,
presumably, that Napoleon studied the campaigns of Cæsar and Hannibal
although their instruments of war were long since out of date.
The usual reasons for the omission of the moral factors from despatches
are twofold. Firstly, the leader from whom the despatch emanates may
consider it inadvisable to publish his preconceived ideas as to the
eventual effect of the operations on the morale of the enemy; this
concealment is especially necessary if the despatch is published before
the declaration of peace. Secondly, the writer of the despatch is
often unaware, at the time of writing, of the effect already obtained
against the enemy's morale; such effects may not be discoverable for
many months after the operations have been concluded. Under certain
circumstances it may also be temporarily {xviii} inadvisable to present
to the enemy, through the medium of despatches, information concerning
psychological effects on one's own personnel. These omissions,
therefore, must not be taken to infer that the moral factors were
ignored. It is clear, then, that post-war accounts of operations may
be far from superfluous whether considered from the point of view of
the man-in-the-street or that of the student of war.
Without some conception of the strategical situation arising from the
German occupation of the Flanders coast it would be difficult to grasp
the true nature of the enterprise described herein. An examination of
the strategical outlook alone, however, would be insufficient. The
geographical and hydrographical, and even the meteorological,
situations largely influenced the choice of tactical methods to be
pursued for the attainment of the object in view. It is therefore
important to consider the situation from these various standpoints in
some detail.
The book has been divided into two parts. Part I deals with the
Situation, the Object, the General Plan for the attainment of the
Object, the Preparatory Work involved, and the various occurrences up
to the eve of the Attack. Part II describes the events which occurred
during the operation itself, and includes some consideration of both
the material and moral results of the enterprise and the lessons to be
drawn therefrom.
For the illustrations the author is much indebted to the Admiralty, Air
Ministry, Imperial War Museum, and Press, to whom he makes this
grateful acknowledgment.
{xix}
With regard to the personal side of the story, it may be as well to
point out that many of the officers and men concerned were mentioned in
the official despatch; that fact lessens one of the difficulties
attached to the author's task. A compromise between the purely
impersonal attitude and the very natural desire to render full justice
to each individual, regardless of the reader's patience, has been aimed
at.
The author trusts that the reader will be tolerant of omission and
repetition, and will forgive the rather obvious shortcomings of a
literary nature which, alas, appear all too frequently in the book.
ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER
8_th March_, 1921
{xxi}
CONTENTS
PART I
Introduction by Admiral Earl Beatty
Appreciation by Marshal Foch
Appreciation by Rear-Admiral Sims, U.S.N.
Appreciation by Count Visart
Author's Preface
I. The Strategical Situation. The German Bases
in Flanders. The Conception of the Plan
II. The Local Situation. The Local Defences
III. The Outlying Obstacles. Considerations of Salvage
IV. Past Experience. Smoke Screens. The Chances of Success
V. Planning The Operation. Matters Affecting
the Plan. Attacks on the Mole
VI. The Vessels Involved: Their Duties. The Rescue Work
VII. Matters affecting the Passage. The Supporting
Forces. The German Sea-Forces. The
Preparatory Work
VIII. The Personnel. Secrecy. Training. Some Personalities
IX. The Waiting Period. The Volunteering Spirit
X. Meteorological and Tidal Conditions. Visibility
XI. The Orders and Instructions. The Time Factor
{xxii}
XII. The First Attempt. The Return to Harbour
XIII. The Second Attempt and Return. Preparing for the Third
Attempt. Rewriting the Orders. German Optimism
PART II
Foreword
I. The Start. The Oversea Passage
II. The Approach
III. The Commencement of the Attack
IV. The Fight on the Mole. H.M.S. Iris
V. The Attack on the Railway Viaduct
VI. The Smoke Screening. Subsidiary Attacks
VII. The Work of the Blockships
VIII. The Retirement
IX. The Material Results
X. The Moral Effect
XI. Some Remarks on the Enterprise
Appendix. A List of Vessels and Craft in the Operations
Index
{xxiii}
ILLUSTRATIONS
Storming the Mole . . . . . . . . . _Frontispiece_
Drawn by Charles De Lacy from details supplied by the author
Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter
A Portion of the German Battery on the Lighthouse
Extension of the Mole
View of the Canal Entrance with its Curved Piers
Aerial Photograph of the Canal Entrance
The Northeastern End of the Mole
The Blockships fitting out for the Enterprise
H.M.S. Vindictive before Fitting Out
A Portion of the Broad Part of the Mole
The Outer Wall, Showing the Parapet Pathway
Sixteen Feet Above The Floor of the Mole
H.M.S. Vindictive's Specially Constructed Gang-Ways
One of the Monitors
H.M. Ships Iris (right) and Daffodil
Lieut.-Col. Bertram N. Elliot
Lieut.-Commander Arthur L. Harrison
Wing-Commander Frank A. Brock
Captain Henry C. Halahan
Vice-Admiral Sir Roger J. B. Keyes (missing from book)
Diagrammatic Sketch of the Attack
Drawn By Charles De Lacy From Details Supplied By The Author
H.M.S. Vindictive's Bridge and Flame-Thrower Hut (right)
{xxiv}
The Fight on the Mole
Drawn by Charles De Lacy from details supplied by the author
Lieut. George N. Bradford
Lieut. Claude E. K. Hawkings
Lieut. Richard D. Sandford
Commander Valentine F. Gibbs
The Railway Viaduct
Aerial Photograph taken through the Clouds a Few
Hours after the Enterprise
The Three Blockships shortly after the Attack
Intrepid and Iphigenia
The Western Side of the Blocked Channel
The Eastern Side of the Blocked Channel
H.M.S. _Vindictive_ at Dover after the Attack
H.M.S. _Vindictive_ on her Return to Dover
MAPS AND PLANS
Chart showing the Relative Positions of Dover,
Zeebrugge, Heligoland, and the Exits from the North Sea
The Canal System of Belgium
The Port of Zeebrugge
Chart of Dover to Zeebrugge
Plan of Canal Entrance Channel
Sectional Sketch of Sunken Blockships
Section of the Mole through No. 3 Shed
Specimen Diagram for ascertaining Available Period
{1}
THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE
PART I
{3}
THE BLOCKING
OF ZEEBRUGGE
CHAPTER I
THE STRATEGICAL SITUATION. THE GERMAN BASES
IN FLANDERS. THE CONCEPTION OF THE PLAN.
The main function of a navy in war is that of obtaining the command of
the sea. The purpose for which such "command" is desired is the
utilisation of the sea-lines of communication and the denial of the
same to the enemy.
Soon after the commencement of the war in 1914 the sea-lines of
communication across the English Channel assumed considerable, if not
paramount, importance for the transfer of personnel and material from
Britain to the Allied forces in France. It was equally incumbent on
the navy to maintain the trans-Atlantic and other lines of
communication along which the necessities of life and war were carried
to the Allies in all theatres of war.
[Sidenote: The Strategical Situation]
The first step towards obtaining "command of the sea" is the removal of
the obstacles which stand in one's way. In this particular case the
main obstacle (admittedly constructed for the purpose) was the German
High Seas Fleet. Thus the first duty of the British Grand Fleet was
that of destroying the {4} so-called High Seas Fleet, or, if
destruction was found to be impracticable, of reducing it to
inactivity. The German Fleet was fully alive to that fact, and, almost
throughout the war, hid themselves away in their naval bases under the
protection of their coast defences. Thus, as events showed, the High
Seas Fleet did not prove to be a very serious obstacle to our Command
of the sea; but, and this fact is easily forgotten, we could not
_foresee_ the continuance of their ineptitude and lack of spirit. The
German submarines, however, were a formidable obstacle, indeed. It is
unnecessary to reiterate what is already common knowledge on that point.
Submarines, by their nature, have certain limitations. Except in the
case of the submarine cruisers, which only materialised in the latter
part of the war, such craft are considerably hampered in their
movements by their comparatively small radius of action. Owing to the
geographical situation of Germany, her submarines were forced to expend
an important percentage of their fuel during the outward and homeward
voyages between their bases and the trade routes. This expenditure
cannot merely be judged by the distances which had to be traversed; the
expenditure of fuel in the submarine bears some relation to the _whole
circumstances_ of the voyage.
The endurance of the personnel is another important factor, and is
similarly affected by the circumstances under which they are employed.
For instance, in waters patrolled by enemy vessels, high speed must
always be readily available and the strain on the personnel, consequent
on the danger of sudden attack from surface craft, aircraft, or other
submarines, {5} to say nothing of the presence of mine-fields, is
increased. Thus the longer the passage that the German submarines were
forced to undertake in comparatively narrow and dangerous waters--such
as the North Sea--the less work could they do on our more important
trade routes. That statement is closely connected with the subject of
this book.
It did not require very much intelligence on the part of the German
Admiralty to realise that the possession of bases on the Flanders coast
would greatly facilitate their submarine campaign owing to the
consequent reduction of the voyages to and from the trans-Atlantic, or
Channel, trade routes. Flanders was therefore used, as will be
explained later in detail, to provide advanced bases for German
submarines.
The coast of Flanders lent itself to other naval uses. In addition to
the _guerre-de-course_ tactics of the enemy--i.e., the direct attack on
Allied merchant vessels--it was always open to Germany to take their
whole main fleet to sea for the purpose of seeking advantageous
conditions for bringing a portion of our Grand Fleet to action.
Movements of modern fleets under war conditions necessitate the use of
various types of small craft to precede them--e.g., mine-sweepers for
clearing channels for the fleet to pass through, destroyers for
supporting the mine-sweepers and for driving back the enemy's small
craft, light cruisers for scouting purposes, etc. Mine-sweepers and
torpedo craft, by virtue of their small size, are unable to keep the
sea for long periods. It will therefore be realised that, in the event
of the High Seas Fleet putting to sea for operations in southern
waters, the Flanders coast provided {6} Germany with an advanced base
from which their light craft could operate.
The German torpedo craft based in Flanders, therefore, would be able to
serve a double purpose, viz., that already mentioned and that of
attacking our patrol craft, our coast and our merchant vessels when
opportunity offered. The mine-sweepers could also serve a double
purpose in that they were required to sweep channels for the ingress
and egress of submarines based in Flanders whilst being suitably placed
for sweeping duties in advance of the main fleet. That Flanders was
also suitable for aircraft bases is as well known as it is obvious; but
it may not be generally understood that such aircraft would also be of
special value to the main fleet under the conditions stated above.
Thus, to sum up, the occupation of the Flanders coast by the German sea
forces would be of treble value--to provide, firstly, a base for the
submarines employed on commerce destruction; secondly, a base for the
advanced flotillas and aircraft operating in conjunction with the main
fleet in the event of the latter coming south; and, thirdly, a base
from which to attack our southern coasts or sea-patrols and from which
to indulge in air raids against British and French territory.
The foregoing consideration of the possible uses of Flanders to the
German Navy shows the inherent value of an advanced base in that
locality; the intrinsic value obviously depended upon the existence of
suitable harbours for use as bases. Let us now examine the
geographical situation.
[Illustration: CHART SHOWING THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF DOVER,
ZEEBRUGGE, HELIGOLAND, AND THE EXITS FROM THE NORTH SEA.]
In the latter part of 1917 the Flanders coast, as far westward as
Nieuport, was in the possession of the {7} Germans. The northern
extremity of the line separating the German and Allied armies was
situated approximately on the Yser Canal, which emanates from Nieuport
harbour. The latter was dominated by the gun-fire of both armies; its
use was, therefore, denied to both. The only other harbours on the
coast of Flanders were Ostende, Blankenberghe, and Zeebrugge. These
will be described in some detail presently.
[Sidenote: The Flanders Coast]
The Flanders coast consists mainly of flat country barely elevated
above the level of the sea. Sand-hills along the shore act as a
barrier between the sea and the land. Parallel to the shore the tidal
current runs to and fro with considerable velocity. The tendency for
the tidal current to wash away the sand from the shore is partially
countered by the use of groynes, such as are similarly used to maintain
our own coastline in many parts of England. Although the groynes on
the Flanders coast are carried well out into the sea--they are often
100 yards in length--the movement of sand along the coast is very
considerable, and, as will be explained later, has a strong influence
on the harbour situation in that locality.
The approaches to the coast are beset with shoals reaching to a
distance of eight miles from the land. These shoals have always
provided serious obstacles to navigation. During times of peace the
charts of this locality had been kept corrected by virtue of continual
surveying. The shoals were frequently moving and new shoals appeared
from time to time. The channels required almost constant dredging.
For obvious reasons during the occupation of Flanders by the Germans it
was not possible for the Allies to continue either the surveying or the
dredging.
{8}
Before the war navigation off this coast required the use of many
facilities such as buoys and lighthouses. At the best of times buoys
are not very dependable as navigational aids owing to their tendency to
break away in heavy weather or to drag their anchors along the bottom.
Their positions need to be "fixed" from time to time by means of angles
to shore objects, or by methods of astronomical observation, and then
compared with the positions shown on the charts. Lighthouses, however,
unless they are of the small type without lighthouse-keepers, are more
efficient aids to the navigator. During the war the lighthouses east
of Nieuport were only used by the Germans during short periods when
specially required for their own craft; the majority of the buoys were
withdrawn and the remainder were moved to new positions which were
frequently altered to prevent the Allies from making use of them.
Thus, during the war, the charts available to the Allies were very soon
obsolete; no others were obtainable. Navigation off the Flanders
coast, for Allied vessels of any size, therefore, became decidedly
hazardous.
The tides on the coasts, in addition to running alternately eastward
and westward with considerable velocity, also caused large differences
in sea-level amounting to fifteen feet between the highest and lowest
states of the tide.
[Sidenote: The Canal System]
Mention has already been made that the only harbours on the coast
eastward of Nieuport were situated at Ostende, Blankenberghe, and
Zeebrugge. But these were not natural harbours. They had been
artificially cut out of the coast-line by means of {9} dredging. The
entrance channels were preserved by piers built out into the sea and by
dredging operations designed to retain the desired depths of water.
[Illustration: BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF CANALS]
Ostende, before the war, had been much used as a commercial harbour,
and was therefore provided with numerous wharves, basins, and docks.
It was a suitable harbour for all classes of submarines and torpedo
craft. Blankenberghe was a little harbour about nine miles east of
Ostende and three miles west of Zeebrugge. Its depth was exceedingly
small; it could, therefore, only be used for shallow draught vessels
such as fishing boats, motor boats, and the like. It was true that the
rise of tide, amounting to approximately fifteen feet, would enable
larger vessels to enter or leave near the time of high water, but any
naval vessel stationed in a harbour from which it can only proceed to
sea during a limited portion of the twenty-four hours at once loses
much of its value. Zeebrugge could accommodate vessels up to a
considerable size: the harbour works and depths will be described in
detail presently. Although these three places provided the only
harbours on the coast, there was a harbour of great importance at
Bruges, about eight miles inland from Zeebrugge.
{10}
Bruges harbour was also entirely artificial, consisting of locks,
basins, and waterways built on the canal system. Bruges was connected
to the sea by means of canals running to Zeebrugge and Ostende, these
canals converging on the waterways of Bruges in such a manner that
vessels of a certain limited size could pass from Ostende to Zeebrugge,
and vice versa, without actually proceeding into the open sea. A
series of small canals also connected Bruges to Antwerp, via Ghent, but
this canal system, being only constructed to accommodate barges, did
not materially add to the value of Bruges as a harbour for sea-going
vessels.
Of the three canal systems connecting at Bruges, the canal to Zeebrugge
easily held first place in importance. This canal was built by the
Belgians. It was commenced in 1896 and completed in 1907. Six and a
quarter miles in length, it was almost entirely straight throughout.
It could accommodate torpedo-boat destroyers or submarines, both of the
largest size, and could, if required, have been used by light cruisers.
[Sidenote: The Harbours in Flanders]
At the seaward end of the Ostende and Zeebrugge canals, locks were
constructed so that vessels could pass from the canals to the sea, or
the reverse, at any state of the tide, without lowering the level of
the water in the canal.
The above-mentioned harbours were used for naval purposes by Germany as
follows. Bruges was chosen as the main naval base. Shelters for
protecting submarines from aerial attack, floating docks, repair
workshops, all the other facilities which go to make a modern dockyard
for small vessels, and the necessary stores and ammunition, were to be
found there. The {11} number of naval craft based on Flanders appeared
to vary considerably; but, at the beginning of 1918, approximately
eighteen submarines and twenty-five destroyers or torpedo-boats would
be at Bruges on an average day. The submarines lay in the special
shelters which were covered by roofs of reënforced concrete several
feet in thickness. Bruges, then, was not only the dockyard but also
the resting-place of practically all the German naval craft based on
Flanders.
The sea exits from Bruges, as already mentioned, were situated at
Ostende and Zeebrugge. There was some doubt, however, whether the
Bruges-Ostende canal could be used for the passage of anything larger
than very shallow draught vessels such as motor boats or barges. The
Ostende canal was known to be narrow, tortuous, and shallow; it had
been constructed many years earlier than the Zeebrugge canal.
At Zeebrugge and Ostende a few German craft were usually stationed for
duties of an immediate nature such as mine-sweeping, patrolling, and
duties connected with the defence of the coast. These harbours were
specially useful as taking-off places for vessels which had
concentrated in readiness for operations at sea, or as bolt-holes for
the same craft when pursued by our patrol vessels. Both harbours were
open to bombardment from the sea; that reason, more than any other,
probably influenced the Germans to use Bruges for their main base.
Ostende, being more open to attack from the sea and air than was
Zeebrugge, was the less important harbour of the two.
Blankenberghe harbour, owing to its small size and shallow depth, was
used as a base for the German {12} armed motor boats; it is believed
that about thirty were stationed there. This harbour, being
unconnected with the canal system, was not in direct inland
communication with Bruges by water.
In addition to the submarines and torpedo craft already mentioned, the
Germans had a large number of trawlers based on the various harbours
for mine-sweeping and patrol duties. At Zeebrugge they had their
largest seaplane base in Flanders; another seaplane base was situated
at Ostende.
In due course Flanders had become a veritable hornet's nest. Let us
consider for a few moments to what extent these hornets could trouble
us.
[Sidenote: Our Lines of Communication]
Across the English Channel, and especially in its eastern portion, we
had established lines of communication of tremendous importance. It is
no exaggeration to state that, every few _minutes_ of the day and
night, a vessel, of one sort or another, left the English shore for
France with her cargo of personnel, guns, ammunition, food or fuel,
etc. Day after day, night after night, for months on end, a constant
stream of vessels poured across the Channel in support of the Allied
armies or on the return trip to English ports with wounded, men to whom
a welcome spell of leave had been granted, empties for refilling, motor
transport vehicles for repair, and the like. The wounded were carried
in hospital ships; but, as the world knows and can never forget, the
Germans ruthlessly torpedoed them whenever the chance offered,
regardless of the Geneva Convention, heedless of the damnable
inhumanity of the proceeding, seeking only for opportunities for
indulging in the frightfulness which formed part of their Kultur.
{13}
All these vessels were continually open to attack, not only from
submarines but also from the surface craft and aircraft based in
Flanders. At any chosen moment, preferably at night or during misty
days, these hornets could emanate from Ostende or Zeebrugge on their
deadly missions. Further westward our trans-Atlantic lines of
communication offered innumerable opportunities for the German
submarine commanders to display their brutality against comparatively
defenceless merchant vessels, or to attack transports carrying
munitions of war and troops from the American Continent. The passage
through the English Channel afforded the most direct route for German
submarines proceeding to, or returning from, their hunting-grounds.
The mercantile traffic off the southeast coast of England and in the
entrance to the Thames was also within easy reach of the German bases
in Flanders; so were our seaside resorts, such as Ramsgate and Margate,
which provided favourable opportunities for bombardments with resultant
casualty lists of innocent women and children.
Dunkerque and Calais on the French coast were the nearest seaport
objectives to the Flanders coast; they both experienced frequent aerial
attacks and an occasional bombardment from the sea.
As a counter to the German craft in Flanders the British Admiralty had
established a force known as the "Dover Patrol." As the name implies,
this force was primarily based on Dover. Their duties were mainly
those of protecting the transports bound across the English Channel,
preventing the German naval craft from passing through the Straits of
{14} Dover, and watching the exits from Bruges so as to obtain timely
information of concentrated German forces putting to sea. The story of
the Dover Patrol is of intense interest, but so many pages would be
required to do it even bare justice that I can only refer the reader to
books written especially on that subject. Suffice it to say here that,
day and night, winter and summer, fair weather and foul, the Dover
force patrolled the sea so successfully that the German attempts to use
their surface craft for attacking the Allies were few and far between.
The difficulties of preventing the submarines passing through the
Straits of Dover were immense. We must realise that the maximum
portion of a submerged submarine visible above water amounts to a
periscope of a few inches in diameter. Compare that dimension to the
width of the Strait which at its narrowest part is twenty miles. _A
few inches in twenty miles_--if I have calculated aright that means
that the visible portion of the submarine would cover little more than
_one-millionth_ part of the surface between Dover and Cape Grisnez.
And when we also realise that the periscope would only be raised above
water for a few seconds at long intervals we shall begin to understand
the difficulty of the problem. Yet, as we know now, the Dover Patrol
force, under the direction of Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, eventually
rendered the passage through the Straits to all intents and purposes
impossible for a submarine. All honour to the Dover Patrol!
[Sidenote: The Dover Patrol]
A point which, until recently, unaccountably seemed to have escaped
notice was that the work of the Dover Patrol was carried out on behalf
of all the {15} Allies and of the United States. It was not a British
force acting solely in British interests. Though it is difficult, and
perhaps invidious, to apportion the credit for protecting the Allied
lines of communication, yet there is no shadow of doubt that the troops
from Canada and from the United States of America owed to the Dover
Patrol force a tremendous debt of gratitude for their safe passage
overseas. Recognition of this fact has since been shown by the
erection at New York, and on the French coast, of memorials to the
Dover Patrol. When the late war has faded into history, and those of
us who took part have long since "gone west," such memorials will
remain to bear witness to the splendid sacrifice and unselfish
gallantry of those hardy seamen who did their utmost to uphold the
honour of civilisation and to destroy the forces working for its
overthrow. (This opportunity of acknowledging the success of their
extremely arduous efforts, humble and brief though the acknowledgment
may be, partially counterbalances my regrets at not having had the
chance of serving with the "Dover Patrol" except on the occasion which
this book is designed to describe.)
[Illustration: CAPTAIN ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER, V.C., R.N.]
The final closing of the Straits, however, was far from accomplished by
the spring of 1918. At that time we had reason to believe that a large
percentage of the total Allied losses in merchant ships was caused by
the Flanders submarines, and that the percentage was on the increase.
Now patrol work of the type described above is essentially defensive in
its nature. This statement is not intended to imply that the Dover
Patrol force were always employed on defensive tactics; such was {16}
by no means the case. Our monitors frequently bombarded the coast
defences and the harbour works at Ostende and Zeebrugge; our motor
boats were continually patrolling close off the three coast harbours,
watching for opportunities to torpedo any German vessels which ventured
to sea; our mine-laying craft were employed, night after night, in
laying mines to the detriment of the German submarines. But from time
to time various suggestions had been made that we should adopt still
more offensive measures against the enemy. It is a very simple matter
to make suggestions, but by no means so simple to accompany them with a
reasoned statement, based on logical deduction, which will _convince
the authorities_ of their value. Until a particular Plan has been put
into execution it may, in the literal sense, be rightly designated a
"paper scheme." It is both unreasonable and unfair to attach a
derogatory sense to the term. It is equally unreasonable for authors
of schemes which have not passed the paper stage to belittle operations
when the latter, based on schemes which differed from their own, have
actually taken place with successful results.
[Sidenote: Paper Schemes]
Whatever suggestions were made, it is clear that there could be only
two radical methods of attaining our object. The most satisfactory, of
course, would have been the recapture of the Flanders coast and of
Bruges, with all the hornets in their nests, by means of military
operations. Unfortunately that was impracticable; the Allied armies
were not yet sufficiently strong. The only alternative to capture of
the craft in their harbours was that of preventing them putting to
sea--i.e., destroying or blocking {17} their exits. Several schemes
for blocking operations had been proposed. In tactical method they had
varied from blowing up the harbour entrances, as suggested by the
Halifax disaster, to "building in" the entrances under cover of poison
gas. Whether such methods were considered too risky, too expensive, or
too hopelessly fantastic is more than the author of this book knows.
An attack on Zeebrugge had been strongly advocated by an eminent flag
officer in November, 1916, but no details were given by him as to the
nature of the operation. In May, 1917, detailed proposals for an
attack had been submitted to the Admiralty by another distinguished
officer. This attack involved a landing on the Mole at Zeebrugge, the
general idea of which was not dissimilar from that eventually followed.
This particular scheme had not earned the approval of Their Lordships,
nor was it considered suitable by the Vice-Admiral then in command at
Dover.
Many months after the blocking of Zeebrugge had become an accomplished
fact two earlier schemes came to light--these having emanated from the
author of that submitted in May, 1917. In November, 1917, however, the
only previous proposals which were available for consideration by the
Planning Division of the Staff were those of November, 1916, and May,
1917, mentioned above.
In November, 1917, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was First Sea Lord and
Chief of the Naval Staff. He had requested the Director of Plans to
consider, amongst many other things, the possibility of blocking the
Belgian ports.
{18}
The Plan was _evolved in the Admiralty_, being commenced on November
13th, and laid before Their Lordships on December 3d. The Plan was
accepted as feasible, and earned Their Lordships' decision to have it
carried out. No previous Plan had reached that stage. The original
edition of the Plan did not emanate from another country, or from
civilian sources, or from any other source outside the Admiralty
buildings in Whitehall except in so far as the details of one
particular phase of the operation were the outcome of conversations, at
the headquarters of the Air Force, with an expert on the formation of
artificial fogs.
[Sidenote: The Conception of the Plan]
The foregoing definite fact has been purposely inserted to correct
other statements which have been published elsewhere, presumably in
error. I shall deal with the details of the Plan in a subsequent
chapter.
Before leaving the consideration of the _origin_ of the Plan, I should
like to emphasise one particular point. Perhaps this can be most
readily illustrated by a simple simile. An uncorked bottle, containing
some noxious fluid, stands upon the table. You realise the
disagreeable results which will follow on the escape of its contents.
You cork the bottle. Now your action is so obviously correct that you
scarcely give it another thought. If any credit was due to anybody you
would probably take it to yourself; you would not apportion any
particular merit to that fond parent who first initiated you into this
obvious solution of the problem. In the case, therefore, of the
Blocking of Zeebrugge one need not apportion credit to the person who
first _suggested the mere idea_; the credit is entirely due to the man
who, in spite of all the difficulties, {19} evolved a _method_ of
"corking the bottle" and who, later, overcoming the great obstacles in
the way, carried the method into execution.
Before we pass on to review the difficulties of blocking the exits from
the German bases it would be advisable to consider the probable effects
of such an operation; this being the logical sequence actually followed
before the details of the Plan were formulated.
The results to be attained by blocking the exits would probably be as
follows. Firstly, there would be a reduction in the number of Allied
vessels sunk by mine or submarine warfare; secondly, a decrease in raid
activity on the part of the enemy torpedo craft; thirdly, the loss of a
convenient advanced base for small craft operating in conjunction with
certain movements of the High Seas Fleet; and, fourthly, the reduction
in the number of enemy vessels available for the purposes mentioned.
The first two results concerned reduction of enemy activity arising
from the longer passages involved by the use of more distant bases such
as Heligoland or the German rivers from which the small craft could
continue their depredations. The third result speaks for itself. With
regard to the fourth, it has already been stated that, on an average
day, there would be many torpedo craft or submarines resting and
repairing at Bruges. If the exits were blocked the use of these craft
would be denied to the enemy, just as effectually as if they were sunk,
for as long as the exits remained unopened. This loss to the enemy,
temporary or permanent, could doubtless be described in terms of
reduction of Allied losses of {20} merchant tonnage. The Admiralty
authorities could probably have calculated, within fairly correct
estimates, the average loss of merchant tonnage caused to the Allies by
a single enemy submarine or surface torpedo craft. Our former average
loss per given period would thus be lessened in proportion to the
number of enemy vessels bottled up in the canals during that period.
[Sidenote: Results to be Obtained]
There would, of course, be other, less important, consequences arising
from the blocking of these exits; e.g., the inconveniences caused by
the necessary transfer of fuelling and repair facilities elsewhere, the
extra work thrown on the escorting vessels in the Bight, and the fact
that the craft already at sea and operating from the Flanders coast
would be forced to curtail their current trips if they desired to
arrive at their new bases with their usual reserves of fuel.
All these material gains to the Allies would be of considerable
importance, but the moral effect was not unworthy of consideration.
The more audacious an undertaking against an enemy the more intense
will be the victor's enthusiasm consequent on success, and the greater
the despondency and loss of moral to the vanquished. Attempts to block
a hostile port in the face of carefully prepared defence measures may
certainly be described as audacious, unless the word "impertinent,"
which the author is inclined to allocate to this particular event, is
deemed to be more truly descriptive. If we endeavour to imagine what
our own feelings would be on hearing that enemy vessels had entered one
of our strongly defended harbours and blocked the entrance, we shall
arrive at some idea as to the probable moral effect produced {21} by
such an enterprise. In spite of the almost entire absence of activity
on the part of the High Seas Fleet, the Germans had never ceased to
sing its praises with all the bombast of which their waning spirit was
capable. It was not difficult, therefore, to estimate the dejection
and consternation that would spread throughout Germany when the success
of our efforts became known. The loss of prestige in the German Navy
would be not merely certain but perhaps of vital consequence later on.
{22}