Q-SHIPS EVERYWHERE
In the spring of 1917 there was a 2,905-ton steamship, called the
_Bracondale_, in the employment of the Admiralty as a collier. It
was decided that she would make a very useful Q-ship, so at the
beginning of April she was thus commissioned and her name changed to
_Chagford_. She was fitted out at Devonport and armed with a 4-inch,
two 12-pounders, and a couple of torpedo tubes, and was ready for sea
at the end of June. Commanded by Lieutenant D. G. Jeffrey, R.N.R., she
proceeded to Falmouth in order to tune everything up, and then was
based on Buncrana, which she left on August 2 for what was to be her
last cruise, and I think that in the following story we have another
instance of heroism and pertinacity of great distinction.
_Chagford’s_ position on August 5 at 4.10 a.m. was roughly 120 miles
north-west of Tory Island, and she was endeavouring to find two enemy
submarines which had been reported on the previous day. At the time
mentioned she was herself torpedoed just below the bridge, and in
this one explosion was caused very great injury: for it disabled
both her torpedo tubes and her 4-inch gun; it shattered the boats on
the starboard side as well as the captain’s cabin and chart room.
In addition, it also wrecked all the voice-pipe connections to the
torpedo tubes and guns, and it flooded the engine-room and put the
engines out of commission, killing one of the crew. Lieutenant Jeffrey
therefore ‘abandoned’ ship, and just as the boats were getting away
two periscopes and a submarine were sighted on the starboard side 800
yards away. As soon as the enemy came to the surface fire was opened
on her by the two 12-pounders and both Lewis and machine-guns, several
direct hits being observed. The submarine then dived, but at 4.40 a.m.
she fired a second torpedo at _Chagford_, which hit the ship abaft the
bridge on the starboard side.
From the time the first torpedo had hit, the enemy realized that
_Chagford_ was a warship, for the 4-inch gun and torpedo tubes had been
made visible, and now that the second explosion had come Lieutenant
Jeffrey decided to recall his boats so that the ship might genuinely
be abandoned. The lifeboat, dinghy, and a barrel raft were accordingly
filled, and about 5.30 a.m. the enemy fired a third torpedo, which
struck also on the starboard side. Having sent away in the boats and
raft everyone with the exception of himself and a lieutenant, R.N.R.,
two sub-lieutenants, R.N.R., also an assistant-paymaster, R.N.R., and
one petty officer, Lieutenant Jeffrey stationed these in hiding under
cover of the fo’c’sle and poop, keeping a smart look-out, however,
through the scuttles.
Here was another doomed ship rolling about in the Atlantic without her
crew, and only a gallant handful of British seamanhood still standing
by with but a shred of hope. To accentuate their suspense periscopes
were several times seen, and from 9 a.m. until 9 p.m. a submarine
frequently appeared on the surface at long range, and almost every
hour a periscope passed round the ship inspecting her cautiously.
During the whole of this time _Chagford_ was settling down gradually
but certainly. At dark Lieutenant Jeffrey, fearing that the enemy
might attempt boarding, placed Lewis and Maxim guns in position and
served out rifles and bayonets to all. Midnight came, and after making
a further examination of the damage, Lieutenant Jeffrey realized that
it was impossible for the _Chagford_ to last much longer, for her main
deck amidships was split from side to side, the bridge deck was badly
buckled, and the whole ship was straining badly. Therefore, just before
half-past midnight, these five abandoned the ship in a small motor-boat
which they had picked up at sea some days previously, but before
quitting _Chagford_ they disabled the guns, all telescopic sights and
strikers being removed.
Having shoved off, they found to their dismay that there were no tanks
in the motor-boat, so she had to be propelled by a couple of oars, and
it will readily be appreciated that this kind of propulsion in the
North Atlantic was not a success. They then thought of going back to
the ship, but before they could do so they were fortunately picked up
at 7.30 a.m. by H.M. trawler _Saxon_, a large submarine having been
seen several times on the horizon between 4 and 7 a.m. The trawler then
proceeded to hunt for the submarine, but, as the latter had now made
off, volunteers were called for and went aboard _Chagford_, so that
by 4 p.m. _Saxon_ had commenced towing her. Bad luck again overcame
their efforts, for wind and sea had been steadily increasing, and of
course there was no steam, so the heavy work of handling cables had all
to be done by hand. Until the evening the ship towed fairly well at 2
knots, but, as she seemed then to be breaking up, the tow-rope had to
be slipped, and just before eight o’clock next morning (August 7) she
took a final plunge and disappeared. The _Saxon_ made for the Scottish
coast and landed the survivors at Oban on the morning of the eighth. In
this encounter, difficult as it was, _Chagford_ had done real service,
for she had damaged the submarine so much that she could not submerge,
and this was probably U 44 which H.M.S. _Oracle_ sighted in the early
hours of August 12 off the north coast of Scotland, evidently bound
to Germany. _Oracle_ chased her; U 44 kept diving and coming to the
surface after a short while. She had disguised herself as a trawler,
and was obviously unable to dive except for short periods. _Oracle_
shelled and then rammed her, so that U 44 was destroyed and _Chagford_
avenged. Nothing more was seen of _Chagford_ except some wreckage found
by a trawler on August 11, who noticed the word _Bracondale_ on the
awnings.
After Lieutenant Jeffrey and crew had returned to their base they
proceeded to fit out the 2,794-ton S.S. _Arvonian_. This was to be a
very powerful Q-ship, for she was armed with three 4-inch guns instead
of one, in addition to three 12-pounders, two Maxim guns, and actually
four 18-inch torpedo tubes. She was, in fact, a light cruiser, except
for speed and appearance, but the _Chagford_ crew were destined to
disappointment, for this is what happened. The reader will recollect
that in her engagement of June 7, 1917, Captain Campbell’s famous ship
_Pargust_ received so much damage that she had to be left in dockyard
hands while he and his crew went to sea in the _Dunraven_. Now, at
the beginning of October Admiral Sims asked the British Admiralty for
a ship to carry out this decoy work, and to be manned by the United
States Navy. The Admiralty therefore selected _Pargust_, and Admiral
Sims then assigned her to the U.S.N. forces based on Queenstown. Her
repairs, however, took rather a longer time than had been hoped; in
fact, she was not finished and commissioned again until the following
May, so it was decided to pay off _Arvonian_ on November 26, 1917,
and she was then recommissioned with a United States crew under
Commander D. C. Hanrahan, U.S.N., and changed her name to _Santee_.
By the time she left Queenstown for her maiden cruise she was a very
wonderful ship. Her 4-inch guns had been disguised by being recessed,
and by such concealments as lifebuoy lockers, hatch covers, and so on.
The 12-pounder gun aft had a tilting mounting, as also had the two
12-pounders forward at the break of the fo’c’sle on either side. Thus
they were concealed, but could be instantly brought into position.
Her four torpedo tubes were arranged so that there was one on each
beam, one to fire right ahead, and one to fire right astern. She also
boasted of a searchlight, a wireless set, and an emergency wireless
apparatus. She had two lifeboats, two skiffs, two Carley floats, and
also a motor-boat. She was thus the last word in Q-ship improvements,
and embodied all the lessons which had been learnt by bitter and tragic
experience. Two days after Christmas, 1917, she left Queenstown at dusk
on her way to Bantry Bay to train her crew, but in less than five hours
she was torpedoed. It was no disgrace, but a sheer bit of hard luck
which might have happened to any other officer, British or American.
Commander Hanrahan was one of the ablest and keenest destroyer captains
of the American Navy, and no one who had ever been aboard his ship
could fail to note his efficiency. He had been one of the early
destroyer arrivals when the United States that summer had begun to send
their destroyer divisions across the Atlantic to Queenstown, and he had
done most excellent work.
But on this night his Q-ship career came to a sudden stop, though not
before everything possible had been done to entrap the enemy. It was
one of those cloudy, moonlight, wintry nights with good visibility.
As might have been expected under such a captain there was a total
absence of confusion; all hands went to their stations, the ‘panic’
party got away in accordance with the best ‘panic’ traditions, while
on board the crews remained at their gun stations for five hours,
hoping and longing for the submarine to show herself. No such good
fortune followed, for the submarine was shy; so just before midnight
Commander Hanrahan sent a wireless message to Admiral Bayly at
Queenstown, and very shortly afterwards the U.S. destroyer _Cummings_
arrived. At 1 a.m. the tug _Paladin_ took _Santee_ in tow, escorted by
four United States destroyers and the two British sloops _Viola_ and
_Bluebell_. _Santee_ got safely into port and was sent to Devonport,
where she was eventually handed back by the U.S.N. to the British
Navy, owing to the time involved in repairs. On June 4, 1918, she
was once more recommissioned in the Royal Navy and took the name of
_Bendish_, the crew having come from the Q-ship _Starmount_. By this
date the conditions of submarine warfare had undergone a modification.
In home waters it was only the quite small Q-ships of the coaster
type, of about 500 tons, which could be expected to have any chance
of successfully engaging a submarine. This class would normally be
expected to be seen within the narrow seas, and the enemy would not
be so shy. But for such vessels as _Bendish_ and _Pargust_ the most
promising sphere was likely to be between Gibraltar and the Azores
and the north-west coast of Africa, where German so-called ‘cruiser’
submarines of the _Deutschland_ type were operating. Therefore a
special force, based on Gibraltar but operating in the Azores area or
wherever submarines were to be expected, was organized, consisting
of four Q-ships. These were the _Bendish_ (late _Santee_), Captain
Campbell’s former ship _Pargust_ but now named the _Pangloss_, the
_Underwing_, and the _Marshfort_, the whole squadron being under
the command of Lieut.-Commander Dane in _Bendish_. After being at
last ready for sea in May, 1918, _Pangloss_, commanded by Lieutenant
Jeffrey, who for his fine work in _Chagford_ had received the D.S.O.,
had then been assigned to serve under the Vice-Admiral Northern Patrols
until she was sent south.
[Illustration: Q-SHIP TRANSFORMATION
Crew painting funnel while at sea (see pp. 220-1).]
[Illustration: Q-SHIP “BARRANCA” AT SEA
The look-out man aft is disguised as one of the Mercantile crew. The
dummy wheel, dummy sky-light, and dummy deck-house are seen. The latter
concealed a 4-inch gun and two 12-pounders.
To face p. 234]
Under the new scheme just mentioned these four Q-ships were so
worked that they always arrived and sailed from Gibraltar as part
of the convoy of merchant ships, from which class they could not be
distinguished. But already long before this date Q-ships had been
employed in such distant waters. For instance, in the middle of
November, 1916, the _Barranca_ (Lieut.-Commander S. C. Douglas, R.N.)
was sent from Queenstown via Devonport, and proceeded to operate in the
neighbourhood of Madeira and the Canaries, based on Gibraltar. This
ship, known officially as Q 3 (alias _Echunga_), had been taken over
from Messrs. Elders and Fyffes, Ltd. Her registered tonnage was 4,115,
and she had a speed of 14 knots, so she was eminently fitted for this
kind of work. She had been employed as a Q-ship since June, 1916, and
was armed with a 4-inch, two 12-pounders, and two 6-pounders, and
terminated her service in the following May. Her captain had been one
of the earliest officers to be employed in decoy work, having been
second in command to Lieut.-Commander Godfrey Herbert when that officer
commanded the _Antwerp_. Soon after this date the Q-ship _Dunclutha_
left for that part of the Atlantic which is between the north-east
coast of South America and north-west coast of Africa. This ship,
together with _Ooma_, both of them being vessels of between 3,000 and
4,000 tons, had commenced their special service at the end of 1916
and been sent to work under the British Commodore off the east coast
of South America in the hope of falling in with one of the German
raiders, such as the _Moewe_. In May, 1918, both these vessels had to
be withdrawn from such service, as the shortage of tonnage had become
acute, and were required to load general cargo in a Brazilian port.
Another of these overseas Q-ships was the _Bombala_ (alias _Willow
Branch_). She was a 3,314-ton steamer and had left Gibraltar on April
18, 1918, for Sierra Leone. A week later, off the West African coast,
she sighted a submarine off the port quarter, and a few minutes later a
second one off the starboard bow. Both submarines opened their attack
with shells, this class of submarine being armed with a couple of
5·9-inch guns. After about thirty rounds the enemy had found the range,
and then began to hit the ship repeatedly, carrying away the wireless
and causing many casualties. _Bombala_ shortened the range so that
she could use her 4-inch and 14-pounder, and the action went on for
two and a half hours. By that time _Bombala_ was done for, and it was
impossible to save the ship; so the crew were ordered into the boats,
and then the ship foundered, bows first. However, the Q-ship had not
sunk without severely damaging the enemy, for when the submarines came
alongside _Bombala’s_ boats it was found that in one of the submarines
there were seven killed and four wounded.
Q-ships were kept pretty busy, too, in the Mediterranean. On March
11, 1917, when _Wonganella_ (Lieut.-Commander B. J. D. Guy, R.N.) was
on her way from Malta to England via Gibraltar, she was shelled by a
submarine, and while the ‘panic’ party were getting out the boats, a
shell wounded the officer and several of the crew in the starboard
lifeboat. Another shell went through the bulwarks of the ship, wounding
some men and bursting the steam-pipe of the winch, thus rendering
unworkable the derrick used for hoisting out the third boat, and the
port lifeboat was also damaged. Shells burst in the well deck and
holed the big boat, so in this case, as all his boats were ‘done in,’
the captain had to give up the idea of ‘abandoning’ ship. There was
nothing for it but to open fire, though it was not easy for orders to
be heard in that indescribable din when shells were bursting, steam
pouring out from the burst winch-pipe, wounded men in great pain, and
_Wonganella’s_ own boiler-steam blowing off with its annoying roar. As
soon as fire was opened, the submarine dived and then fired a torpedo,
which was avoided by _Wonganella_ going astern with her engines, the
torpedo just missing the ship’s fore-foot by 10 feet. No more was seen
of the enemy, and at dusk the armed steam yacht _Iolanda_ was met, from
whom a doctor was obtained, thus saving the lives of several of the
wounded. In this engagement, whilst the White Ensign was being hoisted,
the signal halyards were shot away, so the ensign had to be carried up
the rigging and secured thereto.
_Wonganella_ was holed on the water-line and hit elsewhere, but she
put into Gibraltar on March 13, and on the evening of June 19 of the
same year we find her out in the Atlantic west of the south-west
Irish coast on her way homeward-bound from Halifax. A submarine bore
down on her from the north, and at the long range of 8,000 yards was
soon straddling _Wonganella_. Now the Q-ship happened to have on
board thirty survivors from a steamer recently sunk, so again it was
impossible to attempt the ‘abandon ship’ deception. She therefore
used her smoke-screen—at this time ships were being supplied with
special smoke-making apparatus—and then ran down the wind at varying
speeds and on various courses, with the hope that the enemy would
chase quickly. _Wonganella_ would then turn in the smoke-cloud and
suddenly emerge and close the enemy at a more suitable range. But the
best-laid schemes of Q-ships are subject to the laws of chance, for
now there appeared another merchant ship heading straight towards this
scene, and thus unwittingly frustrated the further development of the
encounter. This ‘merchant ship’ was the Q-ship _Aubrietia_ (Q 13), who
did, in fact, receive a signal from _Wonganella_ that no assistance was
required; but by that time it was too late to withdraw. The submarine,
after shelling _Wonganella_ through the smoke, abandoned the attack and
withdrew without ever scoring a hit.
During all these months the disguised steam trawlers were continuing
their arduous work. On August 20, 1916, the _Gunner_ from Granton
engaged a submarine during the afternoon, but the German subsequently
dived. _Gunner_ then proceeded on a westerly course whilst she altered
her disguise, and then that same evening encountered this submarine
again, shelled her, but once more the enemy broke off the fight.
The disguised Granton trawler _Speedwell_ was also operating in a
manner similar to _Gunner_, and in the following March the trawler
_Commissioner_ began her decoy work. She was a 161-ton ship armed
with a 12-pounder, her method of working being as follows: Lieutenant
F. W. Charles, R.N.R., was in command of the fighting portion of
the crew, but her fishing skipper was otherwise in charge of the
ship. _Commissioner_ proceeded to join the Granton fishing fleet,
looking like any other steam trawler, and then shot her trawl and
carried on like the rest of the fleet. When a submarine should appear
_Commissioner_ would cut away her fishing gear and then attack the
enemy. Such an occasion actually occurred the very day after she first
joined the fishing fleet, but the submarine was not sunk.
A similar decoy was the Granton steam trawler _Rosskeen_, which left
the Firth of Forth to ‘fish’ about 20 miles east of the Longstone.
Three days later she was just about to shoot her trawl when a shot came
whistling over her wheelhouse, and a large submarine was then seen
8,000 yards away. After twenty minutes, during which the enemy’s shells
fell uncomfortably close, _Rosskeen_ cut away her gear and ‘abandoned’
ship. The submarine then obligingly approached on the surface towards
the rowing boat, and when the range was down to 1,200 yards _Rosskeen_,
who was armed with a 12-pounder and 6-pounder, opened fire from the
former and hit the submarine, the conning-tower being very badly
damaged by the third shot. Two more shells got home, and by this time
the enemy had had enough, and dived.
These trawlers were undoubtedly both a valuable protection to the
fishermen (who had been repeatedly attacked by the enemy) and a subtle
trap for some of the less experienced submarine captains. During May
two more trawlers, the _Strathallan_ and _Strathearn_, were similarly
commissioned, and even steam drifters such as the _Fort George_
(armed with one 6-pounder) were employed in this kind of work. On the
thirteenth of June _Strathearn_ was fishing 19 miles east of the Bell
Rock when five shots were fired at her, presumably by a submarine,
though owing to the hazy weather nothing could be seen. The enemy then
evidently sighted a destroyer and disappeared. On the following day
_Fort George_ was fishing about 35 miles east of May Island, when she
was attacked by submarine at 2,000 yards. It was ten o’clock at night,
and the drifter, after the third round, secured her fishing gear and
returned the fire. The enemy was evidently surprised, for after the
drifter had fired three shells the German broke off the engagement
and submerged, but with his fourth and fifth rounds he had hit _Fort
George_, killing two and wounding another couple.
But on the following twenty-eighth of January _Fort George_ was about
14 miles east of May Island, with the decoy trawler _W. S. Bailey_
(Lieutenant C. H. Hudson, D.S.C., R.N.R.). The two ships were listening
on their hydrophones when a submarine was distinctly heard some
distance away, and it was assumed that the enemy was steering for May
Island, so the _W. S. Bailey_ after proceeding for a quarter of an
hour in that direction listened again, and the sounds were heard more
plainly. For an hour and a half the enemy was determinedly hunted,
and just after 9 p.m. the sounds became very distinct, so the trawler
steamed full speed ahead in the submarine’s direction, dropped a depth
charge, listened, and then, as the enemy was still heard on the
hydrophone, a second charge was dropped. The trawler then went full
speed astern to check her way, and just as she was stopping there were
sighted two periscopes not 20 yards away, on the starboard quarter, and
going full speed. The trawler then dropped a third depth charge over
the spot where the periscopes had disappeared, and nothing further was
heard on the hydrophone, but a fourth charge was then let go to make
sure, and the position was buoyed, and the disguised craft remained
in the vicinity until January 30. A few days later the _W. S. Bailey_
swept with her chain-sweep over the position, and on each occasion the
sweep brought up in the place that had been buoyed, and a quantity of
oil was seen. Local fishermen accustomed to working their gear along
this bottom reported that the obstruction was quite new. In short, the
_W. S. Bailey_ had succeeded in destroying UB 63, a submarine about 180
feet long and well armed with a 4·1-inch gun and torpedoes. For this
useful service Lieutenant Hudson received a bar to his D.S.C., while
Skipper J. H. Lawrence, R.N.R., was awarded the D.S.C.
Thus, in all waters and in all manner of ships wearing every kind of
disguise, the shy submarine was being tempted and sought out, though
every month decoy work was becoming more and more difficult: for though
you might fool the whole German submarine service in the early stages
of Q-ships, it was impossible that you could keep on bluffing all of
them every time. The most that could be expected was that as a reward
for your constant vigilance and perfect organization you might one day
catch him off his guard through his foolishness or lack of experience
or incautiousness. But every indecisive action made it worse for the
Q-ships, for that vessel was a mark for future attack and the enemy’s
intelligence department was thereby enriched, and outgoing submarines
could be warned against such a trawler or such a tramp whose guns had a
dead sector on such a bearing. Thus an inefficient Q-ship captain would
be a danger not merely to himself and his men, but to the rest of the
force. Nothing succeeds like success, and there was nothing so useful
as to make a clean job of the submarine-sinking, so that he could never
get back home and tell the news. Surprise, whether in real life or
fiction, is a factor that begins to lose its power in proportion to its
frequency of use. It was so in the Q-ships, and that is why, after a
certain point had been reached, this novel method became so difficult
and so barren in results.