Thereupon Cebes asks: "Well, and what do you think of this now?"

"I think, by Zeus," says Socrates, "that I am far removed from knowing

the cause of any of these things. I do not even admit that by adding one

to one I obtain two, by such an addition. For I wonder how it is that

each was supposed to be one when by itself, while now, that they have

been added to one another, they have become two. Neither can I convince

myself that if one thing divides a thing in two, that this division is

the cause of it becoming two. For this would be the opposite way of

making two. But when I heard somebody reading something from a book,

written by Anaxagoras as he said, to the effect that it is reason which

had arranged everything and was the cause of everything, I rejoiced at

this cause.... Now if one were to search for the cause of all things, of

their origin, existence and passing, he should only find out what is the

best way to maintain their existence.... Hence it is not meet that man

should care for anything else in regard to himself as well as to all

other things, but for that which is best and most excellent, and then he

would also know the worst about things, for the understanding of both

is the same. Considering this, I was glad to have found a teacher who

knows about the cause of all things, who suited me, I mean Anaxagoras,

and who would now tell me, first whether the earth is round or flat, and

after telling me that, would also explain to me the necessity for it and

the cause, by pointing to the fact that it was better that it should be

so. And when he claimed that the earth was the center of things, I hoped

he would explain why it was better that it should be the center, and

when he had explained that, I was resolved that I would not ask for any

other cause. In the same way I was going to inquire after the cause of

the sun, the moon, and the other stars, etc.... For I did not believe

that after claiming all this to have been arranged by reason, he would

be dragging in any other cause than that of being best to have it just

so. And this wonderful hope I had to abandon, my friends, when I

continued to read and saw that the man accomplished nothing by reason

and adduces no other reasons relating to the arrangement of things, but

quotes air, and water, and ether, and many other astonishing things.

"And it seemed that it was as if some one said Socrates accomplishes all

things by reason, and then, when he began to enumerate the cause of

everything I do, were to say first that I am sitting here because my

body consists of bones and sinews, and that the bones are hard and are

differentiated by joints, and the sinews so constructed that they can be

extended and shortened, etc. And further, if he tried to name the causes

of our discussion, he would refer to other similar things, such as

sound, and air and hearing, and a thousand and one other things, quite

neglecting the true cause, viz., that it suited the Athenians better to

condemn me, and that it suited me for this reason to stay here and

seemed more just to me to bear patiently the punishment which they have

ordered. For I believe that my bones and sinews would have gone long ago

to the dogs or been carried to the Boeotians, had I not considered it

more just and beautiful to atone to the state than to flee.

"It is very illogical, then, to name such causes. But if any one were to

say that I should not be able to do what I please without these things

(sinews and bones, and whatever else I may have), he would be right. But

it would be a very thoughtless contention to say that these things are

the cause of my actions, instead of my free choice to do the best. That

would show an inability to distinguish the fact that in all things the

cause is one thing, and another thing that without which the cause could

not be cause. And it seems to me that it is precisely this which some

call by a wrong name in considering it as the cause. For this reason

some put a whirlwind from heaven round the earth and others rest it on

air as they would a wide trough on a footstool."

So far Socrates, whose words I ask you to read repeatedly and carefully,

though they may look a little old-fashioned. This quotation is somewhat

lengthy, but I thought best not to cut it too short and to present it in

its main outlines.

This quotation says on the whole the same thing which I have said in my

proceeding letters. According to Socrates, all our thoughts and actions

have a wider and more general purpose, which he calls the "good," so

that we even do evil for the sake of good. A crime always aims at some

particular good. Evil is misunderstood good. Applied to natural science,

this means that it misunderstands the interrelation of all its fine

discoveries. And this charge is true even to-day. Although the natural

interrelations are more and more recognized from day to day, still the

understanding of the absolute inter-connection continues to be

overlooked, especially that of the intellect with material things, or of

the ideal with the real. Natural science teaches after the manner of the

gospel of John: Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob. But it forgets

to teach that all these genitors were not genitors in the last analysis,

but begotten by old Jehovah himself. The uncultivated condition of

Grecian natural sciences may have been ground enough for Socrates to

think little of it. We, on the other hand, have to-day good reasons for

thinking highly of natural science, and for this very reason I take

pains to illustrate by its prominent example in what respect the neglect

of the universal world thought results in a narrow conception of the

world.

We may well rejoice more lastingly than Socrates when natural science

teaches us how it happens that everything has its origin, life, and end,

because the knowledge of natural science has been far more enriched by

modern experiences than it was at the time of Anaxagoras. Nevertheless

you must not stop learning furthermore from logic that all growing,

coming into existence, living, and passing away is but a change of form.

The causes of natural science are indeed not causes, but effects of the

universe. They are reasonable effects of reason in so far as the latter

is not an isolated part, but interconnected with the universe. To

repeat: Our intellect is not ours, it does not belong to man, but it

together with man belongs to the universe. Reason and the world, the

true, the good, and the beautiful, together with Godhood which you

shall not idolize but understand in the spirit and in the world, in

truth and in reality, are all one thing, one being, and everywhere

eternal and the _same_.

Socrates shows that he has as yet only a narrow anthropomorphic, not a

cosmic conception of the "best and good" and of reason. He was dominated

by the prejudice which still holds sway over the uncultured believers in

God, that reason is older than all the rest of the world, that it is the

ruling and antecedent creator. Our conception of logic, on the other

hand, teaches that the spirit which we have in our brain is but the

emanation of the world spirit. And this latter must not be conceived as

a nebulous world monster, not as an enormous spirit, but as the actual

universe, which in spite of all change and all variation is eternally

one, true, good, reasonable, real, and supreme.

The positive outcome of philosophy · 第 57 / 91 题