THIRTEENTH LETTER

In his "Three Books On The Soul," Aristotle discussed at length the

question whether the human soul has five senses or one. The commentator,

J. H. von Kirchmann, the publisher of the "Philosophical Library,"

remarks in his footnote 172 that man has six senses. He divides feeling

into pure and active feeling. According to this, the phrase of the five

senses belongs to the old iron the same as that of the four elements.

Now neither you, nor I, nor any reader should worry about the question

whether all sensation may be summed up in the one sense of feeling,

whether there are five senses according to Aristotle, or six according

to Kirchmann, or whether there is even a seventh sense for the

transcendental, the organ of which, as some optimists hope, will

gradually be developed with the growing perfection of man. We are

concerned in this matter only so far as it is connected with the

cardinal question, whether the world is only one thing or a mere

collection of an infinite number of disconnected things; whether the

so-called things are independent subjects and objects, or whether they

are only predicates of the one world subject.

Looking through the window I see the river, the street, the bridge,

houses, and trees. Everything is a thing in itself and yet is connected

inseparably with all others. The qualities of the world are regarded by

the intellect as subjects; but the intelligent subject should also know

that its actions, its distinguishing and understanding, are formalities,

a formal dismemberment of the absolute, which in spite of all division

always remains the undivided whole.

In order to master this method of thought, you must understand above all

that the things are only so-called things, but are in reality qualities

of the universe, in other words, relative things or predicates of the

absolute. You will then understand, that our thought has a right to make

one thing as well as six of a chair, its back, its seat, and its four

legs. You will recognize that the five senses of Aristotle are not an

eternal truth, but a classification, which is eternally variable.

Distinguishing means classifying.

I know very well that I am making a bold statement here, and that it is

not easy to justify it. For this reason you must not expect that I can

make my meaning clear in a few sentences. It is not only the general

prejudice which prevents this by making a most mysterious and miraculous

thing of the intellectual function, but also the fact that this thing is

still very obscure, although it has become clearer and clearer in the

course of time.

The freethinking pastor Hironymi writes on this point: "The most

prominent naturalists of the present, such as Dubois-Reymond, who are at

the same time thinkers, admit that they do not know what feeling, life,

consciousness, are, and how they arise. And this ignorance is far more

valuable for truth and religion than the alleged knowledge. Let us,

therefore, continue in the devotion with which we have hitherto admired

the universe without understanding it. The higher existence, the

consciousness, has not been explained, it has remained a miracle, the

only lasting, absolute, miracle."

Thus speaks the preacher who is a know-nothing by nature and makes a

business of admiring and wondering, while we are interested in

understanding and knowing. We wish to fathom the mystery, and hence I

may write still more letters on logic and you may study some more.

I shall try to demonstrate by a trivial example, how it is that

understanding or distinguishing is based on classification.

Take it that you awake at early dawn and notice in a corner of your bed

room something uncouth and moving which you cannot clearly distinguish.

To know that a phenomenon appears is not enough because the term

phenomenon applies to everything, natural and unnatural things, good and

evil spirits. Even if you are sufficiently enlightened to know that the

thing in question must be something natural, still this explains very

little, for the term "nature" again means everything. But you understand

or recognize more when you ascertain that the uncouth thing is dead or

alive, wall paper or garment, man or animal. You will notice that in

this intellectual enlightenment it is simply a matter of classification,

of the head under which the mystery should be classed. To classify the

phenomena of truth and life, means to understand, to use the intellect,

to enlighten the brain.

But we must well consider how far we shall have to go in our

classification in order to find the place in the system which will fully

clarify and determine understanding. Suppose that in the above mentioned

case you have ascertained that the motion is due to a cat, then the

inquiring faculty of understanding has not yet reached the end of its

tether. The next question is then, whether it is your cat or that of

your neighbor, whether it is black, white, or grey, young or old. And

when you finally recognize that it is your tomcat Peter, you must

remember that the subject which understands as well as the object to be

recognized, being parts of the absolute, are absolutely and infinitely

divisible parts, which are never fully understood and never fully

exhausted.

Please remember that in speaking of something uncouth, we are not so

much concerned in Peter or Tabby, but in the intellect which we desire

to understand so that we may make a correct use of it. And I refer to it

as uncouth merely because its understanding is beset with so many

difficulties. When I compared it in the preceding letter with a

photographic apparatus which should furnish us with pictures, and in

likening it now to an instrument designed to distinguish things by

classification, I warn you not to be confused thereby. Classification is

most essential as a means of producing intellectual pictures. In this

connection I emphasize once more that the faculty of understanding, the

same as other things, is not independent by itself, but can accomplish

something only in the universal interconnection. The understanding that

the phenomenon quoted above belongs to the category of tomcats, and more

especially into the column labeled Peter, would not be any

understanding at all, if you had not become previously acquainted with

the mouse-devouring race and individual in question. Only in connection

with your previous experience is the understanding that this tomcat and

the uncouth motion are one and the same thing, or belong to the same

category, a true understanding.

Ludwig Feuerbach says: A talented writer is recognized by the fact that

he assumes talent on the part of the reader also and does not chew up

his subject into minute parts like a petty schoolmaster. On the other

hand, it seems to me that it is possible to assume too much, and I

pursued a schoolmasterly course in this case, because the subject is new

to you and still leaves plenty of room for reflection.

I wanted to show by a commonplace example what I mean by insight and

understanding and how by means of it the unknown and uncouth becomes

known and familiar. True, the understanding in this case was illumined

by previous experience, while you are after new knowledge. You want to

know how enlightenment arises in order to acquire new insight. Now, all

novelty has the dialectic quality of being at the same time something

antiquated. New understanding can be acquired only by the help of old

understanding. In other words, old and new understanding, which I define

here as the faculty of classification, have their existence only in the

total interdependence of the universal existence.

You must discard the old prejudice that knowledge can be collected like

cents. Although this is well enough, it does not suffice for the purpose

of logical thinking. One science belongs to another, and all of them

together belong to one class with the entire universe. It will be

apparent to you, then, that at the beginning of your young days your

knowledge has not sprouted all at once, but has come out of the unknown.

And what is true of you, is true of the whole human race. In its cradle

it was without intellect. It had, indeed, the germ. But do not beasts,

worms, and sensitive plants have that also? In short, the light of

perception and understanding is nothing new in the radical sense of the

word, but connected with the old and with the world in general, and of

the same kind. All our knowledge must be connected and combined into one

understanding, one system, one realm, and this is the realm of reality,

of truth, of life.

Systematic classification is the task of logic. The first requirement

for this purpose is the awakened consciousness of the indivisibility of

the universe, of its universal unity. This consciousness is, in other

words, at the same time the recognition of the merely formal

significance of all scientific classification.

The unity of the universe is true, and is the sole and innate truth.

That this sole world truth is full of differences, is just as absolutely

different as absolutely the same, does no more contradict a reasonable

unity and equality than there is any contradiction in the fact that the

various owls have different faces and still the same owl face.

Aristotle divided the sense into five parts, anthropologists the race of

man into five races, natural philosophers the space into three

dimensions. It is now a question of showing to you that such a division,

however true and just, is nevertheless far from being truth and justice,

but is merely classification. The fundamental requirement of logic is to

designate scientific classifications as that which they are, viz.,

mental operations. It is the business of the intellect to make

classifications. That is its characteristic quality and does not

contradict the indivisible truth in the least.

Old wiseacres teach that a reasonable man must not contradict himself,

and this is a wise, though very narrow, lesson. Hegel maintains that

everything in the world is reasonable, hence the contradictions are

also. Under this conservative exterior there is hidden a very

revolutionary perception of which the "destructive" minds take advantage

in order to flatly contradict the wiseacres and their stable, dead,

disordered order which cannot stand any contradiction.

Reason dissolves all contradictions and opposition into harmony by

logical classification. "Everything in its own time and place." If it

does not wish to be called unreason, reason must rise to the

understanding that its opposite is only a formal antagonism. It must

know that God and the world, body and soul, life and death, motion and

rest, and whatever else the dualists may distinguish, are two and yet

one. Then it becomes clear that the conservatives are the real

revolutionaries, because by their senseless adherence to the "good old

order" they drive the proletariat to desperation, until it upsets that

order. On the other hand, the maligned revolutionaries are conservative,

because they subordinate themselves to the world's evolutionary process

which was, is, and will be eternal.

The red thread winding through all these letters deals with the

following points: The instrument of thought is a thing like all other

common things, a part or attribute of the universe. It belongs

particularly to the general category of being and is an apparatus which

produces a detailed picture of human experience by categorical

classification or distinction. In order to use this apparatus

correctly, one must fully grasp the fact that the world unit is

multiform and that all multiformity is a unit.

It is the solution of the riddle of the ancient Eleatic philosophy: How

can the one be contained in the many, and the many in one?

The positive outcome of philosophy · 第 45 / 91 题